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ABSTRACT

DECLINE OF THE DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN AND
THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1921-1922

FEBRUARY 1993

RAYMOND

C.

GAMBLE, B.S., UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Mary

B.

Wickwire

This dissertation examines Britain's decision to cede
naval parity to the United States at the Washington Naval

Conference of 1921-1922.

The study recognizes that

scholarly opinion emphasizes the role of economic weakness
in Britain's decision to accept capital ship limitation.

The most useful sources in this study are the Cabinet and

Admiralty records at the Public Record Office, London.
The accounts of the various subcommittees of the Committee
of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet Finance Committee are

essential.

Three sets of records are particularly helpful

for the Conference itself: the papers of the British

Empire Delegation, the State Department's Conference on
the Limitation of Armament

,

and Butler and Bury's

Documents on British Foreign Policy

.

The papers of the

members of the British government provide limited
assistance.

At the turn of the century, the Royal Navy,

imbued with the Alfred Thayer Mahan's doctrines of sea
power, enjoyed the nation's confidence.
vi

The Great War

damaged the reputations of both the battleship and its
most ardent supporters.

At the Paris Peace Conference,

the United States challenged the supremacy of British sea

power.

In the face of the continuing American naval

construction, the British policy of supremacy with economy

became untenable*

The Jutland and submarine controversies

of 1920 exacerbated the government's loss of faith in the

battleship and led to an investigation into the future
weapons of the Navy.

The Imperial Conference of 1921

precluded the possibility of Dominion support for

a naval

building program or a decision to renew the Anglo- Japanese

Alliance in the face of American opposition.

The British

Empire Delegation at the Washington Conference sought the

maximum relief from naval expenditure consonant with
traditional measures of national security.

In the face of

American proposals for Anglo-American equality and

a ten-

year holiday in naval construction, Britain salvaged

superiority in cruisers and a two new battleships.

These

results lead to the conclusion that the Cabinet no longer

believed that the battleship remained the ultimate arbiter
of naval disputes.

The Cabinet therefore choose to

disregard the advice of the Admiralty and accept the naval
limitation agreement.

vii
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INTRODUCTION
This work developed from a question posed by a cadet at
the Unites States Military Academy.

After listening for

most of a semester to an interpretation of modern history

colored by frequent and respectful references to the power
of the Royal Navy, he wanted to know why the British had

agreed to the limitations on their naval strength imposed by
the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922.

The resulting

treaties struck the cadet as a repudiation of longstanding

British national policy; the question struck his teacher as
worthy of investigation.

Since the Restoration, a long line

of British statesmen pursued the security and prosperity of

the British Empire through adherence to three constant

principles:

a

balance of power in Europe, the defense of

imperial possessions, and, above all, the command of the
seas.

The Royal Navy served as the twine which bound the

Empire together.

Why, in 1921, had London agreed to a

conference on naval disarmament?
The answer, in short, reflected the changes wrought by
the First World War.

When George Nathaniel Curzon, K.G.,

P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., F.R.S., Baron Curzon of Kedleston,

Baron Ravensdale, Viscount Scarsdale, and 1st Earl of
Kedleston, assumed duties as Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs in January, 1919, the traditional formula for

security seemed inadequate.
a

The First World War had imposed

massive strain on the Treasury and had given rise to new

challengers for naval supremacy, Japan and the United States
of America.

The war had also complicated the formulation of

British national policy; the official British mind, once
comfortably insulated in a small office in Whitehall,
increasingly felt the pressure of public opinion and the
Dominions.

The tension between retaining command of the

seas, establishing satisfactory foreign relations, and

relieving the current economic burden caused division within
the Lloyd George ministry.

British participation in the

Washington Naval Conference reflected

a

resolution of that

tension
I

suggest that a specific pattern of events informed

the British decision to accept President Harding's

invitation to Washington.

At the turn of the twentieth

century, the Royal Navy, imbued with the doctrine of sea

power espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan, enjoyed the nation's
confidence.

The First World War damaged the reputations of

both the battleship and its most ardent supporters.

At the

Paris Peace Conference, the United States challenged the

supremacy of British sea power.

In the face of the

continuing American naval construction, the British policy
of supremacy with economy became untenable.

The Jutland and

submarine controversies of 1920 exacerbated the government's
lack of confidence in the capital ship and led to an

investigation, independent of the Admiralty, into the future
role of the capital ship in the Navy.

The Imperial

Conference of 1921 precluded the possibility of Dominion
support for a naval building program or a decision to
renew
the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in the face of American

opposition.

Thus, the British Empire Delegation (B.E.D.) at

the Washington Conference sought the maximum relief from

naval expenditure consonant with traditional measures of

national security.

In the face of sweeping American

proposals for Anglo-American equality and

a

ten-year holiday

in naval construction, Balfour salvaged superiority in

cruisers and a small program of new battleship construction.
The most useful sources in this study are the Cabinet
and Admiralty records.

The Admiralty records on

issues

m.ost

contain the Board's position and reasoning in considerable
detail, largely in the form of Board minutes and memoranda
to the Cabinet.

The Cabinet papers, which far too often

register conclusions with only scant summaries of the

preceding discussions, are generally less effective at

illuminating the government's decision-m.aking processes.
The accounts of the various subcommittees of the Committee
of Imperial Defence (the Cabinet's strategic planning forum)

and the Cabinet Finance Committee constitute fortunate

exceptions to the general trend.

The Parliamentary Debates

(commonly known as Hansard) supported C.L. Mowat's

generalization: "low-grade ore for the historian."^

^C.L. Mowat,
1971), 54.

Three

Great Britain Since 1914 (Ithaca, NY,

4

sets of records were particularly helpful for the Conference
itself: the papers of the British Empire Delegation (CAB 30

series), which unfortunately were available only in

microfilm; the State Department's Conference on the

Limitation of A rmament

,

which contained the transcripts of

the plenary and committee sessions in a more accessible

format than the Cabinet records; and Butler and Bury's

Documents on British Foreign Policy

,

which published most of

the correspondence between the Cabinet and the B.E.D. in

Washington.
Of the m.ajor actors within the British government.

Admiral David Beatty wrote most extensively on the

development of British sea power between 1919 and 1922.

The

private papers of Arthur Balfour proved marginally helpful.
Eric and Auckland Geddes left no writings at all.

have

I

not had the opportunity to examine the papers of Austen

Chamberlain or those of David Lloyd George, who, to

a great

degree, relied on oral arguments rather than detailed

position papers.

Winston Churchill's contributions are well

established through the voluminous biographies of Randolph
Churchill and Martin Gilbert.

The published papers of

Admirals Fisher and Jellicoe are extremely good on limited
pointS/ while most of the political memoirs (those of

Colonel House excepted) provide little more than anecdotes.
The work of four or five historians has been

particularly useful.

Max Beloff provides the best overview

5

to the concerns of the Cabinet.
a

Stephen Roskill contributes

reliable introduction to the workings of the Admiralty

during the inter-war period.

The Sprouts, who have written

the standard work on the arms control negotiations from

1918-1922, emphasize the American perspective.

Roger

Dingman, who seems unduly concerned with parochial

interests, still renders the most detailed coverage of the
naval arms limitation process in Britain.

In my opinion,

however, none of these authors places sufficient weight on
the Cabinet's loss of confidence in the capital ship in

their explanation of the British decision to accept naval
arms limitation.

CHAPTER

1

BRITAIN'S MATERIAL POSITION
The story of Britain's participation in the Washington
Naval Conference of 1921-1922 is closely bound up with the

rise and fall of the pound sterling.

Two leading naval

theorists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Paul Kennedy, have taken

diametrically opposed views on the value of the Royal Navy
as a creator of wealth in the twentieth century.

Most

historians of the naval conference have attributed Britain's
willingness to bargain away her long-standing naval

superiority to economic difficulties.

But considerations

other than financial also figure in some historical

assessments.

One school of thought has focused on the role

of Canada in the transformation of the Angl o- Japanese

Alliance, completed at Washington.

Another group of authors

has emphasized the desire of British leaders to promote

Anglo-American cooperation.

Recent work on the conference,

while acknowledging the role of finance, has moved away from

simple economic determinism and underscored developments in

British domestic politics.

Modern naval theory began with Alfred Thayer Mahan at
the end of the nineteenth century.

Earlier naval

historians, influenced by Edward Creasy 's concern with

"decisive battles" and Thomas Carlyle's emphasis on heroes,
focused on the finer points of tactics and the exploits of

charismatic captains without examining the larger framework

7

within which fleet engagements took place.

Mahan, a career

naval officer, surveyed the rise and fall of nations
rather

than the exchange of broadsides.

He produced his seminal

^ork The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 in
1890.^

As a publicist as well as an historian, he sought to

influence naval development within Great Britain and his
native America.

Mahan discussed the factors that influenced

maritime strength and then examined the course of modern
European history to demonstrate the value of sea power.
Sea power, according to Mahan, involved control of the
sea, particularly the world's shipping lanes.

He saw sea-

borne commerce as an irreplaceable source of wealth.

He

recognized that the development of railroads and motorways
had reduced the relative superiority of water transport, but
he asserted that water remained "the great medium of

transportation."

Monopoly of the shipping lanes therefore

enabled the holder to profit through sea-borne commerce and
to deny the same benefits to an opponent.

Mahan argued:

major works included The Influence of Sea
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812
(1892), and The Life of Nelson; The Embodiment of the Sea
Power of Great Britain (1897).
4iis other

^Alfred Thayer Mahan, as recorded in Margaret Sprout,
"Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power" in Edward Earle, ed. The
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli
to Hitler (Princeton, 1971), 424.

^Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton,
1958), 13-14, notes the same functions and adds the shelling
of shore installations, the transportation of troops between
theaters, and the denial of those options to the enemy.

8

is not the taking of individual ships or
convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down
the money power of a nation; it is the possession
of that overbearing power on the sea that drives
It

the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear
only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the
great common, closes the highways by which
commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores.^

Mahan clearly appreciated the economic component of war,
identifying the profit of commerce, "the sinews of war," as
the ultimate object of naval warfare. His analysis reflected

traditional British strategic thought.

Henry Dundas,

Secretary at War under Pitt the Younger, had adopted
similar attitude.

a

Defending British strategy since the

onset of war with Revolutionary France to the House of

Commons in March 1801, Dundas stated:
we ought as early as we can at the beginning of a
war to cut off the commercial resources of our
enemies as by doing so we infallibly weaken or
destroy their naval resources.

Although he never precisely defined sea power, Mahan
advanced the possession and concentration of a superior
fleet as the most effective strategy for obtaining command
of the sea.

Mahan clearly stood for the concentration of ships into
a powerful

fleet.

In order to achieve control of the sea,

he felt a nation should focus its sea power on the

'Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon
History 1660-1783 (Boston, 1894), 138.

^enry Dundas, as recorded in Herbert Richmond,
Statesman and Sea Power (Oxford, 1946), 338.

9

destruction of the opposing fleet, guerre d'escadres (fleet
combat)

.

He wrote:

If naval warfare is a war of posts, then the
action of fleets must be subordinate to the attack
and defence of the posts; if its object is to
break up the enemy's power on the sea, cutting off
his communications with the rest of his
possessions, drying up the sources of his wealth
in his commerce, and making possible a closure of
his ports, then the object of attack must be his

organized military forces afloat; in short, his
navy
The success of such an attack depended upon the strength of

broadsides, "the power of offensive action," rather than
speed.

Mahan insisted that "the maximum power of the

fleet.. and not the maximum power of

a

single ship, is the

true object of battleship construction" and utterly
Q

denounced any division of the battle-fleet.

He extolled

the value of numerical superiority, echoing Nelson's dictum
that "numbers only can annihilate."

Slahan,

Sea Power

.

g

288.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, as recorded by Sprout, "Mahan:
Evangelist of Sea Power" in Earle, Military Thought from
Sprout suggests that Mahan'
Machiavelli to Hitler 433.
emphasis on concentration of the fleet reflected his reading
Baron de Jomimi,
of Swiss military theorist Antoine-Henri
who advocated concentration of force as an eternal principle
^

,

,

of war.

^Alfred Thayer Mahan, as recorded in Philip Crowl
"Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" in Peter Paret,
ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machia velli to the
Nuclear Age (Princeton, 1986), 458.
^Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon
the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812 (Boston, 1895),
Vol II, 186.

10

Mahan considered commerce raiding as
activity to guerre

d'

escadres

a

supplementary

Commercial vessels, without

.

naval protection, stood little chance for survival in times
of war and thus represented a lucrative target for a rival

fleet.

Other theorists, particularly the contemporary

French Jeune ficole.

advocated guerre de course (commerce

raiding) as the primary focus of naval warfare.

Hyacinthe Aube

,

Admiral

leader of the influential French school of

naval thought, shared Mahan'

s

appreciation for the value of

the sinews of war and asserted that "everything which gets
at the source of these riches becomes not only legitimate

but obligatory

"^'^
.

distress caused to

Mahan admitted that "the harassment and
a

country by serious interference with

its commerce will be conceded by all."

As a war-fighting

strategy, however, he portrayed commerce raiding as "a most

dangerous delusion.

"^^

He reasoned that a nation which

dispersed its warships against the opposing merchant marine

would see her naval strength destroyed piecemeal by
successive encounters with the enemy fleet.

Mahan thus

12
referred to raiding as "a secondary operation" of war."

^Admiral Aube, as recorded in Arthur Marder, The
Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval
Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era. 1880-1905 (New York,
1940), 87.
"Alfred
as recorded by Crowl
Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" in Paret, From
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age 459.
-^Alfred Thayer Mahan,

,

,

%ahan, French Empire

,

Vol II, 197.

He

11

suggested that the absolute priority in naval warfare should
be the destruction of the opposing fleet, after
which the

hapless merchant marine would face

a

Hobson's choice of

remaining uselessly in port or facing inevitable capture.
Naval strategy, according to Mahan, remained

unchanging.

He defined strategy as follows: "Naval strategy

has for its end to found, support and increase, as well in

peace as in war, the sea power of

a

country."

He made

a

clear distinction between strategy and tactics, which

concerned particular battles and on which he acknowledged
the impact of technology.

He noted that "from time to time,

the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly

torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far
remain, as though laid upon a rock."

The possessor of a

superior fleet assumed the offensive and sought an
engagement, while a nation faced with superior sea power

maintained its fleet in an impregnable port, as the
existence of such

a

"fleet in being" compelled the enemy to

sustain a burdensome blockade.*^

The turbine engine replaced

the wind as the motive power of warships, but the workings
of sea power remained constant for Mahan.

Maritime commerce

still provided unmatched economic benefits, and the

concentration of battleships into a powerful fleet

^^ahan. Sea Power

,

88-89.

"Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power" in Earle,
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler 433.
**Sprout,

,

12

constituted the most effective means of competing for
control of the sea.

Mahan also addressed the crucial role of the national
government which affected sea power through the resourcing
and management of the navy.

He argued that the sea power of

any given nation reflected her endowment with certain

resources

:

"geographical position; physical conformation,

including, as connected therewith, natural productions and
climate; extent of territory; number of population;

character of the people; and character of the government,

including therein the national institutions."*^

determined the quality of

a

Geography

country's ports, requirements

for defense upon land (which reduced the resources available
for use at sea), and ease of access to the shipping lanes.

A merchant marine served as a source of revenue and a

reservoir of ships and trained sailors for the navy.

The

natural resources which informed sea power varied according
to the era;

oak trees (2,500 of which sufficed to build

Nelson's Victory) had given place to coal, which would in
turn yield to oil.

maintenance of

a

While he advocated unequivocally the

superior fleet as the timeless strategy for

obtaining command of the sea, he complained that democratic
regimes "are not generally favorable to military

expenditure, however necessary" and that the British had

'-Mahan,

Sea Power

.

28-29.

neglected their fleet in the late nineteenth century.

He

sought to awaken the Anglo-American publics to the value of

investing in sea power, particularly the battleship.

His

writings offered support to those who argued for more men,
more ships, bigger ships, faster ships--at ever-increasing
costs

Posterity credits Mahan with raising important
questions to which the march of time has rendered his
answers largely irrelevant.

One analyst, after citing "the

vastly increased strength of land power vis-a-vis sea power
in Europe,

and certain technological developments which made

sea bl ockade
been,

"

a

1

ess deadl y weapon than it had previousl

questioned whether "Mahan grasped the significance of

these wor 1 d-wide changes
of

.

"^^

Another condemned his negl ect

"power-projection from the seas" and "the interdependence

of armies and navies in wartime."*

The validity of these criticisms appears increasingly

questionable as one moves chronologically backward from the
Second World War.

A modern strategist noted that Mahan's

"architecture of naval power

... expl

ained clearly why the

handful of big battleships would actually make all the

^

Mahan

,

Sea Power

,

67

"Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power" in Earle,
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler 422.
^^Sprout,

,

"Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" in
Paret, From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age 461.
^^^Crowl

,

,

14

difference" until the advent of the submarine.''

A

contemporary naval historian explained the success of
the

primitive German submarines in the Great War largely in
terms of the British Admiralty's unwillingness to adopt
the

practice of convoy rather than any inherent superiority of
the submarine over the anti-submarine weapons of the time.^^

From

a

naval perspective, Mahan's discussion of sea power

remained valid in the first third of the twentieth century.

Although Mahan's ideas held sway before World War

I,

subsequent scholars who studied the relationship of sea
power to the economy differed.

One such theorist, the naval

historian Paul Kennedy, offered an alternative
interpretation of the relationship between economic and

military power.

To be sure, both theorists recognize the

mutual influence of economic and military strength.
Kennedy, however, rejected Mahan's proposition that sea

power directly produces wealth.

In his most recent work.

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and

Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000

,

he suggested that since

the Industrial Revolution, economic strength generates

military might with far more certainty than the reverse, in
effect turning Mahan on his head.

'^Edward Luttwak, On the Meaning of Victory;
Strategy (New York, 1986), 100.

Essays on

van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign: W orld War
Great Struggle at Sea (New York, 1988), 36-42.
^^Dan

II 's

15

The ability of the Great Powers to supply their armed

forces with the "sinews of war" rested upon their economic

capacities.

Kennedy wrote:

Once their productive capacity was enhanced,
countries would normally find it easier to sustain
the burdens of paying for large-scale armaments in
peacetime and of maintaining and supplying large
fleets in wartime.

Kennedy then went beyond the truism that military strength
requires an adequate economic base.

First, he noted that

Great Powers experience economic growth at varying rates.
Second, while admitting that "economic prosperity does not

always and immediately translate into military
effectiveness,'' he asserted that changes in the economic

capacity of the Great Powers have led to all of the shifts
in their relative military power.

The outcomes of the

Great Power wars have in turn confirmed these shifts in
22
relative economic position.

From the general position that wealth produces military
strength more effectively than the reverse, Kennedy went on
to challenge Mahan's interpretation of the wealth-producing

nature of sea power at the turn of the twentieth century.

Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers;
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New
York, 1987), 439, xvi
^*Paul

537, questions whether the
changing status of the Great Powers contributed to the
outbreak of war. Geoffrey Blaney, in The Causes of War (New

Kennedy, Great Powers

,

York, 1973), suggests that constantly changing economic and
military strengths would increase the potential for
disagreement as to relative strengths and hence conflict.

16

From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the sea
provided the most efficient mode of transportation. From
about 1850, however, the major advances associated with

industrialization--steam, the factory system, railways, and
later el ectrici ty--subsequently reduced the economic

advantage associated with water-borne transportation.

Kennedy highlighted commentary by navalist Gerald Graham:
It is an interesting commentary on human affairs
that Mahan's exposition of the influence of sea
power on the course of European and American
expansion should have occurred at the very time
when new instruments of the Industrial Revolution
were beginning to erode principles and theories

upon which his doctrines were based.
He thus suggested that in accordance with the ideas of

British geo-pol i tician Sir Halford MacKinder, sea power had
waned relative to land power by the turn of the century.

Kennedy himself noted that "what industrialization did was
to take away some of the advantages hitherto enjoyed by

smaller, peripheral, naval -cum-commercial states and to give

them to the great land-based states."

Sea power, according

to Kennedy, had failed to keep pace with land power as a
24
source of either economic or military strength.

In fact, he argued,

it became a liability.

The

international situation which Kennedy depicted featured

^^Gerald Graham, as recorded in Paul Kennedy, The Rise
and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Atlantic Highlands, NJ
1983), 177.

'^Kennedy, Great Powers

,

157.

t

.

•

17

Great Powers that experienced economic change at
different
rates, leading to shifts in relative strength.
Rising
nations, particularly the leading Great Power, tended
to

assume "overseas obligations (dependence upon foreign

markets and raw materials, military alliances, perhaps bases
and colonies)" vacated by powers in decline.
if a state overextends itself st rategical

Kennedy noted:
1

y

.

.

.

i

runs the risk that the potential benefits from
external expansion may be outweighed by the great
expense of it all--a dilemma which becomes acute
if the nation involved has entered a period of
relative economic decl ine
Sea power thus led Great Britain at the turn of the

twentieth century toward imperial overstretch--to incur in
relation to unprofitable regions costs which would later

aggravate the massive deficits imposed by war.

The British

Empire in the late nineteenth century, in the face of
growing French and German competition, increasingly became
formal

(i.e., London established direct political control,

rather than working through local elites) and more expensive
to administer.

British historian Correlli Barnett

denigrated the net value of the Empire to Britain during the
Great War, claiming "the whole British position in the

Middle East and Southern Asia was in fact

a classic,

gigantic, example of strategic over-extension."

^^Kennedy

,

Great Powers

,

xvi

,

and

Kennedy

xviii

^^Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New
York, 1972), 75-80.

18

himself cited the work of Barnett on the British Empire
in
support of his argument for the concept of imperial
overstretch.

Kennedy's analysis, however, seems ill-suited to

Britain during the reign of George

V.

First, his

application of imperial overstretch to the British Empire
between the World Wars appears unsound.

One historian noted

that after 1920, "the empire was very far from being an

anachronism; that on the contrary it was only just beginning
to pay the dividends its old champions had always expected

from it."ii23

Second, his correlation between the economic

strength of

a

nation and its military might remains

generalization, rather than
circumstance.

a

a

description of British

During the Great War, for example, Britain,

despite its massive wealth, experienced enormous difficulty
translating its riches into the specific forms of production
10

needed for mass warfare on land.

The British shipbuilding

industry, on the other hand, proved able to respond to

wartime demands and to compete successfully in the post-war

Paul Kennedy, personal interview at the United States
Military Academy, April 7, 1989.

Empire's share of Britain's exports, for example,
See
rose from 37% between 1920-24 to 49% between 1935-39.
Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British
Imperialism 1850-1983 (New York, 1984), 260-61.
^^The

84-89.
Luttwak, Victory 142-43,
makes the point that there is no automatic correlation
between productive capacity and diplomatic power.
^'Barnett,

Col lapse

,

,

:
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world market.^"

Finally, Kennedy's reference to the

declining importance of Britain's peripheral location only
assumes validity at least

a

decade after the Great War with

the development of the bomber and later the rocket.

From

the perspective of British statesmen in the opening decades
of

the twentieth century, Mahan's conceptualization of sea

power might have constituted the more useful paradigm.

Ignoring the relationship between sea power and

economic strength, most interpretations of the Washington

Conference have reduced British motives for participation to
economic exhaustion.

Raymond Buell pioneered this approach

in 1922 when he wrote:

For the time being at least, Great Britain was
unable to answer the challenge of the United
States who was now threatening the British
supremacy of the seas.
Its finances were in a
state of semianarchy and it could not afford to
engage in a new race for armaments.
"

Harold and Margaret Sprout, writing in 1940, shared Buell
emphasis on economic factors

.

They noted

to maintain even a nominal naval equality
with the United States, in open and unrestricted
competition woul d require a financial out 1 ay
which Great Britain's war-weakened and seriously
depressed economy was then in no condi t i on to
Also it could scarcely be doubted that any
bear.
large British effort in this di recti on would
further stimulate navalism within the United
States ... requiring still larger expenditures by

Yet,

,

The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and
the Great War. 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1986), 782-83.
-"Trevor Wilson,

"Raymond Buell, The Washington Conference (New York,
1922),

141-42.

's
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Great Britain.

Thomas Bailey, in

a

standard short treatment of the subject,

noted in 1964 that Britain's economy "had been so badly

strained by the war that her taxpayers would welcome
holiday in building.

"^^

William Braisted took

a

a

similar line

in 1971:

What Britain needed to compete successfully with
the United States was a throbbing economy capable
of undertaking new ships comparable to the
dreadnoughts and battle cruisers already
authorized by Congress and far more. This Lloyd
George did not have in his hand.^'
Part of the explanation for this monocausal view of British

motivation lies in the fact that much of the major work on
the subject has been written by Americans."

These authors

concentrated on the United States rather than treating all
participants in the conference equally.

Yet,

lest it be

thought that this economic fixation merely reflects American

oversimplification, Canadian James Stokesbury,

a

naval

Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea
Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922
(Princeton, 1940), 26.
Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
People (New York, 1964), 641.
"^William Braisted, The United States Navy in the
Pacific 1909-1922 (Austin, TX, 1971), 437.
to Preparedness: The Washington
Conference and Public Opinion (Washington, D.C., 1941); John
Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and
the Washington Conference 1921-1922 (Athens, GA, 1955);
Thomas Buckley, The United States and the Washington
Conference. 1921-22 (Knoxville, TN, 1970).

"cL. Hoag, Preface

,
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specialist, wrote in 1983:
The treasury was empty; the war had transformed
Britain into a debtor country, and a nation that
lost thirty-five million working days to strikes
1919 was not going to welcome an increase in
taxes for a new naval race.

m

Kennedy himself, in Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945
limited his explanation to

economic weakness

a

.

brief reference to British

.

The general tenor of these dismal appraisals of the

British economy seems substantial ly correct, if somewhat
imprecise.

That the war weakened His Majesty's Exchequer

can scarcely be doubted.

The doubl ing of the value of

retained imports from £600 millions in 1914 to £1200

millions in 1918 while exports remained stable at £550
millions during the same period adversely affected Britain's
Furthermore, the British national

balance of payments.
debt,

£650 millions before the war, increased by

approximately £7 billions during the course of the Great
War.

38

As a result of these trends

,

the relative infl uence

James Stokesbury Navy & Empire A Short History of
British Sea Power from the Armada to the Falklands London
1983), 343.
,

:

(

^"'paul

Kennedy

(London, 1983)

,

68

,

Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945

.

The Development of the British Economy
1914-1967 (New York, 1969), 66-75, gives a figure of £7,186
millions as the deficit on the wartime budgets and notes
that the national debt increased by a similar figure; Robert
Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War 1914-1919: Bri tish Economic
War Aims and the Origins of Reparations (Hamden, CT: 1975),
^^Sidney Pollard,

137

.
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of Treasury officials vis-a-vis the spending departments,

the concept of "Treasury control," increased tremendously

immediately upon the signing of the Armistice.
Nonetheless, Braisted's notion that Britain could not

afford "new ships comparable to the dreadnoughts and battle
cruisers already authorized by Congress" under the 1916

building program appears an exaggeration.

In 1920,

the

First Sea Lord estimated that four new capital ships would

maintain the Royal Navy at
of the American Navy.

a

strength roughly equal to that

The construction of four such ships,

at that time, would have cost some £38 millions.'''

Dividing

that sum over three years of construction, the outlay

required to meet the 1916 program would have been under £13

millions per annum. In the 1920-21 Budget, which surpassed
£1400 millions, the Naval Estimate exceeded £84 millions."

The Admiralty, which at this time possessed considerable

autonomy to determine naval priorities and reallocate funds

within total constraints determined by the Cabinet, could
have offset partially the cost of capital ship construction
by measures such as retiring older ships and putting

a

higher percentage of the navy into reserve commission.

^^Robin Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime:

1918-1940.

a

The

Britain,

Case Study (Foulis, 1962), 278-79.

116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920.

%DM

^'Robin Higham, Armed Forces

,

113.
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Lloyd George ministry in the summer of 1921 in fact

authorized four such ships to meet the American 1916
program.

42

This analysis suggests that, from

a

purely

monetary perspective, naval competition remained unwelcome
rather than impossible and that financial pressure

constituted one reason for the British appearance at
Washington, but not the only one.
The economic school contributed an important

perspective on the British decision to attend the Washington
Conference by emphasizing that naval competition with the

United States dominated strategic debate in London from 1919
to 1921.

Buell noted the origins of the naval competition

in President Woodrow Wilson's demand of February 1916 that

the United States develop "incomparably the most adequate

navy in the world" and the consequent Naval Appropriation
Act, which authorized the huge 1916 program of naval

construction of sixteen post-Jutland capital ships.

"

The

Sprouts discussed the "seemingl y hope 1 ess disagreement" over
the second of Wilson's Fourteen Points.

British

reservations toward freedom of the seas, "utterly abhorrent
to British naval authorities and to the majority of British

statesmen," led to the ensuing American announcement of "a

CAB 23: Conclusion 60 (6), July 20, 1921.
Buell, Washington Conference

,

140-41.
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huge post-war building program in the late autumn of 1918.

"••

Braisted detailed "the naval battle of Paris," where the

Anglophobia of American Admiral William Benson exacerbated
existing Anglo-American antagonism and permitted only

a

temporary naval settlement (Britain supported Wilson's
League of Nations in exchange for cancellation of the U.S.
Navy's proposed 1918 program) rather than permanent

resolution between the world's major naval powers.
J.

Kenneth MacDonald, in

valuable essay in 1971,

a

discussed Britain's search for

a

naval policy in 1919.

In

the aftermath of Versailles, American naval construction

under the 1916 program threatened Britain's naval
superiority.

At the same time,

"pressure for the reduction

of expenditure," according to MacDonald,

led to the

promulgation of the ten year rule, which directed the
fighting services to base their estimates on the assumption
of no major war within the next decade.

"The conflict

between the immediate pressure to reduce navy spending and
the prospect of an impending naval race with the United

States," in MacDonald's view, led Prime Minister David Lloyd

George to explore the possibility of a naval agreement.

dispatched

a special

He

envoy to Washington, where the physical

incapacity of President Wilson dashed any hope that the

^'Sprouts, New Order

,

60-61.

•'Braisted, United States Navy

,

414-38.

,

.
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emissary could convince the American government to allow
Ortat Britain to retain her world maritime supremacy
unchallenged.^^

In the fall

of

1919,

the British government

thus realized that for at least the next fifteen months

their naval policy could not involve agreement with

Washington
Stephen Roskill, in Naval Policy

B elwM-n

the Wars^^

Ij_

The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919 1929_( 1969)

provided the Admiralty's perspective on the major
devel opments in British naval policy during the inter -war

period.

In the spring of 1920,

First Lord Walter Long

"reaffirmed the principle of the One Power standard"
naval strength.
a

On the same occasion,

the First Lord "took

firm stand on the future of the capital ship."

year.

of

First Sea Lord David Beatty opened

a

Later that

campaign for new

capital ship construction "with particular reference to the

relative strength of the British and American navies."

The

Cabinet then directed the Committee of Imperial Defence to

investigate the role of the capital ship in the navy.
the spring of 1921, the commi t tee

i

In

ssued conflicting

reports, "which left matters very much where they were."

The Cabinet then struck a deal with the Admiralty.

In

return for cost-cutting measures which included reducing the

Kenneth MacDonald, "Lloyd George and the Search for
a Post-war Naval Policy, 1919" in A. J. P. Taylor, ed, Lloyd
George: Twelve Essays (New York, 1971), 191-222.
^^J.

number of capital ships in full commission from twenty to

sixteen out of the thirty on the effective list, they

authorized the construction of four new capital ships,
deemed replacements "to avoid providing ammunition to the
'Big Navy School'

in America."

The First Lord, meanwhile,

issued an informal invitation to certain American contacts
in the hopes that the new Harding Administration might

consider "an international agreement on naval limitation."^'
The role of American competition is central to an

understanding of the British willingness to consider naval
disarmament.
Navy possessed

At the conclusion of hostilities, the Royal

massive superiority in fighting strength

a

over any possible opponent. 49

Churchill, before the Paris

Peace Conference, trumpeted Britain's absolute refusal to

accept "any fettering restrictions which will prevent the

British Navy maintaining its well-tried and wel 1 -deserved
supremacy."

The relentless progress of the American 1916

program, however, combined with the Royal Navy's extensive

post-war demobilization, effectively challenged that

•'Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars. I: The
Period of Anglo-American Naval Antagonism (New York, 1969),

218-229.

McDonald, "Lloyd
^^Stokesbury Navv & Empire 342.
George and the Search for a Post-War Naval Policy, 1919" in
Taylor, Twelve Essays notes that the Royal Navy nearly
equaled all of the remaining major fleets combined.
,

,

,

^'Winston Churchill,
62.

as recorded in Sprouts, New Order,

.
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supremacy.

The Admiralty, aware of the challenge, advised

the Cabinet:

The Board believes it to be unquestioned that
Great Britain owes her leading position among the
Nations to her long-maintained pre-eminence upon
the sea.
They believe this pre-eminence cannot be
relinquished without her ability to hold her
position being profoundly affected, with all that
position involves in respect of presjj^ige,
authority, and commercial advantage."^
The Board then presented the alternatives of new capital
ship construction or diplomatic agreement.

The American

building program forced the Cabinet to choose between

maritime inferiority, an extensive construction program, or
a naval

limitation agreement, thus bringing into play

economic weakness and other factors
The second scholarly group to study the British

presence at Washington, the Dominion school, dominated by
Canadian historians

,

emphasized the growing inf 1 uence of the

Dominions in the foreign policy of the British Empire.

Britain

'

s

heightened concern for Dominion considerations

sprang from

a

recognition of their contributions to the war

effort and from

foreign policy.

a

desire to develop

a

common Imperial

At the Imperial Conference of 1921, British

and Dominion statesmen jointly considered the renewal of the

Anglo- Japanese Alliance, which apparently was due to expire
in a matter of weeks.

J.B.

Brebner in 1935 detailed the

116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
Expenditure, October 24, 1919.
^^ADM

.

role of Canada's Prime Minister Arthur Meighen in
preventing
a

renewal of the alliance.

Brebner wrote:

Arthur Meighen ... practical 1 y unassisted, checked
his British and Dominion colleagues at an Imperial
Conference in their determination to renew the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance, ther eby
f aci 1 i tat ing
the movement which culminated in the Washington
Conference
.

.

.

John Galbraith, writing in 1948, emphasized the deference

which the delegates of the Imperial Conference paid to the
reaction of the United States, "perhaps the most powerful

influence in shaping the decisions of the Conference."'^
1966, A.R.M.

In

Lower highlighted the influence upon Meighen of

Loring Christie, the legal adviser to Canada's Department of
External Affairs.

which advocated

a

Christie's memorandum on the alliance,

conference on Pacific affairs, provided

Meighen with the arguments he would employ in London."^
Michael Fry in 1967 qualified the extent of Canada's

influence at the Imperial Conference.

He pointed out that

Meighen "by forceful argument, had succeeded in directing
the imperial meeting toward the calling of a [Far Eastern]

conference, but he had not secured non-renewal."

Prime

Brebner, "Canada, The Angl o- Japanese Alliance,
and the Washington Conference", ( Political Science
Quarterly L, 1935).
J.B.

,

"The Imperial Conference of 1921 and
the Washington Conference", ( Canadian Historical Review
XXXIX, 1948).
^^John Galbraith,

,

Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the
Washington Conference of 1921-1922", ( Canadian Historical
Review XLVII, 1966).
-^A.R.M.
,

:
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Minister William Hughes of Australia, who sought protection
against Japanese expansion in the Pacific, secured retention
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance pending the resolution of

President Harding's opportune invitation to Washington.

Although they thus present an intriguing picture, the
Dominion school in general and J.B. Brebner in particular
have misstated the role of Arthur Meighen in "facilitating
the movement which culminated in the Washington Conference.'*

Meighen's stance on the Angl o- Japanese Alliance had little
impact on London's willingness to go to Washington.

The

British Cabinet, even before the Imperial Conference,
decided
that the President of the United States should be
asked to summon a Conference of the Pacific
Powers, but only after it has been made clear to
Japan and to the other Powers concerned we had no
intention of dropping the Alliance."^

After the shouting match at that conference between Meighen
and Hughes died down, the Cabinet concluded:

That the representatives of the United Kingdom at
the Imperial Meetings should have the authority to
propose or assent to the initiation of full and
frank conversations with the Governments of both
the United States of America and Japan with a vi^w
to some arrangement satisfactory to all parties.

After some legerdemain involving a legal opinion from the

^^Michael Fry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and the
Abrogation of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance", (Journal of

Modern History

.

XXXIX, 1967).

"cab 23: Conclusion 43 (2) a. May 30, 1921.
^•CAB 23:

Conclusion 56 (3)

a,

June 30, 1921.

.
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Lord Chancellor, the Imperial Cabinet agreed the following
day that the Alliance remained in force and that the
Foreign

Office should contact America and Japan concerning an
international conference.

When Lloyd George informed the

Imperial Cabinet of President Harding's invitation to

a

disarmament conference, no one suggested refusing to attend.
Arthur Meighen thus caused neither the abrogation of the
Angl o- Japanese Alliance nor the British Cabinet's acceptance
of President Harding's invitation

Meighen, on the other hand, profoundly influenced the
range of choices open to the British delegation in

Washington.

On July 4th, Lord Lee and Admiral Beatty

provided the Dominion leaders

a

briefing on imperial defense

and explained Britain's difficulties with the cost of new

naval construction

58

In a series of meetings among the

.

prime ministers two weeks later, after the Imperial

Conference had accepted the American invitation, Hughes of
Aus t ral ia proposed that the Dominions share in the burden of

imperial defense on

Meighen demurred.

a

per capita basis of white population.

Smuts proposed applying German

reparations payments towards naval construction
again refused

•

Canada did so.

but Meighen

Hughes in turn refused to contribute unl ess

Meighen's obstruction thus precluded any

32/2: Minutes 12/13,
Minute 21, July 11, 1921.
^^CAB

-^CAB 32/2:

,

Minute 14, July

July

4,

1,

1921; CAB 32/2

1921.

.
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concrete arrangements for Dominion contributions for
imperial defense.

He influenced the British mission to

Washington by denying it options based on economic
constraints rather than by his insistence that British

diplomacy defer to his views.
Another interpretation of British foreign policy

stressed London's own desire to maintain favorable relations
with the United States.
peace settl ement

,

In the aftermath of the Versailles

Britain recogni zed

a

communi ty of

interests, the advancement of which depended upon Anglo-

American cooperation.

John Vinson in 1955 thus described

Britain's wish "to cultivate the good will of the United
States

.

Such an expl anat ion easily incorporated Britain's

economi c woes and her debt to Amer i ca

Correlli Barnett, in 1972, discussed the origins of Pan

Anglo-Saxon feeling in Britain.

He suggested that in the

1880s the British ruling class began to cultivate

a

myth

whereby America assumed first an "ident i ty of race" and
later "identity of political and cul tural

national aspirations."

t

radi tions and

This myth, according to Barnett, had

its roots in the manicured lawns of the East coast

oligarchy, where English aristocrats such as George

Nathaniel, 1st Marquess of Curzon, courted their American
brides.

Within the Lloyd George Cabinet of 1920-21, Winston

John Vinson, Parchment Peace

,

29.
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Churchill and Austen Chamberlain shared the distinction of

American descent on the distaff

side.-''

Michael Fry further refined Vinson's interpretation in
the same year by identifying the At lanticists

,

those elites

within the British Empire who supported "the creation of

a

global hegemony enjoyed by the United States and the British
empire, expressed in maritime and financial terms.""

Even

among this group, motives for cooperation with America

varied considerably.

Liberals Sir Edward Grey, Richard,

Viscount Haldane, and H.A.L. Fisher supported the radicalliberal program of President Woodrow Wilson, while Sir

Robert Cecil and General Jan Smuts sought to further the
League of Nations.

The imperialists of the Round Table

group desired to harness the North American republic to
their vision of missionary idealism.

Conservatives Arthur

Balfour and Arthur, Viscount Lee of Fareham acted from the
Pan Anglo-Saxon conviction of the collective heritage and

common future of the English-speaking peoples.
Yet, the prevalence of Pan Anglo-Saxon views among

British elites constituted at most

a

subordinate factor in

the British decision to enter negotiations for naval

disarmament.

Lee, who assumed the position of First Lord of

the Admiralty in February 1921, certainly used his extensive

"•Barnett,

Collapse

-•Michael Fry,

1972),

6-17.

,

258-263.

The Illusions of Security (Toronto,
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American contacts, which in the past had included friendship
with the late Theodore Roosevelt, to promote
Anglo-American
naval agreement.

politically."

Yet Lee remained among the "lesser men

Fry described him as "a cypher, owing all to

Lloyd George.""

Curzon, despite his American wife,

denigrated America's diplomatic record and urged the Cabinet
to renew the Angl o- Japanese Alliance.

leading Pan Anglo-Saxon, agreed.

Arthur Balfour, the

During the Imperial

Conference of 1921, he noted to the Dominion leaders that
"it is,

from

a

strategic point of view, of very great

importance that the Japanese Alliance should be
maintained."^'

Winston Churchill, the former First Lord,

preferred to place his trust in British battleships rather
than the vagaries of American policy.

In February 1921, he

accepted "the overwhelming case for the capital ship as the
foundation and ultimate sanction of sea-power" and advocated
an extended building program of four capital ships every
year.'^

While several members of the Lloyd George Cabinet

held pro-American convictions, only the politically trivial
Lee sought to construct a naval policy on such a basis.

Perhaps the best general account of the developments
that led the British government to agree to the naval

^Fry,

Illusions

,

16.

"cab 23: Conclusion 43 (2), May 30, 1921.
Churchill, as recorded in Kenneth Young,
Arthur James Balfour (London, 1963), 419.
'Ssfinston
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conference can be found in Max Beloff's Imperial Sunset.
Volume I: Britai n's Liberal Empire 1897-1921 (1970). The
First World War unleashed a host of new inf luences--the

increasingly self-conscious colonies; ideological opposition
to Bolshevism;

a

loss of confidence among the ruling elites;

growing popular desires for both pacifism and domestic
consumption; and, of course, "the weakening of Britain's

material posi tion"--which constrained the choices open to

British statesmen.

They assumed, according to Beloff, that

"the international world was one of competing powers and
that their duty was to make the most of whatever assets were

available.

"^^

The war affected the nature of the great game,

introducing new rules, sweeping old pieces from the board,
and changing the way Britain looked at familiar players.
Bel of f suggested that psychol ogical factors weighed

heavi 1 y in Britain's decision to accept naval
the end of the First World War.

1

imitation at

He noted a change in

Britain's outlook on the world which undermined the need for

maintenance of the traditional degree of naval superiority.
This devaluation of the importance of the

three causes.

f

1

eet stemmed from

First, the reduction of the German and

Russian fleets served to eliminate serious threats to the
home islands.

Second, the supporters of the League of

Nations argued that the new organization had assumed

Beloff, Imperial Sunset. Volume I
Liberal Empire. 1897-1921 (New York, 1970),
-^Max

:

Britain's
5,

10-18.
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responsibility for Britain's defense.

Third, the ruling

elite increasingly questioned the purpose and existence of
the British Empire, the defense of which constituted an

important mission for the fleet.

Beloff's concern for the British attitude towards the
Royal Navy appears reasonable.

His discussion, however,

though reasonable in nature, lacks detailed evidence.

He

fails to differentiate between elites in general and those
in office.

Rejection of the Empire characterized the

radical wing of the Liberal Party far more than the Lloyd

George ministry.

Appeals to the League of Nations failed to

sway pragmatic senior officials such as Sir Maurice Hankey
and Sir Eyre Crowe, who deprecated the ability of that

agency to provide protection.
in the eyes of the Cabinet,
CO

Japan and the United States,

replaced Germany and Russia as

Beloff's investigation of elite support for

naval rivals.

British sea power might have proved more profitable had he
restricted his scope to the Cabinet.
In the most recent major work on the naval conference.

Power in the Pacific (1976), Roger Dingman made

a

valuable

contribution to the study of British motivations for naval
arms limitation.

"Beloff,

He focused on the crucial role of British

Imperial Sunset

"Barnett, Col lapse

295,

336,

348,

359.

244-45.

C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920; CAB
Imperial Conference Minute 14, July 4, 1921.

^^CAB 2/3:

32/2:

,

.
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domestic politics in the foL-mulatiou ot foreign and d^-fenae
policy.

Dingman noted thai David Lloyd George played

a

critical role in Britain's decision to accept naval parity

with the United States and further suggested that the prime

minister elevated "Ireland over everything" in the summer of
1921.

Thus, in order to maintain his fragile coalition

government long enough to resolve the Irish problem, the

Welsh Wizard used the Washington Naval Conference as

a

"middle way out of diplomatic, imperial, and naval
problems."''

Dingman's emphasis on British internal affairs seems

particularly fruitful line of inquiry.
Lloyd C7eorge played

approaches

a

a

truism.

a

His observation that

significant rol» in domtitic politics
Dingman's suggestion that Lloyd

George's concern for Ireland provided the impetus for
naval agreement, however, appears doubtful.

Surely,

a

the

nationwide coal strike, rising unemployment, and the
failure of government housing schemes provided other grist
for the Irish mill.

Furthermore, the Royal Navy, "an

institution with roots deep in the traditions and psychology
of British political

life" in Dingman's own words, would

seem at first glance particularly ill-suited as an object
political sacrifice.^"

Yet,

if

the national

of

leadership had

Power in the Pacific: the Origins of
Naval Arms Limitation (Chicago, 1976), xii, 161-63, 172-77.
^'noger Dingman,

^"oingman.

Pacific, 161.

e
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suffered

a

loss of confidence in the future of the

Dreadnought, then the premier's selection of naval

limitation as

a

vehicle makes more sense.

The historiography of the Washington Naval Conference
lacks a clear linkage between Cabinet attitudes towards the

capital ship and British willingness to conclude a naval

limitation agreement. The Sprouts addressed the importance
of developments in naval warfare in a very general

context.

They stated that '*only incurable optimists and hopeless

reactionaries believed that the submarine peril had been
laid to final rest" at the end of the Great War.

"Submarines and aircraft, both alone and in combination with
surface craft" thus gave rise to "doubts as to the batt 1
fleet's future utility."

They noted:

There were uneasy forebodings in certain quarters
that further advances in submarine and air power
might progressively undermine the security of the
island base which supported the sea power of Great
Britain.
*

Roger Dingman, who considered the British position in depth,
flatly opposed this viewpoint.

He wrote:

Some commentators have suggested that the
negotiators in Washington limited capital ship
fleets because they believed battleships were
This study suggests that precisely the
obsolete.
opposite was true.

Dingman is surely correct as far as the views of the

^Sprouts

,

New Order

^Dingman, Pacific

,

,

43-46

216.

s

,
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Admiralty were concerned.

They shared the world of the

American Navy, where Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and
the Navy the only true Church.

The civilian members of the Cabinet, however, lacked

Admiral Beatty's absolute faith in the value of the capital
ship.

Roskill described Bonar Law, Sir Eric Geddes, and Sir

Robert Horne as "impressed by the arguments of the [junior]
naval men who expressed

doubts regarding the continued

dominance" of the capital

ship."^'

Higham noted that Lloyd

George "did not like Beatty's big ships, but felt more

attention should be paid to small A.S.W. [anti-submarine
warfare] vessels."'*

Conscious of the American challenge to

British maritime supremacy

cognizant of Britain'

,

precarious economic position

and conversant with

,

contemporary criticisms of the capital ship, these men chose
to accept the American invitation to a disarmament

conference

Their acceptance

•

,

unimaginabl e in 1914

reflected at least in part the British experience with the
Great War, in which the performance of the Royal Navy failed
to meet popular expectations and in which new technologies

emerged to pose a threat to the dreadnought.

'^Roskill, Naval Policy

^^i gham

,

Armed Forces

.

.
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CHAPTER

2

THE MOST FORMIDABLE FORCE, 1905-1914
In the decade before the First World War, Britain

pursued new methods to achieve her traditional defense
objectives.

British defense policy rested primarily upon

the twin pillars of command of the sea and a balance of

power in Europe.

As the possibility of a major war on the

continent grew less and less remote, the island kingdom

abandoned her policy of non-alignment to join the Franco-

Russian Entente against Germany.

The Royal Navy remained,

as it had been for centuries, Britain's foremost line of

defense.

The navy experienced a profound transformation,

designed to produce
High Seas Fleet.

a

force prepared to fight the German

The senior service enjoyed considerable

autonomy in its preparation, as

a

result of widespread

support among the leading elements of British society.

In

1914, Parliament felt complete confidence in the ability of

the Royal Navy to defend Britain's national interests.

Leading politicians, regardless of party, adhered to
two constant principles: the balance of power in Europe and

command of the seas.*

Britain's island character determined

the primary considerations of her national defense down to

the Great War. Providence provided Britain with a salt-water

barrier to the march of continental armies.

The British, in

-Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925 (New
York, 1974), 49.
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order to maintain their sovereignty, needed to prevent sea-

borne invasion and to maintain sufficient trade to feed
the

population and to fuel the economy.^

The first priority of

national defense thus involved command of the sea, which

entailed the defeat of the enemy's main naval forces and

provided the subsequent control of maritime communications.^
Command of the sea thus meant control of much of Europe's'

maritime commerce.

This control in turn generated for

Britain "a world weight far beyond her resources in manpower
and wealth."^

Britain frequently used this wealth to

intervene in continental conflicts.

Britain traditionally attempted to prevent any power
from establishing its ascendancy over Europe by cooperating

with others to maintain a rough equilibrium, or balance of
power.'

Sir Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office, who went on

to serve as permanent under-secretary from 1920-1925, noted

in 1907:
It has become almost an historical

truism to
identify England's secular policy with the

Britain lost the ability to feed her population from
her own agricultural production about 1865 and recognized
See John Gooch, The
that enormous disability in 1900.
Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence Policy 1847-1942
(London, 1981),

9.

^Kennedy, Naval Mastery

.

53.

^Gerald Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy:
Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy (Cambridge, 1965),

^William Strang, Britain in World Affairs: The
Fluctuations in Power and Influence fro m Henry VIII to
Elizabeth II (New York, 1961), 18.

9.

.
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maintenance of this balance [of power] by throwing
her weight now in this scale and now in that,
but
ever on the side opposed to the political
dictatorship of the strongest single State or
group at a given time.'
Her balancing took two forms, small expeditionary forces
and,

of greater importance,

continental allies.

economic subsidies to her

Such intervention forced her opponents

to focus on military competition and helped Britain maintain

her unrivaled naval position.

She remained particularly

sensitive to the potential of the Low Countries to serve as
a

a

base for invasion/

The defense of Britain, at the turn

of the twentieth century,

began on the Channel ports.

Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century,

British diplomacy inclined towards an unusually favorable
regard for France.

In the late nineteenth century, with the

forces of France and Germany in approximate balance, Britain

followed a policy of "splendid isolation."

The Boer War,

1899-1902, shocked the British, who began to reconsider the

basis of their national defense.

concluded

,

Britain

military alliance with Japan against the menace

a

"Sir Eyre Crowe,

Sea Power

In 1902,

as recorded in Richmond,

Statesmen and

355.

^St okesbury

,

Navy

&

Empire

.

106

the age of sail, Britain fought a series of wars to
prevent France from seizing the Netherlands, which would
have provided "an estimably valuable naval point d 'appui."
See Strang. Affairs 27.

hn

,

^Belof f

,

Imperial Sunset

,

79-80
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of Russian expansion in the Far East.

A subsequent outbreak

of serious unrest in Morocco led Britain
in April 1904 to

reach an understanding with France, the Anglo-French
Entente, in order to reduce colonial differences and
to

preclude the possibility of being dragged into war in the
event of a Russo-Japanese conflict.*''
The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 served to cement the Anglo-

French Entente. British Foreign Secretary Henry, 5th

Marquess of Lansdowne described the bombastic pronouncements
of support for the Sultan of Morocco by Kaiser Wilhelm II as

"an extraordinary clumsy bit of diplomacy.""

Lansdowne

agreed to support French resistance to German demands for

Moroccan port.

a

Further German demands for an international

conference to discuss the Moroccan question, later expanded
to include the resignation of French Foreign Minister

Theophile Delcasse, reinforced British suspicions of
Germany's intentions.

When the Russo-Japanese War of 1905

revealed the weakness of the Russian war machine, British
leaders feared that the Franco-Russian alliance could no
longer balance Prussian power.

Sir Edward Grey, who

'"Cedric Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power
(Boston, 1972), 4-9, 275-77.

"Lord Lansdowne, as recorded in Lowe and Dockrill,
Mirage of Power 425.
,

Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy:
Background Influences on British External Polic y. 1865-1980
(Boston, 1981), 75-81, 123-24.
*^Paul

43

replaced Lord Lansdowne as Foreign Secretary in December
1905,

authorized staff talks between the British fighting

services and their French counterparts in January 1906.^^

Germany replaced Russia as the greatest threat to the

British Empire.
The German bullying of France led Britain to consider
the likely course of a Franco-German war.

Facing a two-

front war in their struggle with France and Russia, the

Germans adopted

plan devised by Count Alfred Schlieffen,

a

chief of the German general staff, for a wheeling movement

through Belgium for a knockout blow against France.

British saw that

a

The

successful violation of Belgian

neutrality by the Kaiser's legions would place the southern
shore of the North Sea, the sine qua non of successful
A

invasion

I

,

under German control

Viscount Esher

.

Reginald Brett

,

2nd

defense expert and confidential advisor to

,

King Edward VII, wrote to Prime Minister Arthur Balfour:
to Germany to absorb Hoi 1 and ... there
must come a day when France and England will have
to fight Germany in order to neutralize the Dutch
Kingdom, and this day may not be very far off,
It is vital

British hegemony at sea thus required British support of
France in the event of German aggression on land.

obtained the permission of the Prime Minister but
withheld this information from the remainder of the Cabinet.
Beloff, Imperial Sunset 108; Wilson, Mvriad Faces. 22.
^^Grey

.

^^Kennedy

,

Realities Behind Diplomacy

^^Lord Esher,

,

12 9.

as recorded in Young, Balfour

,

228.
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The rapid expansion of the German navy constituted the

most direct threat to Britain's vital national interests.
At the close of the nineteenth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II

decided that Germany required "world-political freedom,"

which could be supplied only by

a

powerful navy.

In 1897,

the Kaiser appointed a new Secretary of State for the

Imperial Navy, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz.^^

Tirpitz, a

disciple of both Mahan and Prussian historian Heinrich von
Treitschke, shared the Kaiser's dream of
fleet.

a

powerful German

He started to create such a fleet with the German

Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900, which authorized

a

fleet of 38

battleships, 20 armored cruisers, and 38 light cruisers.
The admiral rationalized the High Seas Fleet in the

following terms:
In order to protect German trade and commerce
under existing conditions only one thing will

suffice, namely Germany must possess a battle
fleet of such a strength that even for the most
powerful adversary a war would involve such risks
as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful.

Tirpitz made clear that his intended target was the British

Grand Fleet.

He publicly reasoned that

a

German fleet

concentrated in the North Sea would cause Britain, for fear

For conflicting views as to the influence of Mahan on
German naval development, see Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of
Sea Power" in Earle, Military Thought from Machiavelli to
Hitler a nd Growl, "Mahan: The Naval Historian" in Paret,
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
.

'^Admiral Tirpitz, as recorded in Richard Hough, The
Great War at Sea 1914-1918 (New York, 1983), 4.

,
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of combat which might cripple the Royal Navy,

confrontations with Germany.

to avoid

He ostensibly accepted

numerical inferiority to the Royal Navy, arguing that

Britain's world-wide naval commitments would insure that the
Royal Navy would never be in a "position to concentrate all
its forces against us."

His ultimate goal, kept secret from

the British Admiralty and the Social Democrats in the

Reichstag, involved moving through

a

"Danger Zone" of naval

competition to superiority over the Royal Navy.*^

While on

other issues the British might have been disposed to

compromise, the notion of command of the sea remained the

cornerstone of their defense policy.
The British traditionally preferred a navy as their

primary means of defense.

Their dislike of a standing army

dated from the Stuart drive for absolute monarchy and the

interregnum under Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth
century.

In the nineteenth century. Radical

leader Richard

Cobden argued that naval strength was necessary for

Britain's protection, because it had never been used "for

repressive purposes in internal struggle" and because the
Navy was cheaper than a combination of conscription and
coastal fortification."

The Royal Navy had earned the

Strategy and Diplomacy 154; Peter Padfield,
The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry. 19001914 (New York, 1974), 42-43.
-^Kennedy,

as recorded in Bernard Semmel
Naval Strategy (Boston, 1986), 80.

-'Richard Cobden,

Liberalism

&

,

:
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public's confidence, saving England from the depredations
of
Philip II in 1588, Louis XIV in 1692, and Napoleon
Bonaparte
in 1805.

When the growing strength of the major continental

powers threatened the Pax Britannica in the late nineteenth
century, the British turned to the Royal Navy.
In the face of increasing naval competition, the

British embarked on

a

series of naval building programs.

After the French naval scare in 1888, the government

introduced the Naval Defence Act of 1889, which provided for
a

vastly improved fleet at

a

cost of £21,500,000, and

announced the Two Power Standard, whereby the Royal Navy
would be maintained "equal to the naval strength of any two
other countries

.

"^^

Covering the naval display which

accompanied the celebration of Queen Victoria's Diamond
Jubil ee

(

the sixtieth anniversary of her coronation) in

1897, which included over 160 British warships. The Times

wrote
The fleet. ..is certainly the most formidable force
in all its el ements and qual ities that has ever
been brought together, and such as no combination
It is at once the most
of other powers can rival.
powerful and far-reaching weapon which the world
has ever seen.

Russian pressure in the Far East led to further expansion in

as recorded in ADM 116/1605:
Oswyn Murray Memorandum, November 21, 1918. The naval scare
of 1888 followed reports by the London Standard of
extraordinary naval activity by the French fleet in Toulon.
^^Lord George Hamilton,

'

The Times

,

25 June,

1897.

.

s

.
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1898.

In 1902,

Britain possessed 42 first class

battleships, against 44 for France, Russia, and
Germany
combined.
The presence of the Channel Fleet rendered

impotent the disapproval of the other Great Powers
during
the Boer War.

Coincident with the Naval Defence Act,

Britain adopted

a

new prophet of sea power.

The words of Alfred Thayer Mahan permeated the

consciousness of the British naval community.

Mahan argued

that command of the sea provided unmatched economic benefits

and that concentration of a superior fleet provided command
of the sea.

His second book. The Influence of Sea Power

upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812

.

which

appeared in Britain in 1892, received rave reviews from

Professor J.K. Laughton of Britain's naval college at
Greenwich.

Arriving in England as part of

a

lecture tour in

1893, Mahan was, in the words of naval historian Paul

Kennedy, "feted and revered, the more especially since he
had openly expressed his admiration for the Royal Navy."

More important 1 y

,

according to another student of Britain'

navy, Mahan's visit spread "a consciousness of the value of

naval strength" beyond the fleet to the mainstream of

British politics.

The increased concern of Whitehall,

Westminster, and Fleet Street for the relative strength of

^^Kennedy

^^ough

,

,

Strategy and Diplomacy

Great War at Sea

,

3

,

43
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the Royal Navy based on the writings of Mahan would

facilitate the passage of ever-increasing Naval Estimates.
The admiration awarded to Mahan'

s

theories by leading

statesmen in other capitals--Kaiser Wilhelm

II

ordered his

work placed in the library aboard each German warship--only

reinforced his acceptance in British circles.

Most British

officers drank deeply from Mahan's twin sermons, control of
the sea and concentration of the fleet.

One of Mahan's most devoted disciples was Admiral Sir
John Fisher.

"Jackie" Fisher came from a middle-class

family which tended towards clergymen.

Navy as

a

He joined the Royal

midshipman in 1854, at the ripe age of thirteen.

Although his first ship was Nelson's flagship Victory

,

Fisher's evaluation of the potential of the new technology
of the nineteenth century--st eam engines,

armour,

electricity, breech-loading guns--led him to become,

according to naval historian Arthur Marder, "an apostle of

unremitting progress,
against the old."^^

a

passionate advocate of the new

He drilled into his subordinates the

notion that "a Fleet that is always ready to go to sea at an
25
hour's notice is a splendid national life-preserver."

^^Arthur Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought: The
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of
Kilverstone (London, 1952), Vol I, 63.

as recorded in Marder, Fear God Vol
Fisher himself reported to work between 04.00 and
I, 100.
05.30 each day.

^Wmiral Fisher,

,

49

Fisher's demonical energy, exceptional memory, and

considerable powers of persuasion carried him to
the top of
his profession.
He served from 1904-10 as First Sea Lord, the

professional head of the senior service.

The admiral,

invoking Mahan, Nelson, and the old Testament prophets with
equal facility, dragged the navy, encrusted with tradition,

kicking and screaming into the twentieth century.
a host of administrative reforms.

Besides

Fisher made two major

contributions to the evolution of the Royal Navy: the
development of the revolutionary battleship Dreadnought and
the strategic reorganization of the navy.

Fisher's reorganization of the Royal Navy reflected
Mahan'

s

emphasis on the concentration of the fleet.

Fisher

scrapped 154 small, obsolete cruisers and gunboats on
stations around the globe, since, he argued, "their up-keep
is ruinously expensive,

and they militate against efficiency

because those in them are being educated in an obsolete type
of ship."

27

With the personnel thus freed for reassignment,

he provided nucleus crews (40% of normal complement) to the

Fisher's habit for disregarding the views of other
senior naval officers created many enemies within the
service, the most bitter and outspoken of whom was Admiral
For a summary of the FisherCharles, 1st Baron Beresford.
Beresford feud, see Harder, Fear God Vol II, 32-44.
,

as recorded in ADM 116/942: Memoranda
compiled during the preparation of naval reorganization. May
1904.

^Wmiral Fisher,

.

.
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more powerful ships which constituted the Fleet Reserve.
These ships, augmented by sailors from shore barracks
and

training establishments, were available for rapid

reinforcement of the Fleet in commission at sea.

Perhaps

Fisher's most important reform involved the concentration of

three-quarters of the strength of the Royal Navy in home
waters.

28

Mahan had taught him not to divide the fleet,

while an Admiralty memorandum of 1902 emphasized the

importance of retaining control of the North Sea:
It is a fundamental

principle of Admiralty policy
that sufficient force shall at all times be
maintained in home waters to ensure the command of
the seas.
And in no other way than by defeat can
our naval force be rendered unable to meet the
enemy at sea
As a result of his abolition of the Pacific and South

American squadrons and reduction of the number of vessels in
the Mediterranean, Fisher was able to more than double

strength in home waters

.

The size of the Channel Fleet rose

from eight batt 1 eships in 1904 to seventeen capital ships in
1905.^"

In addition to reducing the number of ships in the

Navy, and concentrating them in the North Sea, Fisher also

increased the fighting power of the individual batt 1 eship

^°Marder,

Fear God

,

Vol II, 25.

116/900B: Admiralty Memorandum, "Strategic
Conditions Governing the Coast Defences of the United
Kingdom", March 1902.
^'aDM

Marder. Fear Not
Vol II, 25, gives a figure of 18 battleships immediately
available.

Kennedy, Naval Mastery

,

216-218.

,

.
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The ninth ship Dreadnought to serve in the Royal Navy

represented the culmination of

a

series of trends in naval

technology that resulted in a potent combination of speed
and fire-power.

Immediately upon assuming office as First

Sea Lord, Fisher established a Committee on Designs with

marching orders to create the world's most powerful ship.
Fisher, writing to the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1901,

explained the need "to have superiority of speed in order to
compel your opponent to accept battle.

"^^

turbines drove the 17,900-ton ship at

a

Parson steam
speed of 21 knots

instead of the maximum 18 knots from contemporary triple-

expansion engines.

The Dreadnought fired 850-pound shells

from ten 12-inch guns, in accord with Fisher's determination
to adopt "a uniform armament of the heaviest gun in use."

The elimination of secondary guns (typically

8

to 10-inch

caliber) greatly simplified range-finding and fire control.
The new British battleship fired

a

broadside of eight 12-

33
inch guns, twice as many heavy guns as any ship afloat.

The Dreadnought

,

at the cost of £1.8 millions,

constituted

Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God Vol
A decade later. Fisher advised First Lord Winston
I, 177.
Churchill that the speed of his new battleships should
"vastly exceed" that of their possible opponents.
,

^^Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Peter Kemp, ed. The
Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher (London, 1964), Vol II,

261-62

Dreadnought which mounted a pair of two-gun
turrets forward, one on each beam, and one aft, could thus
fire eight guns to either beam.
^^The

,

)
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such

quantum leap over its predecessors that it instantly

a

became the measure of naval strength upon completion
in

December 1906.
Fisher fashioned the Royal Navy into an instrument

designed expressly to defeat Germany's High Seas Fleet.
Upon completion of his new battleship. Fisher wrote to King
Edward VII that "Germany has been paralyzed by the

Dreadnought

.

"

He explained to the First Lord of the

Admiralty in 1906 that "Germany is our only enemy for years
to come!"

Later that same year, he explained the focus of

his reorganization plan:

Our onl y probabl e enemy is Germany
Germany keeps
her whole fleet always concentrated within a few
hours of England. We must therefore keep a fleet
twice as powerful as that of Germany always
concentrated within a few hours of Germany.
.

In order to defeat Germ.an comm.erce raiders,

Lord developed

a

the First Sea

new form of warship, known originally as

the dreadnought armoured cruiser and later as the battle

cruiser

.

This hybrid cl ass combined the speed (25+ knots

of a cruiser and the power of a battleship's 12-inch guns.

Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Hough, Great War at
Sea

II,

,

2

.

^^Admiral Fisher,
92.

as recorded in Harder, Fear God

,

Vol

116/942: Fisher Letter to the Prince of Wales,
October 23, 1906.
^^ADM

The Ship: Dreadnought to Nuclear
Submarine (London, 1980), 6.
^"^Anthony Preston,

37
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The First Sea Lord claimed they would devour weak cruisers
like "an armadillo let loose on an ant-hill.

"^^

Fisher fought to match every increase in the size of
High Seas Fleet with more and better ships for the Royal
Navy.

The admiral, who shared Mahan

of superior numbers,

'

s

belief in the value

explained to Conservative leader Joseph

Chamberlain that "^God is on the side of the big
battalions,' and that Nelson said truly ^Only numbers can

annihilate.'"

He saw the answer to German naval expansion:

"Of course lose not a moment building ships bigger and

faster
at

39

.

"

Fisher sought

,

in terms of dreadnought strength,

least two British keels for every German--a relationship

quite unacceptable to the aims of Tirpitz.

One historian

described the result: "The obtaining of one country's naval
aims meant the failure of the other's: hence

a

naval

construction race which seemed to have no ending.

"^'^

Fisher,

like Tirpitz, understood that naval construction depended

upon Naval Estimates, which required Cabinet approval.

Fisher perfected the art of manipulating the British
naval community in order to secure funds to support the

His experience during the naval scare of 1893 left

navy.

Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God
II,

I,

.

Vol

,

Vol

29.

^'Admiral Fisher,
167; Vol II, 239.

^^Kennedy

,

as recorded in Harder,

Realities Behind Diplomacy

,

Fear God

128

him filled with "bitter contempt for politicians and
their
lack of principle."^-

At the same time,

appreciation for the power of the press.

it gave him a deep

Lord Esher

reinforced Fisher's recognition of the value of "popular
fears and popular interest, upon which alone rest the Navy

Estimates

.An invasion scare is the mill of God which

grinds you out a Navy of Dreadnoughts."^^

During his tenure

as First Sea Lord, he exchanged letters with a host of

journalists, the most favored of whom was freelance Arnold
White.

Fisher frequently requested that they produce

articles to order on issues affecting the navy.^^

Admiral

Sir Reginald Bacon noted:

He was the first of our Admirals to make an
the London Chamber of Commerce published a
pamphlet which pointed out that Britain had fewer armoured
ships in the Mediterranean than France and that her total
tonnage of such ships completed and under construction was
less than the combined totals of France and Russia.
Sir
William Harcourt, Chancellor of the Exchequer in William
Gladstone's last Cabinet, provided the House of Commons with
an optimistic appraisal of the relative strength of the
Royal Navy and the false impression that the Admiral ty
See Padfield, The Battleship Era (New
shared his views.
York, 1972), 145-46; Harder, Fear God Vol I, 101, 344-45.
"In 1893,

.

Lord Esher/ as recorded in Beloff, Imperial Sunset

,

120.

also corresponded with James Thursfield of The
Times, J.L. Garvin of the Observer J. A. Spender of the
Westminster Gazette and publicists Julian Corbett and Sir
George Clarke. During the invasion scare of 1907, for
example. Fisher wrote to Corbett: "Wouldn't it be a fine
thing for you to have an article in the Nineteenth
and it would be peculiarly appropriate if it
Century
appeared in November, as the matter is coming before us at
the Defence Committee [C.I.D.]." See Harder, Fear God Vol
^•^Fisher

,

,

.

.

.

,

II,

138.

"
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intelligent use of the press for the benefit of
the Navy.
He was convinced that, in order to get
his various reforms understood and appreciated by
the country, it was necessary to have the Press
primed with the whole truth about them... he did
not hesitate to keep in touch with certain
journalists whom he could trust, and to give them
as much information as official secrecy

permitted

.

Fisher also used leading members of British society,

including Lord Esher and Francis, 1st Viscount Knollys, the
royal secretary, and even foreign dignitaries in his efforts
to influence Westminster.

His most influential supporter

was Edward VII, "a priceless ally."

accepted

a

In 1907,

Fisher

royal invitation to Biarritz, where he cultivated

the youngest member of the Cabinet, an ex-Conservative

turned Radical by the name of Winston Churchill.
In that same year, the British Army mounted another

campaign in its long struggle to wrest responsibility for

defense of the home islands against invasion away from the
Royal Navy.

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth

century, Britain had endured a series of invasion scares

concerned with the possibility of

a

"bolt from the blue," or

unexpected attack during temporary loss of naval superiority
over the English Channel.*^

This unlikely scenario received

Admiral Bacon, as recorded in Harder, Fear God

.

Vol

I,

154.

'^Richard Hough, Former Naval Person: Churchill and the
Wars at Sea (London, 1985), 24-26.
^'Gooch,

The Prospect of War

,

2-13.
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periodic endorsement from service officials desirous of

bigger budgets and journalists in a similar quest.

Field

Marshal Frederick, 1st Earl Roberts of Kandahar, with
the
able assistance of Colonel Charles A'Court-Repington, the

military correspondent of The Times

,

propounded the view

that Germany had the ability to breach the navy's defenses.

The Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.), created in 1902,

according to Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, in order "to
survey as a whole the strategic military needs of the

Empire," examined the invasion question.

The Committee had

determined in 1903 that a successful invasion required at
least 70,000 troops; that such a force would require at

least 200 boats and 48 hours to conduct a crossing; and that
the navy would have ample opportunity to attempt a riposte.
It also

recognized that more serious than the risk of

invasion was the risk of starvation, as Britain had become
dependent upon imports to feed its populace.

In 1907,

the

defense committee reached the similar conclusion "that so
long as our naval supremacy is assured against any

reasonably probable combination of powers, invasion is

George Chesney's The Battle of Dorking Erskine
Childers' The Riddle of the Sands and William Le Quex's The
Invasion of 1910 represent three of the more popular
invasion stories.
,

,

^^Arthur Balfour, as recorded in Norman Gibbs, The
Origins of Imperial Defence (Oxford, 1955), 18.

Prospects of War 10; Michael Howard, The
Continental Commitment (London, 1972), 21-22.
^^Gooch,

,

.
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impracticable.

"5°

In 1908,

the Reichstag's passage of

a

novelle, or supplementary German Naval Law, which authorized
the construction of

3

battleships and

1

batt 1 ecruiser each

year from 1908-1911, threatened that supremacy.

The Anglo-German naval race in 1909 created the most

celebrated peacetime naval scare in British history.

London

received indications that Germany's premier manufacturer of
armaments, the Krupp congl om.erate in Essen, had increased
its capacity to produce armour, naval guns, and gun

mountings, while sim.ilar increases in slipways and

shipbuilding capacity led British naval intelligence to
calculate that Germany could equal the British production of
eight capital ships a year.'*

The Adm.iralty, working

necessarily by inference and extrapolation, determined that
by 1912 Germany would deploy, instead of the 13 capital

ships authorized under Tirpitz' various naval laws, 17 such

vessels and that 21 German dreadnoughts seemed
possibility.

a

The Royal Navy, in January 1909, possessed 10

capital ships in various stages of construction, with

authorized in the 1908 estimates.

2

more

Fisher informed his

political superior, First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald

McKenna that the navy needed six dreadnoughts in the 1909

^^Sir

Commi tment

Charles Ottley, as recorded in Howard, Continental
,

40

^^Padfield, Great Naval Race

^Wrder, Fear God

.

Vol II,

.

198-202.

206.

:

.
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estimates to maintain its position.

The First Lord took

Fisher's case to the Cabinet.
The Cabinet under Prime Minister Herbert Asquith

conducted

a

lengthy and passionate debate on the subject of

naval construction.

The Liberal -Radical element in the

Cabinet, led by David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the

Exchequer, and Winston Churchill, President of the Board of
Trade, preferred to support the Cabinet's social programs.

Churchill, who completely accepted the value of British

maritime supremacy, felt that Britain and Germany shared so
many economic ties as to render war unimaginable.

In a

speech in Swansea in August 1908, he said:
think it is greatly to be deprecated that
persons should try to spread the belief that war
between Great Britain and Germany is inevitable.
It is all nonsense.
I

He thus opposed the naval estimates of 1909 as containing "a

great field for reduction."

Lloyd George decried the cost

(almost £3 millions) of Fisher's new program of naval

construction
The laying down of the Dreadnought (sic) seemed to
many of us a piece of wanton and profligate
ostentation ... [The Anglo-German battleship
rivalry] was an exhausting drain upon resources
sadly needed for social amelioration and national
devel opment

'^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Randolph Churchill,

Churchill Volume II. 1901-1914; Young Statesman
(Boston, 1967), 494, 502.

Winston

S.

as recorded in Peter Rowland,
David Lloyd George: A Biography (New York, 1975), 205.
'^David Lloyd George,

.
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Churchill and Lloyd George sought to limit the construction
of new capital

Cabinet,

ships to four, while the big-navy wing of the

led by McKenna and Grey, the Foreign Secretary,

demanded the six requested by Fisher.
fashioned a compromise.

1909,

Asquith, in February

The navy received four

capital ships in 1909, with an additional four in April 1910

contingent on future developments.^^

News that Austria had

commenced a program of capital ship construction led the
Prime Minister in July 1909 to authorize the additional four

dreadnoughts
The course of the Cabinet conflict demonstrated the

depth of support for the capital ship in the leading
elements of British society.

King Edward VII, the direct

predecessor of George V, explained to his nephew the Kaiser
that "the great increase in building German ships of war"

forced Britain to reciprocate. 57

In both the House and the

press, the Conservative party adopted George Wyndham's

slogan: "We want eight, and we won't wait!"

'^Marder,

Fear God

,

58

An important

207.

^Sjinston Churchill, in defeat, summarized the
"In the end a curious and characteristic
compromise:
solution was reached. The admiralty demanded six ships: the
economists offered four: and we finally settled on eight."
See Hough, Great War at Sea 15-17.
,

•^Edward VII,

as recorded in Padfield, Great Naval Race

182.
'^George Wyndham,

George

,

210-214.

as recorded in Rowland, David Llovd

.
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segment of the Liberal party considered naval supremacy
to
be vital to the British Empire.
Sir Edward Grey explained
that "if the German Navy were superior to ours... for
us it

would not be

a

question of defeat.

Our independence, our

very existence would be at stake.""

Opposition to naval

armaments came from a coalition of Radicals and Labourites,
of which a majority were religious Nonconformists with

pacifist beliefs.
the debate,

4

The very limited realm of discourse in

dreadnoughts versus

important facts.

6

versus

8,

reflected two

First, according to historian Howard

Weinroth, "many Radicals and Labour men, traditionally
critics of excess armaments," accepted the prevailing

consensus that "British naval security might be

jeopardized."^

Second, no one (except a few diehard cavalry

colonels) proposed any alternatives to the capital ship as
the basis of Britain's defense.

The Moroccan Crisis of 1911 exacerbated this fear that

British naval security might be jeopardized."
the future of the Royal Navy in three ways.

It influenced

First, David

Sir Edward Grey, as recorded in Padfield, Great Naval

Race

,

220.

Weinroth, "Left-wing Opposition to Naval
Armaments in Britain before 1914" ( Journal of Contemporary
History VI, 1971).
^'^Howard
,

Unrest in Morocco led France to intervene there
militarily in 1911. Germany, determined to receive
compensation, dispatched the gunboat Panther to Agadir in
order to force the French to negotiate.
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Lloyd George, the Welsh radical and hitherto opponent of
all
the Tories held dear, assumed an uncharacteristic

belligerence in response to the arrival of the German
gunboat Panther in Agadir.

With the approval of both

Asquith and Grey, he spoke on July 21, 1911 to the assembled
bankers of London at Mansion House:
can conceive of nothing that could justify
disturbance of international goodwill except
questions of the greatest national moment, but if
a situation were forced upon us, in which peace
could only be preserved by ... al 1 owing Britain to
be treated, where her vital interests are
affected, as if she were of no account in the
Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that
peace would be a humiliation intolerable for a
great country like ours to endure.^
I

This speech moved Lloyd George, who would later have a

significant impact on the senior service, away from the
Radical camp and toward the mainstream of the political
spectrum.
Second, the British government sanctioned

a

new role

for the British army in the event of hosti 1 ities with

Germany.

At a meeting of the C.I.D.

on August 23, 1911,

Asquith met with the services chiefs to consider the
deployment of British forces in case of war.

General Sir

Henry Wilson argued that the army should be employed rapidly
to reinforce the left flank of the French.

First Sea Lord

'^Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David Lloyd
In the debate over the finance bill for 1909George 250.
10, Lloyd George remarked that "a fully-equipped duke costs
as much to keep up as two Dreadnoughts (sic), and they are
just as great a terror, and they last longer."
,

.
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Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, on the other hand, advocated
"a
close blockade of German ports, the capture of
advanced
bases, and possible landings on the enemy's coast.

"^^

He

argued that the army would tie down more German divisions
if
it retained the potential

operations.

to conduct major amphibious

Committee secretary Maurice Hankey supported

the admiral, noting that:
if the army has been committed to the centre of
the campaign at the outset of the war, all
possibility of influencing the course of the war

in... a manner which sea power alone can render
possible, disappears, and the great advantage of
sea power is to a great extent thrown away."

The C.I.D. nonetheless approved General Wilson's plan,

leaving the navy the responsibility of ferrying the army to
France.

This decision would profoundly affect the British

experience in the First World War.
Finally, the Moroccan Crisis also led to a shakeup at

Admiralty House.

McKenna firmly supported Admiral Wilson's

opposition to allowing the army to enter the line in France.

Asquith was further distressed to find at the height of the
crisis that the First Lord and the First Sea Lord had

neither written war plans nor a staff for their creation.

^^ough. Great War at Sea
^Slaurice Hankey,
Commitment 43

.

24.

as recorded in Howard, Continental

,

Admiralty had war plans in the sense of general
strategy for a war with Germany. At that time, however,
they did not possess detailed war orders, which allocated
specific missions to particular fleets and squadrons.
^'The

.

63

Asquith believed that "the present position in which
everything is locked up in the brain of

a

single admiral

[the First Sea Lord] is both ridiculous and dangerous

.

"^^

The Prime Minister thus transferred McKenna to the
Home

Office in October 1911 and brought Churchill to the
Admiral ty

Winston Churchill carried out the responsibilities of
the First Lord of the Admiralty with more vigor than perhaps

any of his predecessors.

Churchill's attitude towards

Germany changed dramatically after the Moroccan Crisis of
1911, when he declared:

with France.""

"If Germany makes war... we shd join

The day after he assumed office, the new

First Lord opened liaison with Admiral Fisher (retired), who

began sending frequent missives from Lucerne, Switzerland.
Three days later, Churchill finished an imposing memorandum
on the need for a Naval Staff, which he created in January
1912.

When First Sea Lord Wilson disagreed, the First Lord

demanded his resignation. Churchill then set off in the

Admiralty yacht Enchantress for a whirlwind inspection of
the fleet.

His assaults on the traditions of the senior

^"Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Leslie Gardiner, The
British Admiralty (London, 1968), 314.

^^Winston Churchill,
S.

Churchill Volume

II

,

as recorded in Churchill, Winston
505.

memorandum is reproduced in its entirety in
Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill Companion Vo lume
^^The

(Boston, 1969), Part 2, 1303-1312.
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service earned the distrust of a conservative element
within
the naval community.^'

His primary accomplishments at

Admiralty House paralleled those of Fisher:

a

reorganization

of the fleet and a revolutionary new battleship.

Churchill assumed a degree of responsibility highly
unusual for a First Lord in the design of the latest class
of battleships,

the Queen Elizabeths

.

He wrote to Fisher in

April 1912 about the new ships, suggesting a speed of 22

knots and the replacement of the scheduled 13.5-inch guns,
in use on contemporary warships, with an untried 15-inch gun

design.

Fisher responded emphatically: "These MUST be the

15-inch gun... there MUST be further VERY GREAT INCREASE IN
SPEED.

"•'^

Churchill decided upon 25 knots and the 15-inch

guns, which increased the displacement of the super-

dreadnoughts to 27,500 tons.

To reach the goal of 25 knots

required the switch from British coal to the more efficient
fuel oil, which Churchill secured through a Royal Commission

(under the direction of Fisher!) which supported the

decision to switch fuels and led to the creation of the

Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

The Queen Elizabeth class of

Churchill, for example, proposed to George V to name a
new battleship Oliver Cromwell and, upon rejection,
resubmitted the same name. He dismissed First Sea Lord
Wilson and his replacement Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman
within thirteen months. His decisions to switch from coal
to oil fuel and to reduce the strength of the Mediterranean
squadron also generated distrust.

II,

^^Admiral Fisher,
451.

as recorded in Marder, Fear God

,

Vol
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battleships, which cost £2.5 millions apiece, would prove
their worth in two World Wars.^*

Churchill also modified both the geographical

disposition and the standard of strength of the Royal Navy.
In January 1912,

Tirpitz' novelles

the First Lord became aware of another of

which increased the authorized German

.

capital ship strength in the North Sea from 21 to 36 capital
ships.

The Naval Law of 1912 provided for the construction

of 3 new battle ships and immediate increase of 12

dreadnoughts through the activation of ships in reserve and
the redeployment of those abroad.

Cabinet to accept

a

Churchill convinced the

modification of the Two Power Standard,

which he announced to the House in March: "Sixty per cent in

Dreadnoughts (sic) over Germany as long as she adhered to
her present declared programme, and two keels to one for

every additional ship laid down by her."

To insure an

adequate margin of superiority in home waters, Churchill
sought to recall the last major contingent of British

battleships abroad.
In 1912,

the First Lord fought a hard campaign to move

the battleships in the Mediterranean Fleet to the North Sea.

^-Hough,

Great War at Sea

,

27-28.

^^Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II
Part 3, 1518.
^H^inston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill Volume II, 548.

.

:
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He expressed his conception of strategy in a
memorandum

which echoed the phrases of Fisher and Mahan
to the Prime
Minister
Gt Britain will keep a Navy strong enough to
deal
with the strongest probable combination in the
decisive theatres. This means concentration, &
consequent abandonment of all seas except those in
wh the supreme issue will be settled.

The enemy was Germany; the decisive theater, to the First
Lord, was the North Sea.

C.I.D. that "the German

He explained to members of the
f

1

eet ... exists for the purpose of

fighting a great battle in the North Sea."'-

recommended that the

Churchill

battleships at Malta be ordered to

6

the Atlantic Fleet and that "a definite naval arrangement

should be made with France without delay.

This

recommendation drew criticism, according to historian
Michael Howard, from Liberals and Radicals "because of the

alliance it implied with France" and Conservatives "because
no such alliance existed." 77
in July:

The C.I.D. reached

a

compromise

the Royal navy would maintain "a reasonable margin

of superiority in home waters" and "a battle fleet equal to

^Sjinston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
Part 3, 1558.
S. Churchill: Companion Volume II
,

S.

^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
Churchill Volume II 560-61.
,

as recorded in Churchill, Winston
Companion Volume II Part 3, 1567.

^Slinston Churchill,
S.

Churchill:

,

Howard, Continental Commitment

,

48-49.

.

67
a

one-power Mediterranean standard, excluding France.

Churchill then replaced the ships in question with

4

"^^

British

cruisers, which in his evaluation equalled twice their

number of Austrian battleships.

This easy victory, however,

could not hide the rising cost of the Anglo-German naval
rival ry

Naval Estimates placed a steadily increasing burden on
the Treasury after the turn of the twentieth century.
1903,

In

the year before Admiral Fisher cam.e to Admiralty

House, the Naval Estimates totalled £34.5 millions.

Upon

his retirement in 1910, the Estimates reached £40.4

millions. 79

On December

5,

1913, First Lord Winston

Churchill informed the Cabinet that the 1913-14 Estimate of
£46.3 millions would not suffice to meet the cost of the

navy's operating expenses and that he required a

Supplementary Estimate for 1913-14 of not less than £1.4
millions.

At the same time, he proposed a Naval Estimate

for 1914-15 of £50.7 millions, with authorization for

4

new

The Cabinet did not appreciate Churchill's

capital ships.

proposal, and a number of junior ministers quickly formed

a

bloc in opposition to the Estimates.

Minute 117, July
and Dockrill, Mirage of Power
''C.I.D.

^Kennedy, Naval Mastery
^''churchill

1819.

,

Winston

S.

,

4,
,

1912, as recorded in Lowe

56.

193.

Churchill: Companion V olume II,

.
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The Naval Estimates of 1914-15 gave rise to serious

division within the Cabinet.

On December 16th, Churchill

resisted suggestions for cutting two dreadnoughts and

satisfied the Cabinet by agreeing to reduce the 1914-15
Estimates to under £50 millionsJ^

Two days later, however,

the First Lord notified the Chancellor of the Exchequer that
he would require a Supplementary Estim.ate for 1913-14 in the

amount of £3 millions rather than £1.4 millions as forecast.
The hard-pressed Lloyd George then placed him.self at the

head of the anti-Churchill coalition with

a

public interview

attacking "the overwhelming extravagance of our expenditure
on arm.aments." 82

announced in

a

Asquith, in an effort to prevent

a

split,

private meeting with the Chancellor and the

First Lord that the consequence of resignation would be an

immediate general election.

Churchill then exacerbated the

problem, by increasing his requirement for 1914-15 to £52.8

millions.

On January 29th, Asquith warned the Cabinet of

"the disastrous consequences of a spl it" over the Naval

Ministers who opposed the estim.ates included Herbert
Samuel, Postmaster-General; Walter Runciman, President of
the Board of Agriculture; Sir John Simon, Attorney-General;
J. A. Pease, President of the Board of Education; Charles
Hobhouse, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; and McKenna
See F.W. Weimann, "Lloyd George and the
at the Home Office.
Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914", in Taylor, Twelve
Essays 78
,

^^Lloyd George,
George 273.

as recorded in Rowland, David Lloyd

,

^^eimann, "Lloyd George and the Navy Estimates", in
Taylor, Twelve Essays 83.
,

69

Estimates and achieved consensus on

a

figure of £2.5

millions for the supplementary estimates.

Asquith privately

asked Churchill to "throw a baby or two out of the sledge,"

whereupon Churchill cut his demand to £51.6 mil lions.
Cabinet accepted his figure (and

4

The

new battleships) on

February 11, 1914.
The Estimates Crisis of 1914 revealed the hegemony of
the value of the capital ship within leading Liberal

circles.

Three of the more influential members of the

Cabinet, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey; Lord Chancellor

Richard Burdon, 1st Viscount Haldane; and Secretary of State
for War John Seely, supported the First Lord throughout the

crisis.

The City merchants at Guildhall unanimously

resolved:
That this Meeting of the Citizens of London begs
to assure the Prime Minister and His Majesty's
Government of the support of the Commercial
Community in any measure--f inancial or otherwise-that may be necessary to ensure the continued
supremacy of the Navy and the adequate protection
of the Trade routes of the Empire.

King George V wrote Churchill in his own hand that "this
year's programme of

4

86
Battleships must be adhered to."

The

Prime Minister later informed his sovereign that the

Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
Churchill Volume II 656, 659.

S.

,

Mayor Sir Thomas Bowater, as recorded in
Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II
^^Lord

as recorded in Churchill, Winston S.
Churchill Volume II, 651.
^^George V,

,

1867.
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opposition objected "not so much to the programme of new
construction, as to the growing cost of maintenance."^^

After Churchill left the Admiralty, Liberal opponents of
his
naval estimates revealed they objected more to Churchill

himself than to his proposals.^*

One of the leaders of the

economy faction disingenuously argued that "the loss of WC,
though regrettable, is not by any means

a

splitting of

party--indeed large admiralty estimates may be capable of
being carried only because WC has gone."^^
One member of the economy faction who did object to the
Naval Estimates was Lloyd George.

He had consistently

opposed "Tory extravagance on armaments.""'

Furthermore,

Churchill's annoying habit of changing his figures played
havoc with the Chancellor's attempts to produce
budget.

a

balanced

The Welsh Wizard, however, realized that opposition

to more dreadnoughts was a weak reed on which to base a

party revolt.

One of his biographers admitted "that the

Chancellor's sympathies were never really engaged by this

Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
Churchill Volume II 656.

S.

,

%ost feared Churchill would
over the issue
replacement at
George and the
Taylor, Twelve

bolt the Liberal Party
of Home Rule, while McKenna resented his
See F.W. Weimann, "Lloyd
the Admiralty.
Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914", in
Essays 77-78.
,

John Simon, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
658.
Churchill Volume II
^'sir

S.

,

'^David Lloyd George,
Lloyd George 213.

as recorded in Rowland,

"

David

,

I

:

.

particular conflict.

"^l

Lloyd George thus repeatedly sought

to arrange a compromise at the lowest possible level
of

spending.

Churchi 1

He expressed his capitulation one morning to

1

Oddly enough, my wife spoke to me last night about
this Dreadnought (sic) business.
She said, "You
know, my dear, I never interfere in politics; but
they say you are having an argument with that nice
Mr. Churchill about building Dreadnoughts (sic).
Of course I don't understand these things, but I
should have thought that it would be better to
have too many rather than too few." So I have
decided to let you build them.^
The Chancellor's finely tuned appreciation of the

sensibilities of the Liberal Party warned him that in 1914

battleships remained a shibboleth he could not afford to
attack

Between 1905 and 1914, the British defense policies of
supporting a balance of power in Europe and maintaining
command of the sea led to an increasingly substantial

commitment to France against Imperial Germany.
commitment took the dual forms of

a small

That

expeditionary

force reserved for the Franco-Belgian border and an

unprecedented period of peacetime expansion for the Royal
Navy.

Fisher and Churchill, inspired by the edicts of

Mahan, guided the evolution of the navy toward a fleet of

dreadnoughts concentrated in the North Sea.

^-Rowland,

David Llovd George

Churchill Volume II,

272

as recorded in Churchill, Winston
662.

%avid Lloyd George,
S.

,

Despite

72

challenges from its Radical wing, at no time after Asquith

assumed the premiership in 1908 had the Liberal
Party denied
the capital ships demanded by the Admiralty.

Nor had the

Asquith Ministry ever seriously considered an alternative
basis for its military preparations.
war,

At the onset of the

the Royal Navy possessed 31 capital ships of

dreadnought or later vintage (with another 16 building)
supported by 39 older vessels.'^

Parliament obviously

believed at the time that the German fleet presented

a real

threat and that capital ships constituted the most secure

means of protection.

Kennedy, Naval Mastery

,

229.

CHAPTER

3

A GREAT PASSIVE VICTORY
In August,

1914, Britain faced the outbreak of war with

confidence in the Royal Navy.

The opening moves of the war,

however, failed to provide the expected victory.

The

Dardanelles Campaign of 1915 would tarnish the reputation of
key members of the naval hierarchy.
in 1916,

initially portrayed as

a

The Battle of Jutland

British defeat, would cast

grave doubts on the value of the dreadnought.

The

effectiveness of German submarine warfare in 1917-18 would
prove the value of new naval weapons and drag down more
naval leaders.

The Great War thus would damage the

reputation of the navy, reducing the fortunes of its
supporters and the perceived value of the capital ship.
At 11.00 PM on August 4th, Winston Churchill signalled
to all elements of the navy:

GERMANY."

"COMMENCE HOSTILITIES AGAINST

The First Lord of the Admiralty felt confident,

having written to the King on August

1,

1914:

"The general

position and strength of the British Fleets Squadrons

&

Flotillas is regarded as satisfactory by the Board of
Admiralty."*

The officers and men of the Royal Navy

anticipated the coming clash with a massive confidence.

The

commander of the Battlecruiser Squadron described the

condition of his unit in the first days of August: "The

^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill Volume II, 706, 698.

.

.
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enthusiasm was immense.

I

have never seen such

magnificent and cheerful spirit.

a

when Londoners heard

about the declaration of war, crowds gathered
outside the

Admiralty building to sing "God Save the King."^

The public

expected, according to historian Richard Hough, "an

immediate and glorious victory."*
The Admiralty's strategy for

a

war with Germany

followed Mahan's general approach of command of the sea

through concentration of the fleet.

The Admiralty's

original analysis of the problem had identified the ultimate

purpose of the navy as the control of ocean trade.

The

Board, after considering Germany's lack of cruisers, poorly

sited bases, and the fact that German naval "expenditure is

chiefly devoted to battleship construction," had concluded
that "it is their intention to dispute the actual command of

the sea."

The Admiralty had intended to concentrate the

Royal Navy off the German coast with instructions "to seek
out the corresponding fleets of the enemy with a view to

bringing them to action."

Commerce destruction would remain

"a subsidiary question" until after combat with the High

2

Vice-Admiral David Beatty, as recorded in Bryan Ranft,
ed. The Beatty Papers: Volume I. 1902-1918 (Aldershot,
1989),

113.

Dingman
Slough,

,

Pacific

,

18

Naval Person

,

59

^ADM 116/866B: Admiralty Memorandum, "The Protection of
Ocean Trade in Time of War", April 31, 1905.

.
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Seas Fleet had secured "the only really decisive factor--

command of the sea."^
The Admiralty abandoned the traditional British

approach of close blockade of the enemy coast.

They saw the

destructive potential of m.ines and torpedoes, particularly
in shallow waters.

A staff officer in 1906 thus rejected

the notion of attacking the German coast and recomjnended
that the Royal Navy withdraw across the North Sea in order
to tempt the High Seas Fleet to "attack us in a position of

our choosing and under conditions agreeable to us

.

"^

Admi ral Sir Arthur Wilson endorsed his analysis, which

formed the basis of the Admiralty's first war plan in 1908.^
the Admiralty decided on "a middle course between

In 1912,

the two undesirable extremes of a close blockade of the

hostile coast... and the abandonment of all observation of
the enemy on the other" by effecting

a

blockade with

a

line

of cruisers in a relatively safe "intermediate position"
Q

approximately 170 miles from the German coast.

In 1914,

ADM 116/866B: Admiralty Memorandum, "The Protection of
Ocean Trade in Time of War", April 31, 1905.
^ADM 116/1036B:

Germany"

,

September

Admiralty Memorandum, "War with
1

,

190 6

Remarks on War Plans by Admiral A.K.
Wilson, May 1907; W.l War Plan Against Germany, June 1908,
^ADM 116/1043B:

'aDM 116/866B: Admiralty Memorandum, "Remarks on War
Orders for an Observation Force in the North Sea in
connection with the lessons of the 1912 Manoeuvres",
September 16, 1912.
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the Admiralty decided to withdraw the cruiser
force and

establish a "distant blockade."*^

The Channel Fleet would

close the English Channel, a mere 20 miles wide,
in

conjunction with a series of minefields and
screening force, the Dover Patrol.

a

small

The Grand Fleet,

comprised of the bulk of the British dreadnoughts, would
block the larger gap between Scotland and Norway.
The Royal Navy had three important missions upon the
onset of hostilities.

Its immediate responsibility was to

insure the safe transport of Imperial forces to France.*^
The quintessential task of the Royal Navy was the protection
of Britain's sea lines of communication,

so vital because

the home islands produced less than 70% of the foodstuffs

required for the British populace.
impose

a

The navy also sought to

naval blockade upon Germany, despite German access

to the Baltic and the Balkans.

Britain's geographical

advantage over Germany meant all three missions could be

accomplished by blocking German egress from the North

Sea.*^

Barry Hunt, Sailor-scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert
Richmond. 1871-1946 (Waterloo, Ontario: 1982), 30.
"Hough, Great War at Sea

,

55.

The navy convoyed 120,000 soldiers of the British
Expeditionary Force in August, 50,000 soldiers of the Indian
Corps in September, and 25,000 Canadian volunteers in
See Martin
October without the loss of a single man.
Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Volume III, 1914-1916: The
Challenge of War (Boston, 1971), 37.
•H^ilson, Myriad Faces

,

77.
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The Grand Fleet, composed of 21 dreadnoughts,

battleships, and

4

8

older

battle cruisers, thus steamed north to

its war stations at Scapa Flow and Cromarty, while the

Channel Fleet, nineteen elderly pre-dreadnoughts

,

slowly

assembled in Portland.*^
During the Great War, the Grand Fleet and the High Seas
Fleet never deliberately engaged in guerre d'escadres

.

British leaders assumed their positional advantage would
force the German navy to contend for control of the

Scotland-Norway passage.*^

One officer wrote that "when the

great day comes it will be when the enemy takes the
initiative,"*^

The High Seas Fleet, however, refused to

compete for command of the seas at unfavorable odds.

German

strategy sought instead to engage nothing larger than

isolated squadrons and thus, according to Arthur Harder:
to whittle down the British Fleet through an
aggressive mining and submarine policy as a
prelude to engaging the Grand Fleet under
favourable conditions when an equalization of

forces had been obtained.

The High Seas Fleet at the time possessed 13
dreadnoughts, 16 older battleships, and 5 battle cruisers.
See Arthur Harder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The
Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (London. 1970), II,
4-5.

'Wilson, Hyriad Faces 77; Alfred Patterson, Jel licoe:
A Biography (New York, 1969), 61.
,

*^Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers 303-04.
,

Harder, Scapa Flow

,

45.

r

.
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The defensive policy adopted by both navies produced
a

stand-off, which depressed the men of the Grand Fleet.

One

admiral wrote:
fear the rascals will never come out, but will
only send their minelayers & submarines .... It is
really very disappointing and looks as if we shall
go through the war without ever coming to grips
with them.
Such a thought is more than I can
bear
I

In an effort to relieve the oppressive stalemate,

opposing

admirals began to experiment with small operations, such as
raids and ambushes.

The Royal Navy, despite the advantages of numbers and

position, suffered

a

number of highly visible setbacks

during the opening months of the war.

In August,

cruisers Goeben and Breslau escaped from

a

the German

more powerful

British squadron under Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne
in the Mediterranean to reach sanctuary in Turkish waters.
In September,

a

single German submarine sank three

antiquated Bacchant e- cl ass cruisers, the Abouki
and the Cressy

,

killing over 1400 sailors.

,

the Hogue

In October,

,

the

German liner Ber 1 in slipped out of the North Sea and off the
Irish coast laid a number of mines, one of which sank the

powerful battleship Audacious

.

Later that month, the sea

plane carrier Hermes fell victim to
coast of France.

a

German torpedo off the

Throughout the fall, German surface

*Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers 134-35.
,

:

f

.
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vessels inflicted
marine.*^

a

rising toll on the British merchant

The German East Asiatic Squadron thoroughly

disrupted Australasian shipping and, before defeat off the
Falkland Islands, sank a pursuing force of two British
cruisers at the Battle of Coronel in November.

In December,

German battle cruisers shelled the East Coast towns of
Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby and escaped cleanly.
The officers of the Royal Navy quickly became

disenchanted with elements of their leadership.

The escape

of the Goeben and Breslau led one distinguished officer to

write: "To think it is to the Navy to provide the first and

only instance of failure.
added:

"I

Goeben.."-

God,

it makes me sick."^^

Fisher

should have shot Sir Berkeley Milne for the
The court-martial of one of the officers involved

found the accused not guilty "in view of the instructions

received from the Admiralty" in the form of
First Lord Churchill."

a

telegram from

The prosecutor himself believed that

•q

'The Karlsruhe alone claimed 17 victims August-October,
1914.
The raiders Emden and Wol were among the most
successful

Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers 138-139.
,

III,
^'Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God
In 1912, Fisher had characterized Milne as "unfitted to
,

52.

See Marder, Fear God

be the Senior Admiral afloat."

,

II,

451.
as recorded in Dan Van der
^^Troubridge Court-Martial
Vat, The Ship That Changed the World: The Escape of the
Goeben to the Dardanelles in 1914 (Bethesda, MD, 1986), 165.
Churchill's offending telegram, reproduced on p. 65, read as
foil ows
,

A

.
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"the Admiralty telegram was badly worded.

"^^

The disquiet

within the officer corps of the Royal Navy over
the Goeben
mishap quickly spread.

Discontent with the management of the naval conflict
became more commonplace after the loss of three ancient

Bacchante-class cruisers off Holland.

Professional

officers, as before, were the first to recognize

incompetence.

A Court of Inquiry identified a decision by

the Admiralty to continue the patrol after bad weather had

forced its escorting destroyers back to base as the primary
factor contributing to the loss of the cruisers.

submarine commander, who earlier had begged the Admiralty to
"take those Bacchante s away," compared the sinking of those

Should war break out and England and France engage in
it, it now seems probable that Italy also will remain
neutral and that Greece can be made an ally.
Spain also
will be friendly and, possibly, an ally.
The attitude of
Italy is, however, uncertain, and it is especially important
that your squadron should not be seriously engaged with
Austrian ships before we know what Italy will do. Your
first task should be to aid the French in the transportation
of the African Army by covering, and, if possible, bringing
particul ar 1 y Goeben
to action individual fast German ships
who [sic] may interfere with that transport.
You will be
notified when you may consult with the French Admiral. Do
not at this stage be brought to action against superior
forces, except in combination with the French, as part of a
The speed of your squadrons is sufficient
general batt 1 e
We shall hope later to
to enable you to choose your moment.
reinforce the Mediterranean, and you must husband your
forces at the outset
,

.

^^Rear-Admiral Sydney Fremantle, My Naval Career, 18801928 (New York, 1949), 174.
^*Marder,

Scapa Flow

,

Vol

II,

57-59.

81

ships with the stalking of tame elephants chained to trees.
A junior officer at the Admiralty described the decision
to

leave the cruisers on station without a destroyer escort as

"the most supreme case of ineptitude

"pure murder."

.

"^^

Fisher called it

Asquith wrote to his confidante: "It is

a

blow, particularly as the navy is not doing very well just

now... the Admiralty have not been clever in their outlying

strategy.

"^^

This incident, unlike the Goeben fiasco,

reached the public.

The press blamed the First Lord:

because, despite the warnings of adm.irals,
commodores and captains, Mr. Churchill refused,
until it was too late, to recall them from a
patrol so carried on as to make them certain to
fall victims to the torpedoes of an active enemy. ^'

Popular backlash from the loss of the Bacchantes thus
reached the Adm.iralty, "the brunt of it falling on
Churchill

."^°

Commodore Roger Keyes The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of
the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes The Narrow Seas to the
Dardanelles 1910-1915 (New York, 1954), 77, 106-10.
,

:

'^Captain Herbert Richmond, as recorded in Arthur
Harder, Portrait of an Admiral; the Life and Papers of Sir
Herbert Richmond (Cambridge, 1952), 110.
^^Admiral Fisher,
III, 61.

as recorded in Harder, Fear God

I,

S.

Vol

as recorded in Martin Gilbert,
Churchill, Companion Volume III (Boston, 1973),

^^Herbert Asquith,

Winston

,

127-28.
^^Journalist Thomas Gibson Bowles, as recorded in

Gilbert, Winston

S.

Churchill, Volume III

Harder, Scapa Flow

,

Vol

II,

59.

,

86.
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During the war, Churchill increased even more than
he
had in peacetime his own prerogatives at the
expense of the

jurisdiction of the Sea Lords.

At the onset of hostilities,

he bypassed the Admiralty Board and replaced Admiral
Sir

George Callaghan as commander of the Grand Fleet with ViceAdmiral Sir John Jellicoe.^^

After the war, he explained:

accepted full responsibility for bringing about
successful results, and in that spirit I exercised
a close general supervision over everything that
was done or proposed.
Further, I claim.ed and
exercised an unlimited power of suggestion and
initiative over the whole field, subject only to
the approval and agreement of the First Sea Lord
on all operational orders.
I

Needless to say, his determ.inat ion and powers of persuasion
rendered imjnaterial the theoretical lim.itation on his

authority which he acknowledged in retrospect.

One of his

biographers noted how the professionals at the Admiralty
lamented "the authoritarian and

com.pl

etely dominating manner

in which he took ... control of the main thrust of events.

"^^

The Chief of the War Staff stated that Churchill's m.anner

Fisher had proposed to Lord Esher that
Jellicoe serve as wartime commander should hostilities
occur: "If war comes before 1914, then Jellicoe will be
Nelson at the Battle of St. Vincent; if it comes in 1914,
then he'll be Nelson at Trafalgar." Fisher repeatedly wrote
See Harder, Fear Nought Vol
Churchill on the same subject.
In 1912,

,

443,

450.

II,

440,

T T

^^Winston Churchill,
39
'^Hough,

as recorded in Harder,

Form.er Naval Person

,

58-59.

Scapa Flow

,

.

"

.

permitted "very little united decision.

Churchill thus

associated himself to an extraordinary degree with the

performance of the navy,
Churchill's attempts to keep the Channel ports in

Allied hands seriously damaged his reputation.

His

formation of a naval division for service on the Western
Front led the Assistant Director of Naval Operations to
declare: "I really believe Churchill is not sane."^^

During

the first week in October, Churchill rushed to beleaguered

Antwerp in an effort to stiffen its defenders.

He ordered

up two British Naval Brigades and proposed to take comjr.and
of the city,

and authority

provided he was given "necessary military rank
.

"^^

Asquith, who found the proposal from an

ex- 1 ieutenant of Hussars "a real bit of tragi -comedy

criticized the deployment of "the rawest recruits,
whom, had

never fired

rifle." 37

a

conf idant e Frances Stevenson

,

,

m.ost

of

Lloyd George, to his

bitterly condemj?-ed the naval

intervention for causing heavy and unnecessary British

Vice-Admiral Doveton Sturdee, as recorded in Hough,
Great War at Sea 85
,

^^Captain Herbert Richmond,
100.
Portrait of an Admiral

as recorded in Harder,

,

%inston Churchill,
Person

,

as recorded in Hough, Former Naval

62

^^Herbert Asquith, Memories and Reflections (Boston,
1928), 50, 54.

^

84
1

losses.

38

Churchill's former Naval Secretary complained:

If we only had a

Kitchener at the Admiralty we
could have done so much and the present state of
chaos in naval affairs would never have existed.
It is inconceivable the mistakes and blunders we
have made and are making.

Churchill's repeated visits to Antwerp led the Morning Post
to level harsh criticism against the First Lord on October

19th:

What we chiefly desire to enforce upon Mr
Churchill is that this severe lesson ought to
teach him that he is not, as a matter of fact, a
Napoleon; but a Minister of the Crown with no time
either to organize or lead armies in the field.
The Times

,

also part of the Northcliffe press, carried

complaints from Conservative leader Walter Long about the

extensive losses (2700 men) in the operation and the lack of
training given to the troops involved.^*
attacks of the Morning Post

,

The repeated

which demanded Churchill's

resignation, reduced the public's confidence in the navy.'^

Churchill's position became rather delicate at the
close of 1914.

The destruction of Admiral Sir Christopher

Taylor, ed, Lloyd George: A Diary by Francis
Stevenson (London, 1971), 6.
A. J. P.

^Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers 144-45.
,

Gwynne, editor of the Morning Post
in Hough, Former Naval Person 62.
^''Arthur

,

as recorded

,

'•Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War (New York,
1971), 192.
^•^Gilbert,

144.

Winston

S.

Churchill. Volume III

,

125-27,

.
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Craddock's squadron at the Battle of Coronel led the
Cabinet
to censure the navy to the King.
Frances Stevenson recorded
Lloyd George's opinion:
Churchill is too busy trying to get a flashy
success to attend to the real business of the
Admiralty.
Churchill blames Admiral Craddock for
the defeat in South America--the Admiral ... having
gone down with his ship & so unable to clear
himself .^^
In conversation with editor

CP.

Scott, Lloyd George

condemned Churchill's decision to bom.bard the Dardanelles as
causing Turkey's entry into the war.'^
som.e of

Churchill deflected

the criticism by accepting the resignation of First

Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg, himself under press

attack for his German ancestry, but then bought new trouble
by bringing Fisher back as First Sea Lord.

This decision

rankled George V, who described the appointment as "a great

mistake" and vainly sought to reverse

it.^^

in Parliament for Churchill's removal.

Pressure mounted

The Conservatives

demanded an explanation of the defeat at Coronel, and both
parties questioned his role in the loss of Antwerp.

Frances Stevenson, as recorded in Taylor, Ll oyd
George: A Diary 10
,

^^Rowland, David Lloyd George

,

293.

George V, as recorded in Nicolson, King George V:
his Life and Reign (New York, 1953), 251.
^^King

Churchill, Volume III 169-70.
Bonar Law described Churchill as having "an entirely
unbalanced mind." See Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill,
Companion Volume III 191.
^^Gilbert, Winston S.

,

,

:

.

86

Any relief provided by Fisher's arrival and the

consequent victory at the Falkland Islands evaporated
in the
face of an attack from Secretary of State for War Field
Marshal Horatio Herbert, 1st Earl Kitchener of Khartoum.
The Field Marshal mistrusted Churchill's frequent visits to

General Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief of the

British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) in France.
17th,

On December

the Earl complained about the "Dunkerque Circus," an

ad hoc military force which Churchill had assembled on the

continent, and presented Asquith

a

letter ostensibly

proposing that Churchill assume the War Office and Fisher
the Admiralty/'

Asquith duly chastised Churchill and

ordered the First Lord's expeditionary force transferred to
the War Office.

The cumulative effect of these attacks on

the First Lord from the press, Windsor Castle, the House of

Commons

,

and the Cabinet shook Asquith'

s

confidence in

JQ

Churchill's judgment-

The Prime Minister wrote in

December

Winston came to see me. ..to report progress or
expect the
rather (as usual ) the 1 ack of i t
I
whole Navy is a little dispirited & chaffing under
the sense of ill "luck and impatience at purely
negative results
•

^'Gilbert, Winston S,

.

.

Churchill, Volum>e III

Kitchener:
^^Philip Magnus,
307.
(New York, 1959)

,

166.

Portrait of an Im.perialist

,

as recorded in Gilbert, Winston S.
Companion Volume III I, 333.

^'Herbert Asquith,

Churchill.

,

87

Churchill realized full well that it was, in the
words of
the Prime Minister, "time that he bagged
something, & broke
some crockery.

"50

His focus turned away from the trenches of

the Western Front to the more lightly defended reaches
of
the eastern Mediterranean.
In the winter of 1914-15,

the British government

conducted a review of grand strategy.

On December 28, 1914,

Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary of the War Council, presented

that body a m.emorandum which em.phasized "the rem.arkable

deadlock" on the Western Front and advocated the use of "our
sea power and our growing military strength to attack

Germany

...

through her allies, and particularly Turkey.

"5*

The following day, Churchill denounced any thought of

"sending our arm.ies to chew barbed wire in Flanders" and

proposed am.phibious action against the island of Borkum, off
the German coast.

Asquith, who felt "profoundly

dissatisfied" with the prospect of fighting in Flanders,
found himself swayed.
On January

2,

1915, the need for urgency increased when

the Foreign Office informed the War Council that Russia,

^''Herbert

110

Asquith, as recorded in Wilson, Myriad Faces

,

.

Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Gilbert, Winston
I, 337-43.
Churchill, Companion Volume III
5*Sir

S.

,

^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Gilbert, Winston
Churchill, Companion Volume III, I, 343-45.
53

Asquith, Mem.ories and Reflections

,

62.

S.
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facing offensives from both the Germans and
the Turks, had
requested that Kitchener arrange "a demonstration
against
the Turk. .either naval or military. "^^ Kitchener
then
sought French's views on the deployment of troops
from
.

France.
a

The commander of the B.E.F. declared that "so large

margin of safety is needed that troops could not be

withdrawn from this theater.

"^^

Kitchener thus informed the

War Council that the Dardanelles constituted the most

suitable objective for a new offensive but that he had no
forces available for such an operation.

On January 13th,

the Cabinet decided to accept an Admiralty proposal for a

purely naval expedition "to bombard and take the Gallipoli

peninsula

"^^
.

Churchill provided the primary impetus for the
operation.

Fisher wrote the First Lord on January

3,

1915

and outlined a plan along the lines of Hankey's analysis for
an expedition of 100,000 troops and a squadron of second

class battleships to force the Dardanelles.'^

Churchill,

under pressure to "bag something," then fired off

telegram

a

George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, as recorded in
I, 359Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Companion Volume III
^^Sir

,

60

.

^^General Sir John French,
Kitchener 311.

as recorded in Magnus,

,

^^The

War Council, as recorded in Wilson, Myriad Faces

107.
^^Marder,

Fear God

.

Vol III, 121-22.

.

.
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to Vice-Admiral Sir

SackviUe Hamilton Garden, commander

of

the squadron blockading the Dardanelles:
Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by
ships alone a practicable operation.
It is
assumed older Battleships fitted with minebumpers
would be used.... Importance of results would
justify severe loss.^

Garden responded cautiously that while he did not believe
that the Dardanelles could be rushed, he thought that "they

might be forced by extended operations with large numbers of
ships."ii53

Ghurchill then drew from Garden

purely naval assault on the Straits.

a

vague plan for a

Disregarding the

reservations of his naval advisors, he carried the plan to
the War Gouncil, which, in Hankey's words, "turned eagerly

from the dreary vista of

a

'slogging match' on the Western

Front to brighter prospects."^'

Vice-Admiral Garden, an elderly officer on the verge of
retirement when the war broke out, opened the bombardment of
the Dardanelles on February 19, 1915.

The attacking

squadron comprised 10 old battleships (4 French and
British), the battle cruiser Inflexible

,

6

and the Queen

'^^inston Ghurchill, as recorded in Hough, Former Naval
Person 79
,

ice-Admiral Garden, as recorded in van der Vat, Ship
That Ghanqed the World 206-07.
,

later implied that he had proposed his plan
for a purely naval assault as the surest means of prying an
See Magnus, Kitchener 317.
army from Flanders.
^^Churchill

.

^-Sir

207.

Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Marder, Scapa Flow

,

90

Elizabeth

,

the most powerful ship afloat."

defenses contained

a

The Turkish

mixture of permanent fortifications and

mobile field batteries overlooking a series of minefields.
The forts closest to the mouth of the Dardanelles
gradually
fell to the more powerful guns of the fleet, which

penetrated four miles up the straits.

As the waters

narrowed, however, the minefields became more serious
obstacles, and the Turkish howitzers defeated attempts by

group of fishing trawlers to sweep the mines.

a

The mounting

difficulties led Garden to resign his command to avoid
nervous collapse in early March.
His successor, Rear-Admiral John de Robeck, attempted
to solve the problem by force majeure

.

On the morning of

March 18, 1915, he ordered forward his battleships, now
eighteen strong.

The result was unmitigated disaster.

A

French ship, the Bouvet, struck a mine and foundered with
over 600 hands still on board.

More mines claimed three

British ships, two of which sank.

Finally, Turkish gunfire

put two more French battleships out of action.

Robeck's

squadron suffered three ships sunk and three more forced to
retire (a loss of one-third strength) in return for minor

damage to the Turkish batteries; the minefields remained

"^Hough,

Naval Person

^\^ilson. Myriad Faces

Sea.

153-157.

91.

.

,

111-115; Hough, Great War at

91

intact."

The naval assault on the Dardanelles drew
to an

inglorious close.

Differences over the operation caused

between Churchill and Fisher.

a

permanent break

The First Sea Lord developed

misgivings about the Dardanelles campaign as early as
January 19, 1915, when he wrote:
Now the Cabinet have decided on taking the
Dardanelles solely with the Navy, using 15
battleships and 32 other vessels, and keeping out
there three battle cruisers and a flotilla of
destroyers-- al 1 urgently required at the decisive
theatre at home
don't agree with a single
I
step taken.
[Fisher's italics]
!

.

.

.

"

The admiral presented his views in late January to the Prime

Minister, who worried about "the growing friction between

Winston and Fisher.""^

Fisher felt himself in

sensed the Dardanelles operation would come

a

dilemma: he

a

cropper; he

regarded inaction as unacceptable; and he knew with

certainty the War Cabinet opposed his plan for an invasion
of the Baltic.

After the naval rebuff on March 18th,

Churchill drafted a telegram to Robeck:

You ought to persevere methodically but resolutely
with the plan contained in your instructions .. .You
should dominate the forts at the Narrows and sweep
the minefields and then batter the forts at close

^Sdarder,

Scapa Flow

,

245-247; Wilson, Myriad Faces

,

116.
^'Admiral Fisher,
III, 133.

as recorded in Marder, Fear God

"Herbert Asquith, Memories and Reflections
^^Wilson, Myriad Faces

,

200.

,

70.

,

Vol

.
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range.

Fisher adamantly opposed the telegram and told
his political
superior that he would resign if Churchill were to send
it.

Churchill, on that occasion, backed down.

Fisher did resign

in May 1915 because the First Lord ordered certain ships
to

Gallipoli in excess of

a

list upon which they had both

agreed

Fisher's handling of the Dardanelles operation and its

aftermath cost him his reputation.
as a highly respected,

He had entered the war

albeit controversial, figure and had

since energized the wartime construction of new vessels and

orchestrated the victory at the Falkland Islands.

His

manner of resignation, however, placed him beyond the pale
of responsible employment.'^

On May 15th, when the Cabinet

believed the German fleet to be at sea, he bolted from the

Admiralty to Charing Cross, with plans to go to Scotland,
which only the Prime Minister's directive prevented him from
executing.

On May 19th, he put forth a series of

conditions as his price for returning to office: the removal
of Churchill,

a

guarantee that his replacement would be

restricted to "pol icy and pari iamentary procedure

,

"

and,

above all, a demand for:

^S^inston Churchill, as recorded in Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill. Volume III 365.
,

^^azlehurst. Politicians at War

,

237-38.

^^Asquith, Memories and Reflections

,

109.

.

.
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complete professional charge of the war at sea
together with the absolute sole disposition
Fleet and the appointment of all officers of of'the
ranks whatsoever, and absolutely untrammeled all
sole
command of all the sea forces whatsoever

Asquith noted that "his conduct at this critical time
convinced me that it had become impossible that he should
remain responsible for the Admiral ty

.

"^^

Fisher would never

again hold a position which affected government policy.

Fisher's resignation toppled Churchill from his

position as First Lord.

From his hotel room in Charing

Cross, Fisher had written to Conservative leader Andrew

Bonar Law: "I am absolutely unable to remain with W.C. (HE'S
A REAL DANGER !)"^^

When Lloyd George heard Fisher had

resigned, he said of Churchill:

Nemesis of the man who has fought for
this war for years.
When the war came he saw in
it the chance of glory for himself, & has
accordingly entered on a risky campaign without
caring a straw for the misery and hardship it
would bring to thousands, in the hope he would
prove to be the outstanding man in this war.
It is the

Fisher's resignation, coincident with The Times

*

dramatic

announcement of a shell shortage in France, led Bonar Law on

7

1

Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God

,

III,

241.
77

Herbert Asquith, Memories and Reflections 113.
See Nicolson, King
George V shared Asquith's opinion.
George V 263.
,

,

^^Admiral Fisher,
III, 237.

as recorded in Harder, Fear God

^^David Lloyd George,
George: A Diary , 50

,

as recorded in Taylor, Lloyd

Vol

"

.

94

May 17th to present Asquith with the alternatives of "some
change in the constitution of the Government" or

attack in the House upon the conduct of the war.^^

a

Tory

The

Conservative price for coalition was the exclusion of
Haldane from the ministry and the removal of Churchill from
the Admiralty,

Lloyd George strongly supported accepting

the Conservative proposal and dumping Churchill.''*'

The Prime

Minister bowed to the pressure and reconstructed the
Cabinet.

Arthur Balfour assumed the duties of First Lord of

the Adm.iralty from Churchill, who received the sinecure post
of Chancellor of

the Duchy of Lancaster.

Asquith's

secretary adm.itted to Churchill's wife Clementine that
"Winston has suffered

happiness

.

a

blow to prestige, reputation and

79

"Andrew Bonar Law, as recorded in Asquith, Memories and
Ref 1 ect ions 116.
,

Asquith, Memories and Reflections
George: A Diary 51

,

122

;

Tayl or

,

Lloyd

,

^^Lloyd George's opposition to Churchill can be traced
See entries for
through the diary of Frances Stevenson.
October 9th, 14th, 23rd, 30th, November 5th, December 16th,
23rd, January 21st, April 8th, and May 15th in Taylor, Lloyd

George: A Diary

.

^^inston Churchill, over a year later complained to
Hankey that "whenever I open my mouth in Parliam.ent someone
shouts out that I am. the m.an who let us in for the
Dardanelles mistake, and the papers are perpetually
repeating it." See Hough, Former Naval Person 125.
,

'^Edwin Montagu,

Person

,

119.

as recorded in Hough, Former Naval

95

Churchill's plan had significant consequences

J°

First,

the failure of the naval assault led the War Council
to

commit an army contingent under General Ian Hamilton to the

Gallipoli Peninsula.

That expedition, at the cost of heavy

casualties, failed to take Gallipoli and eventually withdrew

ingloriously .^^

Second, the failure of the battleships to

penetrate the Straits reflected the decline, relative to the

nineteenth century, in the military advantage of the
European powers over the rest of the worldJ^

Third, the

Dardanelles campaign and its afterm.ath destroyed the

cooperation between Fisher and Churchill and ruined their
reputations (at least temporarily).

The Dardanelles

campaign thus weakened the credibility of the Royal Navy's

leadership and the public perception of the fleet's ability
to project power.

Students of the Gallipoli campaign have given
Churchill's concept of opening a route to Russia through the
Dardanelles generally positive reviews, while taking an
overwhelm.ingl y negative line on his plan to force the
Straits with a purely naval force. Gilbert, Winston S.
224-380, supports both Churchill's
Churchill, Volume III
strategy and his advocacy of a naval assault to the War
Cabinet; Wilson, Myriad Faces 103-121, condemns both the
concept and the plan; and Harder, Scapa Flow II, 259-65,
adopts the prevalent position of admiring Churchill's
strategy while roundly criticizing the First Lord's
impetuous support of a flawed operation.
,

,

,

Gallipoli (New York, 1956), 80-343,
provides the Dominion perspective of the military engagement
at Gallipoli.
^-Alan Moorehead,

British squadron under Admiral Sir John
Duckworth successfully forced the Dardanelles.
^^In

1807,

a
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For the first two years of the war,
the Royal Navy's
control of the exits of the North
Sea remained unchallenged.
In the minds of the officers of
the Grand Fleet, only German

passivity prevented a British victory
on the scale of
Trafalgar.
One officer wrote: "Nothing less than
complete
annihilation can or m.ust be allowed to satisfy
us

.

The

fact that the patrolling of the Grand
Fleet reduced the

German Navy "to virtual immobility" seem.ed
meager

compensation

On a single occasion, however, German

m.iscalculation led to the duel between entire fleets
for

which the British had longed so earnestly.
m.oment at

For a brief

Jutland, the dreadnoughts squared off.

Mutual misapprehension contributed to the onset of the
battle.

Admiral Reinhard Scheer hoped to lure the British

cruiser force into a subm.arine ambush, using his battle

cruisers under Vice-Adm.iral Franz von Kipper as bait.

In

the event that the cruiser forces engaged heavily, he would

bring the main force of German battleships, kept in reserve,
into the fray.

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, commander of the

British Grand Fleet, similarly hoped to engage only the
enemy cruisers with his entire force.

The Admiralty

misinterpreted certain electronic intelligence and informed
him that Kipper's cruisers, rather than the entire Kigh Seas

33

Vice-Adm.iral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beattv
Papers 167.
,

ilson. Myriad Faces

,

8,
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Fleet, would sortie.

He ordered his forces east toward

Denmark in two divisions, sending his cruisers under
ViceAdmiral David Beatty to scout to the south.

Beatty's ships

made contact on the afternoon of May 31, 1916.^^
The ensuing battle, fought in four phases, confirmed

British control of the North Sea.
cruisers chased Hipper 's south.

In the first, Beatty's

The Germans inflicted heavy

damage on the British cruisers before reinforcements forced

Hipper to give way."

He then led Beatty's force into the

arms of Scheer and the German battleships.

Upon sighting

the main body of the High Seas Fleet, Beatty reversed course

and fled north.

During this phase, the British rear guard,

comprised of battleships rather than battle cruisers, gave
better than it received.

Meanwhile, Jellicoe deployed his

battleships across the path of the onrushing Germans.

In

the third phase of the battle, the fire of the British

Scheer left harbour with 16 dreadnoughts and 9 older
battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 11 light cruisers, and 61
British figures were 28 battleships, 9 battle
destroyers.
See Wilson,
cruisers, 34 light cruisers, and 78 destroyers.
Myriad Faces 285.
,

crucial flaw in the design of the British cruisers,
a lack of baffles between firing turrets and the magazine,
enabled German shells to reach and ignite a ship's
ammunition supply, causing the total destruction of three
Beatty remarked to his flag-captain: "There seems
vessels.
See
to be something wrong with our bloody ships today."
Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty the Last
Naval Hero; An Intimate Biography (New York, 1981), 160.
^^A

.
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battleships forced Scheer to seek to break contact.
used

a

He

torpedo attack from his destroyers to gain room in

which to maneuver.

The Germans then fled from the British.

In the final phase, which took place after dark,
individual

German vessels sought to pass through the British lines in
order to make Wilhelmshaven before daylight.

The British

fleet, which lacked training in night operations, failed to

block the German

f

light.

The Battle of Jutland produced ambiguous military

consequences.

The Grand Fleet earned the satisfaction of

seeing the entire High Seas Fleet turn tail and flee for

Wilhelmshaven, but, in accordance with the nature of naval
warfare, retention of any given portion of the ocean's

surface provided no benefit.
won

The British more importantly

strategic victory, as they maintained their control of

a

the Scotland-Norway gap, with its resultant effect on

blockade.

Admiral Jellicoe reported operational readiness

on the evening of June 2,

1916, while Admiral Scheer,

on

87

Correlli Barnett, Swordbearers Supreme Command in the
First World War (New York, 1964), 182-188, argues that
German naval technology far surpassed that of Britain;
Hough, Great War at Sea 273-280, suggests that British
equipment had offsetting advantages.
:

,

standard account of the battle is Harder, Scapa
John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty; The
Flow III, 36-160.
Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York, 1988), 97-155,
emphasizes the destructive nature of combat between
Trevor Wilson, Myriad Faces 283-299, argues
dreadnoughts.
instead that, except for the design flaw in British battle
cruisers, Jutland established the remarkable endurance of
both British and German warships.
^^The

,

,

:

.
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July 4th, was forced to admit that the High Seas
Fleet

required at least another five weeks in port

J'

The design

flaw of the British cruisers, however, prevented
the Grand

Fleet from claiming a numbers-game victory.^''

The Germans

thus were able to claim a tactical triumph, since
they sank
14 British ships of 112,000 tons while losing only 11 of

62,000 tons.^The Battle of Jutland proved bitterly disappointing for

many of Britain's leaders.

Jutland failed to produce the

victory of annihilation, with its attendant list of ships
sunk, that the legend of British naval superiority required.

King George V felt st\inned by the Admiralty's first, stark
report
Our losses Queen Mary Indefatigable Invincible
Defence Black Prince Sparrow Hawk Ardent Fortune
Tipperary Turbulent also missing at present Shark
Nestor Nomad.
For Hankey, who expected a victory on the scale of

Trafalgar, Jutland was "the most bitter disappointment of

Keegan, Price of Admiralty

,

131, 151.

The Germans began the war with a similar flaw, but
identified and corrected the problem earlier. British
losses, except for the three cruisers which suffered
catastrophic explosion, were equal in number but of less
displacement than those of Germany.
a:

Barnett, Swordbearers

,

176.

'^Admiralty message, as recorded in Nicolson, King
George V 278. The first three ships listed were battle
,

cruisers
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this disappointing war.""

"The naval battle in the North

Sea", echoed Lloyd George, "is most disquieting."'-

Churchill, from the sidelines, wrote to Asquith that
he felt

"profoundly grieved."'^
The officers of the Grand Fleet were uniformly

dissatisfied.

Jellicoe, writing to Fisher, cited "bad luck

with the weather and time of meeting" as the primary reasons
for the lack of a decisive victory at Jutland.'^
a cri de coeur,
a

job of it.

wrote:

Beatty, in

"Would that we had been able to make

To be so near and yet so far was worm and

gallwood."

Captain Herbert Richmond recorded in his diary:

"It is a nasty knock and there is no denying it.

engaged an inferior force

&

got the worst of it."

We have
After a

ship-board dinner, he noted: "How unanimous these Captains
all are that Jutland was a failure!

They can hardly bear to

speak of it."'^

Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Stephen Roskill,
Hankey; Man of Secrets. Volume I 1877-1918 (New York, 1971),
^'Sir

277

.

David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
Lloyd George 337-38.
,

as recorded in Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill. Companion Volume III 1511.

^^^inston Churchill,

,

Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Harder, Fear God
III,

,

Vol

356.

^Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Harder, Fear God
Vol III,

357.

^^Captain Richmond, as recorded in Harder, Portrait of
213, 248.
an Admiral
,

,
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The press, at least initially, took a very
negative
line on the outcome of the Battle of Jutland.

The Times

trumpeted: "Great Naval Battle Heavy Losses", while
the

Daily News went so far as to admit "defeat in
the Jutland

engagement."

go

Barely a week after the battle. Fisher

denigrated "the miserable pessimism that was so ignobly
spread abroad.

Beatty, on June 18th, complained to the

editor of the Morning Post that "one did not expect the
Press to put the interpretation on it [Jutland] that they
did.

It does not say

much for their faith, so long and

frequently vaunted, in the

Navy."*'''

Public fault-finding

adversely affected the navy's unity.
The search to explain the Grand Fleet's failure to win
the expected victory led to mutual recrimination between

Jellicoe and Beatty.

Jellicoe wrote Beatty

a

week after the

battle:
That difference in reckoning between the Lion &
Iron Duke was most perplexing.
Impossible to
avoid, of course, but nonetheless it put me out
very much.
Then all or one of your cruisers
turned to port and I could not make out why.

A month later, Beatty's wife wrote that "there seems to very

qq

Dingman, Pacific

'"'^Admiral

III,

,

24-25; Harder, Scapa Flow

,

III,

Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God

,

355.

*^*Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers 340.
,

-'•^Admiral

Papers

,

340.

Jellicoe, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty

196.

Vol

,

.
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little to say except to curse Jellicoe for not going
at
them."-"^

This disagreement occasioned, according to one
of

Beatty's biographers:
the names of Jellicoe and Beatty to become
associated in the public mind with two different
camps of naval opinion.
Self-appointed champions
poured forth a stream of calumny and uninformed
criticism upon one or the other of the two
admirals

The Battle of Jutland thus opened divisions within the navy
and between the navy and the public.

The Royal Navy, as the

bulwark of the British Sm.pire, according to historian
Correlli Barnett, "was never again accorded quite the same

religious faith" by the British public.
Jutland had another result with enormous consequence
for Britain.

Scheer reported to Kaiser Wilhelm that he held

little hope of catching and destroying
the Grand Fleet and thus achieving

a

might permit the Entscheidungsschacht

a

detached portion of

naval balance which
,

or decisive battle,

for which Tirpitz had designed the High Seas Fleet.

He then

recommended the resumption of unlimited submarine warfare.'"^
The greatest challenge to Britain's command of the seas
came not from the High Seas Fleet but instead from Germany's

'"•^Lady

Papers

,

Ethel Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty

369.

The Life and Letters of David Beatty,
Admiral of the Fleet (London, 1951), 266.
'"S^.S.

Chalm.ers,

'"'Barnett,

Swordbearers

''^^Barnett,

Swordbearers

,

177.

177.

.

.
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submarines, or U-boats.

Germany first initiated

unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1915.

German U-

boats began to attack merchant vessels without warning
and,
on occasion,

from beneath the waves.

Before the war, the

British had discounted the idea that submarines would be
used against merchant vessels as "impossible and
1

(17

unthinkable."*"

They correctly assumed that the laws or

naval warfare,

should the Germans obey them, would render

the submarine ineffective against merchant vessels.

Once

war began, however, German tactics quickly shattered the

wildly optimistic British belief that the Kaiser's empire
woul d adhere to such legal restrictions

The subsequent

.^^^

months dem.onst rated the destructive power of the
unrest ricted U-boat against undef ended targets.
days,

22 subm.arines sank 39 merchantmen.

Within 90

By August 1915,

the growing submarine fleet began sinking more ships than

the British shipyards had the capacity to rep lace."*

Commodore Keyes
I,

,

Narrow Seas

,

53;

The

Harder, Scapa Flow

^

363-64.

arships were legally requi red to ascertain their
victims belonged to an opposing belligerent, to identify the
presence of contraband, and to provide accommodation to
passengers and crew
Henderson, for exampl e did not bel ieve
that in any future war "territorial waters would be
violated, or neutral vessels sunk... No nation would permit
See Wilson,
it, and the officer who did it would be shot."
Myriad Faces 90
'^^Admiral W .H

,

.

,

'Wilson, Myriad Faces

,

91-92.
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anti-submarine tactics of the Royal Navy, based
upon
"offensive" patrols, proved singularly hopeless.

Only the

threat of American intervention following the sinkings
of
the British liners Lusitania and Arabic caused
Germany to

redirect her efforts into the Mediterranean, where the

danger of killing Americans was remote."*
In 1916,

Admiralty.

submarine warfare led to

a

shake-up at the

Admiral Scheer employed his U-boats in the North

Sea against warships, while maintaining a vigorous anti-

shipping campaign in the Mediterranean.

The growing German

submarine fleet increased its destruction of commercial
vessels from 113,000 tons per month in 1915 to 192,000 tons
per month in 1916."'

Walter Runciman, President of the

Board of Trade warned the Cabinet in November:
My expert advisers believed that I am far too
sanguine in advising the War Committee that the
complete breakdown in shipping will come in June^.
1917; they
[bel ieve] it will come much sooner."^
.

.

.

David Lloyd George urged the navy to convoy merchant
'

^

i

vessels, but the Admiralty opposed the practice.*

^"Hough

,

Great War at Sea

,

17 5-76.

"Potter, E.B. and Chester Nimitz, eds
Sea Power: A
Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960), 459.
,

"^al ter Runciman as recorded in David Woodward,
George and the Generals (Newark, 1983), 116.
,

"The Admiral ty had four principle objections

Ll oyd

convoys
would be reduced to the speed of the si owest ship they
would congest ports; civilian ships could not maintain the
necessary formations and lack of sufficient escort vessels.
See Potter and Nimitz, Sea Power: A Naval History, 466.
:

;

;

A
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First Lord Arthur Balfour instead transferred Admiral

Jellicoe from Scapa Flow, where Beatty assumed
command of
the Grand Fleet, to Whitehall as First Sea Lord to solve
the

submarine problem.

A week later, Lloyd George replaced

Asquith as Prime Minister."^

Lloyd George, who regarded

Balfour as possessing "neither the energy, initiative, nor
the administrative gifts requisite for the position of First

Lord of the Admiralty," appointed Sir Edward Carson to the

Admiralty."^

The war immediately tested the new team.

Lloyd George quickly lost faith in his subordinates.

Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in February,
1917, accepting the risk of American intervention.

The U-

boats quickly proved they could inflict greater losses than
at earlier stages of the war.

Allied merchant losses rose

from 171 ships (49 British) of 370,000 tons in January to
234 ships (105 British) of 500,000 tons in February."^

First Sea Lord publicly maintained
attitude, leading

a

a

The

particularly glum

senior Army officer to write: "The

situation at sea is very serious indeed. It has never been
so bad as at present,

and Jellicoe almost daily announces it

"^Asquith never served in the Cabinet after his defeat
From the perspective of the Royal Navy,
in December 1916.
the resignation of Asquith, who believed that the war would
See Taylor, Lloyd
be decided at sea, was a grave loss.
George: A Diary 19
,

"David Lloyd George, as recorded in Harder, Scapa
Flow

,

288.

"^Patterson, Jel licoe

,

159; Wilson, Myriad Faces

,

429.
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to be hopeless.""^

fronts.

Jellicoe attacked the problem on two

First, he sought "to restrict imports and to cut

down consumption drastically."

Second, he attempted to

increase the number of escort vessels "acting offensively
against enemy submarines.""^

The Cabinet wholeheartedly

supported the effort to increase the available shipping
tonnage by chartering ships from neutrals, increasing

maritime construction, rationing imports, and increasing
internal production.*^''

As to the use of escort vessels,

however, Lloyd George had come to prefer convoy to offensive

patrolling.

In late February,

the Prime Minister attempted

to convert Carson and Jellicoe.*^*
to overrule his naval advisors.

Carson, however, refused
He responded publicly: "As

long as

I

scope.

They will not be interfered with by me, and

am at the Adm.iralty, the sailors will have full

allow no one else to interfere with them.."

I

will

The

"General William Robertson, as recorded in Randolph
Churchill, Lord Derby; King of Lancashire (New York, 1960),
268

.

Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Alfred Patterson,
ed. The Jellicoe Papers (London, 1968), Vol II, 154-56.
Proconsul in Politics: A Study of Lord
Milner in Opposition and in Power (Letchworth, U.K., 1964),
410-413.
^^^Alfred Gollin,

oyd George s advocacy of convoy ref 1 ected the
counsel of Hankey, who served as a conduit for the ideas of
Hankey Vol I, 356-578.
See Roskil 1
younger officers
*^^Ll

'

.

^^^Sir

,

,

Edward Carson, as recorded in Gollin, Proconsul

in Pol i tics

421.

107

Admiralty's continued opposition to convoys exasperated the
Prime Minister.
Yet the Admiralty, for a number of reasons, eventually

adopted the general practice of convoying merchant vessels.
First, Commander Reginald Henderson discovered an error of

methodology in the Ministry of Shipping statistics which
supposedly had shown the number of merchant ships hopelessly
exceeded the available escorts.

Henderson's discovery,

combined with the entry of America into the war on April

6,

1917, undermined any argument about the lack of escort

vessel s

.

Second

,

Admi ral Beat t y convinced Jellicoe to

impl ement convoys for Scandinavian trade

previously suffered
dramatically.*

a

25% loss rate.

,

which had

Losses there plummeted

Finally, in April, submarines sank 373

vessels of 870, 000 tons

,

damaged another 300 ,000 tons of

shipping, and reduced the number of neutral merchantmen

calling in Allied ports by 25%.

On April 25th, Lloyd George

announced in the War Cabinet his intention of visiting the

Admiralty five days later to review the anti-submarine
When he arrived, he found Jellicoe determined to

campaign.

^"^"Rowland,

David Lloyd George

,

396-98

enderson discovered the figure of 5,000 ships per
week using British ports included an overwhelming majority
of coastal vessel s and that the ocean-going steamers which
See Marder,
required escort numbered perhaps 300 per week.
Scapa Flow ISO.
,

^^^Frederick Dreyer, The Sea Heritage: A Study of
Maritime Warfare (London, 1955), 218.
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give convoy "a thorough and fair trial.

"-^^

Convoy, once

implemented, steadily reduced the losses from U-boat
attacks.

117

Lloyd George, in 1917, decided to replace Carson and
Jellicoe.

In early June,

the Prime Minister took counsel

with Captain Herbert Richmond, one of the navy's most
original thinkers, who criticized Jellicoe's organization of
the Admiralty staff.

War Policy

Comjr^itt ee

On June 20, 1917,

Jellicoe told the

that Britain's survival depended on

clearing the Belgian coast and that "we should not be able
to continue the war next year for lack of shipping

Lloyd George disliked Jellicoe's

pessir.'^.ism

and resented the

admiral's support for the Army's proposals for offensives in
Fl

anders

.

'30
*

The Prime Minister realized that Carson would

never m.ove against his First Sea Lord and decided that
Carson, therefore, needed to go.'"
Mi 1 ner

1

Sea

,

,

who shared Ll oyd George's derogatory opinion of the

Admi ral Jellicoe, as recorded in Hough

,

Great War at

308.

son. Myriad Faces
466-69.
A History

Power:

I,

Alfred, 1st Viscount

,

439;

Potter and Nimitz, Sea

,

257-59.

'^^Marder,

Portrait of an Admiral

^^^Admiral

Jellicoe, as recorded in Roskill, Hankey

,

,

Vol

404.

'^^Hankey noted in his diary on July 3rd that Lloyd
George "was hot for getting rid of Jellicoe." See Roskill,
Hankey Vol I, 406.
,

-^-Rowland,

David Llovd George

,

406-07.
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Carson- Jellicoe regime, then suggested "promoting" Carson to
the War Cabinet and making Sir Eric Geddes,
Controller of
the Navy, the new First Lord.*^^

Lloyd George proposed the

change to Carson, who accepted in July 1917.
The new First Lord quickly became disillusioned with

Jellicoe.

In October, Geddes took counsel with Balfour,

Carson, and Lloyd George as to the advisability of replacing
the First Sea Lord.*"

In December, Geddes, upon the

recommendation of Deputy First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Rosslyn
Wemyss, directed Jellicoe to relieve the commander

responsible for the Dover Barrage, Vice-Admiral Reginald
Bacon, a close friend.

The First Sea Lord demurred.

Geddes, with Lloyd George's approval, informed Jellicoe on
the evening of December 24th that "a change is desirable in

the position of First Sea Lord."*^^

The news that Admiral

Wemyss had assumed the duties of First Sea Lord pleased the
Prime Minister.*"
The German submarine effort, contributing to Jellicoe's
fall, had far-reaching consequences for the navy.

First,

the replacement of Jellicoe and Carson marked the eclipse of

Gollin, Proconsul in Politics

,

423-42.

•^^Stephen Roskill, "The Dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe",
Journal of Contemporary History (I, 1966), 69-93.

*^%ir Eric Geddes,

203

as recorded in Patterson,

.

-^-Rowland,

David Llovd George

,

426.

Jel licoe

.
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two of the Royal Navy's most ardent supporters

Second,

.

the destruction wreaked by the U-boats
demonstrated the need
to modify Mahan's premise that concentration
of a superior

fleet resulted inexorably in command of the sea.

The future

role of the capital ship would become the dominant
question
in naval circles.

The Great War was not kind to the Royal Navy.

Despite

the ultimate defeat of both the High Seas Fleet and the U-

boat threat, the public remained dissatisfied.

The

Dardanelles campaign, the damage done by German submarines,
and above all the Battle of Jutland contributed to

"expectations unfulfilled."

Admiral Beatty, the day after

the armistice, wrote: "The Fleet, my Fleet is broken-

hearted... All suffering from

a

feeling far greater than

disappointment, depressed beyond measure.""^

Leading

supporters of the navy, including both civilians (Churchill,
Asquith, and Carson) and sailors (Fisher and Jellicoe) lost
their positions and preeminence.

Only debonair David Beatty

remained to carry the torch for the capital ship in a world

characterized by rising idealism and shrinking defense
budgets

Carson resigned from the Lloyd George ministry in
See
January 1918, primarily over issues related to Ulster.
Gollin, Proconsul in Politics 464-65.
,

'^'Admiral Beatty, as recorded in W.S.
and Letters of David Beatty 341.
,

Chalmers, Life

CHAPTER

4

CONFLICT AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE
At the conclusion of the Great War, the Allied and

Associated Powers gathered in Paris to conclude a peace
agreement.

The Fourteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson,

as the basis of the Armistice with Germany, dominated the

early discussions.

The British contingent strongly opposed

Wilson's proposal concerning freedom of the seas.

The

question of relative naval strength and the fate of the
captured High Seas Fleet further strained relations between

Britain and the United States.

Lacking the cement of a

common enemy, the former wartime alliance cracked under the

pressure of divergent national interests.

Although President Wilson first arrived in Europe in
December 1918, his ideas had long preceded him.

He

presented his program for the future of Europe in a series
of talks in 1918.
8,

The first of these speeches, on January

1918, contained the famous "Fourteen Points."*

plan contained three major components.

Wilson's

First, it advocated

nationality as the primary basis for the determination of
territorial boundaries.^

Second, Point XIV proposed the

and
^-he president's Four Principles of February 11th
original
Five Particulars of September 27th expanded the
Moment: 1918 -

Fourteen Points. Arthur Walworth, America's
American Diplomacy and the End of World War I (New York,
and particulars
1977), 283-84, contains Wilson's principles
2points V, VI, VII,

IX,

XI, XII,

a^J^.

XIII-

see jJ-A.S.

Grenville, The Major International ^^^^^
57.
History and Guide with r.nmplete Texts (New York, 1974),
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creation of

a

supranational organization,

a

"general

association of nations," to arbitrate international
conflict.

Third, the plan provided several measures

designed to reduce the possibility of such conflict.

These

measures included open diplomacy (Point I), freedom of
the
seas (II), the removal of trade barriers (III), and the
reduction of armaments (IV).
David Lloyd George shared Wilson's desire for
safe for every peace-loving nation and developed

approach to post-war security.

a

a

world

parallel

Knowledge that Wilson

intended to make an address on the subject of war aims
combined with Labour party demands for

a

Cabinet statement

on the subject spurred the British Prime Minister to reach

the public first.

Lloyd George, in

war aims on January

3,

1918,

a

Cabinet discussion of

took a position remarkably

similar to Wilson's only five days before the President

pronounced his Fourteen Points.^

With the aid of Hankey,

the Prime Minister drafted a speech on war aims which won

approval from Asquith and Grey.*

Minister spoke to

a

On January 5th, the Prime

meeting of trade union delegates at

Caxton Hall on the subject of post-war reconstruction and

^e advocated

the restoration of Belgium, AlsaceLorraine, and Poland, together with "the principle of selfdetermination" for German colonies and the Austrian
nationalities.
CAB 23/5: War Cabinet 312, January 3, 1918,
599as recorded in Lowe and Dockrill, The Mirage of Power
.

600.

'Rowland, David Llovd George

.

428.
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advocated the right of self-determination, the sanctity
of
treaties, and "the creation of some international

organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish
the probability of war."^

The British government, which

thus supported the general tenor of Wilson's
proposals,

nonetheless entertained serious reservations concerning
Point II and Wilson's vision of freedom of the seas.

The second of Wilson's Fourteen Points sought to

establish the right of neutrals to trade freely in time of
war.

It read:

Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas
outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in
war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or
in part by international action for the
enforcement of international covenants.
Belligerent nations would lose the right to interfere with
the trade of privately-owned vessels, regardless of the

nature and destination of the cargo involved.

Wilson argued

that "the freedom of the sea is the sine qua non of peace,

equality, and cooperation."

The General Board of the

United States Navy had articulated America's traditional

David Lloyd George, as recorded in George Egerton,
Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations:
Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 19141919 (Chapel Hill, 1978), 61.
^Point II as recorded in Grenville,

Treaties

,

International

57

'Woodrow Wilson, as recorded in Edward Buehrig, Woodrow
Wilson and the Balance of Power (Bloomington, IN, 1955),
261.
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position on the issue after reviewing the British blockade
against Germany in 1915:
The claim now put forward by the British
government of the right to take neutral vessels
from the high seas and conduct them into a British
port for the purpose of search without capture is
untenable under any law or custom of maritime war
hitherto known, and is one that cannot be conceded
without the gravest sacrifice of the most vital
neutral rights.
In February 1916, Wilson had sent emissary Colonel Edward

House to Europe on a mission, which ultimately proved
futile, to present to both belligerent camps a peace plan

based upon: "(a) military and naval disarmament and (b)

a

league of nations to secure each nation from aggression and

maintain absolute freedom of the seas."'

Wilson sought to

protect neutrals against the disregard for maritime law

displayed during the Great War by strictly regulating the
right of belligerents to establish future blockades.

Britain viewed the issue of freedom of the seas from
the perspective of a belligerent, rather than from that of

neutral.

a

In her long series of struggles with continental

states, sea power, to include blockade, had played a crucial
part.

British use of blockade in the First World War faced

General Board Memorandum 438, March
recorded in Roskill, Naval Policy 80-81.

3,

1915, as

,

House contributed to
213.
Wilson's formulation of freedom of the seas, arguing "that
in time of both war and peace a merchantman should traverse
^Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson

,

the seas unmolested." See Charles Seymour, The Intimate
Papers of Colonel House (Boston, 1928), Vol III, 327.
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restrictions arising from the Declaration of London
(1909),
which divided goods into three categories:
absolute
contraband, subject to seizure under all conditions;

conditional contraband, subject to seizure if destined
to a
belligerent government; and free goods, which were immune

from blockade.^"

Britain resorted, as she had in 1807 after

the advent of Napoleon's Continental system, to a series of

Orders in Council which steadily increased the list of

contraband goods.

In 1915,

the Cabinet adopted the

principle of continuous voyage, whereby neutral goods
ultimately bound for Germany were subject to seizure,
regardless of their immediate destination.

In the same

year, Hankey produced an analysis of blockade which

emphasized the importance of economic pressure in modern

warfare and argued that national interests dictated that the
blockade weapon remain under the control of the Cabinet,
rather than any international body.^^

In early 1916, Robert,

Viscount Cecil assumed control of the Ministry of Blockade
and supplemented the British blockade effort with vigorous

attempts to dissuade neutrals from trading with Germany.

The Liberal Cabinet of Sir Henry Campbel 1 -Bannerman
accepted these restrictions on the right of blockade in the
belief that Britain would remain neutral in the event of a
future European conflict. The Declaration of London never
achieved the force of law because the House of Lords
See Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power 280.
rejected it.
,

17/130: Hankey Memorandum, "Freedom of the Seas",
June 11, 1915.
^^CAB
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American criticism towards Britain's implementation of
blockade influenced two Englishmen to publish in 1917

essays

concerning the freedom of the seas.

Professor Ramsay Muir

labelled the arbitration between belligerent and neutral
rights in wartime as "one of the most vexed and difficult

problems of international law."^^

He asserted that custom

had established two prerogatives for belligerents: the

destruction of the sea-borne commerce of the enemy, subject
to the safeguarding of the lives of non-combatants and

neutral property; and the use of blockade,

a

practice which

interferes with neutral trade attempting either to run the

blockade or to carry war materials (known as contraband)

destined for the enemy.

Muir then criticized the German

naval war effort for seven categories of major violations,

including the destruction of "all shipping, enemy or
neutral, which ventures to traverse any areas of the world's
seas which she [Germany] chooses to indicate" and the

subsequent abandonment of "men, women, and children in open
boats, in stormy seas, and far from land."

He admitted that

Britain exceeded customary practice in two respects: forcing
neutral vessels to submit to contraband searches in British

ports rather than on the high seas, thus to avoiding

submarine attack at some expense of time and fuel

;

and the

significant extension of contraband lists to include all

^^Ramsay Muir, Mare Liberum:
(London, 1917), 6-16.
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goods, taken in reprisal for the German policy of

unrestricted submarine warfare.

Muir ended with a warning

that "to disarm sea-power while leaving land-power in

possession of all its weapons of of fense.

.

.would be a

positive danger to the liberties of the world.

"-^

Naval historian Julian Corbett sought even more

directly to respond to Wilson's demand for freedom of the
seas.

Corbett, who would later write Britain's official

naval history of the Great War, professed that the American

President realized "the impossibility of absolute freedom so
long as naval warfare is admitted as part of the machinery
of international

to Corbett,

relations."

Freedom of the seas, according

thus meant "nothing more than the liberty of

neutrals to trade with belligerents subject to the time-

honoured restrictions of blockade and contraband."

He then

noted the complications introduced by advances in naval
technol ogy--the mine, the torpedo, and the submarine--and
the increasingly intimate relationship between war and

industrial society.

Corbett concluded by arguing that

restrictions on sea power would adversely affect the

viability of Wilson's proposed League of Nations by reducing
"the executive ability of the Naval Powers," Great Britain

and the United States.**

*Muir, Mare Liberum

,

6-16.

•^Julian Corbett, The League of Peace and a Free Sea

(London, 1917),

6.
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While fully cognizant of the value of naval
blockade,
the British government also recognized the
hazard
of

offending neutral opinion on the issue of blockade.

In

August 1914, Radical Charles Trevelyan warned President
of
the Board of Trade Walter Runciman:
feel great uneasiness about the trend of action
of the Government towards trying to exclude German
I

food-supplies passing through neutral
countries ... It would be bad enough to alienate
Dutch opinion. But it will be infinitely worse if
you alienate the U.S.A.
Remember that under very
analogous circumstances the U.S.A. went to war
with us against its will.*^

The British government chose to subordinate maximum naval

efficiency to diplomatic relations with neutral powers,

particularly the United States.

The Cabinet, over the stiff

objections of Admiral Jellicoe, repeatedly directed the navy
to release neutral vessels loaded with foodstuffs.

Captain

Herbert Richmond complained bitterly about the "half-

measures" imposed on the navy's cruisers.*^

Asquith, late in

1916, noted in his diary:
It is highly creditable to the Foreign Office that

during the last two years we have escaped a
breakdown of our blockade policy, which, in spite
of continual obstruction and bad faith, has
produced excellent results; but we have been
within an ace of grave complications with Sweden
and the United States.

*^azlehurst. Politicians at War

,

186.

Captain Richmond, as recorded in Harder, Portrait of
198.
an Admiral
,

'^Asquith, Memories and Reflections

.

170.
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The German decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare
in 1917, which led the United States to join
the anti-German

coalition, temporarily eclipsed Anglo-American differences
over the legality of the blockade.

Historian Charles

Seymour noted:

After entering the struggle against Germany, the
American Government naturally changed its point of
view and in its efforts to prevent goods from
entering Germany rather improved upon the
strictness of Allied measures."^

Wilson's public address of January

8,

1918 reopened the

issue

David Lloyd George fired a counter salvo in the

struggle over freedom of the seas.

In a speech in January

1918, he noted:

"Freedom of the Seas" is a very elastic term.
There is a sense in which we would rejoice to
accept it, but we must guard very carefully
against any attempt to interfere with the capacity
to protect our shores and our shipping that has
alone enabled us even to exist up to the present
moment
Lloyd George carefully portrayed his concerns with Britain's

ability "to protect her lines of communication" as defensive
in nature, yet Wilson's proposal would have enhanced such

protection.

In reality,

the proposal restricted the

offensive use of British sea power.

Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House
III,

,

193.

*'Beatty MSS: Memorandum,
November 29, 1918.
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There the matter rested until October

Wilson received

a

6,

1918, when

note from Germany asking the President to

invite all belligerents to arrange an armistice on the
basis
of his program for peace.
Two days later, the President
sent back a note asking whether the German government

accepted the Fourteen Points as a basis for negotiations and

whether the German Army would withdraw from captured
territories.

On the urging of Lloyd George, the Supreme War

Council sent two telegrams to Wilson which indicted that any

armistice terms would have to receive the approval of Allied

military experts and that they would appreciate consultation
in advance of further communications with Germany.^'

Wilson

decided to send his emissary Colonel Edward House to Europe
to consult with the Allies.

The British government resurfaced its earlier fears

concerning freedom of the seas.

On October 12th, Lloyd

George cautioned Geddes, then in Washington seeking to
influence the American naval construction effort, against
any premature suggestion that Britain shared the American

position on freedom of the seas:
You should be careful to express no approval or
disapproval of President Wilson's attitude towards
Prince Maximilian's note about which we were not
consulted.
As you are aware we cannot accept his
views about freedom of the seas.

Rowland, David Llovd George
^*ADM

1918.

,

453.

116/1809: Lloyd George to Geddes, October 12,
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An informal meeting of

a

majority of the Cabinet the next

day manifested the British conviction,
maintained throughout
the process of peace negotiation, that the Allies
could not,
in the final treaties, go much beyond the terms
of the

armistice.

Lloyd George deftly guided seven leading

officials to a pair of conclusions.

First, the Cabinet

members objected to the apparent agreement between Wilson
and Germany that, in Hankey's words, "evacuation of occupied

territory [was] to be the sole condition of armistice."*^

More importantly, the group criticized the Fourteen Points
as unclear and roundly condemned freedom of the seas.

The Admiralty shared fully the Cabinet's opposition to

Wilson's Fourteen Points.

British naval leadership had

clear appreciation of the value of blockade.

a

First Sea Lord

Rosslyn Wemyss objected to the notion that neutral rights
took precedence over those of belligerents in wartime and to
any surrender of British sovereignty to the League.

Admiralty in October sent

a

The

memorandum to the Cabinet:

The British idea of freedom of the seas is free
and unfettered access to all the seas by all... but
in time of war this privilege must be fought for
by belligerent navies, causing as little damage as
possible to neutrals, but maintaining the right of
searching neutral merchant ships... to verify their
nationality and prevent ... aiding a belligerent.

Sir Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Roskill, Hankey
Vol

I,

,

613.

116/1771: Admiralty Memorandum, "An Inquiry into
the Meaning and Effect of the Demand for Freedom of the
Seas", October 17, 1918.
^^ADM
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The memorandum argued that restrictions on
blockade would
prove detrimental to Britain, since "the
value of naval
power for attack and def ence ... would be correspondingly

diminished."

The Board contended that the untested League

of Nations could not defend Britain's national
interests as

well as British sea power, which "had been exercised

beneficially for centuries."^*
The Board convinced Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour.
He suggested that "if the League of Nations develops into an

efficient instrument for securing international peace," then

Britain might entrust the proposed organization with the
right of blockade and its corollary, the right of search at
sea.

Until such time as the peace-keeping mechanisms of the

League became "firmly established," however, Balfour noted
that "every attempt to limit the use of sea power merely

adds to the relative strength of land power."

The Foreign

Secretary thus cautioned against accepting Wilson's Fourteen
Points until the League could provide "full security to all

Nations against aggression" and "enforce its own decrees
against recalcitrant Nations."

25

In mid-October, the Cabinet received, in addition to

the Admiralty and Balfour memoranda, reports of two separate

ADM 116/1771: Admiralty Memorandum, "An Inquiry into
the Meaning and Effect of the Demand for Freedom of the
Seas", October 17, 1918.
116/1651: Memorandum, "Freedom of the Sea",
October 23, 1918.
^^ADM
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interviews with Wilson concerning his views on the
freedom
of the seas.
First Lord Geddes, who had spoken with Wilson
on October 6th, suggested that Wilson's views on sea
power

"appeared to be unformed," but that the President desired
the League to exercise control over all wartime naval

action.

Foreign Office liaison Sir William Wiseman, who

had talked with Wilson on October 16th, corroborated Geddes

notion that the President's views on sea power were elastic
and further indicated that Wilson desired a formula enabling

him to harness British naval power to the League.
The British War Cabinet considered the possibility of
an armistice with Germany at greater length in a meeting on

October 26th.

Sir Austen Chamberlain opened the discussion

by complaining that Wilson's position on freedom of the seas

served to shackle sea power while leaving land power
unrestricted.

Lloyd George immediately concurred.

Next,

Geddes informed the Cabinet that Wilson had placed a request
before Congress for a major increase in the size of the

United States Navy.

The Cabinet then voted to reject "the

doctrine of Freedom of the Seas" and decided that "a

notification to this effect must be made in some form to

^^Sir
I,

Eric Geddes, as recorded in Roskill, Hankey

605.
^^Beloff,

Imperial Sunset

,

272-73.

,

Vol
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Germany before we entered into peace negotiations."^^

The

Cabinet never found cause to reconsider this
decision to
oppose freedom of the seas.
To surrender the time-tested

weapon of blockade to international action required

a

faith

in the community of nations with which the British

government was not imbued.
Colonel House, together with naval advisor Admiral

William Benson, arrived in Paris in late October for his
discussions with the Allied Supreme War Council.
2

9th,

On October

Lloyd George and French Prem.ier Georges Clem.enceau

inform.ed Colonel House that they were not prepared to accept

the Fourteen Points.
to Point

1 1

Lloyd George explained his opposition

:

This point we cannot accept under any conditions;
it means that the power of blockade goes; Gerinany
has been broke almost as much by the blockade as
by military methods; if this power is to be handed
over to the League of Nations and Great Britain
were fighting for her life, no league of nations
would prevent her from defending herself.

The Prim.e Minister then relented slightly and admitted his

position on blockade was not unconditional: "I should like
to see this League of Nations established first before

this power go."

29

I

let

In the face of this rejection, House

hinted that the United States might end its war effort if

^XAB 23/14: War Cabinet 491B, October 26, 1918, as
recorded in Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage 717-18.
,

^^David Lloyd George,
Papers Vol IV, 163-64.
,

as recorded in Seymour,

Intim.ate
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the entire program were not accepted.

Lloyd George riposted

swiftly: "We should deeply regret it, but,
nonetheless,

should be prepared to go on fighting."

He quickly added

that "to give up the right of using its Fleet was
a thing no

one in England would consent

Allied leaders with

to."^*^

House then presented the

a coirjr.entary on the

Fourteen Points

which had the blessing of Woodrow Wilson."
future war in which

a

In the case of a

presumed league of nations should

remain neutral, the comji^entary read: "The rights of neutrals
shall be m.aintained against the belligerents,

the rights

o

both to be clearly and precisely defined in the law of
nations.""

House conceded the right to blockade, without

specifying its extent.

The m.eeting ended with House's

suggestion that the Allies draft their reservations to the

Fourteen Points.
House cabled the results of the first m.eeting to
Wilson, who replied the next day.
dem.onst rated the high m.oral

The President

tone which characterized his

'"David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference
(New Haven, 1939), Vol I, 42.

Rowland, David Lloyd George 455, states that House
produced the commentary at the end of the meeting; Seymour,
Intimate Papers 153-63, states that House distributed the
commentary at the start
,

,

'^House Comm.entary, as recorded in Walworth, Am.erica s
The comjnentary advocated complete freedom
Moment 275-283.
of the seas in tim.e of peace and in time of war reserved for
the League the right to close the seas to an offending
'

,

nation.
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dipl omacy
feel it my soleiryi duty to authorize you
to say
that I cannot consent to take part in the
negotiations of a peace which does not include the
Freedom of the Seas, because we are pledged to
fight not only Prussian militarism but militaris-"
I

everywhere

Wilson ended with
hope

a threat to appeal

to popular opinion:

shall not be obliged to make this decision public.

I

"I
"^^

The second meeting between House and Lloyd George

produced no substantial agreement.

The Am.erican warning

failed to m.ove Lloyd George, who insisted on reserving

Britain's acceptance of Point

II.--

House then relayed

Wilson's threat to "build up the strongest navy that our
resources permit.""'

That,

too,

failed of effect, as Lloyd

George remained obdurate.
On Novem.ber 3rd, House and Lloyd George m.anaged to find
a

form.ula for compromise.

The Prim.e Minister started by

restating the im.possibi 1 i ty of accepting freedom, of the seas
and added that Britain "would spend her last guinea to keep

oodrow Wilson, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate
Papers

,

Vol

IV,

168.

The Prime Minister proposed the wording: "that the
freedom of the seas is liable to various interpretations
I,
See Roskill, Hankey
som.e of which we cannot accept."
France expressed simi 1 ar reservations with regard to
623
See Rene
Point VIII, which dealt with reparations.
Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe (New York,
356-57.
1958)
,

.

,

^^oodrow Wilson, as recorded in Michael Fry, "The
Im.perial War Cabinet, the United States, and the Freedom, of
the Seas", Journal of the Royal United Service Institute
(XC,

1965),

353-62.
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a

navy superior to that of the United States or any
other

power.

ti36

He cited the pressures of British domestic

politics, in which freedom of the seas translated loss
of
blockade.

The Prime Minister explained:

It's no use saying I accept the principle.
It
would only mean that in a week's time a new prime
minister would be here who would say that he could
not accept this principle.
The English people
would not look at it. On this point the nation is
absolutely solid. ^'

Wiseman then suggested that the issue could be reserved for
discussion at Versailles without including Germany.
George finally wrote House

a

Lloyd

note stating that Britain

remained willing to discuss freedom of the seas in Paris.
This Anglo-American settlement reflected an agreement to

disagree
The second naval issue raised by Wilson's communication

with the German government involved the disposition of the
German fleet.

Admiral Wemyss sought Germany's

acknowledgment of defeat at sea in the same degree as defeat

Lloyd George, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate Papers
Vol IV, 180-81.

David Lloyd George, as recorded in Walworth, America'
Moment

,

64

The Supreme War Coiincil subsequently agreed that the
"freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations,
some of which [the Allies] could not accept. They must
therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this
subject when they enter the peace conference." See David
Trask, Captains & Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations.
1917-1918 (Columbia, MO, 1972), 341-42.

,
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on land.

25

The Admiralty desired that the naval
conditions

of the armistice include surrender of ten
battleships,

including the flagship Baden

,

six battle cruisers, and the

entire submarine force, so as to preclude the possibility
of

German resumption of hostilities

.

Admiral Beatty made a

lengthy presentation to the War Cabinet on October 20th.

He

argued
To achieve the destruction of German Sea Power and
reduce Germany to the status of a second-rate
Naval Power, it is necessary to lay down in the
Naval Terms of the Armistice conditions which
would be commensurate with the results of a Naval
action
To achieve that purpose, Beatty emphasized the need to

obtain the surrender of both the High Seas Fleet and the

German submarine force.

Despite the persuasiveness of

Beatty's presentation, the meeting proved inconclusive.
The War Cabinet finally resolved the issue on October
26th. Lloyd George suggested a more conciliatory position on

submarines, but the First Lord stuck to his guns.

The War

Cabinet decided:
The naval condition of the armistice should
represent the admission of German defeat by sea in
the same degree as the military conditions

"ADM 116/1771: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Conditions
of Armistice", October 19, 1918.
^'^Marder,

Scapa Flow

,

Vol V, 177.

^'Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Chalmers,
Letters of David Beatty 333.
,

Life and
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recognize the corresponding admission of German
defeat by land.-^

Wemyss recorded his gratification that the War
Cabinet had
accepted his position that "as far as the Naval
terms are

concerned it is impossible not to embody terms of
peace.
Admiral Wemyss took these demands to the Allied
Naval
.

council.

44

French Minister Georges Leygues on October 28th

opened the sixth session of the Allied Naval Council with
proposal to demand the surrender of

a

a

large number of

submarines and surface vessels and to maintain the blockade.
First Lord Geddes then argued that the armistice terms "must
leave the German fleet reduced to impotence and unable at
will to disturb the peace of the world."

*^

The Naval

Council accepted the British calculations as a basis for

negotiation and established a committee to determine
specific figures.

Admiral Benson, the American Chief of

Naval Operations and a pronounced Anglophobe, sat quietly

through the first meeting.

His primary concern involved the

disposition of the German fleet, any distribution of which

*^ar Council 491B, as recorded in Trask, Captains and
Cabinets 326.
,

as recorded in Victoria Wester Wymess,
(London, 1935),
The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wymess
386.
^^Admiral Wemyss,

Allied Naval Council, which comprised the civil
and service chiefs of Britain, France, Italy, and the United
States, met for the first time in November 1917.
^^The

^'Sir

Cabinets

Eric Geddes, as recorded in Trask, Captains and
332.
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he feared would strengthen the Royal Navy against his own

service
Admiral Benson soon shattered the apparent unity of the

Allied Naval Council.

On October 29th, he received

a

cable

from President Wilson which advocated moderate naval terms
in order to avoid unnecessary humiliation of Germany.

Benson then sought, without much success, to persuade his
naval colleagues that the ultimate disposition of the German

fleet could await the peace conference and that the

internment of the submarine force alone would suffice.

Wemyss felt Benson's efforts lacked substance but
council meeting "tiresome

.

"^^

m.ade the

The Naval Council's draft

armistice terms (surrender of 160 submarines, ten
battleships and six battle cruisers, as well as

a

host of

lesser craft) mirrored the Anglo-American positions on the
14 Points;

the position of the Admiralty carried the day,

while the United States reserved its views.

48

Admiral Benson

sought help from his superior. Colonel House.

Admiral Benson flatly opposed the British position on
freedom of the seas. The wartime American naval attache in
London, Admiral William Sims, while testifying before
Congress in 1920, reported that Benson had told him: "Don't
It is none of
let the British pull the wool over your eyes.
our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We
would as soon fight the British as the Germans." See Mary
Klachko, Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of
Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD, 1987), 58, 97, 122-23.

*Wmiral Wemyss,
Wester Wymess
*^Trask,

,

as recorded in Wester Wemyss, Lord

387.

Captains and Cabinets

,

330-334.
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On the disposition of the German fleet, the views of
the political leaders assumed much greater convergence
than

those of their naval advisors.

Geddes presented the terms

of the Naval Council to the Supreme War Council
on November

1st, with the accompanying explanation:

The list of ships to be surrendered has been drawn
up on the basis that if the Grand Fleet and the
High Seas Fleet were to fight a battle, the German
fleet would come out of it with the loss of the
equivalent of these ships. ^
He added that Germany possessed a lead in battle cruisers

which if unchecked would force the Allies to resume
shipbuilding.

Allied Commander-in-Chief Ferdinand Foch

attacked these terms as unduly harsh--perhaps so harsh as to
lead the Germans to continue the war.

Lloyd George, who

considered the proposals of the Allied Naval Council "rather
excessive," proposed

a

compromise; surrender of the

submarines together with the battle cruisers and internment
of the battleships.'''

This suggestion satisfied the Supreme

War Counci 1
The Allied Naval Coxmcil reconsidered the situation the

same day.

Geddes explained the compromise worked out by the

Supreme War Council.

Wemyss then reiterated the Admiralty

arguments in favor of surrender of a large portion of the

Sir Eric Geddes, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate
Papers 127.
,

V,

^^Lloyd George,
181.

as recorded in Harder,

Scapa Flow

,

Vol

132

German Navy.

French Chief of Staff Admiral Ferdinand de Bon
strongly supported Wemyss' position. Only Benson,
who

feared a surrender of German battleships would result
in a
distribution which would benefit the Royal navy--despite

assurances from Geddes--supported the Lloyd George
proposal. 5^

The Naval Council voted to resubmit its original

recommendation.

Geddes privately sent

a

note to Lloyd

George explaining that if Germany regained the battleships

tentatively scheduled to be interned, she would have twelve
more than she had at the beginning of the war.^^
The Supreme War Council reached

a

substantive agreement

on the future of the German Fleet on November 4th.

Benson

argued that internment of the ten German battleships would

"increase the probability of acceptance of the terms of the
armistice."'^
of the naval

nominal gain.

Foch once again protested that the harsh terms
experts threatened the armistice in return for

Lloyd George then proposed that Germany

should surrender her submarines, but that all surface
vessels might be interned in neutral ports.

This suggestion

won acceptance from all political leaders present.
The Allied Naval Council thus found their room for

maneuver seriously restricted.

^'Harder,
^^ADM

Scapa Flow

,

The politicians told their

Vol V, 182.

116/1651: Geddes Note, November

2,

1918.

^Wmiral Benson, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate
Papers

,

132.
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service advisors that the only responsibility of the
Allied
Naval Council was to draw up the terms of
internment.
Lloyd

George then somewhat cushioned the blow by announcing that
the Supreme War Council had agreed that Germany would
never

recover any of the interned vessels.

First Lord Geddes

expressed his reluctant endorsement: "The Naval Council did
not agree but accepted the decision of the Ministers."'^

The

Allied Naval Council subsequently added several minor
modifications to the armistice terms: internment of the
German flagship Baden in place of the unfinished battle
cruiser Mackensen and the provision that if the victors were

unable to find neutral harbors, then they would utilize

Allied ports.
The terms of the armistice profoundly disturbed Admiral
Beatty.

During the negotiations in Paris he sent

a

note to

the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, Sir Oswyn Murray,

opposing any substitution of internment for surrender.

After hearing from Wemyss that the Supreme War Council had

balked at requiring Germany to surrender the High Seas
Fleet, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet sent an

angry missive to the First Sea Lord on November 5th:
was very perturbed at the underlying tone of
your letter, which indicated that the Supreme
Council might override the Naval Council. You
speak about, "If we are obliged to ease up our
I

5^Sir

Cabinets
55

Eric Geddes, as recorded in Trask, Captains and
348.

ADM 116/1651: Beatty Note, November

2,

1918.
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Naval terms", also "If our terms are put down
by
the Supreme War Council, we can do nothing
but
enter a protest."

Beatty's concerns, furthermore, were not
limited to the
future of the High Seas Fleet. He also addressed
the

absence of any mention of the German island fortress
of
Heligoland, "which means that Germany, with any fleet of

battleships at all, can menace the Sea Power of this country
with her submarines

.

"^^

He even went so far as to suggest

the resignation of the Board of Admiralty in the event the

Supreme War Council decided on further reductions in the
naval terms of armistice with Germany.

His anger was only

partly assuaged on November 21st, when he enjoyed the sight
of the High Seas Fleet sailing helplessly into Scapa Flow

under the guns of the Grand Fleet.

Beatty then sought to stiffen the position of the

Admiralty and ultimately the Cabinet on the issue of freedom
of the seas at the upcoming peace conference.

In November,

he produced a paper, based on the Admiralty's work, which

portrayed blockade as "an economic weapon for use in extreme
emergencies against predatory continental emperors."

He

^^Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Chalmers, Life and
Letters of David Beatty 337-338.
,

57

The decisions by Norway and Spain to refuse the German
fleet led the Allied Naval Council to decide on November 13,
Detailed procedures for
1918 for internment at Scapa Flow.
the internment can be found in Ranft, Beatty Papers 562-69.
,

^^Beatty MSS: Memorandum,
November 29, 1918.

"Freedom of the Seas",
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depicted the British blockade as

a

vital weapon in the

recent struggle with Germany:

The essential facts therefore are that the
blockade, with its kindred operations, has sapped
the vigor of the enemy people, has weakened their
financial resources, has killed their hope of
speedy economic recuperation, and has to some
extent impaired the efficiency of their fighting
machine
.

About

a

month later, in another memorandum on the same

subject, Beatty condemned the confusion in maritime law

which resulted from the lack of precise definition of
conditional and absolute contraband and predicted that "in
the future, the distinctions between conditional and

absolute contraband will become hopelessly muddled."

suggested that maritime rules "designed to protect

assisting

a

a

He

neutral

belligerent" (i.e., Wilson's Point II) would

"inevitably break down when vital issues are at stake and
the opposing navy is in a position to dispute

them."^*"

The Admiralty, in preparation for the peace conference,

focused on three issues.

The Board manifested its

opposition to both freedom of the seas and submarine warfare
in early November.^*

Wemyss shared Beatty's belief in the

need to oppose Wilson's position on freedom of the seas.

^^Beatty MSS: Memorandiam,
November 29, 1918.

"Freedom of the Seas",

116/1772: Memorandum, "Freedom of the Seas",
December 21, 1918.
'•ADM

"ADM 116/1852: Board Discussions on the Peace
Settlement, November 9, 1918.
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The First Sea Lord contended:
the crux of the matter, as far as
we are
concerned, is the proposal with regard to "Freedom
of the Seas."
Any limitation of sea-power is
clearly to our disadvantage and should be strongly
opposed.'^

Britain's two leading admirals also held similar views as
to
the future of the submarine.

Beatty advocated complete

elimination, recommending that:
Great Britain should take a definite standpoint in
the Peace Conference that submarine warfare should
be abolished, and the building of submarines
should be definitively prohibited by International
Law and the League of Nations."

The Admiralty also hoped to eliminate Germany as

significant naval power.

a

The Board wanted to strip Germany

of her colonies and to sink all German submarines,

interned

vessels, and her nine remaining capital ships.
As far as naval arms limitation was concerned, the

Admiralty remained ambivalent.

Wemyss, according to his

wife, believed that the League would "sink into

a

mere

debating society more likely to breed wars than prevent
them."^^

The Board violently objected to any arrangements

Admiral Wemyss, as recorded in Beatty MSS: "Notes on
Naval Interests Connected with the Peace Settlement",
December 1918.

*%eatty MSS: "Notes on Naval Interests Connected with
the Peace Settlement", December 1918.
116/1861: Admiralty Memorandum, "Admiralty Policy
in Relation to the Peace Settlement", January 6, 1919.
^^ADM

'tester Wymess, Wester Wymess

,

410.
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which would "place i- the hands of some international
tribunal the responsibility of det errr.ining what
force is

required for the protection of the Empire."

tentatively supported naval
IV)

The Admiralty

reductions (Wilson's Point

arm.s

so long as the Royal Navy maintained "adequate

superiority for reasonably possible contingencies."
Board suggested, as

The

basis for determ.ining relative naval

a

strength and apportioning reductions, using the value of
overseas trade, a m.ethod which would

m.a intain

"predorr.inant position" of the Royal Navy.

the

The Board

did not believe, however, that the "League would ration the
arrr^s

of other nations and let Britain curb herself" and thus

concluded that arms limitation under the auspices of the
League was probably not feasible.
The British government seemed far m.ore concerned with

rapid dem.obi 1 ization of the wartim.e navy than with the
future of bl ockade or submarines

Hankey

.

,

predicted that the Adm.iralty would "becom.e
m.onths."

on Novem.ber 22nd
a

sideshow in

3

The next day. Chancellor of the Exchequer Andrew

Bonar Law wrote to Sir Eric Geddes
First Lord to reduce costs

:

,

strongly urging the

"I am most anxious that the

cutting down of unnecessary expenditure should take place at

116/1772: Adm.iralty Mem.orandum, "Naval Aspects of
December
a League of Nations and Limitation of Arm.am.ents"
23, 1918; ADM 116/1863: Naval Sections Paris Records
League of Nations, undated.
^^ADM

,

^'Roskill, Hankey

,

Vol

II,

22.
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once."

Only Winston Churchill, at that time Minister
of
Munitions, sounded a note of warning:

Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think
of, or dream of, or anyone may tell you, no
arguments, however specious, no appeals, however
seductive, must lead [Britain] to abandon that
naval sunremacy on which the life of our country
depends."
Nonetheless, within

month the Board of Admiralty learned

a

that the navy's wartime unlimited vote of credit ended with
the fiscal year on March 31, 1919 and that they needed the

blessing of the Treasury before spending money on new
warship construction.

"

The Admiralty Board therefore

decided not to continue with the construction of their
newest class of battle cruisers.^*

While the British government was reducing the size
the Royal Navy, the Wilson Administration laid

building program before Congress.

a

of

naval

At the end of the war,

the United States possessed a navy inferior to that of Great

Britain: 16 dreadnoughts against 42 capital ships

(battleships and battle cruisers).

^^ADM

Due to the need for

116/1809: Bonar Law to Geddes, November 23, 1918.

^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Klatchko, Admi ral
Benson 136.
,

^^Roskill,

Naval Policy

104.

,

116/1772: Admiralty Memorandum re Battle Cruiser
Program, January 14 1919
^*ADM

,

Roski 1 1 Naval Policy 71
New Order 51
credits the Royal Navy with a total of 70 capital ships,
including an unspecified number of pre-dreadnought vintage.
^^Sprouts

,

,

.

,

,
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convoy escorts, the United States had temporarily
delayed
work on its 1916 program of 10 battleships and
6 battle
cruisers, together with

3

battleships authorized in 1914-

73

Completion of these vessels would provide America with
superiority in modern capital ships by 1924, as Britain's
15.

fleet included many older battleships.^*

The 1918 program

provided for an additional 10 battleships and
cruisers over a three-year period.

It also

6

battle

included a

clause that allowed Wilson to cancel the program in the
event of diplomatic agreement.

Secretary of the Navy

Josephus Daniels explained to the House Naval Affairs

Committee that Wilson supported the fleet because its

authorization would help him at the upcoming peace
conf erence .^^

Admiral Benson opposed these delays, arguing that the
United States could "expect the future to give us more
potential enemies than potential friends so that our safety
must lie in our own resources." See Trask, Captains and
Cabinets 48
,

74

Admiral Benson fervently hoped that regardless of the
outcome of the peace conference, the United States would
build a navy "equal to or superior to that of any other
country." See Klatchko, Admiral Benson 130.
.

75

The United States Navy
Sprouts, New Order 58n.
Board, which originally proposed 12 battleships and 16
battle cruisers, viewed "the British Navy as the maximum
possible force which we must be prepared to meet." See
Trask, Captains and Cabinets 290
,

,

Ison earlier told Benson that he wanted "to go into
the Peace conference armed with as many weapons as my
pockets will hold so as to compel justice." See Trask,
Captains and Cabinets 310.
,

140

The 1918 program pointed up a contradiction
in Wilson's
position.
In the Fourteen Points, he publicly
called for

national armaments to be "reduced to the lowest
point

consistent with domestic safety.

"^^

recognized the potential value of

At the same time, he
a

maritime police force.

He also wanted to reduce the preeminence of the Royal
Navy.
The meeting of the Supreme War Council with Colonel House

had already demonstrated his willingness to use the size
of
the American Fleet as a bargaining chip.

Historian Mary

Klatchko concludes that Wilson "intended to use the naval
building program as leverage during negotiations in Paris.
In Paris,

"^^

the issue of freedom of the seas caused

little problem.

Wilson's vision of the post-war world

rested upon establishment of

League of Nations.

a

He

understood the intensity of Britain's commitment to
blockade, and he wanted to avoid a battle with London.^"

He

also believed that the establishment of the League would

greatly reduce the importance of the issue of freedom of the

77

Point IV, as recorded in Grenville, International
Treaties 57
,

^^Balfour MSS: Derby to Balfour, December 20/23, 1918.
^^Klat chko, Admi r a 1
80

Bens on

,

132.

The Times for instance, declared on December 11,
1918: "This war could not have been won for civilization but
There can therefore be no
for the British sea power.
question, so far as this country is concerned, of
diminishing the sharpness of the weapon that has given us
the victory in this war." See Ray Baker, Woodrow Wilson and
(Garden City, NY, 1922), 381.
World Settlement.
,
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seas.

Furthermore, his own naval advisor, Benson,
shared

*

Beatty's view that legal restrictions on sea power
would
operate only in peacetime.*^ When Lloyd George suggested
that "the matter could be left for further
consideration

after the League of Nations has been established and
proved
in its capacity in actual working," the President agreed.

American legal expert David Hunter Miller subsequently
accepted Australian Prime Minister William Hughes'

suggestion to drop from the draft covenant of the League the
implication that the Permanent Court of International
Justice might exercise jurisdiction over freedom of the
seas.

When Miller presented the revised draft covenant of

•

the League of Nations to the Peace Conference on February
14,

1919, it contained no reference to freedom of the seas.^'

September 1919, Wilson used some verbal
prestidigitation to explain the absence of freedom of the
seas at Paris: "One of the principles I went to Paris most
insisting on was the freedom of the seas. Now, the freedom
of the seas means the definition of the rights of neutrals
to use the seas when other nations are at war, but under the
League of Nations there are no neutrals, and, theref ore
by
unnecessary
became
the very thing that I was advocating it
See Buehrig, Woodrow
to define freedom of the seas."
Wilson 262-63.
*In

.

.

.

,

01

Dingman, Pacific

76-77.

,

^%avid Lloyd George, as recorded in Maurice Hankey, The
Supreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (London,
1963), 16.
^^Egerton, League of Nations

.

127.

^Tor the complete text of the compromise draft, see
Baker, World Settlement Vol III, 144-151.
,
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Secondary matters, however, proved more difficult to
resolve
The "naval battle of Paris" focused primarily
upon the

American program of naval expansion.

First Lord of the

Admiralty Walter Long, who replaced Sir Eric Geddes on
January 16, 1919, expressed the Admiralty's concern over the

American naval building program to the Prime Minister in
late February:

The Navy... is the very foundation of our existence
as a free people, and we cannot afford to trifle
with our Naval Strength.
It may be that the
U.S.A. are bluffing, but we cannot, I submit,
presiime that this is the case, and therefore I
recommend diplomatic action.

British apprehension over the American threat to British
naval superiority was not limited to the Admiralty.

Lloyd

George's assistants in Paris, Hankey and Philip Kerr,

portrayed an Anglo-American naval limitation agreement as

a

prerequisite for the effective operation of the League:
The first condition of success for the League of
Nations is... a firm understanding between the
British Empire and the United States of
America ... that there will be no competitive
building up of fleets.

They advised making British acceptance of the League

provisional upon American willingness to accept naval arms
limitation.

"•Walter Long,

230

as recorded in Harder,

Scapa Flow

.

Vol V,

.

^^Hankey/Kerr memorandiim, as recorded in Egerton, League
of Nations, 158.
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Lloyd George accepted their recommendation to use the

League as a means of forcing the United states
to make naval
concessions.
Robert, Viscount Cecil, the head of the League
of Nations section within the Foreign Office,

explained to

Lloyd George that Wilson required an amendment to the League
covenant protecting the Monroe Doctrine in order to
overcome

opposition within the United States Senate.

On March 26th,

the Prime Minister explained to Cecil that he was "anxious
to induce the Americans to give up their plans of building

ships against the British" and ordered him to veto the

inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the covenant of the
League.

38

Cecil informed House the following day that

British acceptance of the League covenant depended upon a
naval arrangement.

The civil and professional heads of the respective

services proved unable to reach agreement.

The dispute

nearly reached the point of fisticuffs in late March when
Admiral Wemyss paid an unscheduled visit upon Secretary

Daniels to discuss the 1918 program.

Admiral Benson arrived

and felt burdened to correct what he considered as Wemyss'

disregard of diplomatic etiquette.

Daniels, some years

later, described the confrontation:

never saw two men of their high standing so
infuriated as Admiral Benson and Admiral
Wemyss ... They exchanged such bitter comments that
at one time I feared they would pass the bounds
I

^^Robert, Viscount Cecil as recorded in Egerton,
of Nations, 161.

League

144

and have an altercation.^^

Daniels and Long subsequently struggled to reconcile
the

British aim of naval superiority with the American goal
of
naval parity.

Daniels, who claimed that "the peace of the

world demanded equality of naval strength" between Britain
and the United States, suggested that passage of the
League

covenant might render the 1918 naval building program
super fluous.'^

Long responded by stating that the existing

American building programs precluded British support for the
League.

Benson then went so far as to assert that British

*

attempts to maintain naval superiority would lead to war.'^
Poor personal relations between Lloyd George and Wilson

complicated attempts to resolve the Anglo-American naval
conflict.

Upset with Wilson's condemnation of British naval

practices early in the war, the Prime Minister described the

American President as "so stupidly unpleasant to both sides
that statesmen of the fighting alliances were never quite

Josephus Daniels, as recorded in Klachko, Admiral

Benson

,

144.

on

On January 4, 1918, Daniels
Sprouts, New Order 65.
told Wilson that if the Peace Conference failed, the United
See Seth
States would need the greatest navy in the world.
Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919 (Princeton, 1961), 288.
,

'*Marder,

Scapa Flow

,

V,

231.

%latchko. Admiral Benson

,

147.
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sure where his sy-pathies lay."^^

Wilson,

ir.

turn,

complained to Daniels that "I will come out of the war
hating the English."'^ The President offended his
British
counterpart at

a

state dinner at Buckingham Palace in

December 1918, when he failed to pay tribute to the Royal
Navy.

95

During the peace conference, Lloyd George became

annoyed, according to his confidential secretary, with the

President's habits of returning to issues which Lloyd George
regarded as settled and "preaching the gospel of the League,

while increasing

arm.y

&

navy."'^

Lloyd George thus bypassed

Wilson and turned to Daniels in an attempt to resolve the
naval controversy

On April 1st, Lloyd George and Daniels met over

breakfast to try to am.eliorate the Anglo-American tension.
The Prim.e Minister pointedly suggested that the United

States "ought to stop work on your cruisers and dreadnoughts

David Lloyd George, as recorded in Walworth, America
Wilson, for example, annul led an arrangem.ent
Moment 5
concluded by Colonel House and Arthur Balfour whereby the
United States would forego the construction of capital ships
during the war in return for an option to buy British ships
Balfour MSS: Cabinet
at the conclusion of hostilities.
Memoranda 1914-18
'

,

.

,

^*Woodrow Wilson,

Cabinets

,

as recorded by Trask,

Captains and

283-84.

^^Lloyd George, Mem.oirs of the Peace Conference

113,

.

called the speech a "blunder."
'^Frances Stevenson,

George: A Diary

,

172-175.

as recorded in Taylor,

Ll oyd

Vol I,
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if you really believe in the League of Nations."'^

Daniels

explained that the United States Navy required the
new ships
to fulfill its extensive responsibilities which,
he claimed,
exceeded those of the Royal Navy.

Lloyd George heatedly

disagreed, and the meeting ended in an impasseJ^

Wilson's

call, on April 6th, for the George Washington to take him

back to the United States made clear to both sides that room
for maneuver was limited.

Cecil and Colonel House, who shared a fierce

determination to reach agreement, finally found an
appropriate formula.

Cecil wrote a letter to House on April

He described the American 1918 program as "wholly

8th.

inconsistent with the conception of the League of Nations"
and as leading "to a competition in arms."

He next asked

House to recognize that "the British sentiment about sea
power ... [was] an article of faith with every British
SB

statesman."

Cecil then proposed that, in exchange for

support on the League of Nations, America should agree to

abandon the new naval program and to consult annually with
the British government concerning relative naval strength.

House, with Wilson's approval, agreed the following day to

David Lloyd George, as recorded in Tillman Angl oAmerican Relations 291.
^

,

'harder, Scapa Flow

,

Vol V, 233.

^^Robert, Viscount Cecil as recorded in Seymour,
Intimate Papers Vol IV, 418-19.
,
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abandon or modify the 1918 program, without mentioning the
1916 program.

Upon further discussion. House agreed to

postpone construction under the 1916 program on ships not
yet begun until the signing of the peace

treaty.*'^''

As a

result of the Cecil-House compromise, Britain maintained her

existing naval superiority, while the United States retained
the right to achieve parity through completion of the 1916

program.
The potential naval competition between America and

Britain complicated the disposition of German naval
resources.

Britain originally desired the wholesale

elimination of Germany's naval strength.

The Admiralty

recommended that all German colonial possessions be retained
by the Allied Powers and that all battleships, battle

cruisers, and submarines, together with most of the German

auxiliary vessels "be sunk in deep water within three months
of the signing of the Peace Treaty."

In Paris, Benson

concurred on the grounds that distribution of the German
naval assets "makes it impossible during many years to come
'02

for the American Navy to overtake the British Navy.*

France, however, indicated a desire to retain a share of the

In May, President
League of Nations 162.
Wilson withdrew his support for the 1918 program.
-'^"^Egerton,

,

116/1772: Admiralty Memorandum, "Disposal of
Enemy Ships", January 6, 1919.
-°-ADM

-^^Baker,

Woodrow Wilson

,

Vol

III,

205.
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High Seas Fleet as compensation for construction
prevented
by the war.

House, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau accepted

partition of the German fleet on March 7th, under the
condition that Britain, Japan, and the United States
would
sink their shares.-^This compromise quickly broke down.

Lloyd George had

agreed to sink the British share on the understanding that
the United States would cease building against Britain.

-'^^

Subsequent discussions revealed that the American delegation
did not share this appreciation.

Long then observed:

United States were determined to proceed
with their huge program, we should have to
reconsider our position, and might be obliged to
utilize our^^hare for the purpose for which they
were built.
If the

On April 25th, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau again

met to discuss the future of the captured German vessels,
but they were unable to find a formula on which they could
agree.

When German sailors of the interned High Seas Fleet

scuttled their ships on June 21, 1919, they effectively
ended the distribution question.
The final question of significance to be addressed at
Paris involved the future of the submarine.

The Admiralty

favored "universal prohibition against the building of

-^^Seymour,

Intimate Papers

-"^^Roskill,

Naval Policy

'^^Jalter Long,

V,

265.

,

,

Vol IV, 356-58.

264.

as recorded by Harder,

Scapa Flow

,

Vol

149

submarines, together with the general destruction of

existing submarines under international auspices.""^

During

the course of the peace conference, the British
had

persuaded Benson and Daniels to support abolition.*"

The

Allied naval delegates considered the suppression
of

submarine warfare on May 1st.

At that meeting, the French

again proved an impediment to Anglo-American cooperation.

Viewing the submarine as a weapon for weaker naval powers,
they opposed any limitation on the relatively inexpensive

alternative to the capital ship.

Minister of Marine Leygues

argued that "there is no treacherous weapon, there can only
be treachery in the way the weapon is used.""^
of French intransigence,

In the face

the Admiralty failed to secure the

abolition of the submarine.
The delegates at the peace conference terminated the
"naval battle of Paris."

Wilson abandoned both his notion

of freedom of the seas and the 1918 program in return for

British acceptance of

Monroe Doctrine.

a

League covenant which recognized the

The scuttling of the High Seas Fleet

obviated disagreement over the distribution of German ships.
Nonetheless, the conference compromises represented a truce,

116/1772: Admiralty Memorandum, "Freedom of the
seas: The Use of Mines and Submarines in War", January 21,
1919.
-^^ADM

"^Roskill, Naval Policy
•''^Georges

Vol V,

258.

,

92.

Leygues, as recorded in Marder, Scapa Flow

.
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not a treaty,

with the relative strengths of the Anglo-

American navies still unresolved and the submarine
still
considered a legitimate weapon of war, Britain struggled
to
determine a post-war naval policy.

CHAPTER

5

TOWARDS A NATIONAL POLICY, 1919-1920
In the aftermath of the First World War,

the British

government sought to determine an appropriate naval policy.
The Lloyd George ministry found itself in a
milieu
that

differed from its pre-war counterpart in two important
aspects: the British populace had developed new views on the

relative importance of armaments and social services, while
the costs of the war had adversely affected the balance of

His Majesty's Exchequer.

The Cabinet alternated emphasis

between economy and security.
a

In August 1919,

it announced

drastic reduction in expenditure and ordered the fighting

services to base their estimates on the assumption of no

major war for ten years.

With apparent disregard for

budgetary consequences, however, the First Lord of the

Admiralty announced in March 1920 the government's intention
to maintain a navy at least equal in strength to any other.

For nearly two years, the government sought a balance

between the advocates of sea power and the proponents of
"Treasury control."
The Great War accelerated a trend in British domestic

opinion that the Boer War had initiated:

a

retreat from the

martial bellicosity of the late Victorian period.

The

butcher's bill for Britain exceeded three-quarters of a

152

million dead and double that number wounded.^

The officer

corps suffered disproportionate losses, and neither
the
royal household nor the Cabinet escaped sacrifice.^

terrible loss seared the public consciousness.^
of 1918,

This

In the fall

for example, one of the magazines of the British

Expeditionary Force in France labelled war as "the vilest
disaster that can befall mankind."*
revulsion against war was

a

One reflection of this

growing willingness to see law

replace force majeure as the ultimate arbiter in

international relations
This view found particular favor with the British Left.
A coalition of Liberals and members of the Independent

A. J. P.

Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (New York,

1965), 120.
2

Deaths from the entourage of George V included three
aides-de-camp, plus the only son of Sir Arthur Bigge, the
King's Private Secretary, while Andrew Bonar Law lost two
sons, Herbert Asquith sacrificed two nephews and oldest son
Raymond, and Cabinet Secretary Sir Maurice Hankey parted
with his brother Donald.
See Nicolson, King George V 253.
,

Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New
York, 1975), passim relies on the works of Robert Graves
Al f red Havinghurst
and Sigf ried Sassoon among others
Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century (Chicago,
1979), 152-53, develops in related fashion the concept of a
"lost generation," which A. J. P. Taylor points out produced
three Prime Ministers and, moreover, lost fewer men to the
war than the anticipated figure for emigration, running at
300,000 per year before the war.
,

.

,

^The Wipers Times

,

,

as recorded in Wilson, Myriad Faces

756.

^Gerda Crosby, Disarmament and Peace in British
Politics 1914-1919 (Cambridge, 1957), 95.

,
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Labour Party formed the Union of Democratic Control (U.D.C.)
in November 1914 in opposition to the
British war effort.

The U.D.C. advocated a supranational organization for
the

enforcement of international law combined with dramatic

reduction of armaments.*

At the conclusion of hostilities,

the Labour Party viewed armaments as a major cause of

international conflict.^

According to Paul Kennedy, a

coalition of organizations, including the Union of

Democratic Control, the League of Nations Union, the
National Peace Council, and the Peace Pledge Union, sought
to impart to the public the belief that:

the pacific settlement of all disputes, the rule
of law rather than the rule of force, the
condemnation of those old-fashioned and patriotic
sentiments, the turning of swords into plowshares
and, above all, the belief in the sanctity and
efficacy of an international 'public
opinion'
.would deter aggressors by moral suasion
al one
.

.

The League of Nations Union, through seventy public rallies

held across the nation on the anniversary of the armistice,

Crosby, Disarmament

,

17.

^Kenneth Miller, Socialism and Foreign Policy: Theory
Sir Edward Grey,
and Practice (The Hague, 1967), 106.
Liberal Foreign Secretary from 1905-1916, later blamed the
outbreak of the Great War on the pre-war arms race: "Great
If there are armaments on
armaments lead inevitably to war.
one side there must be armaments on other sides. While one
nation arms, other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by
The enormous growth of armaments in
remaining def encel ess
Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them--it
was these that made war inevitable." See Kennedy, Strategy
and Diplomacy 165.
.

.

.

.

,

^Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy

.

26.
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became a leading pressure group on behalf of a new direction
in British foreign affairs.'

Such convictions eroded the previous position of the
Navy as the guarantor of British national security.

Changes

in public opinion affected popular perception of the fleet
in two ways.

First, advocates of international authority

considered the British Navy a potential stumbling block to
the success of the League.

David, Baron Davies, for

example, an ardent supporter of the League, argued that "the

prevention of war depends upon the ability of the League to
secure justice" and "that justice cannot be achieved without

disarmament."

In his opinion,

Britain's ratification of the

Versailles Treaty severely restricted the scope of the navy,
which could best be used as part of an international police
force under the auspices of the League.

Davies asserted

that "it is not, however, enough to sheath the sword: it

must be handed over for safe keeping to an international
authority."^"

Second, a union of Radicals and Labourites,

such as Ramsay MacDonald, who argued against the utility and

morality of national armed forces, also tended to oppose the
notion that any people could hold another in subjugation.^^

Egerton, League of Nations

,

175.

The Problem of the Twentieth Century: A
Study in International Relationships (London, 1930), 54,
646-49.
^"oavid Davies,

Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies
(Garden City, NY, 1959), 302.
^^A.P.
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As the defense of the British Empire constituted
one of the

primary justifications for the maintenance of
the Royal
Navy, the rising strength of anti-imperialist sentiment

signified, in some measure, a decline in support for
naval

predominance

While popular opinion, particularly among the Left,
became increasingly enamored with the notion that the

arbitration of international disputes might replace war,
Parliament took scant notice of the new organization.

The

1918 Election produced a House of Commons that contained an

unusually large number of businessmen, 260 against an
average of 200, giving rise to Lloyd George's description of

Commons as "the Trades Union Congress on the opposition
benches and the Chamber of Congress on the governm.ent
side."*

The domestic and commercial orientation of Commons

led one historian to describe it as "certainly one of the

most insular and ignorant in British history."

The lack of

concern with foreign policy (Ireland excepted) in the House
left such policy in the hands of the Lloyd George ministry.

David Lloyd George, as recorded in T.O. Lloyd, Empire
to Welfare State; English History, 1906-1967 (London, 1970),
Conservative Stanley Baldwin described the House of
100.
Commons as a group of "hard-faced men who looked as if they
had done well out of the war." See Taylor, English History

,

129.

Northedge, as recorded in Havinghurst, Britain in
Transition 151. The "Coupon" election, so-called after
Asquith's epithet for the letter of support issued by Lloyd
George and Bonar Law to approved Coalition candidates, gave
the Coalition 520 seats out of 707.
*'F.S.

,
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A majority of senior policy makers remained
unconvinced
of the soundness of the public's faith
in the League of

Nations.-^

Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office felt that
the
League would disrupt economic cooperation within the
British

Empire.

Leo Amery worried about the undue influence of

small states, pointing to the prospect of "Great Britain
and

the United States together being outvoted by a com.bination
of Liberia, Montenegro,

and Guatemala."'^

Sir Eyre Crowe,

who rose from assistant under-secretary to permanent-

undersecretary of the Foreign Office in 1920, believed that
unwarranted aggression in Europe could not be prevented by
economic blockade or boycott--the methods of collective

security--but only by "real military preponderance," which
included numbers, cohesion, efficiency, and geographical
location (i.e., the balance of power)."

The reservations

held by most diplomats and servicemen stemmed

from,

similar

'Lord Cecil remained the only senior British official
who vigorously supported the League; his most powerful ally
was General Jan Christian Sm.uts of South Africa, who joined
the Imperial War Cabinet in July 1917.
After these two one
must look to such relatively obscure civil servants as
Arthur Salter and Frank Walters. See Egerton, League of
Nations 177.
,

,

'^Belof f
^^Leo

Imperial Sunset

,

,

292-93

.

Amery, War and Peace 1914-1929

.

162.

'7

Eyre Crowe, as recorded in Harnett, Collapse of
British Power 245. Crowe's 1907 memorandum on the balance
of power remains the classic application of that doctrine to
See Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power 355British policy.
**Sir

,

,

56.
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coricerns with the League's inability to enforce its decrees

on recalcitrant states.-^

Chief of the Imperial General

Staff Sir Henry Wilson, for example, declared that "to
build
on the League was to build on shifting sands.

"^^

Sir Maurice Hankey, the secretary to the Cabinet,

regarded the League in

a

manner representative of many other

leading members of the Coalition government. During the war,
he criticized Lord Robert Cecil's proposals for

Nations on the grounds that it would "create

security which is wholly fictitious."

a

a

League of

sense of

He continued

prophetically that the League:
will only result in failure and the longer that
failure is postponed the m.ore certain it is that
this country will have been lulled to sleep.
It
will put a very strong lever into the hands of the
wel 1 -m.eaning idealists who are to be found in
alm.ost every Government, who deprecate expenditure
on armaments
and, in the course of time, it wil
almost certainly result in this nation being
caught at a disadvantage
,

Later, he decided that a League based on the Supreme War

Counci 1 might serve as

a

useful cl earinghouse for

ministerial exchanges, but he never believed it could

substitute for military preparedness.

He therefore declined

Even Lord Davies, one
Beloff, Im>perial Sunset 295.
of the League's most ardent supporters, worried about this
See Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth Century
problem.
,

54.

-^General Wilson,
Nations 159.

as recorded in Egerton,

League of

,

Balfour MSS: 49704, Hankey to Balfour, May 25, 1916.

,

158

an appointment as the League's first secretary general
after
a

survey of Britain's leading statesmen, including an

extensive interview with the Prime Minister, convinced him
that the fledgling organization would prove ineffective."

The Cabinet itself reflected the traditional British

appreciation for the role of force in international
relations.

In 1917,

the Cabinet discussed the future of

the League, guided by papers from Lord Robert Cecil and Sir

Eyre Crowe.

Thomas Jones, one of Hankey's assistant Cabinet

Secretaries, recorded the following discussion of the

League
The members ranged between those who hope for m.uch
and those who hope for little.
The latter fear
danger of being lulled into false security by a
League and the danger of com.prehensi ve and
am.bitious projects.
Are you going to have a
general conference to interfere in the affairs of
the world? Think of the agenda and what a field
day the sm.al 1 Powers will have
Even the Hague
Conferences have 1 ed to anim.osi ties
Conferences
will lead to the nursing of grievances, aj^d to
instability. Who will be our next enem.y?"
,

•

.

The Cabinet shared Hankey

'

s

opinion that whi 1 e the League

Egerton, League of Nations

.

167-68

Coalition Cabinet, formed in January 1919,
included Prime Minister David Lloyd George; Lord President
Arthur Balfour; Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon; Lord Privy
Seal Andrew Bonar Law; Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen
Chamberlain; Colonial Secretary Lord Milner; Secretary for
War and Air Winston Churchill; First Lord of the Adm.iralty
Walter Long; and Minister of Transport Sir Eric Geddes.
Taylor, English History 646, lists the com.plete Cabinet.
^^The

,

Jones, as recorded in Keith Middlem.as, ed,
Whitehall Diary. I: 1916-1925 (London, 1969), 32-33.
^"Thom.as
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might serve

a

useful function, it was no substitute for

military preparedness.

One British historian regards the

Lloyd George governm.ent as am.ong the last in which:

Britain's policies were decided by a select group
of aristocrats, country squires and men of
comjT.erce, who argued without m.uch concern for
the
views of the m.asses about the 'national interest'
and who usually displayed a wish to preserve that
interest energetically, if need be by armed
f orce
Lloyd George, for exam.ple, ordered im.perial forces to
support the Greek expedition to Turkey.

certainly m.eant to fight and

Winston Churchill, in

I

He wrote:

"I

was certain we would win.""

a sim.ilar vein,

wanted Britain to

intervene "thoroughly with large forces, abundantly supplied

with mechanical appliances" against the Bolsheviks
Churchill hated Russian

Corrjr^.unisrr.,

.^^

which he believed had the

potential to cause "universal coll apse and anarchy

11

"Kennedy, Naval Mastery 271. Wilson, Myriad Faces
7 57
shares Kennedy s view that Pari iament rejected the
public's repudiation of force as a legitimate tool of
foreign policy,
,

,

,

'

David Lloyd George, as recorded in F.S. Northedge, The
Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers 1916-1939
The Greek occupation of Smyrna in
(New York, 1966), 151.
When
1919 inspired Turkish resistance under Mustapha Kem.al
Kem.alist forces routed the Greeks and approached
Constantinople, Lloyd George directed land and naval forces
to Chanak to keep the Turks in Asia.
.

^S^inston Churchill, as recorded in William Manchester,
The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Visions of Glory,
1874-1932 (New York, 1983), 679.
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throughout Europe and Asia."^"

More co-pel ling for -en of

their character was the state of British national
finance.

The precise i-pact of the Great War on the British

economy remains unclear.

That the war brought some distinct

gains can hardly be denied.
from, the

An endless stream of orders

Ministry of Munitions, combined with the loss of

5.7 m.illion m.en m.obilized in the fighting services,

the industrial sector towards greater efficiency

:

forced

the

standardization of com.ponents, the recycling of metals, the

modification of factory interiors, up-to-date accounting
m.ethods,

increased use of unskilled labour, and the

im.plem.entation of new processes discovered under the im.petus
of wartim.e requirem.ents

The British shipbuilding

.^^

industry, for exam.pl e, adapted to m.erchant vessel

construction

a system, of

autom.atic welding devel oped for

warships, whose rivets had tended to

vibration of naval gunfire

loose under the

Increased cooperation between

.

firm.s m.ultiplied the im.pact

x^ork

of each new devel opm.ent

Winston Churchill, as recorded in Kenneth Young,
Churchill & Beaverbrook: A Study in Friendship (London,
Lloyd George appointed Churchill Minister of
1966), 55.
Munitions in July 1917 despite the nearly universal
opposition to the return of the m.an responsible for the
Dardanelles fiasco, prim.arily out of fear that Churchill, if
left out of the government, would combine with Sir Edward
See Rowland,
Carson to sweep Lloyd George from office.
David Lloyd George 407-09.
,

,

"Tol lard, British Sconom.y

^^ilson. Myriad Faces

.

,

53-62

782-83.
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according to

econorr.ic

historian R.H. Tawney, "by breaking

down trade jealousies and secrecies and accustoming

engaged in the same industry to joint action.
government,

f urtherm.ore

"^^

firrr.s

The British

aggressively supported new or

,

previously insignificant industries, such as aircraft, dye
stuffs and optics, in its drive for autarky.

British

industry, as a result, emerged from the war with its

productive capacity enhanced
The impact of the war was not, however, entirely

beneficial

Britain lost the potential contributions of

.

over two m.illion workers killed or

conflict

m.aim.ed

during the

Rol ling stock and physical plant suffered

.

deterioration due to inadequate m.aintenance

Additionally,

.

some of the new construction palliated wartim.e requirements

without addressing
exampl e

,

1

ong-term. needs

New steel

.

m.il Is

were bui It in existing industrial centers

Cumber 1 and and Sheffield

,

,

,

for

such as

rather than in the vicinity of the

iron ore fields, where transportation costs, and hence

production costs, would have been reduced,'
expansion

,

Wartim.e

according to econom.ic historian Duncan Burn

,

"put

new obstacles in the way of radical adaptation to changed

%,H. Tawney,

as recorded in Pollard, British Economy

55.

440 ( chart ), reveal s
Sm.pire to Welfare State
that the total value of British industrial production in
1920 surpassed that of any previous year.
-*Lloyd,

'^Taylor,

,

English History

,

122.

.
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circumstances of raw-material supply, technique, and

competition" and thus reinforced

the ingrained

som.e of

inefficiencies of British industry.
Of greater im.port to Britain's economic future,
the war

proved detrimental to her position as
goods on the international m.arket.

a

supplier of finished

During the war, British

shops and British shipping diverted their efforts from

customary comjr.ercial orders in order to supply the incessant
dem.ands of the armed services.

Developing nations, finding

Britain unable to satisfy their needs, turned to alternative
sources, such as Japan or the United States.

Britain's

share of the world's shipping construction, for exam.ple,
fell

from 58.7% in 1909-14 to 35% in 1920.--

In related

fashion, the wartim.e dem.and for military and naval armam.ents

stimulated world-wide expansior* in steelworks.""

British

staple industries after the war thus found themselves faced

with markets characterized by over-capacity.

Yet,

from the

Arm.istice until the spring of 1920, a post-war boom,

stimulated by the pent-up dem^ands of domestic consumption,

masked the structural weaknesses of the British economy

33

Duncan Burn, as recorded in Wilson, Myriad Faces

Kennedy

,

Naval Mastery

,

.

790.

260

notes that during the
57
lard, British Economy
war the steel -m.aking capacity of both Britain and the United
States increased by 50%.
^"Pol

""Havinghurst

,

,

,

Britain in Transition

.

158
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The war did surprisingly little damage to Britair/s

favorable position with regard to capital investinent
abroad.
Before the war, Britain invested in foreign ventures over
£150 millions per year.

By 1914, British overseas

investments exceeded £4,000 millions, of which the share in
the United States (£850 millions) alone produced an annual

income of about £85 millions.

During the course of the war,

on governm.ent urging, private investors liquidated some £550
m.illions,

a

investm.ent,
m.il

1

ions

37
.

figure partially offset by £250 m.illions of new
so the net reduction totalled only £300

The British governm.ent

of the Allied coalition,

,

the financial m.ainstay

lent £1,741 m.illions to co-

belligerents: £171 millions within the Em.pire, £412.5
£434.5 millions to France, and £568

m.illions to Italy,
m.il

1

ions to Russia

£1,

3

65

m.i 1 1

ions

United States."'

,

.

Against these

of which £1,027

1

m.i 1 1

Britain thus raised

cans she borrowed

ions cam.e from the
m.ore

than the cost of

her own war effort from internal resources, as the net loans
to her Al 1 ies si ight 1 y exceeded the sale of foreign

securities

"Pol lard

,

British Sconomy

,

72

;

Tayl or

,

English History

,

123.

Bolshevik government subsequently repudiated the
debt contracted by the tsarist regim.e.
^^The

ard British Econom.y 7 4 Tayl or English History
123, lists British lending as £1,825 millions and British
borrowing as £1,340 millions.
•-Pol

1

,

,

;

,

,
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The greatest and most detrimental impact of the
war

with respect to finance involved a massive increase
in the
size of the National Debt.

To raise the revenues necessary

to support imperial forces in the field, the
Asquith

ministry sought to augment both tax assessments and
government borrowing.

After an initial attempt to raise the

duty on beer and tea, the Exchequer relied primarily on

increases in direct taxes, including income tax, supertax,
and excess profits duty, to render the necessary income.

The yield from these taxes increased dramatically, from £94

millions in 1913-14 to £721 millions in 1919-20.*^
Nonetheless, tax revenues paled in comparison to the
expenses of the war, which cost Britain about £7,500
millions. 42

Britain raised only 30.5% of her income through

Taxation would have been higher except for the
influence of Chancellor of the Exchequer Andrew Bonar Law.
Civil servant J.C.C. Davidson explained that "McKenna and
Lloyd George had both been exponents of higher taxation, but
with Bonar the policy changed and taxation was held at a
steady level." See Robert Rhodes James, ed. Memoirs of a
Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs and Papers, 19101937 (New York, 1970), 52.

British Economy

64, notes that income tax
rates rose from Is. 2d. in the pound in 1913-14 to 6s. by
1918-19, while the number of taxpayers increased from 1.2

*^Pollard,

.

million to 7.8 million in the same period.
British War Finance 1914-1919 (New York,
Grady lists total expenditure from August
1968), 122-23.
1914 through September 1919 as £10,271 millions and then
subtracts £1,000 millions for estimated normal expenditures,
£870 millions for recoverable Allied loans, £221 millions
for Imperial obligations, £425 millions for war stocks, and
£240 millions of tax arrears.
*^Henry Grady,

165

taxation between August

1,

1914 and September 30th, 1919.-^

At that mo-ent, the National Debt, which before
the war

totalled about £650 millions, thus approached £7,800

millions.-

The service of the National Debt, which consumed

about 14% of the pre-war budget, swallowed two-fifths of

Britain's post-war tax revenues/'^
At a time when the cost of the war strained the

national Exchequer, Britain found that peace brought with it
additional expenses.

During the 1918 Election, Lloyd George

him.self promised "to m.ake Britain a fit country for heroes

to live

in."^-^

The public then dem.anded that the governm.ent

assum.e responsibi 1 ity for an increased array of social

services, such as public education and subsidized housing.

Grady War Finance 75 Bunselmeyer Cost of the War
137, gives a figure of 28% through 1918.
Grady, War
Finance 121; and Pol lard, British Economy 66-67 describe
the m.echanisms (Treasury bills. War Bonds, and Ways and
Means Advances) through which the Treasury funded the debt.
,

,

,

;

,

,

,

,

it

"Grady War Finance 123 Pol lard British Economy 66
201; and Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy
97, treat the
post-war Debt som.ewhat differently.
Pollard notes the Debt
reached a maximum of £7,830 millions in March 1920, while
Kennedy simply lists the Debt as £7,400 millions,
,

,

;

,

,

,

^^Taylor, English History . 124; Pollard, British
Taylor argues that the Debt "did not diminish
Economy 201.
the wealth of the community at all," as it m.erely
transferred wealth from those who paid taxes to the holders
(approximately 17 million) of War Loans.
,

^^David Lloyd George,
Lloyd George, 467

as recorded in Rowland,

David

The Labour
Empire to Welfare State 105-10.
Party supported these demands, but the Asquithian wing of
the Liberal Party did not.
'^Lloyd,

,

166

Popular dissatisfaction peaked in May 1919, when

a

mob of

ex-servicemen attempted to storm the House of Commons.

The

Lloyd George ministry hastily announced plans for 300,000
new homes, with

a

supplemental program, of public relief."

The funding of various social services, which in 1914

consumed about 4% of Britain's gross national product,
required double that level of pecuniary resources during the
interwar years. ^'
The Cabinet adopted a two-fold approach to the budget
deficit.

The Lloyd George ministry moved to increase tax

revenues while slashing governm.ental expenditures

Successive Chancellors of the Exchequer adopted "anti-waste"
campaigns to elim.inate unnecessary expenses.

Particularly

lucrative marks for Treasury knives were the service
estimates, described by one historian as "clearly the Number

One target for public and politicians alike."'*

Rowland, David Lloyd George
^^ilson. Myriad Faces

,

,

Fortunately

510.

800.

Wilson, Myriad Faces 799800, notes that the war made "available to the central
government a much larger proportion of the community's
wealth than had previously been at its disposal." The
Labour Party manifesto of Decem±)er 1918 championed "heavier
taxation of big incom.es" and "a levy on capital." See
Bunselmeyer, Cost of the War 138.
^"crady. War Finance

,

284.

,

,

Kennedy notes that the
Gladstonian economic theory then prevalent at the Treasury
regarded as anathema the deficit spending which in the
following decade reduced unemployment and stimulated new
industrial techniques in Britain, Germany, and the United
States
'-Kennedy, Naval Mastery

,

270.
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for the senior service, the Prime Minister considered
the

Army Estimates as

m.ost

suitable for reduction.

He directed

Churchill to cut the War Office Estimate on the grounds
that:

the highest expenditure is still military ... [and]
the largest immediate reductions which could be
affected without damage to the public welfare are
foreseeable in the activities controlled by your

department

Nonetheless, the Navy also faced the cuts which

traditionally followed the conclusion of hostilities.
The British governm.ent at the conclusion of the Great

War thus moved quickly to try to reduce expenditure linked
to the Royal Navy.

On November 23, 1918, Chancellor of the

Exchequer Andrew Bonar Law wrote
Eric Geddes

a

s em.i - f o rm.a

the First Lord of the Adm.iralty.

,

1

letter to Sir

Bonar Law

strongly urged Geddes to reduce costs, adding: "I am

m.ost

anxious that the cutting down of unnecessary expenditure

should take place at once.""

Within a month, the Board of

Admiralty learned that the navy's wartime unlimited vote of
credit would end with the fiscal year on March 31, 1919 and
that pending the 1919-20 estimates they would need the

blessing of the Treasury before spending money on new

David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
lloyd George 502-03.
,

116/1809: Bonar Law to Geddes, November 23, 1918.
The Revised Statement of Revenue and Expenditure for 191920, released the same day, revealed an estimated deficit of
£474 millions.
^'ADM

168

warship construction. 5-

In March 1919, Bonar Law warned

Churchill that the public must be convinced that
Britain
could not afford a big army and navy and jokingly
suggested
that the combined service estimates might be reduced
to £20

millions per year.''
The Admiralty cooperated after

a

fashion.

First Lord

Geddes, the day before Bonar Law's request, suggested

reducing the size of the Royal Navy by a "20% cut on manpower on the pre-war numbers.

"^^

The Board subsequently

agreed to reduce the number of naval personnel on active
duty from 148,000 officers and other ranks to a combined

strength of 136,000.^''

The Admiralty next concurred with the

cancellation of three new battle cruisers--sister ships to
the Hood --al ready under construction in March 1919.'^

In

May, as they met to consider the Navy Estimates for 1919-

'^oskill. Naval Policy

.

104.

''Wddl em.as Whitehall Diary 82.
Bonar Law may have
been trying to needle Churchill, as the two were on very
poor terms about this time.
In fact, Bonar Law suggested to
Churchill, in front of the Cabinet, that he resign.
See
Young, Churchill & Beaverbrook 57-58.
,

,

,

^^ADM

116/1605: Geddes Mem.orandum, November 22, 1918

'ADM 167/56: Board Minute 629, February

6,

1919.

Board Minutes 553, December 28, 1919;
Minute 658, February 27, 1919; and Minute 676, March 6,
1919; ADM 116/1773: Admiralty Memorandiun "Battle Cruiser
Programme", March 13, 1919. Reasons for cancellation
included the destruction of the German fleet, the need to
use the slips that the cruisers occupied for merchant
construction, and their outdated (pre- Jutland) design.
'^ADM 167/53:

169

1920,

the members of the Admiralty Board recognized the need

to establish,

in conjunction with the Cabinet, a post-war

naval policy.

They agreed that "it should be possible in

coming years to reduce the Fleet below its 1914 strength."-'
For the present, however, "in view of the current

uncertainties of the International situation," Britain's
naval leadership felt the need to maintain "a relatively

strong fleet in

a

state of readiness for action."^"

Admiralty thus proposed

a

The

fleet of twenty-two capital ships

in full commission, supported by nineteen more in various

degrees of reserve.

Walter Long, who replaced Sir Eric

Geddes as First Lord in January 1919, submitted the Navy

Estimates for 1919-1920.'*

he asked the Cabinet for

In June,

£171 millions, m.ore than three tim.es the highest pr9-v;ar
estim.ate

The Navy Estimates provoked a Cabinet quarrel in July.

Long presented his colleagues with

a

paper that stressed the

"ADM 167/56: Board Minute 802, May 29, 1919.
116/1773: Admiralty Memorandum on Fleet Strength,
Britain at that time had armed forces
June 19, 1919.
operating in Russia, the Middle East, India, and Ireland.
See Anthony Clayton, The British Empire As a Superpower
1919-39 (Athens, GA, 1986), 45-249, for a detailed
discussion of British interventions world-wide.
^'ADM

Conservative politician who held his first Cabinet
post. President of the Board of Agriculture, in 1895, Long
nearly captured the party leadership in 1911. After
supporting Lloyd George during the resignation of Asquith in
1916, he became Secretary of State for the Colonies from
1916-19.
^*A
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importance of command of the seas and described the Navy as
"the cheapest and most efficient police force that
the

Empire can possess.""

The First Lord then explained that

the swollen size of the estimate resulted from two causes:

non-recurrent wartim.e expenses (£75 millions) and pay
increases previously sanctioned by the Cabinet (£45
millions), implying that he was operating the Navy on
roughly the same budget as required by the pre-war fleet
(£51 mil lions)

Austen Chamberlain, who replaced Bonar Law as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, then submitted

a

memorandum

attacking the navy's failure to accept greater reductions."^

"Long later adm.itted that identifying the force against
which Britain should build was "a very difficult,
indeed ... almost an impossible question." He contended that
the duty of the Admiralty was not "to search for possible
enemies," but instead to provide "a Navy, sufficient in
strength, and efficient for any duty which it may reasonably
be called upon to perform." See Walter Long, Memories
(London, 1923), 269.
CI

"ADM 116/1773: Admiralty Memorandum, "Navy Estimates,
1919-20", July 5, 1919.
The Admiralty normally began work
on the Estimates in the early summer and submitted them to
the Treasury in December; the Cabinet discussed the figures
in January and the First Lord of the Admiralty presented
them to the House of Commons early in March in preparation
for the ensuing financial year, which runs from April 1st to
See Roskill, Naval Policy 204-09, for a
March 31st.
complete discussion of the process of developing of the
Estimates
,

(see pp. 48-51 above).
Chamberlain assured the Second Sea Lord that "if the Naval
Lords stand firm, and are prepared to resign together, they
See Sir Charles Petrie, The Life and
will get their way."
Letters of Austen Chamberlain (London, 1940), Volume I, 224.

^Wring the naval scare

of 1908
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He argued that only Japan and the United States possessed

sufficient naval strength to threaten Great Britain and,
given Britain's existing superiority in capital ships, that
placing more ships into reserve would not endanger her
national interests.

The Chancellor recommended that £110

millions be cut from the Navy Estimates.
The issue remained temporarily undecided, however,

because Number 10 Downing Street sat empty at the time these
papers were submitted.

Lloyd George spent 5-18 July

visiting his constituency in Criccieth, Wales."

Assistant

Cabinet Secretary Thomas Jones, in Hankey's absence, thus

decided to delay consideration of the Navy Estimates by the
Cabinet until the Prime Minister's return, as the Admiralty
and Treasury memoranda raised issues "of the first
importai^ce.""

Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey then provided Lloyd

George an important analysis of Britain's strategic position
in 1919.

Hankey, who had accompanied the Prime Minister to

Criccieth for

a

^'MacDonald,
Pacific 108.

conference on the coal industry, prepared

"Post-War Naval Policy", 197; Dingman,

,

^^During the Prime Minister's visit to Wales, Churchill
pressed the case for the creation of a unified Ministry of
See Rowland, David Llovd George 511.
Defence.
,

Jones sided with
89.
^'Middlemas, Whitehall Diary
Chamberlain: "The crux of the matter--as it seems to me--is,
having squashed Germany are we now going to start building
against America? It is clearly in the minds of the Sea
,

Lords

.
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for the latter an essay entitled "Towards a National
Policy,

July 1919."

He launched his appraisal by addressing

domestic policy.

He focused on "our dependence on imports"

and the war's detrimental impact on Britain's ability to

maintain

a

favorable balance of payments.

He then urged

that

non-productive employment of man-power and
expenditure, such as is involved by naval,
military, and air effort, must be reduced within
the narrowest lim.its consistent with national
safety

With this line of reasoning the Cabinet Secretary
foreshadowed Sir Thomas Inskip's argument that the economy
was Britain's "fourth arm of defence.""'
Next, Hankey gave his attention to British foreign

policy.

He began with his evaluation of the League of

Nations.

He declared that Britain would have to support the

League, but that

it remained "an experiment on the success

of which we cannot yet afford to base our national

security."

The only potential threat he could see from

Europe rested in a possible combination of Germany and
Russia, which he judged as far distant and, with proper
policy, preventable.

Hankey maintained that Japan lacked

"the mineral and manufacturing resources to sustain war with

^CAB 21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.

Thomas Inskip, as recorded in Kennedy, Strategy
and Diplomacy 100-01.
^'Sir

,
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a

Great Power on the modern scale" and indicated that

Britain should seek to reduce tensions between Japan
and
China.

Having eliminated all other threats, the Secretary

turned to "the most powerful nation in the world," the

United States.
Hankey considered war with the United States "almost

unthinkable."

American military and economic strength meant

that "it is quite impossible that we could make successful

war against her," while the lack of antagonism towards the

United States in British policy-making circles rendered
improbable the onset of hostilities between the Atlantic

Although he considered war with the United States

powers.

"the maximum danger" that Britain might face," Hankey

believed it to be "an extremely remote contingency.""
The Cabinet Secretary nonetheless displayed

a

marked

disinclination to base British national security on the
basis of Anglo-American cooperation.

He pointed out the

"antagonism towards the British Empire among important
elements in the United States."

Hankey insisted that the

Royal Navy "should not be allowed to sink below the level of
the United States fleet" lest some "truculent, overbearing

Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
•CAB 21/159:

Hankey Memorandum, "Towards
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
^-CAB 21/159:

National

21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
July 1919", July 17, 1919.

'^CAB

Policy,

a
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and anti-British president" subject Britain to "unbearable

pressure."

To reconcile his desire for "real savings in

Navy estimates" with his determination not to abandon
"general command of the sea to the United States," he urged
that "no opportunity be lost to induce the United States to

abate their armaments in accord with us."

Hankey then

suggested that the first step in naval disarmament:
should be to invite all the Naval Powers to
concert a scheme, reducing to an absolute minimum
the number of ships in commission and in immediate
reserve, thereby reducing personnel to the lowest
possible limit
As an interim measure, he advocated as public policy

a

Two

Power Standard of naval strength "excluding the United

States" which would both protect Britain against the remote
yet dangerous possibility of war with America and avoid

offending "the mass of public opinion.""
Hankey

'

impl i cat ions

s

.

anal y sis contained two interesting

First, his discussion of naval disarmament

involved the downgrading of capital ships from full

commission status into various degrees of reserve, rather
than destruction.

This treatment would enable Britain, in

the event of future threat, to rapidly regain her existing

naval superiority over all nations not signatory to the arms

control agreement.

Second, he above all sought to avoid

provoking the United States into

a

naval competition, which

"CAB 21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.

a

National
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would have forced
economy.

a

choice between naval supremacy and

Yet he gave no direct indication of priority

between those goals.

Surely he realized that naval

disarmament required Washington's active cooperation,

something in short supply during the Wilson Administration.
His differentiation between "published policy" and national

policy which "could never be alluded to in public, and

should only be spoken in the most secret and intimate
conversations" indicates that he was willing to run

considerable risks of antagonizing the United States.'^
On July 16th, the First Lord warned his colleagues of
the Admiralty Board that when the Cabinet debate resumed

upon the Prime Minister's return to London, the government

would probably press for severe reductions.

He explained

that he was prepared to propose that the Cabinet arrange a

vote on account (temporary spending authority) of £70

millions to carry the service through December, until which
time the Admiralty would search for further reductions.

*

Despite the expected assault from the Treasury, Long

convinced his ministerial associates to approve
Estimate of £171 millions.

a

revised

When the First Lord presented

21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
''CAB

'ADM 167/56: Board Minute 871, July 16, 1919.
27/71-72: Finance Committee Memorandum 23,
November 11, 1919.
'^CAB
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the Estimates to the House of Commons on July 24th,
he

avoided mentioning rivalry with America or even
articulating
a

naval strategy and instead emphasized the process of

demobilization.

A week later. Long informed his fellow

members of the Board of Admiralty that the Cabinet had
indeed pressed for "most drastic reductions in expenditure,"
for which purpose the Board would establish a Committee on

Naval Expenditure.''

Following

a

recommendation of the

previous First Lord, the Admiralty would also establish
"strong, critical, and.

..

a

independently-minded" commission,

known as the Post-War Questions Committee, to consider the
lessons of the war for the navy of the future."

Admiralty

House, in the sunder of 1919, looked to the future with the

knowledge that sacrifices would have to be made but

nonetheless with confidence that the Navy could control its
own destiny-

Lloyd George, however, had other plans.

He attempted

to pursue Hankey's recommendation "to induce the United

States to abate their naval armaments in accord with us."
He arranged for Lord Haldane to ask former Foreign Secretary
Sir Edward Grey, recently elevated to the peerage as 1st

"

Parliamentary Debates

,

Commons

,

vol.

118,

cols. 1597-

1609.

Long may
167/56: Board Minute 890, July 31, 1919.
have been influenced by a second missive from the Treasury
demanding reduction of the service estimates.
•^ADM

°ADM 167/57: First Lord Memorandum, December 17, 1918.
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Viscount Grey of Fallodan, to serve as an envoy to
Washington.

Haldane and Grey discussed the idea with

Colonel House, who sent to the failing Wilson the following

record of Grey's proposal:
That in no circumstances would Great Britain build
against the United States no matter how many keels
we laid.
However, England would hold herself free
to build against any European Power in any
quantity that seemed to her best. On the other
hand, the United States could exercise her own
judgment about building...

Grey further shared with House his belief that war between

Britain and the United States was "inconceivable."^'

He

decided to agree to the Prime Minister's request, providing
the Cabinet pursued a naval policy which included reduction
in the estimates and avoided any reference to rivalry with

America.

Lloyd George, before consulting the Cabinet,

concurred
On August 11th, the Prime Minister met with the War

Cabinet Finance Committee, which included Lord Privy Seal
and Leader of the House of Commons Andrew Bonar Law,

Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain, Colonial
Secretary Alfred, Viscount Milner, and, of course, the

Lord Grey, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate Papers
Grey's scheme, which implied that both Britain and
IV, 496.
the United States would refrain from considering the other's
navy in their calculations, provided no indication of what
to do in case this happy state of affairs failed to
material ize
,

^'MacDonald,

203-06.

"Lloyd George and Post-War Naval Policy",
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ubiquitous Hankey.

This meeting represented the nadir of

the influence of the advocates of sea power.

The Finance

Committee, in the absence of the responsible civil and

professional heads of the Royal Navy, considered ways to
reduce naval expenditure.

They discussed halting naval

construction and reducing "the number of ships in commission
at least to the pre-war standard."

Recognizing the adverse

effect on public opinion if the United States were to

maintain

a

larger fleet than Britain, the Committee proposed

approaching the United States government "with
arrangement for

a

a

view to an

reduction of the number of ships

maintained in commission."
of guide 1 ines for the

f

They also established a series

ormul ation of future service

estimates, the most important of which directed the fighting

services to "proceed on the assumption that no great war is
to be anticipated within the next ten years."

The Finance

Committee further agreed that the services ought to be able
to frame estimates at a combined figure of £135 mi 1 1 ions

which £60 millions would be earmarked for the navy.

,

of

These

momentous decisions, reached without the benefit of naval
counsel, would occupy the full Cabinet four days later.

Before the Cabinet coul d consider the decisions reached
by the Finance Committee, however, the First Lord submitted
a

paper concerning "Post-war Naval Policy."

"^CAB 27/71:

1919.

Finance Committee Minute

2,

Long requested

August 11,
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the Cabinet to declare a naval policy "as regards supremacy
of the seas:

a)

over the United States of America or b) over

any probable combination."

He implied clearly that

supremacy resulted from possession of the world's strongest
fleet.

The First Lord then addressed the policy of "showing

the flag," abandoned before the war in the face of the

German threat.

The deployment of additional light cruisers,

Long suggested, would prove beneficial to British trading

interests.

'

Finally, Long requested for planning purposes

"the period of time during which we may reckon on immunity

from war with a Great Power?"^'
The Cabinet gave scant consideration to the Admiralty's

petition for the command of the seas.
George ministry quickly reached

a

Instead, the Lloyd

series of decisions that

reflected the findings of the Finance Committee.

The

Cabinet agreed that "for framing revised Estimates

...

the

British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during
the next ten years."

The Cabinet then added the

stipulation that "no alteration should be made without

Long later described the policy of "showing the flag"
by means of independent cruisers and small squadrons as "the
most potent influence which can be used to maintain the
great position of our Empire, and to secure peace, progress
and good trade." See Long, Memories 283.
,

116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum, "Post-War Naval
Policy", August 12, 1919.
'•ADM

"ten year rule" was repeatedly extended and in
See Roskill, Naval Policy,
1929 made sel f -perpetuating
••The

.

215

.
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Cabinet authority in the pre-war standard governing the
size
of the Navy."

The government also established a spending

limit of £60 millions on the Navy's Estimates.

As a logical

extension of the cap on the service estimates and the "ten
year rule," the Cabinet concluded that "no new naval

construction should be undertaken.""

These decisions,

fulfilling the conditions laid down by Lord Grey, enabled
the British government to explore more fully the possibility
of a naval

accord with the United States.

The Lloyd George ministry moved promptly to facilitate

Lord Grey's mission to Washington.

Less than

a

week after

promulgating the "ten year rule," the Cabinet approved the
terms of his instructions.

The letter maintained that the

British government, as it had before the war, sought to
avoid rivalry with the United States.

As proof, the

instructions noted that "the strength of the British Navy
next year will be based upon a standard of security that
does not take account of the United States Navy as a

possible enemy." 27

In late September, Lord Grey sailed for

Washington, where he quickly discovered that President

Wilson's illness precluded any meeting between the two, let
alone extended discussion of an naval arms limitation

"ADM 167/56: War Cabinet Minute 616A, August 15, 1919.

^Rohan Butler and J.P.T. Bury, eds Documents on
British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (London, 1966), 1st Series,
Volume V, No. 360, 998.
,
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agreement. 9B
George:

Grey relayed the unfortunate news to Lloyd

"Within

a

week... of my arrival, the reason for my

coming has disappeared.

For some time, with no one to take

the place of the President, there will be chaos in American

policy."-

Thus died any hope of an Anglo-American naval

accord, at least until another president assumed office in
1921.

Lloyd George accepted another of Hankey's

recommendations by instituting

a

series of reforms designed

to restore the Treasury to its pre-war preeminence.'"

The

Prime Minister, who disliked the unwieldy size of the full
Cabinet, utilized the Finance Committee to dictate national

policy through the management of pecuniary resources

.

Under

the auspices of "Treasury control," the spending departments

detailed officers to the Treasury to devel op retrenchment
programs

.

"

More significantly, they had to justify all

go

Seymour

,

Intimate Papers

,

IV,

499-500.

39

Lord Grey, as recorded in MacDonald
Policy", 209.

,

"Post -War Naval

The Chancel lor of the Exchequer bears the
res pons ibi lity to insure that spending departments disbursed
the moneys allocated by the House of Commons for the
appropriate purposes and in a frugal manner. Higham, Armed
Forces 278-79, notes that "just as in production and in
contractual arrangements there are cycles of equilibrium and
In wartime the Navy,
disturbance, so in treasury control.
for instance, could spend its annual peacetime budget in six
days, but the instant the Armistice was announced, the
Treasury leaped, and by mid-1919 was proudly explaining how
it resumed supreme command."
,

''Dingman

,

Paci f ic

,

107

.
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expenditures to internal representatives of the Treasury.'^
That ministry, according to Roskill, "had only to
declare a

proposal ran counter to the Ten Year Rule to render it
nugatory."'

Secretary of the Treasury Warren Fisher, who

controlled these budgetary commissars, thought the Treasury
should determine the funds available for each department.''
In September,

the Chancellor of the Exchequer provided

the Finance Committee an analysis of national expenditure.

The Treasury divided the total budget of £1,490 millions
into four categories: irreducible

services

-

£503 millions;

-

£518 millions; fighting

loans and subsidies

millions; and other costs

£143 millions.

-

-

£326

The memorandum

noted that "expenditure will almost certainly exceed the
£1,500 millions already voted for this year."^^

The Treasury

identified the fighting forces as the primary field for

27/71-72: Finance Committee Minute 3, August 20,
1919.
At its second meeting, the Committee decided that the
Treasury shoul d prepare an analysis of the spending of the
various departments that the departments should justify
their expenditures; and that the Treasury should indicate
where savings could be realized.
'^CAB

;

211-15.
This practice
'"Roskill, Naval Policy
contributed to the marked antagonism with which both the
naval and civilian members of the Admiralty viewed the
,

Treasury during the inter-war period. The Board objected to
bearing the responsibility for naval defense without even
the opportunity to explain to Parliament why funds were not
available to remedy known deficiencies.
^^Higham,

Armed Forces

,

123-24

27/71-72: Treasury memorandum re National
Expenditure, September 20 1919
'"CAB

,
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retrenchment and declared that "it is imperative to fix the
peace strength of the forces, to impose limits of numbers
and expenditure, and to hasten demobilization."

Chancellor's analysis included
Exchequer.

a

The

review of the state of the

A projected deficit of £250 millions for 1919-

1920 would increase the National Debt from £7,435 millions
to £7,685 million on March 31st,

1920.

A smaller deficit

projected for the following year would increase the Debt to
£7,885 millions.

Turning to the Royal Navy, the paper noted that

projected expenditure for 1919-20 (£171 millions) exceeded
the March figures (£149 millions) by more than £21 millions.
It

then claimed that financial exigencies mandated deep cuts

in the size of the fleet:

Prima facie it is difficult to understand what
menace to the external security of this country or
to the freedom of the seas exists comparabl e in
gravity to the financial danger.
If this be
admitted it should surely be possible to make-wi thout 1 osing command of the sea --very large
reductions of ships in commission and a more rapid
demobilization of superfluous personnel.'
The Treasury analysis then changed focus from the number of

ships needed in the post-war fleet to an attack on the
capital ship, questioning "whether capital ships are ever in

'XAB 27/71-72: Treasury memorandum re National
Expenditure, September 20, 1919. Although the naval annex
was unsigned, it was probably prepared by G.L. Barstow, the
Treasury's Controller of Supply Services and naval expert.
27/71-72: Treasury memorandum re National
Expenditure, September 20, 1919.
''CAB
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the future going to repay the cost of maintaining them."

The memorandum baldly asserted that such vessels
"are not

likely to be required to repel invasion."

With somewhat

greater justification, the Treasury paper stated that
capital ships "are probably vulnerable to torpedo attack by

submarine, motor boat or aircraft" and added that "their

value in diplomacy would probably be seriously discounted by
their vulnerability."'^

This initial criticism of the

capital ship, however valid, lacked the imprimatur of naval

expertise and utterly failed to impress the naval staff.
Coming after

a

naval budget "victory" in July, the

Cabinet eruption of August 15th combined with the subsequent
rumblings of the Finance Committee must have struck

Admiralty House like

a

broadside from the Hood.'^

At a

meeting on August 18th, the First Lord explained to his coworkers on the Board that Lloyd George intended in the

directive that "no alteration should be made... in the prewar standard governing the size of the Navy" to exclude
'OP

comparison with the fleet of the United States.'"

The Board

CAB 27/71-72: Treasury memorandum re National
Expenditure, September 20, 1919.

First Lord subsequently wrote to Admiral Beatty
that "in consequence of the changed conditions resulting
from the defeat of Germany and the heavy financial burden we
have to bear, it is necessary to effect great economies in
the estimates." See Charles Petrie, Walter Long and His
Times (London, 1936), 226.
''The

•ADM 167/56:

Board Minute 924, August 18, 1919.
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members concluded that the "ten years rule" rendered
superfluous new building programs for the next six years
and
agreed to stop work on all ships not due for completion
before November 1919.
operations.

Then they mapped out damage control

Financial Secretary Thomas MacNamara undertook

to try to prevent the Prime Minister from announcing any

definite estimate to the House.

The Board also agreed to

prepare a memorandum to the Cabinet showing how the navy
would comply with the decisions of August 15th and the

consequences thereof.*^*
The Board finally produced the memorandum on October
24,

1919.

The Admiralty determined that the minimum fleet

consonant with safety would include sixteen battleships and
four battle cruisers in full commission and thirteen

battleships and three battle cruisers in reserve.

Such

a

fleet would consist of 126,000 sailors and cost £75 millions
in 1920-21.*

The paper revealed the Admiralty's continuing

faith in the doctrines of sea power.

The planned reductions

would leave Britain "supreme in European waters" but

relinquish overall maritime superiority.

Without

a

building

program, Britain would fall to the position of second naval

power by the end of 1923.

^'^-ADM

The Board then invoked the logic

167/56: Board Minute 924, August 18, 1919.

"^The Board explained the sum as £58-59 millions, plus
£12 millions for "dead-weight" wartime expenditure and £4-5

millions for separation allowances currently established.
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of Mahan:

The Board believes ... that Britain owes her leading
position among the nations to her long-maintained
pre-eminence upon the sea. They believe this
preeminence cannot be relinquished without her
ability to hold her position being profoundly
affected, with all that position involves in
respect of prestige, authority, and commercial
advantage

The Admiralty touted the benefits of sea power and urged
that Britain's command of the sea "should not be

sacrificed."^"
The Board, worried about the growing challenge of the

American fleet, believed that Britain had two alternatives:
to induce the United States to modify their 1916 program or
to undertake a program of construction within twelve months.

The naval staff then attacked the notion that the United

States played no part in pre-war "comparisons of Naval

strength."

Instead, the Board contended:

All that was ever laid down by any Government was
that in applying the "Two Power-Standard" the
United States, owing to their distance from
Europe, should not be counted as one of the two
principal BPwers against whose combination we were

providing
The Admiralty clearly demonstrated their faith in the
capital ship and their reluctance to ignore developments

across the Atlantic.

From the perspective of the Board,

116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum "Naval Policy and
Expenditure", October 24, 1919.
*"^ADM

116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum "Naval Policy and
Expenditure", October 24, 1919.
•°^ADM
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Britain needed new capital ships because America was
building them.
The Lloyd George ministry proved unable to produce
a

unified naval policy in 1919.

The Treasury made only too

clear the need to reduce expenditure, particularly the naval
budget.

Lord Grey's mission to Washington established the

futility of negotiations with the United States.

The

Admiralty's memorandum on "Naval Policy and Expenditure"

demonstrated the Board's unwillingness to contemplate a
surrender of naval superiority to the United States or a
fleet based on anything other than the capital ship.

Lloyd

George, despite the Chancellor's insistence that Admiralty

House refused to obey the directives of the Finance
Committee, had no desire to incur the political liability of

surrendering Britain's traditional command of the

seas.^"^

News from America suggested a way to break the deadlock.
In late November, the Finance Committee received

reports, unconfirmed by the Admiralty, that the United

States Navy had been demobilizing at an unexpectedly rapid
rate.

While proclaiming that "the standard of the United

States was not the standard by which our fleet had to be

reckoned," the members of Lloyd George's inner circle

CAB 27/71-72: Finance Committee Memorandum 22,
The Finance Committee decided not to
October 29, 1919.
See also
announce the "ten year rule" in Parliament.
Dingman, Pacific, 110; MacDonald, "Post-War Naval Policy",
206-08.
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admitted that significant changes in the size of that force
"would not be without influence on our own measures."

They

instructed Lord Grey to determine the actual state of the

American demobilization and intended building program.
Awaiting his reply, the Finance Committee took up some

unfinished business with the First Lord, attending by
special invitation.

One of the committee members asked Long

"whether the time for the abolition of large ships was not

approaching."

The First Lord replied that the Sea Lords

unanimously disagreed, but the issue was being studied
(apparently in reference to the Post-War Questions
Committee).

The Finance Committee then discussed the

Admiralty's revised Navy Estimates for
to some trifling conclusions,

1919-20.*'''

Subject

the economic council accepted

the new figure of £158 millions.*

The Finance Committee's

acceptance of a reduction of only £13 millions from the July
Estimates is evidence of the quality work put forth by the

Admiralty's Committee on Naval Expenditure and of the
failure to consider adequately wartime residues in their

decree of £60 millions annually for the Navy.

*''"'CAB

24,

27/71-72: Finance Committee Minute 16, November

1919.

27-71/72: Finance Committee Memoranda 29, October
31, 1919 and 23, November 11, 1919, contain the revised Navy
Estimates and the Treasury analysis thereof, respectively.
''^CAB

*'^CAB

24,

1919.

27/71-72: Finance Committee Minute 16, November
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Grey's response, three days later, proved a

disappointment.

The envoy stated that the United States

Navy intended to maintain a large fleet: sixteen modern

battleships, twenty-five older battleships, and eight

armoured cruisers.

Man-power shortages (107,400 men against

an authorization of 177,500) temporarily weakened the

American fleet, leading Grey to comment: "The United States
Navy cannot in its present state be raised to

efficient state for at least

a year."*^^

a

really

He then admitted

his inability to elicit any sort of assurance as to the

nature of future American naval policy.

Grey's failure

ruled out any possibility that the Admiralty might

voluntarily cooperate with the Finance Committee's plans for
retrenchment
The First Lord presented the revised Estimates to

Parliament in a cautious manner.

Speaking on December 10,

1919, Long made no major pronouncements on the future of the

Royal Navy, but instead presented the figure of £158

millions as

a

compromise between the Government's desire to

economize and the need to conclude wartime obligations.

In

response to questions from the floor, he promised to expound

more fully with the 1920-21 Estimates in March."

"^CAB 27/71-72: Finance Committee Memorandum 38,
January 26, 1920; Documents in British Fore ign Policy, V,
No. 412, 1038-39.
••^

1497.

Parliamentary Debates

,

Commons, vol. 122, cols. 1367-
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Admiral David Beatty then threatened to destroy the

Cabinet's fragile consensus on naval policy."*

Lloyd George

had satisfied both the Treasury and the Admiralty as
long as
the naval superiority with which Britain had emerged from
the Great War obviated the need for new naval construction.
But Beatty, who replaced Admiral Wemyss as First Sea Lord

and Chief of the Naval Staff in November 1919, worried about
the inexorable growth of the United States Navy.-*^
of the American proposals,

Learning

he prepared in January 1920 a

paper on naval policy which argued that Britain had two
al ternatives

For a definitive approach to be made by the
British Government to the Government of the United
States with a view to a limitation of Naval
Armaments:
or
b) Ourselves to embark
on a further building program
which will insure
that we are at least equal in material strength to
the United States Navy as at present budgeted
a)

for."^

He then convinced the Board to call upon the First Lord to

prepare a memorandum concerning the size of the fleet for

•
1 1

'"Before he assumed office, Beatty assured Long: "I
fully understand the necessity of effecting great economies
and that the naval estimates have to be considerably reduced
See Petrie, Walter
to meet the altered circumstances,"
Long 227.
,

73-79, discuss the progress of
In December 1919,
American naval construction, 1919-1920.
the United States Navy Department requested two battleships
and one battle cruiser to be laid down within the fiscal
year, a considerable advancement over the 1916
*-^Sprouts, New Order

,

authorizations
116/1677: Chief of Naval Staff Memorandum, "Naval
Policy", January 7, 1920.
'^^^ADM
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the Cabinet."^

Beatty next persuaded Long to incorporate

much of the First Sea Lord's paper into the First Lord's
communication to the Cabinet.
Long, however, decided not to include funding for a

program of capital ship construction in the Navy Estimates
for 1920-21.

Instead, he reiterated the warning of the

previous October that continued expansion of the American
fleet would require either an arms accord or

a

British

program of capital ship construction if Britain were to
avoid losing command of the sea."^

decision not to include

a

The First Lord's

building program undoubtedly

reflected the fact that Britain still had about
before new construction would be critical.

It

a year

may also have

reflected his desire to place on record, well in advance of
potential budgetary conflict, the naval staff's appreciation
of the battleship and the battle cruiser.

In the spring of 1920,

the Admiralty publicly affirmed

its faith in the capital ship.

In the preparation of the

Navy Estimates for 1920-21, the First Lord rebuffed the
''6

Chancellor's efforts to put more capital ships in reserve."

*--ADM

167/60: Board Minute 1117, January 14, 1920.

"^ADM 116/1775: First Lord Memorandum,
and Naval Policy", February 13, 1920.

"Naval Estimates

""ADM 167/60: Board Minute 1154, February 18, 1920.
Long compromised by reducing the amount of fuel oil the Navy
planned to stockpile that year. See CAB 27/71-72: Finance
Committee Memorandum 43: February 20, 1920.

192

His stance was strengthened by the conclusions of the
Post-

War Questions Committee.

That group examined "the military

uses and values of the different types of vessels" and

concluded that "nothing has happened to displace the

Battleship from her position.""^

The First Lord's request

for £84 millions without any provision for new construction

sailed smoothly through the Cabinet.

Long used the

accompanying White Paper to identify the capital ship as
"the unit on which sea power is to be built up.""^

The

First Lord then made his case before the House of Commons.

Speaking at Westminster on March 17th, Long

unequivocally pronounced the capital ship to be the bedrock
of British naval policy.

adherence to

a

He affirmed the government's

One Power Standard, whereby the strength of

the Royal Navy--meaning the number of capital ships in full

commission--"should not be inferior in strength to the navy
no

of any other Power."**

He immediately sought to downplay

the possibility of rivalry with the United States by

announcing that "the idea of competition in armaments

... is

Interim Report of the Post-War
Questions Committee, December 22, 1919.
"'ADM 1/8586/70:

Beatty
"^Beatty MSS: Naval Estimates, March 12, 1920.
argued that the "abandonment of the capital ship... would
leave the British nation destitute of sea power."
"'

parliamentary Debates Commons, vol. 126, cols. 2296Long's budget speech, without the
2347; 2442-2550.
subsequent debate, can also be found in Petrie, Walter Long
258-277
,

.

,
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repugnant to us all."

The First Lord concluded his

presentation by rebutting the notion that "the day of
the
capital ship is over." Long stated that his naval advisors,
along with their counterparts in every other great naval
country, believed that the capital ship, in time of war:

would prove again, as it has proved before, to be
the predominant factor in naval warfare, and that
in the end the weight of metal would tell, and
that therefore the big ship must, at all events
for some time to come, be preserved as an
important part of our naval equipment.
He further dismissed the possibility that the Air Force

could as yet fulfill the functions of the Navy, and added
that for the proper training of officers and seamen, "the

big ship is absolutely essential

.

Subsequent to the approval of the Navy Estimates for
1920-21, Beatty resumed his efforts to preserve Britain's

precarious maritime supremacy. In late March, in

speech to

a

the Highland Society, the First Sea Lord cautioned against

budgetary savings at the expense of naval strength
said

:

.

"The economical side requires a note of warning

He
.

cannot have a valuable thing without paying for it."*^
July

,

Beatty introduced

contended that the Hood

a
,

new

1

ine of argument

.

You
In

He

in a manner similar to the

Parliamentary Debates Commons vol. 126, cols. 2296Long's budget speech, without the
2347; 2442-2550.
subsequent debate, can also be found in Petrie, Walter Long
258-277
,

,

^^'Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Chalmers,
Letters of David Beatty, 359.

Life and

,
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Dreadnought
strength.

,

had established

a

new standard of naval

To compare properly the Royal Navy to its

Atlantic rival, he wrote:
It is not sufficient to consider total numbers.
The far more important consideration is the

comparison between the respective numbers laid
down as a result of the Battle of Jutland.

The First Sea Lord then advanced the idea of "replacement

based on war experience" as a means to avoid open

competition with the United States.

Beatty suggested 15

years as a life-span for vessels completed before the war
and twenty for post-Jutland ships.

On that basis, he

calculated that Britain required four new capital ships in
1921 with a further four in

1922,'^'^

The First Lord relayed

Beatty's arguments to the Cabinet, warning that American
naval construction threatened Britain with "a position of

absolute and marked inferiority at sea by the 1924."

Long

even went so far as to suggest providing naval contractors

with confidential warning, "such warning of course not

binding

.

"'

For the first time since the Armistice

Admiralty House formally requested

a

program of capital ship

construction
In the summer of 1920,

the Cabinet remained divided

over the issue of naval policy.

-^^ADM

The advocates of sea power

1/8602/54: Beatty Memorandum, July

8,

116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Construction", July 23, 1920.
-^^ADM

1920.
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demanded

a

fleet not less than that of the other leading

naval power, the United States.

The Admiralty argued that

American progress on the 1916 program constituted
threat to Britain's maritime supremacy.

a

grave

Therefore, in order

to maintain the One Power Standard, Britain required either
a

program of naval expansion or an arms limitation agreement

with the United States.

The physical condition of President

Wilson precluded agreement with Washington.

The proponents

of "Treasury control" forbade costly new construction

programs.

The two planks of British naval policy no longer

seemed compatible.

CHAPTER

6

THE PARTICULAR WEAPON
In the winter of 1920-21,

the British government

continued its search for a naval policy.

As the British

naval community reviewed the lessons of the war in 1919-20,
the "Jutland controversy" and its aftermath damaged the

reputation of the Admiralty.

established
of vessel

a

In December 1920, Lloyd George

committee to investigate the appropriate type

for the future of the Royal Navy.

During the

course of that investigation, several committee members

revealed

a

marked reluctance to accept the testimony of the

Admiralty's expert witnesses.
committee

,

The conclusions of the

which issued two opposing reports

the government s
'

1

demonstrated

,

oss of confidence in the value of the

capital ship

Post-war study of the Batt 1 e of Jut 1 and

1

ed to the

"Jutland controversy," which still continues today.
origins of the controversy are two-fold.

The

First, the

technology available in 1916 for plotting the movement of
ships appears primitive by modern standards.^

Thus, wide

disagreement existed and continues to exist over the actual
and relative position of ships at various times during the
battle.

Admiral Jellicoe, in his own account of the battle,

stated that "the conflicting reports [of the positions of
various ships] added greatly to the perplexity of the

^Roskill, Last Naval Hero

,

322-23.
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situation."

ft 2

Second, the overwhelming majority of the

British naval commiinity regarded the battle, in the words of
one of Jellicoe*s biographers, as "a big disappointment

after the high expectations that had been entertained of the

long-awaited meeting with the High Seas Fleet.

Not

unnaturally, the leading participants became concerned to

portray their own actions in the most favorable light.

The

Jutland controversy, therefore, involved not only the
conduct of the battle but also the degree to which the

protagonists sought to influence its historiography.
Admiral John Jellicoe, who commanded the Grand Fleet

during the battle of Jutland, initiated the battle's postwar review.
1914-16:

In February 1919, he published The Grand Fleet,

Its Creation. Development, and Work

,

in which he

explained his unwillingness to close with the High Seas
Fleet for fear of losing command of the North Sea.

Jellicoe

revealed a longstanding concern with the possibility of

a

torpedo attack by German destroyers against the Grand Fleet.
The admiral explained that "the element of chance enters

very largely into torpedo warfare" and noted that "our enemy
was almost certain to possess a very considerable

superiority over us in the number of destroyers likely to be

^Admiral Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 1914-16: Its
See
Creation, Development, and Work (London, 1919), 344.
also Chalmers, Life and Letters of David Beatty 265;
Barnett Swordbearers 148
,

,

,

^Patterson, Jel 1 icoe

,

135
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present during

a

Fleet action."

Jutland not as

a

man determined to win, but rather as

He fought the Battle of
a

man

determined not to lose, constrained by:
the necessity for not leaving anything to chance
a Fleet action, because our Fleet was the
one
a nd only factor that was vital to the exist ence of
the Empire, as indeed to the Allied cause.'
[Jellicoe's italics]

m

Jellicoe's cautious approach reflected his beliefs that the

High Seas Fleet, under certain circumstances, had the
potential to defeat the Grand Fleet and that defeat would be

much more damaging to Britain than to Germany.
Carlyon Bel lairs,
of Parliament,

a

former naval officer turned Member

joined the debate in the same month with The

Battle of Jutland: The Sowing and The Reaping

.

He savagely

attacked British naval leadership, claiming:
Since the British Government refused to adopt
Chatham's policy in regard to the American
colonies there has been no lost opportunity to
equal in its consequence pur failure in leadership
at the Battle of Jutland.^

Bellairs personally blamed Jellicoe for "a narrow conformity
to defensive tactics which could never achieve victory," in

sharp contrast to Nelson's adage that "the boldest measures
are the safest; nothing great can be achieved without risk."
In summation,

the ex-Commander presented an eleven-step

indictment against the Admiralty, starting with "defective"

^Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet

,

393-98.

^Carlyon Bellairs, The Battle of Jutland: The Sowing
and the Reaping (London, 1919), xii.

199

preparations for war and concluding with the failure to
send
out the Harwich force to reinforce the Grand Fleet.

From that point, the controversy over Jutland
intensified, and many critics began to impute blame to
either Jellicoe, for his caution, or Beatty, for his failure
to keep Jellicoe better informed of the position of the High

Seas Fleet.

One of Beatty's biographers notes: "Self-

appointed champions poured forth a stream of calumny and

uninformed criticism upon one or the other of the two
admirals."

The effect of this public criticism, according

to one of Jellicoe's biographers, was to open even wider

"the schism that disputes over the action were already

creating in the Navy."^

The division between the followers

of Jellicoe and Beatty soon deepened.

Carlyon Bellairs, The Battle of Jutland: The Sowing
and the Reaping (London, 1919), 268, 272. The complete
indictment includes: (1) defective preparations for war; (2)
not being inspired by the offensive spirit; (3) failure to
hold courts-martial on superior officers; (4) Jellicoe's
failure to establish communications with Beatty; (5)
Jellicoe's deployment to port, rather than to starboard; (6)
failure to seek close action; (7) lack of British destroyer
attacks; (8) the turning away of battleships from destroyer
attacks; (9) failure to maintain contact with the German
fleet during the night action; (10) failure to seek the
German fleet the following morning; and (11) failure to send
out the Harwich force.

William Jameson, The Fleet that Jack Built: Nine
Men Who Made a Modern Navy (London, 1962), 205; Dingman,
Pacific 114.
'see
,

^Chalmers

,

The Life and Letters of David Beatty

^Patterson, Jellicoe Papers

,

Vol

II,

399.

,

266.
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The Jutland controversy took a decisive turn with the
appointment of Admiral Beatty as First Sea Lord on
November
1,

1919.

In January 1919, his predecessor. Admiral Rosslyn

Wemyss, perhaps influenced by the imminent publication
of

Jellicoe's memoirs, appointed Captain J.E.T. Harper to

prepare a chronological record of the battle.

On March 26,

1919, First Lord Walter Long announced to the House of

Commons that Captain Harper and four subordinates had been

attached to the War Staff "for the purpose of collecting
from official records the narrative of the Battle of
Jutland."^"

Harper submitted his report on October 24, 1919,

to the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Osmond

de Beauvoir Brock.

He decided that approval should rest

with Beatty, who would assume the post of First Sea Lord in
a week.

On October 29th, Long promised publication of the

report to the House of Commons.

Beatty, however, disagreed

with the findings of the Harper record, particularly the
charting of various ships.

The new First Sea Lord, a firm

believer in both battleships and battle cruisers, found the

Iter Long, as recorded in Bellairs, The Reaping xi
Bel lairs suggested that Harper was not up to the task,
noting that Harper had never been a staff officer and that
he had served as navigating officer aboard the Royal Yacht
from 1911-14 and thereafter as assistant Harbour Master at
Portsmouth.
,

reads with reservation the words of Beatty's
biographer. Rear Admiral Chalmers, The Life and Letters of
David Beatty 267: "It is a measure of Beatty's greatness
that he forbore to reply to his critics, being content to
abide by the judgment of his countrymen and history."
^^One

,
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report unduly critical of the performance of the Battle

Cruiser Force during the Battle of Jutland.

Beatty ordered Harper to amend his account, thus

initiating the process of official interference in the

history of Jutland that excited much Parliamentary and
public attention.^

Harper made the directed changes, with

the result that the report protected the reputation of the

Battle Cruiser Force and hence its commander, Beatty.*^

Long

then directed Harper to cancel the changes, which appeared

detrimental to Jellicoe.

The harried captain tried to

accommodate the First Lord.

As a result, the report that

went forward for printing in May 1920 was a compromise

between the original narrative and the modified version that
Beatty desired.

The First Sea Lord pressed First Lord Long

to accept further changes.

He in turn consulted the Board,

which on June 21st authorized

a

preface desired by Beatty.^*

The Harper report generated Parliamentary discussion
on at least twenty-two occasions between 1919 and 1927,
according to Roskill, Intimate Biography 324.
,

%arper published his own record

of the Battle of

Jutland and the process of official interference with his
Several of
report as The Truth about Jutland in 1927.
Harper's papers can be found as an appendix to Patterson,
Jellicoe Papers Vol II, 458-490. Harper criticized Beatty
for "attempts to neutralize the effect of the plain,
unvarnished chronological Record of Facts" and described
Bel lairs' work as "the most unscrupulous attempt to
influence the public and disparage the Official Record."
,

^^Both the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief
The text of
of Staff had previously served under Beatty.

the preface can be found in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, Vol
II,

469.
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Long forwarded the edited version to Jellicoe, who objected
to the alterations ordered by Beatty and strongly
opposed

the Admiralty's preface, which he described as "distinctly

inaccurate as to facts [Jellicoe's italics]."'^

The Board,

under Beatty's direction, objected to Jellicoe's objections.
Long now sought to escape the crossfire of the admirals
by seeking an alternative introduction from Sir Julian

Corbet t, the eminent naval historian.
to his publishers, Messrs.

Longm.an.

Corbet t referred Long
In August 1920

they

,

requested that the First Lord withhold the m.anuscript as
detrim.ental to the sale of the Official History of the war,
to which they possessed exclusive rights.*^

The First Lord

and the First Sea Lord then agreed to turn Harper's report
over to Corbett to assist in his preparation of the official

history.

Beatty, not entirely satisfied, comjnissioned

a

fresh study of the Battle of Jutland.*
The Adm.iralty's conduct drew considerable notice,
of it critical.

In Novemijer and December 1920,

m.ost

the House of

Commons repeatedly requested publication of the Official

Record and dem.anded the Government's reasons for suppressing

Jellicoe to Long, July 5th 1920, as recorded
in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers Vol II, 406-10.
"Adm.iral

,

-^Chalmers, The Life and Letters of David Beatty

,

357-

58.

staff appreciation prepared by Captains Kenneth
Dewar focused on the lessons of the battle, in
and A.C.
contrast to the Harper Report, which provided strictly a
description of the action.

%he

203

Harper's work.'^

Admiral Wemyss publicly attacked the

integrity of the First Lord.

The Times abused the prime

minister for failing to provide the full story to the
public.

Arthur Pollen,

a

naval reformer, dem.anded

a

court-

investigation of the conduct of the Battle of

m.artial

Jutland.*

The enormously influential Northcliffe press,

which included The Times and the Daily Mail

.

even-handedly

blasted Jellicoe's handling of the battle and Beatty's
handl ing of the report

Fleet Street, after tarnishing the Royal Navy's past
and present,

turned its attention to the naval warfare of

the future.

The press carried the letters of retired Rear

Admiral Sir Percy Scott, the gunnery expert who had shocked
the service in 1914 with a letter to The Tim.es which stated
that the subm.arine and the airplane had "driven the

battleship

Scott pronounced absolutely that

from, the sea.'

the war had proven

correct: "I regarded the battleship

him.

as dead before the War,

that is possible."

and

I

think her more dead now if

The Times featured the essays of Rear-

atterson, Jel licoe Papers
TO

Dingman

,

Pacific

,

.

Vol II, 476-77.

115

A copy of Scott's letter is located in Charl es
Domvil le-Fif e. Submarines and Seapower (London, 1919), 71.
A synopsis, together with a surprising number of replies,
can be found in Scott's mem.oirs. Fifty Years in the Royal
Navy (New York, 1919), 263-268.
^'Scott,

Mastery

,

199,

Fifty Years
282.

,

332.

See also Kennedy, Naval
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Admiral Sydney Hall, who focused on the inability of
capital
ships to protect Britain's sea lines of
communication.
Hall
cited Admiral Jellicoe's statement that the submarine
cam.paign of 1917-18 placed the British people
"closer to

ruin than we had been for 200 years" and an Admiralty
m.emorandum from 1910 which warned that "the really
serious

danger that this country has to guard against is not
invasion, but interruption of trade and destruction of our

merchant m.arine."

The admiral predicted that future

subm.arines would possess m.uch greater range and mount guns

capable of sinking m.erchant vessels.

Against these

submarine cruisers. Hall concluded that "in any naval war
that can reasonably be forecast, capital ships can do

nothing to assist in the protection of trade.

"^^

The Daily Telegraph serialized The Submarine in War by

Charles Dom.vi 1 1 e-Fif e

,

a

form.er naval

experience in anti-subm.arine warfare.

officer with
In 1919,

Dom.ville-

Fife published a m.ore serious work, Subm.arines and Seapower

.

in which he predicted--sim.ilarly to Hall--the evolution of

submarine cruisers with increased displacement, speed, range
(surface and submerged), and armament.

He then envisioned

the development of wolf pack tactics, "the employment of more

than one submarine in an engagement with a heavily armed

37/2: N.S.C. Memorandum 2 contains articles
appearing in the Tim.es from December 10-14, 1920, by RearAdmiral S S Hal 1
''^CAB

.

.
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surface ship, the under-water attack being delivered
from
two or more points simultaneously."

He also anticipated the

maturation of specialized anti-submarine craft equipped with
hydrophones and depth charges and emphasized the need to
protect capital ships with these auxiliaries.

Domvil le-Fif

expected that "it will become a rule of naval warfare that

battleships should never be without a guard of destroyers

.

"^^

Magazines from all political persuasions joined the
chorus against the capital ship: the Conservative Spectator

Labor's New Statesm.an
even

The Nation of Liberal persuasion,

.

CP. Scott's Manchester Guardian

of naval

suprem.acy

.

.

,

the pre-war advocate

On December 14, 1920, the Times

announced that "the country has recognized during the last
fortnight that the future of the Navy is foremost among the

problems that confront it."
comjTiitment to a

After noting the Admiralty's

program of naval construction, the paper

continued: "But so strong is the case for keen and expert

inquiry before entering into warship construction that the
It

government have yielded to the demand for investigation."
The genesis of that investigation had occurred a mere

fifteen days previously.

^Domvil le-Fif e. Submarines and Sea Power, 10-11, 58-63,

77-82

.

Dingman, Pacific

,

115-16

^^Beatty MSS 8/2: Clipping from the Times

1920.

,

December 14,
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In the fall

of 1920,

the Admiralty drive for a new

program of capital ship construction temporarily stalled.
In July 1920, Admiral Beatty had written a memorandum

calling for four replacement capital ships in 1921 and
another four in 1922, upon which the First Lord had based
his own missive to the Cabinet.

In August,

Financial

Secretary to the Admiralty Sir James Craig provided the
Cabinet the projected cost of the Admiralty's construction
program: £84.5 millions.
the Admiralty

iTiemo r andum

The Cabinet took scant notice of

except to concl ude there was no

commitment to expenditure.^
then entered

a

The issue of naval construction

hiatus of several months

When the Cabinet ignored their entreaties, the Board
waited unti 1 November and returned to the same argument
The Admiralty submitted another memorandum calling for the

construction of four capital ships in 1921-22 and another
four in 1922-23,

position

,

The m.emorandum restated the First Lord's

taken during the presentation of the Navy

1/8602/54: Beatty Memorandum, July 8, 1920; ADM
116/1775: First Lord Memorandum, "Naval Construction", July
^^ADM

23,

1920.

1/8602/54: Financial Secretary Memorandum, August
The program included four capital ships in 192110, 1920.
one minel ayer two carrier conversions and compl etion
22
of ancillary craft, together with four additional capital
ships in 1922-23, for £81.7 millions. Additional carrier
work and a floating dock brought the total to £84.5
mi 1 1 ions
^^ADM

^^CAB

1920

,

,

,

.

23:

C.

48(20),

7:

Naval Construction, 13 August
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Estimates in March 1920, that "our Navy should not be
inferior in strength to the Navies of other Powers."

The

Board argued that the United States had increased her forces
and that as a result Britain "had reached the critical time

previously forecasted" when she must "act or fall behind."
The argument possessed a new note of urgency.

Even the

prompt construction of the desired vessels, according to the

Admiralty's calculations, would leave

a

"window of

inferiority" in 1923-25 below the One Power standard.^'

The

Director of Naval Construction, Sir Eustace Tennyson
D'Eyncourt, passed this argument to Lloyd George via Lord

George Riddell during the first week of November.
Two days before the completion of the Admiralty paper,
the Treasury produced a mem.orandum. of its own.

Chancellor

of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain focused on the failure
of the fighting services to adhere to estimates in

accordance wi 1 1«

1 1^ e

so-called normal year total of £135

millions established in August 1919.

The Chancellor noted

that the cost of the Navy depended largely upon its size,

which remained the prerogative of the Admiralty.

He

complained that "there is no satisfactory evidence that the
normal year basis is regarded by the Admiralty as the limit

116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920.
^^ADM

Lord Riddell 's Intimate Diarv of the
Peace Conference and After (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock),
^^George Riddell,

246.
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to which Navy votes should be reduced in the near
future"

and also pointed out that the Navy's dockyard
strength

greatly exceeded pre-war figures.

Chamberlain then

presented opposing methods for resolving the size of the
Navy Estimates: Cabinet agreement upon a specific sum or

Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) determination of

a

scale of naval strength necessary for national defence,

without regard to cost.

In conclusion,

stated that if Britain entered into

a

the Chancellor

building competition

with America, then "all prospects of reduction on Navy votes
must disappear for an indefinite time and huge liabilities

instead be contemplated."'*
The Cabinet Finance Comjnittee, on November 29th,

surveyed the position of the Exchequer.

The Treasury

reported that the revised Estimates for 1920-21 were better
than expected, as "the balance for redem.ption [of the

National Debt] being slightly larger than the earlier
estimate.
revenue."'

This was due to larger receipts on miscellaneous

Opposing this bit of good news, however, was the

report that Debt redemption for 1921-22 appeared to be down

from a previous estimate of £250-300 millions to about £221
millions.

The Government failed to meet its "normal year"

27/71+72: Finance Committee Memorandum 52:
November 20, 1920.
^*CAB

'^CAB

29,

1920.

27/71+72: Finance Committee Minute 28, November
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expenditure of £850 millions by £250 millions, as the
original figure did not include subsequent expenditure

decisions, such as doubling Old Age Pensions, extending

Unemployment Insurance, and the increases in the Service
Estimates. 33

The Admiralty paper on Naval Policy and

Construction raised the possibility that the Navy Estimates,
instead of falling from the £90 millions of 1920-21, might
have to be increased.

The Finance Committee expressed

unhappiness with Service Estimates and agreed that the

Treasury should prepare, as

a

starting point for discussion

with the Fighting Services,

a

drastic curtailment of at

least £100 millions from the present total of £255

millions.^
devel oped

In the wake of this meeting,
a

the Prime Minister

possible resolution to the conflicting demands

of economy and security.

Some

tim.e

between November 29th and December 7th, 1920,

David Lloyd George decided to form

a

committee to

investigate the role of the capital ship in future naval

7^

increases in revised Service votes constituted
about 10% of the total shortfall (£24.5 millions out of £250
mi 1 1 ions )
Revised
Increase
Original
£140.0 millions
£125.0 millions +£15.0 millions
Army
^"The

Navy

£84.5 millions

+£5.5 millions

£90.0 millions

Air Force

£21.0 millions

+£4.0 millions

£25.0 millions

£230.5 millions

+£24,5 millions

£255.0 millions

Total
^^CAB

29,

1920.

27/71+72: Finance Committee Minute 28, November
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operations.

In this decision, he was probably influenced by

Hankey, his Cabinet Secretary, who received some time
before

December 8th

a

similar proposal from Archibald Hurd, the

naval correspondent of the Daily Telegraph ."^

The Prime

Minister's course of action carried the immediate benefit of
delaying major expenditure on naval construction.

In

addition, it held the potential for reducing the cost of the
fleet if the investigation revealed that some com.bination of

submarines, airplanes, and smaller ships could replace the
capital ships which the Admiralty demanded.

Such

a

finding,

unthinkable in 1914, seemed far more reasonable in light of
the Jutland controversy and the recent campaign by Scott,

Hall, and others against the capital ship.

The Welsh Wizard demonstrated his vast political acumen

through the manner in which he pursued his plan for
committee to investigate the capital ship

.

Whi 1

e

a

pointing

to the public debate over the value of the capital ship as a

rational e for conducting a governmental inquiry

Ll oyd

,

George carefully avoided backing any specific weapons system
as a better alternative.

In lieu of battleships and battle

cruisers, he suggested "small ships" and "lesser craft,"

ambiguous terms broad enough to encompass submarines
torpedo boats, destroyers, light cruisers, and even pocket

"'Hurd also suggested that announcement of an inquiry
into the future of the capital ship might delay American and
See Roskill, Hankey Vol II,
Japanese building programs.
,

205

.
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battleships.-

Furthermore, the Prime Minister carefully

selected the venue for the initial presentation of his
proposal.

Before subm.itting his idea to the full Cabinet,

he first broached the proposition for an investigation
of

the capital ship in the Cabinet Finance Committee,

a

body

far more concerned with ledger balances than with the

nuances of naval construction.
In the next meeting of the Finance Committee,

on

December 7th in Andrew Bonar Law's room in the House of
Commons, Lloyd George introduced his plan for an inquiry
into the role of the capital ship.

committee, which did not contain

a

He reminded the

single representative of

the fighting services, of the country's need to pay out

heavy obligations with respect to maturing debt and that

major reductions were possible only in the service
estimates.

He then addressed the Admiralty's request for

naval building program.

a

Lloyd George expressed reservations

as to whether "the experience of the Great War" supported

the Navy's claims as to the value of the capital ship and

proposed an inquiry. 37

The Prime Minister recommended to the

Finance Committee that the Cabinet should release

a

statement to the effect that:
Great Britain did not propose to embark on a big
27/71: Finance Committee Minute 29, December 7,
1920; CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
^^CAB

"cab 27/71: Finance Committee Minute 29, December
1920

.

7,
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Naval Programme without a full and careful
investigation of the relative merits of big and
small ships, in light of the lessons of the las^war

He also recommended including

a

reminder that Britain was

committed to maintaining "a Fleet stronger than any other
Power."

Lloyd George asserted that if the Government

reaffirmed the One Power Standard, in conjunction with the

proposed inquiry, then "public opinion would be satisfied"
and the Wilson Administration would probably defer their
naval program "pending knowledge of the action taken by

Britain."

The Prim.e Minister's proposals struck

a

responsive chord with the Finance Comjnittee, which in its
previous meeting had balked at the size of the service
estimates

.

Ll oyd

"

George thus secured the support of key

members of the Cabinet, including Andrew Bonar Law and

Austen Chamberlain, before Admiralty House had any
opportunity to rebut his arguments
The

f

ol

lowing day, the Prime Minister had little

difficulty convincing the Cabinet of the wisdom of his
proposal.

Armed with the support of the Finance Committee,

Lloyd George persuaded the full Cabinet to establish

a

committee to investigate the place and usefulness of the
capital ship in the future of the Navy.

^^CAB 27/71:

In line with the

Finance Committee Minute 29, December

7,

1920.
^'CAB

1920.

27/71: Finance Committee Minute 28, November 29,
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Prime Minister's reasoning before the Finance Committee, the

Cabinet embraced the One Power standard while questioning
the role of the capital ship.

The Lloyd George ministry

agreed "to maintain the Navy at

a

standard of strength which

shall adequately secure the safety of the Empire and its

maritime communications."

At the same time. His Majesty's

Government concluded that they were "bound to satisfy
themselves that the lessons of the war have been

definitively ascertained" before "sanctioning
of construction."-^

a

new program

The cabinet then agreed to suspend the

question of naval construction pending the upcoming
investigation
On December 14th, the Prime Minister carried his plan
for a committee to investigate the capital ship to a

different forum, the Committee of Imperial Defence

.

The

C.I.D. provided the cabinet a valuable means of securing

inter -service cooperation

.

Ll oyd George pursued a strategy

developed two nights before, over dinner with Hankey and

•^CAB

23:

Cabinet Minute 67(4), December

^"During its first post-war meeting,

8,

1920.

the C.I.D.
established a sub-committee which included the Prime
Minister, the First Lord and First Sea Lord, the Secretary
of State for War and the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, the Under Secretary of State for Air and the Chief of
the Air Staff to handle routine matters. Winston Churchill
held the combined office of Secretary of State for War and
See CAB 2/3: C.I.D.
Air from January 1919 to February 1921.
Minute 133, June 29, 1920; Roskill, Naval Policy, 256.
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Lord Haldane.-

He opened by announcing his regret over the

absence of First Lord Walter Long, due to ill health, on
day when the members of the C.I.D. were to
discuss

a

"about

the most important question that had ever been
submitted to

them."

The Prime Minister then identified the issue as the

type of Navy needed in the future.

He questioned the need

for "a great constructive programme" and stated "the kind of

ship they were to select" was a decision that "required both

political and expert [i.e., naval] opinion."-"

Lloyd George then asked the assembled experts to

identify the "probable enemy."

Europe, he suggested, could

be ruled out; the only powers with formidable navies were

Japan and the United States.

He described these nations as

"friendly" but noted that they were building against one
another, forcing Britain to consider the uses to which their

fleets could be put."

The Prim.e Minister then insisted that

Britain could not fight the United States for economic as
well as military reasons.

indefensible border," while

Canada, he contended, had "an
a

shipbuilding competition

"might be ruinous" and would reduce the possibility that the

Hankey recorded that "we arranged the general lines of
the Naval Inquiry viz: -first consider what enemies we are
prepared to fight; second how; and third with what weapons
so far as the Navy is concerned." See Roskill, Hankey Vol
,

II,

206.

'CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
"CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
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United States would press for the repayment of
£1,000
millions in war loans."' In something of a non
sequitur

.

he

suggested the possibility of naval spheres of influence,
with Britain taking the Mediterranean, the North
Sea,

and

the Indian Seas, among others/'^

Lloyd George then raised "the very important question
of the particular weapon to be employed" by the Royal
Navy

in the future.

He noted that the submarine "nearly became

a

determining factor in the war" and speculated as to the best

method of establishing "the proportion between capital ships
and lesser craft."

After reiterating the need to ascertain

the most likely future opponent and "the means with which to

fight," the Prime Minister ended by emphasizing the

importance of the experts to be consulted.-^

Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for War and
Air,

joined in to argue that Britain must remain the

strongest naval power.

He reviewed the history of previous

standards of naval strength and suggested that, in line with
traditional practices, Britain should "avoid direct

application" of the One Power standard "to any particular

For the American perspective on Britain's ability to
defend Canada, see William Braisted, "On the American Red
and Red-Orange Plans, 1919-39", in Gerald Jordan, ed. Naval
Warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900-1945; Essays in Honour
of Arthur Marder (New York, 1977), 167-185.
•^CAB

2/3:

C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.

•CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
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Power."

He rejected as fallacious thinking Lloyd George's

notion of regional sea supremacy, since "the seas were
indivisible."

Churchill then recommended that sea power be

measured, not in terms of post-Jutland capital ships alone,
but including man power and the fire power, armor, and

handling of vessels of every class.
Admiral Beatty then provided the Navy's position.*^

He

noted that the Admiralty had pointed out in October 1919 the
need for either an arrangement with the United States or a
new program of capital ship construction.^"

He then

explained that in the absence of any diplomatic agreement
the Admiralty Board had planned a building program which

sought equality in sea power.

The Board of Admiralty had

considered the lessons of the Great War and were unanimous

"CAB 2/3; C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
49

Beatty was well aware of the Cabinet decision to
commission an enquiry into the role of the capital ship,
which he had briefed to the Admiralty board five days
earlier.
See ADM 167/60: Board Minute 1281, December 9,
1920.

116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
Expenditure", October 24, 1919.
^"adM

Jellicoe, as recorded in Bellairs, The Sowing
and The Reaping 15, made the point that the Navy had a much
easier time obtaining funds for battleships than for smaller
classes of ships: "'Dreadnoughts' had caught on, and if you
wanted money, you were pretty sure, with a certain amount of
But in the shout
pressure, to get it for 'Dreadnoughts.'
for 'Dreadnoughts' people forgot that there were other
If
classes of craft that were necessary for other purposes.
money was asked for those craft there was not quite the same
response
^^Admiral

,

.

217

in their belief that the basis of sea power remained the

capital ship.^^

Responding to Churchill's argument, Beatty claimed the
Admiralty's program did not measure naval strength purely in
"post- Jutland battleships."

The Admiralty could accept a

ratio of twelve such American ships to nine British vessels,

compensated by "superior design and a better proportion of
other types of vessels.

"^^

The admiral avoided stating the

obvious: if the Admiralty's program were not approved, the

ratio of post-Jutland capital ships would be twelve American
and eight Japanese to one British vessel (the Hood )

.^^

Beatty concluded by emphasizing the urgency of the
situation.

The Admiralty had already made clear to the

Cabinet that a failure to build in the near future would
result in a de facto abandonment of the One Power Standard.

Beatty then addressed a new issue, the adverse impact of

^^CAB 2/3:

C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.

%his

ratio came from a table of projected strength for
1924-25 presented in the Admiralty's latest request for a
building program. Class A ships were those of post-Jutland
design over 40,000 tons; Class B ships were capital ships of
at least 30,000 tons with gxms of at least 14"; Class C
ships were capital ships of at least 25,000 tons with guns
of less than 14":
Britain with Program
Japan
US
Britain
9
8
12
1
Class A
13
4
11
13
Class B
4
4
4
4
Class C
See ADM 116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920.
.

^*CAB 2/3:

C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
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post-war retrenchment on the ship-building industry.
December 10th, he had prepared a short memorandum

On

for the

Cabinet that stated that one large armaments firm had
closed
and another had accepted a foreign order.

The admiral had

explained that further delay on the construction of
capital
ships threatened the livelihood of naval contractors and
thus endangered Britain's capacity to build warships.'^

The

First Sea Lord warned the C.I.D. that Britain's capacity to

manufacture armor plate was disappearing.^^
After Beatty's discussion, the C.I.D. committee focused
on the naval rivalry between Britain and the United States.

Austen Chamberlain urged the avoidance of
with America.

a

building race

Andrew Bonar Law observed that the United

The Director of Naval Construction had first raised
this issue with the Admiralty Board a year earlier: "The
drive for economy may lead to the shutting down of new
construction, which would be deleterious to the navy. We
must review our designs annually and construct at least one
new ship of each type. We must keep the necessary staff of
designers, draughtsmen, and skilled workers on tap. We must
enter some arrangements with the contractors to ensure the
capacity to build does not become lost.
See D'Eyncourt MSS
21: D'Eyncourt Memorandum, "Naval Material", September 8,
1919.

Armstrong works at Openshaw, near Manchester, had
closed, and Vickers had contracted to supply 7,600 tons of
armor plate to the Japanese Government.
^^The

116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Construction", December 10, 1920.
^^ADM

C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
Beatty's prediction had some validity: during Britain's
rearmament in the 1930 's, the lack of native armament
producers forced Britain to order armor plate from the
Czechosl ovakian firm of Skoda.
^^CAB 2/3:
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States was having difficulty manning her fleet and declared
that British naval construction would arouse American
pride.

He counseled the acceptance of some risk in terms of naval

security and then suggested a diplomatic solution to obviate

"battleship building on a large scale."
swiftly concurred.

Lloyd George

Before adjourning, the C.I.D. agreed

that the Foreign Secretary would consult Auckland Geddes

Britain's Ambassador to the United States, regarding the
prospects of the "limitation of armaments."-'
The Prime Minister's position regarding the capital

ship controversy meanwhile crystallized.

If

there had been

any doubts in his mind during the first week of December,

they disappeared during the public debate on the issue.

December 20th, Hankey recorded in his diary:
The P.M. rather irritable.
I
felt instinctively
that he was rather cross with me - I think over
the Naval Inquiry.
He wants to be able to prove
that the Capital Ship is doomed.

Hankey himself believed that the capital ship remained
viable, forwarding the latest Admiralty memo to his chief

with a minute stating "their arguments appear
incontrovertible."^*^

Within two days of discussing the

future of the capital ship with Hankey, Lloyd George told
Lord Riddel

1

that "it would be a great mistake for the

-^CAB 2/3:

II,

C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.

''Maurice Hankey,
207.

as recorded in Roskill, Hankey

,

Vol

On
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country to engage in

moment."

a

big ship-building programme at the

The Prime Minister indicated his desire to
reduce

"the size of ships and the weight to be carried.
On December 23, 1920, at the next meeting of the

C.I.D., Churchill proposed the formation of a subcommittee
that would collect and lay evidence before the full

Committee of Imperial Defence.

He suggested evidence from

eight or nine individuals from different points of view,

with cross examination by the Admiralty.

The Secretary of

State for War and Air explained that he tended to support
the views of the Admiralty, but that he believed a hearing

would simplify the task of refuting the opinions in the
press
The Prime Minister immediately supported Churchill's

recommendation for a committee to investigate the capital
ship, the idea that he had first proposed to the Cabinet

Finance Committee over three weeks before.

He added that

"it was very necessary to obtain the views of men who

favoured the Mittle ship'.""
Beatty whether Tyrwhitt, Keyes

Lloyd George then asked
,

Duff, and Richmond-all of

whom were officers known for accomplishments apart from

"David Lloyd George, as recorded in Riddell, Intimate
Diary

,

255.

^^CAB 2/3:

C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.

^^CAB 2/3:

C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.
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capital ships--would be available to testify.^*

Beatty

answered that the Admiralty "had always considered
themselves the advisors of the Cabinet on naval matters" and
in turn asked the Prime Minister whether the Government

still adhered to the One Power standard.

Lloyd George

stated that "no alteration had been made in the Government's
policy" but refused "to consider the question of taking

immediate steps" regarding the construction of capital ships
pending further deliberation.
agreed to form
capital ship. 65

a

On that note, the C.I.D.

subcommittee to investigate the role of the
David Lloyd George would provide this group,

known officially as Naval Shipbuilding Subcommittee
(N.S.C.), the maximum opportunity consonant with the

appearance of open-mindedness to limit the role of the
capital ship.
On December 29th, the prime minister commissioned

Andrew Bonar Law (Lord Privy Seal) as chairman of the
N.S.C., whose members included Beatty, Churchill, Sir Eric

"Rear-Admiral Reginald Tyrwhitt during the war
commanded the Harwich Force, where he earned a thrusting
reputation with light cruisers and destroyers. Vice-Admiral
Roger Keyes who commanded the Dover Patrol in a manner
similar to Tyrwhitt, led the daring raid on Zeebrugge
harbour which featured destroyers and blockships. Admiral
Sir Alexander Duff, who served with the Admiralty as the
Director of the Ant i -Submarine Division, influenced Jellicoe
Rear-Admiral Sir
to institute the convoy system in 1917.
Herbert Richmond, the President of the Naval War College at
Greenwich, earned distinction as naval historian,
strategist, and tactician.
,

"cab 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.
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Geddes (Minister of Transport and former First Lord), Sir
Robert

Home

(President of the Board of Trade), and First

Lord Walter Long.

At first glance, the Bonar Law Enquiry,

as the N.S.C. was informally known, seemed evenly
balanced

between the advocates of naval security (Beatty, Churchill,
Long) and those of economy (Bonar Law, Geddes, Horne)

.

In

reality, however, the dynamics of the subcommittee

discreetly favored the supporters of naval limitation.
Bonar Law, who as chairman was responsible for drafting the

subcommittee's report, generally lacked interest in defense

matters."
Churchill."

In addition,

he disliked and distrusted Winston

When Lloyd George had asked the Chancellor of

the Exchequer-designate his opinion of keeping Churchill in

the Cabinet in December 1916, Bonar Law had responded: "I

would rather have him against us every time."'
ill

to attend most of the N.S.C. meetings.

Long was too

He and

Churchill, furthermore, were bitter political enemies.
Admiral Beatty fought doggedly to insure the Bonar Law

Enquiry accepted the primacy of the capital ship in the

""Kobert Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1966), 20.

%obert Blake, Unrepentant
Andrew Bonar Law (New York:
James, J.C.C. Davidson 53.

Tory: The Life and Times of
St. Martin's, 1956), 232-34;

,

'^Andrew Bonar Law,

as recorded in Blake, Bonar Law

.

234.
^'Martin Gilbert, Winston S.

Churchill. IV: The Stricken

World 1916-1922 (Boston, 1975), 29.
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future of the Royal Navy.

The First Lord's rapidly failing

health left to the First Sea Lord the primary burden of

protecting the interests of the Royal Navy,
that the admiral took deeply to heart.

responsibility

a

One diarist

recorded Beatty's determination "to resign rather than go
down to posterity as the First Sea Lord in office at the
time such a shameful decision" [the abandonment of the

capital ship and with it, naval supremacy] was implemented.*The First Sea Lord built his case on the premise that for
the life of a new battleship (approximately 20 years), it

would remain the predominant weapon of naval warfare.
Beatty took care to use all of the tools at his disposal: at
Cabinet meetings he habitual

1

y

appeared impeccably dressed

in morning coat, striped trousers, and a satin cravat

adorned with

single pearl, while at night he carefully

a

rehearsed his arguments with his secretary, who played the
role of devil

'

s

advocate

Beatty orchestrated the Admiral ty

'

s

case

,

sel ecting the

expert witnesses and producing five documents for the

"Roskill
Naval Policy 224, notes that although Long
was unable to attend the meetings of the N.S.C., he reviewed
all the papers presented to it, and even prepared two of his
See CAB 16/37: N8-First Lord Memorandum, "Subcommittee
own.
on the Capital Ship in the Navy", January 28, 1921 and N9First Lord Memorandum, "Naval Policy and Shipbuilding",
January 31, 1921.
,

,

'*Bryan Godf rey-Faussett

Naval Hero

,

,

as recorded in Roskill,

Last

302-03.

^^Chalmers,

Life and Letters of David Beatty

,

363-64.
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committee on which he sat.

He expanded his oral argument

for the preservation of naval armament firms
and recommended

the adoption of a slow yet steady building program.

Such a

course, he argued, would serve not only to maintain naval

production lines but also to reduce production costs.

He

pointed out the extensive capital ship construction of the

United States Navy and reminded the committee of the
Government's professed adherence to the principle that the
Royal Navy "should not be inferior in strength to the Navy
of other Powers."^'

Beatty also reiterated his judgment that

only the immediate construction of four new capital ships

would suffice to maintain Britain's position of equality.'^
In a progress report to the ill First Lord,

the First Sea

Lord wrote that he had pointed out to the Bonar Law Enquiry
that:

time was of the utmost importance ... that unless we
were authorized to commence bui Iding ships in the
summer of 1921 we should drop from the position we
have hel d for the past three hundred years to that
of taking third place in the world.

16/37/3: N2-Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Construction", December 10, 1920; N4-Admiralty Memorandum,
"Naval Construction", December 14, 1920; N6-Admiralty
Memorandum, "Naval Construction-Armour Plate", December 15,
1920.
•"CAB

pronounced by Walter Long in March 1920 and last
See
reaffirmed by David Lloyd George in December 1920.
Parliamentary Debates Commons, vol. 126, cols 2296-2347;
CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.
'•First

,

"cab 16/37/3: Nl-Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy
and Construction", November 22, 1920.
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Beatty added that the Royal Navy would "never be able to
regain our present position without incurring great cost."^Finally, the First Sea Lord introduced a new line of

argument regarding imperial naval defense.

The Admiralty

previously had recommended to the C.I.D. that "the Dominions
and colonies limit their shipbuilding programmes to the

provision of light cruisers and submarines," develop bases,
and build up fuel supplies.

The Royal Navy would serve as

an imperial fire brigade, rushing as a whole to any

threatened location.
required

a

Such a strategy, the admiral argued,

fleet of speedy capital ships: "the mobility of

the main body is a very important factor."

The eight

proposed capital ships would form the backbone of the rapid
response force.

Beatty indicated that the projected

division of labor would reduce the Royal Navy's ancillary
costs

77

Beatty discounted the threat from the sky, knowing that
air power enthusiasts could make only limited claims for the

fledgling Royal Air Force based on actual performance.'

The

Admiralty's Post War Questions Committee had reported less

Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Chalmers, Life and
Letters of David Beatty 363.
,

16/37/3: NlO-Admiral ty Memorandum, "Naval
Shipbuilding Policy", February 23, 1921.
^^CAB

^^Geoffrey Till, "Airpower and the Battleship in the
1920's", in Brian Ranft, ed. Technical Changes and British
Naval Policy 1860-1939 (London, 1977), 108-122.
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than a year before that aircraft could not threaten the
capital ship "until the capabilities of aircraft
increase

beyond anything that appears probable in the near future.

"^^

Chief of Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard suggested that the
Air

Force could be expanded to assume the Navy's mission of

preventing invasion, but for the present would go no further
than to claim:
if we can concentrate on the development of the
aircraft, the importance of the capital ship must

be greatly reduced and will become an insurance
for which we cannot afford to pay the premiums.^'

Stronger claims for air power were made by retired MajorGeneral Sir Frederick Sykes, who stated: "All forms of

warship will soon become obsolete, and by the time

a

programme of battleship construction is completed new
factors may have arisen which render them useless,"

Retired Rear-Admiral Charles de Bartolome, wartime Third Sea
Lord, strongly supported Sykes's views concerning the

enormous potential of air power.

He asserted that the new

technologies "are so promising that we should be well
82
advised to defer the building of capital ships,"

^ADM 1/8586/70: Final Report of the Post-War Questions
Committee, March 21, 1920.
^^CAB

16/37/2: NSC-22, Testimony of Air-Marshal

Trenchard
^-CAB

16/37/2: NSC-24, Testimony of Ma jor-General Sykes.

^^CAB

16/37/2: NSC-23, Testimony of Rear-Admiral de

Bartol ome
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The Admiralty's counterattack included

a

memorandum

which addressed the future of air/sea combat and the
testimony of Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Ernie
Chatfield.

'

Chatfield identified numerous difficulties that

air power would face:

the problem of locating targets, the

need to mass sufficient aircraft, the limited pay-load of

ship-borne bombers, and the inability of contemporary bombs
to penetrate armor before detonation (thus much of their

explosive power was wasted on

a

ship's superstructure,

rather than concentrating against its vitals).

An Admiralty

paper highlighted the vulnerability of aviation to inclement
weather, promised that anti-aircraft fire would render air

attacks useless, and flatly stated that "there is nothing in
the present offensive qualities of aircraft which render

them

menace to the existence of the capital ship."

a

The

memorandum also predicted that naval count ermeasu res woul
progress in step with advances in aviation.^^
The First Lord concentrated his efforts on discrediting
the value of the submarine.

In order to impeach the

credential s of Rear -Admiral Hall, Beatty arranged for the

appearance of Captain Max Hor ton
three submarines and

1

ater

a

,

who successful ly commanded

submarine flotilla during the

synopsis of Chatfield's testimony can be found in
Till, "Airpower and the Battleship", in Ranft, Technical
Change 112.
^^A

,

16/37/3: N5-Admiralty Memorandum, "Retention of
the Capital ship", December 14, 1920.
^^CAB
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war.-

In response to a series of questions from
Sir Eric

Geddes concerning the potential of the magnetic torpedo,

Horton emphasized the operational difficulties involved with

deploying futuristic weapons.

He deprecated the theoretical

capabilities of the submarine touted in the press as:
out of all proportion to the damage which these
weapons will actually inflict under wartime
conditions, and the difficulty of bringing them
into action is not appreciated by the 'Material
School '--of little sea experience--who are
conducting the newspaper campaign against the
Capital ship."

Rear-Admiral Keyes advised Vice-Admiral Brock against the

possibility of testimony from Admiral Freemantle:

"I don't

think he would be a good witness until he has made up his

mind that the submarine is not going to take sea supremacy
from the Battleship." 37

In his own memorandum,

Beatty argued

that during the war improved anti-submarine warfare

techniques "sensibly eased the submarine menace."

German U-

boats neither deterred the Grand Fleet from proceeding to
sea nor sank "a single capital ship in the main fighting
go

His task was made easier by the refusal of Sir

fleet."

''Beatty MSB 8/2/4: Hankey prepared the list of

witnesses after discussion with Beatty.
^-Beatty MSS 8/3: NSC-19, Testimony of Captain M.K.

Horton
^^Admiral Keyes,

as recorded in Paul Halpern,

Keyes Papers. Volume II: 1919-1938 (London: Allen
1980),

The
Unwin,

ed.
&

49.

16/37/2: N2-Admiralty Memorandum, "Retention of
the Capital Ship", December 14, 1920.
^^CAB
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Percy Scott, with his cry of "What is the use of a

battleship?," to appear before the Committee J'
One of the interesting features of the Bonar Law

Enquiry was the absence of oral or written testimony from
the Director of Naval Construction (D.N.C.), Sir Eustace

Tennyson D'Eyncourt.
of his day,

Probably the leading naval architect

D'Eyncourt held the responsibility for

incorporating the lessons of the war into the design of His

Majesty

or

s

warships.'^

In the face of the German submarine

menace, the D.N.C. arranged for a series of experiments

involving the use of torpedoes against

a

target ship

equipped with bulges, which consisted of external watertight
compartments filled with air and inner compartments filled
with water.

At the conclusion of the trials, he wrote:

With ships of this character [possessing bulges
the supremacy of the Battleship against the
submarine can be taken as reestablished, a

Scott viewed the invitation to testify as an Admiral ty
trap to 1 imit his freedom to speak out on the future of the
Beatty
See Hunt, Sailor-Scholar 121.
capital ship.
considered 1 egal proceedings against Scott for his
See
disrespectful references to the Admiralty in The Times
Beatty MSS: 8/2/4.
.

.

'^After an apprenticeship with Armstrong,

the Royal
Naval College, and Fairchild, D'Eyncourt served as the
Director of Naval Construction from 1912 until his
retirement in 1924
'^Professor Hopkinson of the War Committee of the Royal
Society conducted these experiments at Cambridge, Chatham,

and Portsmouth.
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supremacy which at the earlier period of the war
seemed to be threatened.'^

Wartime experience strengthened D'Eyncourt's faith
in the
value of bulges.
The battleship Marlborough torpedoed at
,

Jutland, subsequently remained in the fight for a

considerable time and returned safely to port.

In 1917,

the

cruiser Grafton in the Mediterranean received a torpedo full
amidships, but the ship made way safely back to Malta.

At

the height of the public controversy involving the

submarine, D'Eyncourt made the following comparison:
Of Edgar class light cruisers, unbulged Hawke was
torpedoed and sank rapidly with great loss of
life, while sister ships Edgar Grafton and
Endymion all with bulges, returned safely to
.

.

,

harbour after being torpedoed.
The summer of 1920 he developed the designs for the Royal

Navy's next capital ships, the first British vessels to
exceed 100' of beam in order to provide adequate anti-

torpedo bulges.
Why, then, did the First Sea Lord not invite his

Director of Naval Construction to educate the other members
of the Bonar Law Enquiry as to the degree of protection

D'Eyncourt MSS 31: D'Eyncourt Memorandvim, January
1915.

"D'Eyncourt MSS 31: D'Eyncourt to Sir Philip Watt,
November 15, 1920.
'^D'Eyncourt MSS 27: Goodall Memorandum, "Battleship
The complete dimensions of the
Design", July 1, 1920.
vessels were length, 760'; breadth, 112'; draft, 32';
displacement, 48,000 tons.

1,
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provided by anti-torpedo bulges?

Beatty's wholehearted

efforts throughout the work of the committee strongly

indicate the omission did not stem from

hopelessness or futility.

a

sense of

One possibility is that Beatty

may have suffered from tunnel vision: he was so convinced
that the capital ship was safe from the submarine that
he

may not have seen the potential impact of D'Eyncourt's

testimony on the other committee members.

Another

possibility involves the secondary effects of constructing
capital ships equipped with bulges.

necessarily broad of beam--D' Eyncourt

Bulged vessels were
'

s

latest design called

for a width of 112 '--and required very large docks.

None of

the royal dockyards were capable of handling ships wider

than 100', and only four private yards (Armstrong, Brown,
Cammell, and Fairfield) could service vessels of such

dimension."

The Admiralty's cost estimate for their

construction program of eight new capital ships included
£400,000 for the enlargement of

a

captured German floating

or

The maintenance of those vessels, furthermore, would

dock.

undoubtedly have entailed more than one such dock.

Beatty

thus may have feared closer investigation into the ancillary

costs associated with bulged ships.

Eyncourt MSS 27: D' Eyncourt Memorandum to the
controller, June 14, 1920.
D'

116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920.
'^ADM
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Three members of the committee repeatedly challenged
the professional

judgments of the Admiralty experts.

Sir

Eric Geddes, who served as First Lord of the Admiralty
from
June 1917 through January 1919, strongly opposed
the

Admiralty experts who claimed that "by the autumn of 1918
the submarine menace was practically overcome."
of Rear-Admiral Keyes'

In the face

testimony that the Royal Navy's first

line of defense against the submarine was the mine rather

than the use of convoy, supplemented by depth-charges,

Geddes burst forth:
do not want to give evidence before the
committee, but when the Admiral [who after all was
in charge at Dover, and succeeded at Dover] says,
that he considers in this War we overcame the
submarine menace, I am amazed...! consider the
submarine was temporarily held up to May, 1918,
but was getting more dangerous in the later
months, and everything in the Admiralty will
support that
I

Geddes also chal 1 enged the judgment of naval witnesses

regarding the value of the magnetic torpedo.
Sir Robert Horne, who along with Bonar Law could make

no claim to any expertise in naval matters, rejected the

proposition that future air defenses for capital ships would
develop to counter air attack.

He predicted that "a

concerted attack by ten or fifteen torpedo carrying
98
machines" would defeat the Hood class battle cruisers.

Beatty MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute

3,

January

7,

1921.

'Beatty MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute 4,

January

7,

1921.
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Horne swept aside the notion that fighter planes would
be
able to defend capital ships, provided the attacking
bombers
themselves had

a

fighter escort "to take care of your

[defensive] fighters.

Committee chairman Andrew Bonar Law led overmatched
Rear-Admiral Keyes, the Admiralty submarine expert, to
discuss the course of

a

hypothetical war with America.

After Keyes stated that he would take

a

fleet of capital

ships to Bermuda, the Lord Privy Seal asked an important

question: "Do you think it would be possible under any

circumstances, with or without the equality of battleships,
to keep the Canadian trade route open?"

The admiral

admitted that the Navy could not keep the sea line of

communication at all times, but contended that the fleet
could escort

a

large convoy.

Bonar Law then pronounced:

"You would lose the war and lose Canada for the time being.'

He next continued the attack on the capital ship with

a

series of questions:
What purpose would the fleet serve to protect our
trade?... How could the American fleet interfere
with our trade? ... Could not smaller ships, planes,
and submarines constitute the same threat to
American trade as the fleet?
He concluded by asking a final question which demonstrated
that he shared the viewpoint of Prime Minister David Lloyd

"Beatty MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute
-'^Beatty

MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute

4,

4,

January
January

7,
7,

1921.
1921.
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George: "Did not those smaller craft offer a more efficient

alternative than the batt 1 eship?"^"^
The advocates of economy listened closely to the

testimony of Rear-Admiral Herbert Richmond, President of the
Royal Naval College at Greenwich.

His reputation as a naval

theorist had led Admiral Beatty in November 1920 to ask him
for arguments in favor of funding capital ships.

Richmond's diary reflected his belief that

a

'"^^

rigorous

a.

posteriori investigation would serve Britain better than the
First Sea Lord's abiding faith in the capital ship:

He wanted arguments to shew [sic] that battleships
were necessary.
I
thought he was going about
investigation the wrong way. One should not try
to prove what needed proving in one's own mind,
but to find out what was right.
The Post-war
[Questions] Comm.ittee had merely made statements,
assertions, had not examined the war to find out
what the influence of [the] big ship was or
whe.t|ier she was still in the position she used to
The President of the Royal Naval College had his own vision
of the navies of the future,

in which technological

developments and financial constraints would lead to more.

-"*Beatty MSS 8/3:

N.S.C. Minute

4,

January

7,

1921.

talents were universally recognized; his
intolerance and scathing criticism for those with differing
Eminent naval
views alienated many contem.poraries
historian Arthur Harder considered Richmond the ablest naval
officer of the day, while Admiral Ernie Chatfield, who
eventually rose to the position of First Sea Lord, called
See Higham, Military
him. the m.ost irresponsible.
Intellectuals 32
''^^Richmond' s

.

,

.

-''^Rear- Admiral

Richm.ond,
364.
Portrait of an Admiral

as recorded in Marder,

235

yet smaller ships:

The Fleet may then [1930] consist of very few
ships of the line and a host of cruisers.
To
imagine that we are going to see fleets of 30 or
more ships of the line, each costing 8 million
pounds, is to imagine that the purses of the
nations are bottomless - which they are not. We
may see a core of heavy ships - a nucleus, with a
host of lesser vessels.

Rather than giving this answer to Beatty, however, six weeks
later, in December 1920, he provided his views to Hankey for

transmission to Lloyd George."'

Richmond's failure to work through his superiors or
even to inform them of his actions, which the typical Royal

Navy officer would have found reprehensible, was not unique.

Richmond had once before communicated his views on naval
matters to the Prime Minister, to whom he had turned in 1917
in order to force the Admiralty to the use of convoy against
submarines.*'^

His actions can best be explained by his

biographer
He was a man of strong views which did not always
coincide with those of his seniors, and he was apt
to be impatient and to show his annoyance when,|^his
views on any matter were not accepted by them."
By 1920, he had become disillusioned with the Beatty regime,

"*Rear-Admiral Richmond, as recorded in Harder,
Portrait of an Admiral 364.
,

'^'Roskill,
-"^^unt,

IV,

Hankey

,

Vol

Sailor-Scholar

II,
,

207-08.

56-67; Harder, Scapa Flow

154.

"^Harder, Scapa Flow

.

Vol V,

20.

.

Vol
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particularly the Admiralty's inability to articulate and
implement

clear-cut policy for naval defense. -^^

a

Rear-Admiral Richmond provided support to both sides of
the capital ship debate.

He began by agreeing with Beatty's

long parade of wartime veterans as to the value of capital

ships.

He testified that "the capital ship still remains

the basis of sea power, cannot be seriously interfered with

by submarines in open waters, and must be included in the

British fleet.

Sea power, he continued, encompassed more

than simply battleships; it stemmed from balanced fleets,

supported by adequate bases, from locations with positional
advantages

Richmond next addressed the impact of national finance
on naval strength.

The Royal Naval College president stated

that Britain's position "depends upon the restoration of our

credit and also the devel opment of our trade

.

He

therefore strongl y recommended against the Admiral ty

'

building program based on the cost of new capital ships and
the dockyards and smaller craft on which they relied.

He

argued: "If we cannot at the same time afford the great

^%unt

,

Sailor-Scholar

,

109.

•^^CAB

16/27/3: Summary of Evidence.

**''CAB

16/37/3: NSC-27, Testimony of Rear-Admiral H.W.

Richmond
*^*CAB

Richmond

16/37/3: NSC-27, Testimony of Rear-Admiral H.W.
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ships and the cruisers, flotillas, and bases,
the great
ships will be useless." The admiral's analysis
rested upon,
but did not explicitly refer to, the existing
distribution
of capital ships which provided virtually
no threat outside

of Japan and the United States,

faithful wartime allies.

Richmond then put forth his recommendations for naval
defense.

He urged a policy of research work and experiment

with new technologies and tactical combinations.

He

contended that:
if the battleship programme hinders our research
work it will do harm. .merely to build ships of a
.

larger and more heavily armed type than those of
the United States does not solve the problem.

He also suggested that the Royal Navy might adopt a much

smaller battleship, "a more efficient instrument."

The

savings created by downsizing new capital ships would in
turn enable Britain to "create a sufficient number of units"
to fulfill its global obligations.*"

The idea of a smaller vessel which would fulfill most
of the functions of the capital ship and do so in a more

efficient manner attracted other naval thinkers."^

"•'CAB

Admiral

16/37/3: NSC-27, Testimony of Rear-Admiral H.W.

Richmond
"^CAB 16/37/3: NSC-27, Testimony of Rear-Admiral H.W.

Richmond
"^It is interesting to speculate whether Richmond

served as the source for Lloyd George's interest in "smaller
ships." This researcher, however, cannot document any
linkage between the two from the submarine crisis of 1917 to
the campaign for an investigation of the capital ship.
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Mark Kerr, who published his memoirs in 1933, lamented
the
size of post- Jutland capital ships, which, as they
became
larger, grew "more vulnerable to gunfire, torpedoes, or

bombs.

"^^^

The German Navy enjoyed considerable success

during the Second World War with their three pocket
battleships. Admiral Graf Soee
Deutschland.

.

Admiral Scheer

.

and

At 12,000 tons displacement, these ships

weighed less than a third as much as the British King Georae
V class battleships, at 38,000 tons each.^^^

Given the conflicting testimony, the Naval Shipbuilding
Committee could not agree on the value of the capital ship.
Bonar Law, supported by Geddes and Horne, prepared a report
that found "no evidence adequate to support the contention

that the capital ship is obsolete," but that emphasized "the

doubtful expediency of deciding to build big and costly
117
vessels at the present time."^^

The Bonar Law-Horne-Geddes

report called particular attention to the evidence of Rear-

Admirals Richmond and Bartolome, who both gave credence to
the potential of emerging weapons systems.

The chairman's

Mark Kerr, The Navy in My Time (London: Rich and
Cowan, 1933), 227; 242.
the technical specifications of these ships, see
Cajus Bekker, Hitler's Naval War (New York: Kensington,
1977), 379; Wi 1 1 iam McMahon Dreadnought Battleships and
Battle Cruisers (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1978), 54-55.
^^^For

,

16/37/3: "Report of the Subcommittee on the
Capital Ship", March 2, 1921.
*^^CAB

239

report accepted the conclusion of these officers, who both

advised against the construction of new capital ships.
Churchill vehemently disagreed, noting that Bonar Law's

summary laid "an undue emphasis on any evidence which may
have been obtained against the capital ship."

The Secretary

of State for War and Air claimed that the Admiralty had

"made out an overwhelming case for the retention of the
capital ship as the foundation of sea power.
a

""^

He wrote in

similar vein to Arthur Balfour on February 26, 1921, when

he pointed out that:

"Britain is in danger of becoming not

only the second but third naval power in a few years time."

Churchill advocated

a

program of four capital ships to be

built every year for four or five years "on the lines

I

declared against Germany in 1912."
Beatty, adamantly opposed to Bonar Law's findings,

wrote a separate report.

The adm.iral maintained that the

advocates of the new technologies had in no way undermined
the position of the capital ship as the predominant weapon
in naval warfare for the foreseeable future.

His report

concluded that "the capital ship remains the material basis
of sea-power" and "that to maintain the one-Power standard

""cab 16/37/3:

"Report of the Subcommittee on the

Capital Ship", March
^^'seatty MSS 8/4:

2,

Churchill Note, February 13, 1921.

*^°Winston Churchill,

419.

1921.

as recorded in Young, Balfour

,
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in accordance with the policy adopted by the
Government, it
is necessary to lay down capital ships without

delay."

Churchill and Long concurred with Beatty's findings.*^*
The N.S.C. issued its divided report in March 1921.
The body of the report comprised the opposing conclusions of
the committee; those written by Bonar Law were printed on
the left-hand pages of the report, while those written by

Beatty were printed on the right hand pages for direct
comparison.

The remainder of the report gave no cause for

controversy.

Appendix

I

listed the fourteen witnesses

before the committee, together with their present and
wartim.e appointments.

evidence.

Appendix

II

provided

a

summary of

On the last page of that appendix was a

discussion of the contingency of a war with Japan.

The

committee agreed that "for such a war a British naval base
at Singapore was essential,"

111

Although the very constitution of

a

committee to

investigate the role of the capital ship in the navy
reflected the Admiralty's loss of hegemony in naval affairs,
the reports of the Naval Shipbuilding Subcommittee served to

strengthen marginally the position of the Admiralty.

The

Jutland controversy and the ensuing media debate influenced

CAB 16/37/3: "Report of the Subcommittee on the
Capital Ship", March 2, 1921.
16/37/3: "Report of the Subcommittee on the
Capital Ship", March 2, 1921.
*^^CAB
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certain members of the Cabinet to reject the Admiralty's

assurances on the continuing value of the capital ship.

The

oral arguments of Bonar Law, Geddes, and Horne demonstrated

the battleship no longer enjoyed the position of

unquestioned predominance it had had before the war.
of the witnesses before the committee,

None

however, established

a credible alternative to a fleet based on the capital

ship.

Nor had any of them challenged the Admiralty's claim that
the construction of four capital ships was necessary to

maintain equality with the fleet of the United States.
the spring of 1921, the Cabinet nonetheless remained

unconvinced as to the value of such

a fleet.

In

CHAPTER

7

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1921
The course of the Imperial Conference of 1921
reflected
one of the major changes wrought by the Great War, the

increased strength of the Dominions, Japan, and the United
States.

As the Angl o- Japanese Alliance came due for renewal

in 1921, the British government pursued the cautious policy
of seeking renewal under the covenant of the League of

Nations.

Independently, the Admiralty dispatched Admiral

Jellicoe on a tour of the Pacific in order to evaluate the

strategic requirements for imperial defense in that region.
At the Imperial Conference of 1921, Australia and New

Zealand supported renewal of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance in
order to avoid offending the Japanese, while Canada sought

abrogation to avoid offending the Americans.

Lloyd George

brought the Imperial Cabinet to agreement on two decisions:
the development of a naval base at Singapore and Britain's

acceptance of an American invitation to discuss disarmament
and Pacific security.

Early in 1921, the British government began its

preparations for the forthcoming Imperial Conference.

In

order to develop an agenda for the conference, the prime

minister created a planning committee under the direction of
Leo Amery.

On February 4, 1921, the Amery committee

submitted its report, which identified for the conference
four major issues, of which the two most important were

243

imperial defense and renewal of the Anglo- Japanese
Al liance

Britain had concluded a defensive alliance with Japan
on January 30, 1902, primarily from concern with Russian

imperialism.

British interests in the region included the

defense of India and trade in China's Yangtze Valley.^

In

the wake of the Boer War, Britain had felt isolated and

threatened by Russian territorial aggrandizement as well as
the expansion of Russian sea power.

^

The original Anglo-

Japanese Alliance, valid for five years, allowed each

signatory to remain neutral in a war between the other

nation and a single belligerent but required intervention if
the other party faced two or more powers.^

London also

agreed to maintain a certain level of naval strength in Far

Eastern waters.^

Britain avoided the need to join

a

purely

ADM 1/8611/151: Imperial Conference Agenda, February
The committee, comprised of representatives from
4, 1921.
the Board of Trade, the Air Ministry, and the Colonial,
Foreign, India, and War Offices, included Captain Barry
Domville of the Admiralty Plans Division.
Lowe and Dockerill, Mirage of Power

,

275-76.

^eloff. Imperial Sunset 100-01, notes that in the
search for an ally against Russia, Britain first looked to
the United States.
,

Belof f
^Kennedy Realities Behind Diplomacy 116-17
Imperial Sunset 75, points out that the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance represented the only diplomatic undertaking before
the First World War in which Britain agreed to go to war
upon a specified condition, regardless of other
,

,

,

circumstances
^Belof f

,

Imperial Sunset

,

101.

.
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Russo-Japanese conflict, but secured Japanese assistance
against a possible Franco-Russian combination in the
Far
East.

Continued fears of Russian menace against India,

fueled by the completion of the Transcaspian and Orenburg-

Tashkent railways, led the Balfour Government to revise and
renew the Angl o- Japanese Alliance on August 12, 1905, for a

period of ten years. ^

The terms of the revised Alliance,

which became operative in the event of a signatory engaging
in hostilities with a single belligerent, served to bolster
the defenses of India against invasion by land and to

facilitate the concentration of British naval strength in

European waters against the growing German fleet.
The British government again revised and renewed the

alliance on July 13, 1911, for another period of ten years.
The incompatibility of an Anglo-American treaty of

arbitration proposed by American President William Taft in
July 1910 with the existing terms of the treaty caused

Britain to review the treaty four years ahead of schedule.
The Asquith Government decided to renew early and to revise
the agreement to accoimnodate Taft's proposal.

In May 1911,

at a special meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence,

Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey briefed the Dominion Prime

Ministers on the alliance and requested indorsement of the

'Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power

.

279.

^lan Nish, Alliance in Decline; A Study in Anglo-

Japanese Relations 1908-23 (London, 1972), 41-77.
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proposed renewal, which he received unanimously.^

Article

IV of the 1911 treaty absolved either signatory of
the need

to conduct hostilities against any third party with whom

they had contracted a treaty of arbitration.'

Although the

refusal of the United States Senate to ratify an Anglo-

American arbitration treaty in August 1911 left Article IV
temporarily inoperative, Britain announced to Japan that the
peace commission treaty of September 15, 1914, constituted
such an arbitration agreement. *°

After 1914, then, the

Anglo- Japanese Alliance specifically relieved Britain of any

obligation to support her ally in the event of hostilities
between Japan and America.
The Angl o- Japanese Alliance, which in 1905 facilitated
the concentration of British naval strength in European

waters against the growing German fleet, served to protect

British interests in a region Britain could not defend

militarily at the conclusion of the Great War.

The

concentration of imperial forces against the German threat,

which forced Britain to denude her overseas defenses, caused
London to insist on the renewal of the treaty in 1911

Imperial Sunset 149, indicates that Britain
would have renewed even without Dominion concurrence.
'Beloff,

,

'For the text of the 1911 treaty,

see Nish, Alliance

66-68.
*^Nish,

Alliance in Decline

,

110-111.

,
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despite the objections of Australia and New Zealand.^*

In

the spring of 1920, the British Fo'reign Office
conducted a

study which identified seven points of divergence between

British and Japanese interests, including the autonomy of
China, economic competition, and the racial policies of

Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

Nonetheless, one

senior Foreign Office official concluded that "it is
essential for us, owing to our naval weaknesses in the
Pacific, to have a friendly Japan.

"^^

The value of the

Anglo- Japanese Alliance was also clear to his Department
chief, the Foreign Secretary.

George Nathaniel Curzon, K.G.

,

P.O., G.C.S.I.,

G.C.I.E., F.R.S., Baron Curzon of Kedleston, Baron

Ravensdale, Viscount Scarsdale, and 1st Earl of Kedleston,

assumed duties as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in
January, 1919.

The Foreign Secretary remained a staunch

imperialist, concerned always to strengthen the bonds of the

British Empire, particularly British control over Persia and
the Middle East.

He visited Mesopotamia in 1889 and wrote

Dominion reservations concerned their right,
unrestricted by the revised alliance, to enact
discriminatory legislation against Japanese immigrants.
Beloff, Imperial Sunset 148-49.

See

,

^^James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the
Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (Oxford,
1981), 38.

Assistant Secretary John Tilley,
Alliance in Decline, 277.

as recorded in Nish,
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Persia and the P ersian Question

work in England.^*

,

which became a standard

In his book, Curzon explained his

view of diplomacy, which involved making decisions based
upon accurate information and then conveying his positions
clearly:

There are two constituents of successful
diplomacy, which seem to me sometimes in danger of
being forgotten. One is knowing one's ownjnind,
the other is letting other people know it.^^
In August 1917,

Guardian

,

CP.

Scott, editor of the Liberal Manchester

noted in his diary that "Milner and Curzon were

powerful, but useless--their minds were closed.

Curzon

lived in the year 1902 (when Britain sent gunboats to the

Persian Gulf)."^^

After the conclusion of the Great War, the

Foreign Secretary sought to establish a bulwark of Moslem
states to protect the British possessions of India and his

beloved Persia against Russian imperialism.

The success of

Bolshevik propaganda at stirring nascent Moslem nationalism
caused Curzon in 1920 to warn his Cabinet colleagues: "The

Russian menace in the East is incomparably greater than
anything else that has happened in my time to the British

^*David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace; The Fall of
the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Modern Middle
East (New York, 1989), 455.
^^Lord Curzon,

as recorded in Nicolson, Curzon

.

42-43.

Scott, as recorded in Trevor Wilson, ed. The
Political Diaries of CP. Scott 1911-1928 (Ithaca, NY,
1970), 301.
^^C.P.
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Empire.

"^^

He gave liberally of his time and attention to

the issue of Angl o- Japanese relations, although it never

stirred his passions as did questions involving Persia.

Curzon guided the British Cabinet meeting of May 30,
1921, in its consideration of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance.*^

The Foreign Secretary began by providing a history of the

development of the alliance, including the 1905 renewal and
the 1911 modification.

He then reminded those present that,

in accordance with the provisions of Article IV of the

revised treaty, the peace commission treaty of September
1914 constituted an arbitration agreement and that Britain

hence was no longer obligated to support Japan in a conflict

with America.^'
The Foreign Secretary then followed with the arguments
for and against renewal

.

The case against renewal

he

,

reasoned, rested upon three points: the causes for its

Lord Curzon, as recorded in Fromkin, To End All Peace

,

461.
18

Curzon lacked the authority of previous Foreign
Secretaries in dealing with the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, in
part because Lloyd George distrusted the professional
diplomatic machinery of the Foreign Office and in part
because Curzon refused to confront the Prime Minister for
See Roberta Warman,
fear of being dismissed from office.
"The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of
Foreign Policy, 1916-1918", ( The Historical Journal XV,
1972); Kenneth Morgan, "Lloyd George's Premiership: A Study
in 'Prime Ministerial Government'", ( The Historical Journal
XIII, 1970); Craig and Gilbert, The Diplomats 33; Nicolson,
Curzon 31
,

,

,

,

^^CAB 23/25:

Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
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creation no longer endured, it offended American opinion,
and it alienated Britain from China.

Curzon argued that the

arguments for the treaty "on the whole made out the stronger
case."

He presented numerous justifications: the alliance

had been a substantial success for both parties; it served
as a barrier against a revitalized Russia (and possibly a

revived Germany); it served as a brake on the rapacity of
Japan; it precluded the need to maintain large forces in the

Far East; and it was favorably regarded by Britain's allies,

France, Holland, and Japan herself.

The Foreign Secretary

then suggested that non-renewal would prompt "considerable

resentment" among the Japanese, who might adopt "a spirit of
retaliation."^"

He noted that both the Admiralty and the War

Office favored renewal, as did Australia and New Zealand,
while Canada strongly opposed, and South Africa had not yet

made her position clear.

Curzon added that Auckland Geddes

the British ambassador to Washington, favored renewal as a

means to quiet extremists who demanded additional armaments.
To round out his presentation, he mentioned the idea of

replacing the alliance with a tripartite pact which included
America, but suggested the possibility of the United States
Senate passing such an agreement was slim.

The Foreign

Secretary recommended renewal for a period of four or five
years in a form modified to conform with the Covenant of the

^"cAB 23/25:

Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
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League of Nations, after consultation with the United
States
and China. ^'

Winston Churchill and Arthur, 1st Viscount Lee of
Fareham, argued against the treaty as poisoning relations

with the United States.

Churchill, who traded his portfolio

as Secretary of State for War and Air for the office of

Colonial Secretary in February 1921, contended that the

Foreign Secretary had misstated the positions of the
Dominions. 22

Canada, he indicated, had even gone as far as

to suggest an independent arrangement with the United States

in case of renewal, while Australia and New Zealand

supported the alliance only out of fear.

He suggested there

would undoubtedly be several advantages arising from an
agreement with both Japan and America.

Lord Lee, who

replaced the failing Walter Long as First Lord of the

Admiralty in February 1921, asserted that political
relations with the United States were of transcendent
importance.

In his opinion, based upon conversations with

American Admiral William Sims, public opinion in the United
States violently detested the Anglo- Japanese Alliance.

Lee

suggested a conference on Pacific affairs that would
culminate in a tripartite pact between Japan, the British

^^CAB 23/25:

Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.

^^Beaverbrook, Fall of Llovd George 40-42, notes that
Curzon and Churchill were fighting over whose Department
should exercise control of Egypt.
.
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Empire, and the United States--a solution he believed
would

incidentally provide a political framework within
which the
armed services could complete their military planning.
He

concluded by emphasizing the need to avoid

a

split in the

British Empire.^*

A greater share of the Cabinet worried more about the
effect of abrogation upon Japan than that of renewal upon
the United States.

Austen Cham.berl ain

,

who had assum.ed the

office of Lord Privy Seal upon the tem.porary retirement of

Andrew Bonar Law in March 1921, raised the specter of a

disaffected Japan drifting into

a

Russo-German combination.

Lord President Arthur Balfour pointed out the existing anti-

Japanese legislation in Australia, New Zealand, California,
and the Philippines and then declared that attempts to keep

Japan out of China were unreasonable.

Edwin Montagu, the

Secretary for India, noted that although Japan was not

popular in India, the Alliance was, both for security
reasons and as a means of legitimizing British interests in
the Far East.

The Prime Minister concluded the discussion

by echoing the arguments of the Lord Privy Seal.

Lloyd

George asserted that failure to renew would alienate the
Japanese and, as a result, British prestige in the Far East

would suffer.

Fry,

I 1

He gave credence to the prospect of a Russo-

lusions

,

113.

CAB 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
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German combination.

Should these two possibilities

materialize, he believed that Tokyo would fall into the

Berlin-Moscow orbit.

Lloyd George characterized Japan as

faithful to her treaty obligations and indicated that he

would not oppose a Pacific conference, but that

consultations with Japan must take precedence .^^
The Cabinet then reached four conclusions.

First, at

the upcom.ing Imperial Conference, Britain would ask the

Dominions and India to support a proposal asking the
President of the United States to summon

a

conference of

Pacific affairs, but only after informing Japan and the
other nations that Britain had no intention of dropping the

Anglo- Japanese Alliance.

Second, the Alliance should be

renewed, albeit for a period shorter than the previous term
of ten years,

in a form, com.patible with the Covenant of the

League of Nations, and inoffensive to American
sensibilities.

In order to accomplish the latter goals,

Britain should enter discussions with China and the United
States, while keeping Japan fully informed of any

developments.

Third, in order to gain time, Britain should

renew provisionally the Angl o- Japanese Alliance in such
three month increments as were necessary.

Finally, the

Admiralty and the War Office should prepare memoranda
showing the assistance given by Japan during the Great War,

"cab 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
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while the C.I.D. should prepare a study of the strategic

situation in the Far East.^^
The Anglo- Japanese Alliance affected the second topic

identified by the Amery Committee, imperial defense.

The

Great War had overturned the strategic situation in the
Pacific.

The German presence had vanished, while the

(Bolshevik) Russian hold over Siberia remained tenuous for
several years after the war.

The United States, by 1919 the

world's second naval power, appeared poised to advance in
the Pacific.

At the same time,

Japan, in the words of one

historian of Far Eastern affairs, "emerged from the war as
third in the table of world powers.

"^^

The strength of the

imperial forces needed in the region would depend to a large

degree on the intentions of Japan and the Dominions.
During the Great War, the leaders of the British Empire
had begun to look ahead to the problem of imperial defense
in the post-war era.

The Imperial War Conference of March

1917 passed a resolution which requested the Admiralty "to

work out after the conclusion of the War what they consider
the most effective scheme of naval defence of the Empire."

28

Pre-occupied with the German submarine campaign, the
Admiralty staff took over a year to prepare their answer.

"cab 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
^^Nish,

Alliance in Decline

,

261.

116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.
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The history of imperial naval defense had involved a

continuous struggle between Dominion concerns for control
over local defense forces and the Admiralty's doctrine of

"one ocean, one fleet, one flag" inspired by Mahan.

Naval

defense had first assumed an imperial, as opposed to purely

British character, in the wake of the Australian naval
agreement of 1887.

In return for an annual subsidy of

£126,000 from the colonial government, the Royal Navy

created and maintained in the south Pacific an auxiliary

squadron of ships "for the protection of floating trade in

Australian waters."

Subsequently, the control of these

vessels proved controversic.1 --the colonials expected them

permanently assigned to local waters, while the Admiralty
considered them available for use world-wide.
C.I.D.

In 1906,

the

reiterated Admiralty opposition to the localization

of naval

forces:

The policy of devoting the entire naval forces of
the Empire to seeking out and destroying the ships
of the enemy, wherever they may be, is that which
will best ensure not only the safety of floating
trade, but also the immunity from attack of coast
towns and harbours ... if this policy is to be
properly and efficiently carried, the Royal Navy
must be one and undivided.

During the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, at the
height of the naval crisis with Germany, the Admiralty

gratefully accepted the offers of New Zealand and Australia

Appendix to Admiralty Memorandum, "Past
History of Dominion Contributions to the Naval Defence of
the Empire", September 25, 1919.
^'adm 167/56:
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to pay for the cost of construction of a new battleship
for

the Royal Navy.
At the same time, Canada and Australia had proposed

creating their own naval forces, based on small vessels

designed for local defense.

The Admiralty reversed its

earlier position and supported the notion that each of the

Dominions "might be made responsible for the maintenance of
a

certain naval strength in its own sphere of influence,

thus relieving the imperial fleet of direct responsibility
in distant seas."^"^

The Adm.iralty suggested these fleet

units would include a battle cruiser, with supporting
cruiser, destroyer, and submarine elements, together with
port facilities.

Australia chose to include a battle

cruiser in her squadron, while New Zealand and Canada agreed
to lesser flotillas.

By 1912, however, the Adm.iralty had returned to its

earlier insistence on a unified fleet.

In July 1913,

the

C.I.D. invited Canadian Prim.e Minister Robert Borden to

contribute three new battleships to offset German
construction.

Borden guided

a

naval bill through the

Canadian House of Commons, but it died in the Senate.^*

July 13, 1909, as recorded in
Donald Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense,
1870-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1965), 237.
"'"Admiralty Memorandum,

"The Naval Policy of Sir Robert
Historical Review XXVIII,
( Canadian

^-Gilbert Tucker,

Borden, 1912-14",
1947)
.

,
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Canada proved unable to agree on any program of
naval
defense.

In the spring of 1914, First Lord Winston

Churchill unilaterally abrogated the 1909 agreement to

station modern capital ships in Dominion waters.

Coincident

with his announcement of the withdrawal of the new battle
cruisers, the First Lord praised New Zealand's donation of
a
capital ship as the most effective contribution to the

security of the British Empire.

Both the decision and the

lack of consultation with London created significant

resentment in Melbourne and Wellington.

These differences

were suspended, but not forgotten, with the outbreak of

hostilities in Europe.
The Admiralty's wartime planning had reflected

sustained faith in the maintenance of sea power as taught by
Mahan: balanced fleets, based on capital ships adequately

provided with bases.

The Board recognized that "money

contributions have always been unpopular" and that "fleet
units are not within the reach of some of the Dominions."

The Board, with Lloyd George's approval, therefore submitted
to the Imperial War Conference of 1918 a memorandum which

recommended the establishment of a unified imperial fleet:
The whole naval force of the Empire to form one
Navy, all effective units being under the control
of an Imperial Naval Authority, both in peace and

''Gordon, Dominion Partnership

,

290-296.

116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.
^^ADM
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war.

Ships to be available to serve in any
waters, and officers and men in any ship. *

Under this plan, each of the Dominions would assume

responsibility for all local naval establishments, including
dockyards and the recruitment and training of naval
personnel
In recognition of Dominion sensitivities about

domination from London, the Admiralty had indicated that the
Dominion Naval Ministers should visit London "whenever
possible.

..

for the consideration of the annual estimates and

deliberation on large matters of policy."

At other times,

the Dominions "could be represented generally by the First

Lord of the Admiralty," who would consult them "on the

distribution of naval forces and other important questions
affecting the squadrons in their waters."

The Board further

suggested that the staff of the proposed single navy "would
gradually become fully representative as officers from the
overseas nations acquired sufficient naval experience" for

leadership positions.

On the critical issue of funding,

the Admiralty recommended that:

Each nation would decide, with due regard for its
resources, the extent to which it would share in
the total cost of the navy, and, as far as
"aDM 116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.; ADM 116/1603:
The First Lord discussed the Admiralty memorandum with the
Prime Minister, who liked the concept of Dominion ships as
part of an Imperial Navy.
116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.
^^ADM
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possible, control the expenditure of the money it
provides

After each member indicated the size of its voluntary
contribution, the Imperial Naval Authority would develop

a

unified budget proposal, "subject to the approval of the
respective Parliaments."^^

During the Imperial Conference of 1918, the Dominion
premiers had firmly rejected the Admiralty's proposal for
single Imperial Navy under a single Imperial Authority.

a

Sir

Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, took the lead
in drafting a memorandum to First Lord Sir Eric Geddes which

flatly stated that from the perspective of the Dominion

Ministers "the proposals set forth in the Admiralty

Memorandum for

a

single navy at all times under

a

naval authority are not considered practicable."'^

central

The Prime

Ministers asserted that the Admiralty's arguments for "a
single navy... under

a

but not unanswerable."

central naval authority, are strong

They pointed to the example of the

Australian Navy in the recent conflict as proving that
Dominion units could "operate with the highest efficiency"
in concert with the Royal Navy.

The memorandum acknowledged

the value of commonality in "the character of construction,

armaments and equipment and the methods and principles of

116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.
^^ADM

116/1815: Memorandum from the Dominion Prime
Ministers, cover letter dated August 15, 1918.
"^ADM
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training, administration, and organization."

The Dominions

indicated their desire for a visit from "a highly
qualified
representative of the Admiralty" for technical assistance.
Perhaps as a consolation to the Admiralty, the memorandum

concluded by agreeing to the possibility of a wartime
"supreme naval authority" provided that "each of the

Dominions would be adequately represented."

Borden's cover

letter noted that the memorandum expressed the sentiment of
all of the Dominion Prime Ministers with the single

exception of Newf oundl and
The Admiralty had responded to this memorandum by

selecting Admiral Jellicoe to undertake the mission of
advising the Dominions on efficiency and commonality.''

Within three months of the Dominions' memorandiim rejecting a
single imperial navy, both Australia and Canada made further
requests for Admiralty assistance with their fledgling
fleets.

Geddes consulted with Colonial Secretary Walter

Long as to the wisdom of including New Zealand and South

Africa on the admiral's itinerary.

They agreed that New

Zealand should be approached about a naval assistance visit,
but that, for fear of adversely affecting public opinion.

South Africa should merely be informed that Jellicoe might

'Vdm 116/1815: Memorandum from the Dominion Prime
Ministers, cover letter dated August 15, 1918.
116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum,
"Proposed Visit of Lord Jellicoe to the Dominions and India
to Advise on Naval Matters", December 17, 1918.
^'ADM
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visit in order to gather information regarding naval

defenses there
On December 23, 1918, Admiralty Secretary Sir Oswin

Murray issued Admiral Jellicoe instructions to visit
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, with the possibility of
additional calls at South Africa and India.

The Admiralty

instructions indicated that the primary purpose of the

mission was "the promotion of uniformity in naval
organization and training and types of naval material."
They also included the provision that:

Should Dominion Authorities desire to consider how
far it is possibl e
to take a more effective
share in the naval defence of the Empire, he
[Jellicoe] will give assistance from the naval
point of view in drawing up a scheme for
consideration.
.

.

.

This proviso created the potential for

a

serious

misunderstanding between the Admiralty Board, which expected
the admiral to deal with finite matters such as ship design

and squadron tables of organization, and Jellicoe, who

interpreted the last paragraph as authority to develop and
discuss a comprehensive strategy for the post-war naval

defense of the British Empire.

In February 1919,

the

admiral, accompanied by his former flag captain. Commodore

^^Geddes to Long, November 25, 1918; Long to Geddes,
November 28, 1918; Geddes to Long, November 30, 1918, as
recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers Vol II, 287-288.
.

*^ADM

1918.

116/1815: Admiralty to Jellicoe, December 23,
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Frederic Dreyer, together with a small staff, sailed in the
battle cruiser New Zealand on

a

cruise that would last

a

year
In March,

from Port Said, Egypt, he sent his

appreciation of post-war naval requirements to the
Admiralty.

The admiral acknowledged the difficulty of

framing imperial naval requirements since previous standards
of naval strength were based on that of possible opponents

and "our late enemies were practically powerless and we are

allied to, or working in co-operation with, the rest of the

world."

Jellicoe admitted the delicacy of planning

a

naval

strategy based on opposition to the United States, but

asserted "the safety of the British Empire should rest
securely on the might of the British Navy and should not be
The "enormous

dependent on the goodwill of other nations."

program of warship building" projected by the Wilson

Administration would give the United States Navy 41 modern
capital ships by 1925.

As the width of the Atlantic Ocean

would enable the Royal Navy to defend Britain with a fleet
of capital ships "of a strength of 70% of that of the United

States," Britain required at least 30 capital ships by 1925,

which required 12 new capital ships, hence

program of three new ships per year.*^

Such

building

a
a

fleet would

^^Jellicoe Memorandum, "Post-War Naval Requirements",
March 3, 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers,
Vol II, 290-95.
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also be able to deal with "any likely combination of

European Powers."

The admiral also indicated the need for a

force of cruisers and aircraft carriers for the protection
of trade.

Jellicoe next stopped in India from mid-March through
the end of April.

While most of his recommendations for

that region dealt with reforms limited to the Royal Indian

Marine, he raised one issue of greater import.

In terms of

potential enemies, the admiral switched his focus from the

United States to Japan, which he labelled "as much a bogey
to India as it is to Australia."

Given the possibility of

conflict in the Far East, Jellicoe concluded that "it will
be necessary before long to construct a dock in the Far East
that will accommodate our largest ships" and to improve "the

anti-submarine defenses of Singapore
In June 1919,

which he began

the admiral reached Australian waters, of

a careful

next reports in August.

General

,

"^^
.

inspection.

Jellicoe rendered his

In a lengthy paper to the Governor-

he framed the naval requirements of the Pacific and

Indian Oceans as a single problem which required

Eastern fleet.

a

Far

He reviewed the latest developments in naval

*^Jellicoe Memorandum, "Post-War Naval Requirements",
March 3, 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers
Vol II, 290-95.

,

"Jellicoe to the First Lord of the Admiralty, May 2,
1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers Vol II,
296-97
,

.
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technology and concluded that "the wise course to pursue is
to build capital ships until,

if ever,

it is shown that some

other weapon has been found which permanently renders them

inefficient."

Jellicoe also emphasized the importance of

proper docking facilities, without which the latest capital
ships "cannot be sent to the Far East except under the

gravest disadvantage."

He suggested that the cost of these

defenses "should be provided by those constituent parts of
the Empire, including Great Britain, for which it is of
vital necessity."^'

Jellicoe considered the likeliest potential enemy to be
Japan, "the only nation in the Far East, except the United

States, which would be in a position to inflict any

permanent injury on the British Empire."

He noted "the ill-

feeling against Britain" prevalent in the Japanese Press and
cited the resentment throughout the Eastern portions of the

British Empire against Japanese commercial expansion into
India, China, the Dutch East Indies, and Australia.*^

He

concluded:
therefore, almost inevitable that the
interests of Japan and the British Empire will
clash, and the two parts of the empire most
It is,

Jellicoe to the Governor-General of
Australia, August 12, 1919. RoskiU, Naval Policy 281,
notes that Jellicoe quietly approached the Australian
Government about assuming responsibility for warships that
the Royal Navy had placed on the Disposal List as excess
during the post-war consolidation.
^'ADM 116/1834:

,

116/1834: Jellicoe to the Governor-General of
Australia, August 12, 1919.
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affected are Australia and India. For this
reason, the potential enemy in the Pacific is
taken as Japan.
The admiral then conveyed the latest reports of a Japanese
capital ship building program, which aimed for a fleet of
eight battleships and eight battle cruisers by 1924.
result, he recommended:

As a

"the fleet of capital ships of the

British Empire stationed in the Pacific should be composed
of not

less than eight battleships and eight battle-

cruisers."

He stated "the proper strategy of the British

Empire" involved two planks: the provision of "an adequate
fleet in the Far East" and the defense of "Singapore and

Hong Kong (in that order).

"^^

In a letter to the First Lord the following week,

Jellicoe provided

a

summary of his appreciation of

Australian defense, in which he identified Japan as "the
possible enemy of the future."

He predicted that the

Admiralty would "strengthen the fleet in the Far East."

The

admiral emphasized the importance of "docks, naval bases,
and local defence flotillas" to support the capital ships
that would constitute the backbone of naval defense.

48

He

admitted his inability to establish local support for the
idea of a single Imperial Navy and advised the Admiralty "to

116/1834: Jellicoe to the Governor-General of
Australia, August 12, 1919.
*'ADM

^^Jellicoe to the First Lord of the Admiralty, August
Vol II,
20, 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers
,

312-13

.
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accept the inevitable and make the best of it" with regard
to an independent Australian Navy.^'

After delivering his appreciation of New Zealand

defense requirements, which scarcely differed from his
report on Australia, Jellicoe sailed to Canada, arriving in

November 1919.

There he found Prime Minister Sir Robert

Borden desirous of his assistance with the task of

establishing

a

Canadian Navy in the face of opposition

within the Government.^''

In December 1919,

Jellicoe provided

the Governor-General of Canada his survey of the Canadian

situation, which differed markedly from India and the

Australasian Dominions.

The admiral noted that Canada's

location, isolated from most threats and proximate to the

United States, provided

degree of protection which allowed

a

Canada to choose either of two lines: "in the light of

Canada's own requi rem.ents

.

.

.

[

or ] in the broader light of the

security and safety of the Empire as
could choose either

a

a

whole.

Thus Canada

small force designed for coastal

defense (a flotilla of light cruisers, torpedo boats and
submarines) or

a

squadron built around

a

modern battle

Jellicoe to the First Lord of the Admiralty, August
Vol II,
20, 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers
312-13
,

.

^"Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada,
Origins and Early Years (Ottawa, 1952), 309-23.

I:

"Jellicoe to the Governor-General of Canada, 31
Decem.ber 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers
Vol

II,

369-90.

,
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cruiser.

The admiral reiterated his opinion that Japan was

the most probable enemy of the British Empire and
predicted
that in the course of such a conflict, Japan would refrain

from landing on the North American continent and would limit
her attacks to Canadian trade in the Pacific.

Canadian

bases would probably not host imperial fleets, which "would
in all probability be working, not from the Canadian Pacific
coast, but from Singapore or Australia."

Jellicoe's report

also included a section entitled "Naval Co-operation on a

Wider Basis," which explained the enormous costs associated
with the Royal Navy and which emphasized the per capita

contributions to naval defense made by the Australasian
Domini ons.^^

During his stay in Ottawa, the admiral finally

established communications with Admiralty House.

Jellicoe

received notice from London that the Admiralty had renounced
its plan for a single Imperial Navy and now supported his

proposals for Dominion naval forces.'^

The Board also

endorsed his proposal to give warships on the Excess List to
the Dominions, who would bear the cost of their operation.^*

^^Jellicoe to the Governor-General of Canada, 31
December 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers
Vol II, 369-90.

,

Board Minute 958, September 25, 1919;
Patterson, Jellicoe Papers Vol II, 267.
-^ADM 167/56:

,

116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum, "Gift of Surplus
Warships to the Dominions", September 16, 1919.
^^ADM
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On a less agreeable note, however, the Board sharply

criticized his formulation of an imperial strategy based
on
a Far Eastern fleet prepared to oppose Japan.
After
reviewing Jellicoe's report to Australia, First Sea Lord

Wemyss wrote to the First Lord: "A preliminary survey of
Lord Jellicoe's report shows that he has entered a sphere

never contemplated by the Admiralty and far beyond his terms
of reference.

Long agreed, and Admiralty House sent

Jellicoe a telegram admonishing him for submitting proposals
to the Dominion governments without staffing them through

London for approval
it was not the intention of the Admiralty for your
views on the strategic arrangements of the future
to be presented to the Commonwealth Government
without submitting them to the Admiralty.
This
procedure should be followed as regards any future
reports to other Dominions.

The Admiralty, at the last stop of Jellicoe's world tour,
for the first time provided him with guidance on imperial

naval defense.

Upon his return to Portsmouth, England, Admiral
Jellicoe submitted his final report to the Secretary of the
Admiralty.

He explained that his efforts had been hampered

"adM 116/1815: First Sea Lord Memorandum, "Lord
Jellicoe' s Report to the Commonwealth Government of
Australia", October 3, 1919.
^^ADM

116/1815: Admiralty Board to Jellicoe, November

1919.

Admiralty Memorandum, "Imperial Naval
Defence", Board Minute 958, September 25, 1919.
'^ADM 167/56:

3,
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by a lamentable series of political developments:
the

absence during his visit of the Australian Prime
Minister
and Minister of the Navy, the break-up of a coalition

government in New Zealand upon his arrival, and the ill
health of the Canadian Prime Minister and Minister for Naval

Affairs during his stay in Ottawa.

Jellicoe then stated his

mission as one of "inducing the Dominions to co-operate in
the naval defence of the Empire" and developing a scheme of

cooperation which ensured commonality and at the same time
rem.oving party politics from Dominion considerations.

The

adm.iral noted disparagingly that he had had difficulty

obtaining information from the Admiralty and thus had had
"to form my own opinion as to the future necessary naval

strength of the Empire and to base my recomm.endations on
this opinion."

He saw "no difficulty in deciding on the

source from which danger might come" and assumed that sooner
or later "a fleet of a definite strength would be required

either in the Pacific or in the vicinity."

Jellicoe also

explained that he had disregarded the official Admiralty

policy--in effect, to the best of his knowledge, until
December 1919--which called for a single unitary Imperial
58
Navy as hopelessly at odds with Dominion intentions.

The Admiralty, meanwhile, had been striving to

formulate and receive Cabinet approval for a post-war naval

116/1831: Jellicoe to the Secretary of the
Admiralty, February 3, 1920.
^'ADM
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policy.

In the wake of "the ten year rule" promulgated in

August 1919, and in search of

a

justif ication--and perhaps

even funding--for the Royal Navy, Admiralty House shifted
its focus from British to imperial affairs.

conducted

a

The Board

review of imperial defense in September.

With

respect to the role of capital ships, the Admiralty declared
that "a superior fighting force must be maintained in the

main theatre of operations."^'

The Board emphasized

cooperation with the Dom.inions rather than dictation by
London, particularly "as greater financial obligations are

likely to be maintained," and then announced that "the

Dominions can now best contribute to the naval defence of
the Empire by building up their own Navies," which might

include capital ships.

The Adm.iralty, influenced by the

need for fiscal restraint, as well as Admiral Wemyss'
personal animosity towards his predecessor as First Sea
Lord, repudiated Jellicoe's recommendations for

Eastern Fleet, regardless of size.^"

a

Far

The proposal for a

naval base at Singapore, however, attracted a more favorable

reception.

As their opponent's strategy in an Anglo-

167/56: Admiralty Memorandum, "Imperial Naval
Defence", Board Minute 958, September 25, 1919.
'''^ADM

116/1815: First Sea Lord Memorandum, "Lord
Jellicoe's Report to the Commonwealth Government of
Australia", October 3, 1919; ADM 116/1815: Admiralty Board
to Jellicoe, November 3, 1919; Roskill, Naval Policy, 279282, notes that Wemyss frequently criticized Jellicoe to the
First Lord.
^^ADM
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Japanese conflict would probably feature an offensive
thrust
into the south Pacific, Admiralty planners had
earlier
concluded:
the imperial fleet should be provided with a
secure base well to the southward of Hong Kong,
and no more suitable position can be suggested
than Singapore.

The Board accepted the Naval Staff analysis and recommended
to the Cabinet that "if it is decided that the Empire should

be prepared for a war with Japan, Singapore and Sydney

should be considered the two primary imperial bases in the

Pacific.""
In a subsequent memorandum to the Committee of Imperial

Defence, the Board reviewed the naval situation in the Far
The Admiralty memorandum emphasized the crucial

East.

nature of Anglo- Japanese relations and inquired as to the

intentions of the Government regarding the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance.

The Board presumed that the Cabinet would be

hesitant "to prolong an alliance which might cause them to
be embroiled with the United States.

"^^

The Board also

projected a reduction in the niomber of British capital ships
in full commission, in an effort to free money for other

£1

Naval Staff Paper, "Imperial Naval Defence", August
1919, as recorded in Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base 31.

4,

,

^^ADM 167/56:

%DM

Board Minute 958, September 25, 1919.

1/8571/295: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Situation
Accepted as C.I.D.
in the Far East", October 21, 1919.
Paper No. 119-C, October 31, 1919.
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purposes.^-

Placing almost half of the Royal Navy's capital

ships into reserve would affect the naval situation in the

Pacific in two ways: during peacetime, Britain would not
be
able to match Japanese naval strength in the region; and
in

wartime, reinforcements would take longer to arrive.

In

consequence, if war with Japan did break out, "a period of

three months might elapse before our Naval supremacy in the
Far East could be established. During this period, Japan

might have practically a free hand."

Reinforcements should

not plan on assembling at Hong Kong, which would be too

vulnerable.

The best base for the task force would be

Singapore, which "may be considered sufficiently far from
any Japanese possessions to make an attack on it in force

improbable during the period before the Fleet arrives."'^
This analysis rested upon two assumptions: first, that

Britain would always possess in other waters sufficient
naval strength to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy, and
second, that Japan could not inflict irreparable damage on

the British Empire during its window of superiority.

The Admiralty subsequently began to take steps to

facilitate the development of Singapore.

Early in 1920, the

Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base 35, notes that the
budgetary constraints of the Ten Year Rule led the Admiralty
to place 16 of 36 capital ships from full commission into
reserve
,

1/8571/295: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Situation
Accepted as C.I.D.
in the Far East", October 21, 1919.
Paper No. 119-C, October 31, 1919.
^^ADM
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Board dispatched H.M.S. Merlin to Singapore to ascertain
if
any of the anchorages there could support a fleet.
By
January 1921, Admiralty interest extended to the
details of
the Johore Causeway, to ensure that capital ships would be
able to put rapidly to sea.'^

Later that month, the Board

formally requested that the Colonial Secretary maintain a
close hold over the Royal Navy's interest in Singapore in
order to keep its development as
Japan as long as possible.

a

naval base secret from

The Admiralty also made

arrangements with the War Office for a joint service study
of the defense of southern Malaya against attack by land.'^

These efforts to expand and develop Singapore as a

major fleet base complemented the Board's strategic thought
in early 1921.

In preparation for the coming Imperial

Conference, Admiralty House in February prepared for the

Cabinet a memorandiim which surveyed imperial naval defence.
The Board still lauded the concept of a single imperial
navy, but admitted that the Dominions would not support such
an arrangement.

Given the current situation (separate

Dominion fleets supporting

a

reduced Royal Navy), the

Admiralty stressed the need for thorough coordination.

The

Board also emphasized the importance of capital ship

"aDM 116/2100: Admiralty Telegram, January 12, 1921.
^ADM 116/2100: Admiralty Telegram, January 20, 1921.
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mobility, which rested upon pre-positioned fuel reserves:

Here then is a matter of first importance to the
naval policy of the Empire.
The expenditure
necessary to put the reserves in a satisfactory
condition is very great, and the Dominion
Governments would be affording valuable assistance
to the naval defence of the Empire if they would
accept the liability for the installation in the
regions for which they are responsible,
respectively, of the fuel reserves which are
considered essential by the Naval Staff on
strategic grounds.'^
The Admiralty undoubtedly realized, but did not state, that

trying to persuade the Dominions to pay for fuel rather than
new capital ships carried two advantages: the costs involved
were lower (and, to

a

large degree, non-recurring) and any

use of those fuel reserves would be in direct support of the

Dominions.

Three months later, a Naval Staff study, working

on the assumption of a war with Japan in 1930, developed

these general concepts into specific proposals.

Additional

fuel depots in the Red Sea and off Ceylon would enable the

fleet, given fair weather and three days warning, to move in
40 days from the Mediterranean to Singapore, where some 1.2

million gallons of fuel should be stored, with an additional
730,000 tons in the East Indies.

proposals in late May 1921.

''^ADM

The Board accepted these

*

1/8611/151: Admiralty Memorandum, February 1921.

1/8607/98: Director of Plans Memorandum, "Proposed
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The Committee of Imperial Defence became increasingly

interested in the future of Singapore between 1919 and
1921.
A subcommittee of the C.I.D. entitled the Overseas Defence

Committee (O.D.C.) considered the development of Singapore
in over 12% (9 of 77) of its meetings between April 1920 and

August 1921.

The O.D.C. heard Admiralty testimony "strongly

in favour in any scheme which will improve and increase

facilities for oiling at Singapore," while the Air Council,
the counterpart of the Admiralty Board, urged development of

Singapore as a regional air junction.

In the spring of

1920, the O.D.C. received the Navy's judgments that the Old

(Johore) Strait at Singapore would form sufficient anchorage
for a fleet and that the defense of Singapore would rest

upon command of the seas, as the Malayan jungle would
"render military operations on

difficult and tedious."'^

a

In May,

large scale extremely
the O.D.C. reviewed a

Naval Staff appreciation of the defence of Singapore,

described as occupying "the corresponding position to the

British Empire in the East that Gibraltar does in the
West."^*

The Naval Staff labelled the development of

Singapore "a necessity in any sound Empire Naval Policy" and

O.D.C. Minute 11, April 14, 1920; O.D.C
Minute 33, September 27, 1920.
'^CAB 8/8:

O.D.C. Minute 49, March
Minute 57, April 27, 1921.
^^CAB 8/8:

^^CAB 8/8:

O.D.C. Minute 63, May

6,

3,

1921; O.D.C.

1921.
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ascribed previous inaction to "our preoccupation in Home
Waters and the comparative weakness of the Japanese
Fleet."
On June 7th, the O.D.C. forwarded to the Standing Defence

Sub-Committee a report that endorsed the analysis of the
Naval Staff and provided a cost estimate of £4.9 millions
for the development of Singapore over a period of eight

years

75

The Standing Defence Sub-Committee (S.S.) of the C.I.D.

held its first meeting of 1921 on May 2nd, four months after
the decision to investigate the capital ship.

From 1920-22,

this body, in the words of the leading historian of the

C.I.D., functioned as "the virtual replacement of the full
C.I.D."^^

The S.S. considered the naval situation in the

Pacific in light of the findings of the O.D.C. and decided
that Singapore would replace Hong Kong as the focus of

imperial defence, since Britain's foothold in China could
not be adequately defended and the loss of the latter port

would "almost irretrievably damage the British position in
the Far East."

The senior defense council directed the

O.D.C. to investigate the measures necessary to develop and

defend that port.^^

"Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base 42-54; W. David
Mclntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base.
1919-1942 (Hamden, CT, 1979), 29.
,

^^Franklin Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British
Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959 (London, 1960), 170.
^'CAB 2/3:

C.I.D. Minute 136, May 2, 1921.
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Two meetings and ten days later, the Standing
Defence

Sub-Committee continued its review of imperial naval
defense
in rehearsal for the imminent Imperial Conference.

During

that review, discussion touched upon the development
of

Bermuda as a base against the expanding United States Navy.

Realizing that strategic planning against America was bound
to offend Canadian opinion,

the committee agreed that the

less reference made to Bermuda as a naval base the better.

The S.S. concluded:

That in any such statements the desirability of
concentrating discussions on Pacific rather than
North American problems should be borne in mind,
and the whole trend of the discussion should be
steered in that direction.

The Roy^il Navy, at least, still took Atlantic considerations

seriously; the First Sea Lord personally reviewed the Naval

Staff's war plans for a conflict with the United States in
January 1921.

Subsequent discussion of imperial naval

defense must be examined in light of this agreement to frame
all

requirements and justifications in purely Pacific terms.
In June 1921,

less than two weeks before the Imperial

Conference, the Standing Defence Sub-Committee revisited the

question of the development of Singapore as

a

major fleet

"cab 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 138, May 12, 1921.

MSS 8/1: Plans Division Memorandum, January 4,
1921.
This document anticipated a separation of the United
States Navy into a fleet on each coast, thus inviting defeat
in detail by a concentrated British force based at Bermuda
and Halifax.
^'fieatty
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base.

On the 10th, after reviewing the

7

June report of the

O.D.C., the coiranittee members agreed that from the
strategic

point of view, the arguments in favor of development were

irrefutable.

They also considered Dominion opinion.

The

Dominions were loyal in part because of British sea power;
the loss of which "would be disastrous to the prestige of

Great Britain."

The S.S. noted at the same time that

development would be expensive at a time when economy was
needed.

A leak to the public of large expenditure on a

naval base "might not only embarrass the Government but

might even occasion their fall."

The meeting ended

inconclusively, the proponents of "Treasury control" having

checked the adherents of sea power.

Arthur Balfour swiftly engineered

suggested that Britain should formal

1

y

a

compromise.

He

indicate an intention

to develop Singapore, while deferring any immediate

financial commitment.

The Standing Defence Sub-Committee

quickly agreed to submit this proposal to their political
superiors.
Cabinet.

The committee made four recommendations to the
First, the S.S. noted that the basis of any system

of imperial defense must be the maintenance of British sea

power.

Second, the Standing Defence Sub-Committee

indicated that the most pressing question [in accordance

°CAB 2/3:

C.I.D. Minute 140, June 10, 1921.
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with the agreement of May 12th] involved the Pacific.
Third, they advised the Government that "it is
essential
that Singapore should be available as a base of

concentration."

Fourth, the senior defense advisors urged

that while Britain could not afford to spend much

immediately, owing to existing economic conditions, the work

should be done and "the greater the assistance that can be

rendered by the overseas Governments in this connection the
sooner will the necessary programme be completed.

"^^

Three days later, the Cabinet considered the proposals
of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee.

discussion.

Balfour guided the

He maintained that the renewal of the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance, although reducing the immediate danger,

would not remove the need for developing the base, because
"whatever fleet we might maintain, it was almost

inconceivable that we could not use it in those waters where
it was most likely to be needed."

The Lord President

explained that the project would take five years to complete
and that British interests in the region were very likely to

continue far longer.

The Cabinet recognized the value of

having a plan for the Pacific, as Washington was constantly

suggesting that the United States Navy could protect whites
in that region, and that Singapore incidently would protect

the west coast of Canada.

The Government directed the

CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 141,

Jxine 13,

1921
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O.D.C. to prepare a detailed plan for the development of

Singapore.

On the condition that there would be no major

expenditure for two years--in accordance with Balfour's

plan--the Cabinet agreed to develop Singapore and raise at
the Imperial Conference the question of Dominion

assistance
Lloyd George officially convened the Im.perial

Conference at 10 Downing Street on June 20, 1921.

In

addition to the Prime Minister, the British contingent
included Austen Chamberlain; Winston Churchill; Edwin
Montagu; Sir Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary at the

Foreign Office; Sir Henry Lambert of the Colonial Office;
and Sir Edward Grigg, a personal advisor to Lloyd George.

The Dom.inions all sent their Prime Ministers: William Hughes

from Australia; Arthur Meighen from Canada, together with
his advisor, Loring Christie; William Massey from New

Zealand; and Jan Smuts from South Africa.

Lloyd George came

quickly to the heart of the matter, "the most urgent and
important of foreign questions--the relations of the Empire

with the United States and Japan."

He indicated his

aspirations "to m.aintain peace and fair play for all

nations" and additionally "to avoid a competition of
armaments

.

34

^^CAB 23:

Cabinet Conclusion 50 (3),

^*CAB 32/2:
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1921.
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The Prime Minister began his discussion of Anglo-

Japanese relations by paying tribute to the Alliance.

He

characterized Japan as "a faithful ally, who rendered us
valuable assistance in an hour of very serious and critical
need" and mentioned the Japanese escorts which had protected
imperial troop transports from German cruisers.

He

expressed his desire "to preserve that well-tried friendship

which has stood us both in good stead, and to apply it to
the solution of all questions in the Far East."

Lloyd

George concluded by mentioning Japan's "special interests"
in China and Britain's wishes for an "open door" policy,

thus tacitly acknowledging disagreements with Japan.

The Prime Minister then addressed Anglo-American
relations.

He adopted a somewhat warmer tone, stating that:

friendly co-operation with the United States is
for us a cardinal principal, dictated by what
seems to us the proper nature of things, dictated
by instinct quite as much as by reason and common
sense

Lloyd George then reiterated his opposition to "the growth
of armaments, whether in the Pacific or elsewhere" and

praised American public opinion "for showing so much
earnestness" over the issue of disarm.ament

. 8fi

The British Prime Minister concluded with a brief

discussion of imperial defence.

He proclaimed his

CAB 32/2:

Imperial Conference Minute 1, June 20, 1921.

CAB 32/2:
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willingness to discuss any proposal for the limitation of
armaments. At the same time, however, he paid
tribute to
the value of sea power:

We cannot forget that the very life of the United
Kingdom.
indeed, the whole Empire, has been built
upon sea power--and that sea power is necessarily
the basis of the whole Empire's existence.

Having concealed his own positions, the Welsh Wizard closed
the first meeting and waited for the Dominion premiers to

take sides. °'

Prime Minister William Morris Hughes took the lead at
the second meeting.

His wel 1 -publ icized position on the

Anglo- Japanese Alliance involved renewal "in such form--

modified if that should be deemed proper--as will be
acceptable to Britain, to America, to Japan, and to
ourselves.'

He placed Australia squarely on the side of
go

renewing the alliance, subject to two conditions.

The

alliance must "conform to the requirements of the League of

Nations" and "specifically exclude the possibility of war
with the United States of America."

**'CAB

32/2:

He contended that "a

Imperial Conference Minute 1,

Jxine 20,

1921.

illiam Hughes, as recorded in J.C. Vinson, "The
Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance", ( Pacific Historical Review XXXI, 1962).
.

Dignan, "Australia and British Relations with
Japan, 1914-1921", ( Australia Outlook XXI, 1967), argues
that Hughes' support for the Angl o- Japanese Alliance stemmed
from Curzon's deliberate manipulation of the Foreign Office
documents available to the Dominion leaders.
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treaty will help us influence Japanese policy" and
suggested
a

conference with both Japan and the United States.'*
Hughes next addressed the issue of naval disarmament,

which he linked to the diplomatic situation.

He desired "an

agreement among the great naval powers" which would enable
the participants to eliminate "naval expenditure other than

that necessary for the maintenance of existing units."

He

refused, however, to hazard Australia's security to the

oscillations of foreign relations:

We must have such naval defence as is adequate for
our safety... In our case, sea power is, and must
always be, the determining factor in our foreign
pol icy

Hughes then admitted the need for Dominion contributions to
the cost of imperial defense and suggested per capita shares

applied to Dominion naval forces.'^

William Massey of New Zealand echoed the sentiments of
his neighboring Prime Minister.

He stated his belief that

the Pacific would be the site of the next great war and

pointed to the Japanese assistance to the Australasian
Dominions during the conflict past.

He championed the

renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, "with whatever

modifications may be necessary."

Massey also supported the

93
idea of Dominion contributions to imperial naval defence.
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Jan Christian Smuts, the most experienced of the

Dominion representatives, proposed a compromise
diplomatic
arrangement. He adopted the role of mediator, perhaps from
his desire to persuade the Conference to adopt his
proposals
for constitutional development within the framework of
the

Empire.

94

Knowing that Meighen of Canada opposed any renewal

of the treaty with Japan,

Smuts suggested replacing the

Alliance with a trilateral pact:
But supposing some specific arrangements could be
made with America which would deal both with Japan
and America in regard to disarmament, and which
involved the League of Nations, and that America
were to agree to come in^ then you solve the whole
sum of problems at once."

The prerequisite for the success of Smuts' proposal, of
course, was the cooperation of the United States.

The idea of expanding the Anglo- Japanese Alliance into
a broader arrangement including the United States was not

original.

The Foreign Office had first suggested such a

course in an analysis of the Alliance written in February
1920:

"Some sort of tripartite understanding in the Far

East, to which France might also adhere, would indeed be an

Hancock, Smuts. II: The Fields of Force. 1919Smuts' proposals anticipated
1950 (Cambridge, 1968), 40-49.
the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of
Westminster of 1931, which provided equality of status
between Britain and the Dominions.
'*W.K.
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ideal situation.

In January 1921,

the Anglo- Japanese

Alliance Committee of the Foreign Office had again
recommended that "a Tripartite Entente between the
United
States, Japan, and Great Britain" replace the
existing
Alliance.

97

The Foreign Office regretfully shared the

opinion of Britain's Ambassador to Washington, Sir Auckland
Geddes, that there was "little chance of the Senate agreeing
to anything of the nature of an Anglo-American Alliance,"

let alone a tripartite pact involving Japan.

The United

States, in fact, had rebuffed Britain's latest overture

towards such an agreement.

Hughes' support for

modification to exclude war with America rather than

modification acceptable to America thus reflected both
Washington's reluctance to enter a tripartite pact with any
defense obligations and his pref erence--if forced to choose-

rs

'F.O. Memorandum, "Effect of Angl o- Japanese Alliance
upon Foreign Relationships", February 28, 1920, as recorded
in Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol VI, 1016-1023.
.
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F.O. Memorandum,

"Report of the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance Committee", January 21, 1921, as recorded in Butler
and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series,
Vol XIV, 221-227.
,

P.O. Memorandum, "Respecting the Anglo- Japanese
Alliance, September 1, 1920; Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon,
NovemJDer 15, 1920, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents
on British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 106-13 and
,

177-178

,
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'Vinson, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance", notes that the State Department
rebuffed inquiries from Britain's Foreign Service concerning
a tripartite pact in May 1921.
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-for a meaningful agreement with Japan rather than a
vague

understanding with the United States.
The day after Smuts' proposal, Curzon answered with
an
appraisal of American diplomacy.

In the morning, he stated

that the peace of the world could only be maintained
by the

"continued cooperation of the Great Powers," from the ranks
of which the United States had defected.

He added that "the

influence of a powerful Empire like Great Britain... is most
potent for good or evil" and asserted that "it ought to be
used."

He continued:

There can be no doubt that while the AngloJapanese Alliance has lasted, whether we continue
it or not, it has enabled us to exercise a very
controlling influenj^e on the sometimes dangerous
ambitions of Japan."
In the afternoon,

the Foreign Secretary explained that the

rift between the Senate and the Wilson Administration had
led to a collapse in Anglo-American relations.

He stated:

"Official relations with the American Government almost

ceased to exist, and for ten months we practically did no

business with America at

all".*''*

He briefly touched on

America's 1916 naval construction program, designed to

CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute

4,

June 22,

1921.
'"'Curzon could have mentioned that the Harding

Administration had ignored two invitations from First Lord
Lee, during his address to the British Institute of Naval
Architects on March 17th and an interview with Adolph Ochs
of the New York Times on April 22nd, to discuss naval
See Sprouts, New Order 129.
disarmament.
,
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produce "the most powerful fleet that the world
has ever
known." Curzon ended in a more positive
fashion by noting
that the Senate had recently authorized
President Warren

Harding to discuss disarmament with Great Britain
and
r
Japan.

102

At the sixth meeting of the Imperial Conference,
on

June 24th, Prime Minister Arthur Meighen made his first

major contribution to the discussions.

In February 1921, he

had suggested to Lloyd George the desirability of replacing
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a multi-lateral pact and

suggested that a Canadian envoy approach the Harding

Administration about scheduling
Affairs.*'03

a

conference on Pacific

At the Imperial Conference, Meighen sought to

establish an entente between the British Empire and the

United States so as to ensure America would remain an active
force in the League, which he and his advisor Loring

Christie believed was essential to the peace and security of
the post-war world.
if possible,

'"^^

He also desired to consolidate, and

advance, the gains made by his predecessor in

Canada's pursuit of recognition as a fully autonomous
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"The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation
of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance".
'^^Fry
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nation.-"

The Canadian Prime Minister recoiranended
frequent

imperial conferences; a single imperial foreign
policy,
administered by the British Foreign Office; and,
with regard
to issues bearing on the Dominions, that
their opinions be

given weight commensurate with their interest.

For issues

affecting Canada and the United States, he claimed that
"the

Dominion should have full and final authority."

Without

addressing the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, he then stated:
The maintenance, and if it is by any means
possible, the betterment, of relations between the
British Empire and the United States of America
should be, as the Foreign Secretary has well said,
'the pivot of Britain's world policy'.

Meighen concluded by urging, in support of Curzon,

a

policy

of intervention in Europe in order to avoid "isolation full

of menace not only to ourselves, but also to the world.

"-^^

On June 28, 1921, the conference focused on the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance.

Curzon began by reminding those present-

-Lloyd George was absent due to a coal strike--that Article
IV of the Alliance contained a provision which removed any

obligation of either signatory to go to war with any third

J.W. Dafoe, "Canada and the Peace Conference of
1919", ( Canadian Historical Review XXIV, 1943), notes that
in 1919, Sir Robert Borden had secured separate
representation for Canada at the Paris Peace Conference.
For a contemporary Canadian perspective on Meighen and the
Imperial Conference, see Ramsey Cook, ed. The Dafoe-Sifton
Correspondence. II: 1919-1927 (Altona, Manitoba, 1966), 6979.
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party with which they had a treaty of arbitration; that

Britain regarded the Anglo-American Peace Commission
Treaty
of September 1914 as such a treaty;

and that Britain had

communicated her position to both Japan and the United
States.

He noted that the American press suggested

nonetheless that the Alliance contained "seeds of possible
conf lict

"^"^
.

Curzon next announced that the treaty would

expire on July 13th, in consequence of the Angl o- Japanese

notice to the League of Nations in July 1920, which stated
that the Angl o- Japanese Alliance was incompatible with the

Covenant of the League.

He then duplicated his earlier

presente^tion to the Cabinet.

He included the opinion of Sir

Charles Eliot, Britain's Ambassador to Japan: "If the
present alliance is replaced by an Anglo-American

understanding, at the expense of Japan, the Japanese will no
doubt cast about for new allies." 108

Curzon concluded that

to expand the alliance into a tripartite agreement was

reasonable but hardly feasible.

He recommended that "the

agreement should be renewed in a different form" after

consultation with the United States and the League.

^"'CAB
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^^^Sir C.
,

^"XAB 32/2:

1921.

Imperial Conference Minute

8,

June 28,

289

Balfour, as chairman of the Standing Defence Sub-

Committee, added the perspective of the C.I.D.

He noted the

relative decline of British naval strength in the Pacific
and declared that "it is, from a strategic point
of view, of

very great importance that the Japanese Alliance should be

maintained."

He also explained that the bulk of the Royal

Navy would remain in European waters.

In order to increase

the mobility of Britain's capital ships, which would act as

an imperial fire brigade, Britain "must develop a base at

Singapore with the capacity of storing significant

quantities of oil."

Until the completion of Singapore,

Balfour admitted that the British Empire was vulnerable to
naval attack in the Pacific and so should attempt to

maintain good relations with Japan.
The next meeting contained the expected confrontation

between the representatives of Australia and Canada.

Meighen flatly rejected renewing the Alliance in any form
whatsoever.

He argued that it had not served to restrain

Japan's exploitation of China.

He claimed that Canada had a

special interest in Anglo-American relations, which would be

ruined by renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance.

He said:

if we now... renew a confidential and exclusive
relationship with Japan it is wholly impossible to
argue convincingly, to my mind, that it is not
going to affect detrim.ental 1 y our relations with

the United States, no matter how steadfastly the
British government sets its face to keep those

"^CAB 32/2:
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relations good.

Meighen asserted that the abrogation of the Alliance
would
facilitate an arms control agreement with America,
where

the

new administration was open to fresh initiatives.

He

recommended a conference involving America, China, Japan,
and the Empire.

He asserted that non-renewal would not

estrange Japan, provided a multi-lateral agreement was
reached.

Meighen concluded by stating Canada would not

participate in an Alliance aimed at the United States.
Hughes immediately reduced Meighen' s argument to "listen to

America."

He claimed that Canada's interests were smaller

than those of Australia, for which national survival could
be at stake.

The Australian prime minister mentioned

Am.erica's rejection of the League and stated that he would

vote "against any renewal of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance

upon one condition and one only... that America gives us the

assurance of safety which our circumstance absolutely
demands

.

""^

The next meeting of the Imperial Conference, which took

place the same afternoon, produced little more than heated
rhetoric.

Curzon suggested two alternatives: a renewal of

'"Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the
Washington Conference", notes Meighen based his arguments on
a paper prepared by Loring Christie, the Legal Advisor to

Canada's Department of External Affairs.
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9,

June 29,
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perhaps five years in consonance with the Covenant of
the
League or a temporary renewal of a year in
order to hold an

international conference on the Pacific.

Hughes supported

the former and argued that "a nation who rejects
the League

cannot fault those whose work falls entirely within the

arrangements of the League."

He further deprecated the

possibility of diplomatic relations with

a

country whose

policy rests on "shifting quicksands of faction or public

opinion."

Smuts then turned Hughes' tactic of paraphrase

against him.

The old Boer restated Hughes' position as:

"Japan is the bigger danger and, therefore, we should
control her by keeping up the Alliance."

Massey occupied

the rest of the session with a pronunciation of loyalty to

the British Empire.***

The next morning, Lloyd George convened
his Government.

a

meeting of

Curzon briefed the Cabinet regarding the

Dominion posi tions

:

Meighen opposed

,

possibly to the degree

that Canada would disassociate from any decision to renew;

Hughes and Massey strongly in favor; with Smuts balancing.
The Foreign Secretary then discussed the latest report from

Washington, received five days before.

Geddes, who had

lusions 136, notes that the Foreign Secretary
was handicapped by the conflicting reports he was receiving
from Ambassador Harvey in London and from Auckland Geddes in
Washington as to the American position on renewal of the
al 1 iance
**^Fry,

1 1

"*CAB 32/2:

1921.

,
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originally advised for renewal but later recommended
the
substitution of a tripartite pact, relayed a conversation

with the Secretary of State.

The Secretary had explained

that public opinion opposed renewal and that the
Senate was

unlikely to ratify any tripartite arrangement, but that he

personally favored "a declaration of policy embodied in
identic notes" between the American, British, and Japanese
Governments."^

The Cabinet, however, did not believe that

an exchange of notes constituted an adequate substitute for

the existing Alliance.**^

Lloyd George emphasized the twin

pillars of British policy: the avoidance of any dispute with
the United States, and the avoidance of any insult to Japan.

The Cabinet subsequently agreed that the British delegation
at the Imperial Conference had the authority to propose or

assent to negotiations with both Japan and America."^
The Cabinet then considered a suggestion from Lloyd

George, to the effect that the Lord Chancellor might re-

examine the case for the termination of the Alliance.

Only

three days before, Curzon had informed the Japanese

Ambassador that the British Government considered that the

"^Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon, June 24, 1921, as
recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign
Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 311-12.
,

"Vry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation
of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance".
"^CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 56 (3), June 30, 1921;
Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power Vol I, 652-656.
,
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Anglo- Japanese notice to the League constituted

a

denunciation of the Alliance, which would therefore
expire
on July 13th, and had requested a second joint notification
to the League of a prolongation until October.

A ruling

to the reverse effect would mean that the Alliance
would

continue indefinitely, thus buying time for diplomatic

conversations before any potentially divisive action
regarding the Alliance."^

The Cabinet promptly agreed that:

The Lord Chancellor should be asked to give an
opinion as to whether the notice given to the
League of Nations in regard to the Anglo- Japanese
Alliance must... be held as equivalent to a
denunciation of the Treaty of 1911.
The Lord Chancellor, F.E. Smith, Viscount Birkenhead,

obligingly ruled that the joint notice to the League did not
constitute denunciation and the Treaty thus would remain in
effect.*2D

Late that afternoon, Lloyd George reconvened the
Imperial Conference and moved to break the deadlock between

Meighen and Hughes.

He started by reminding the delegates

Note from Earl Curzon to the Japanese Ambassador,
June 21
1921/ as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 313.
*

,

,

"^Frances Stevenson recorded in her diary: "It suddenly
occurred to D. [Lloyd George] that under international law
the League of Nations ruling did not hold good, & on looking
it up found that instead of renewing the agreement this
year, it had never been legally terminated & no notice had
It would therefore leave a whole year in
yet been given.
which to make up our minds." See Taylor, Lloyd George: A

Diary

,

225.

CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 56 (3), June 30, 1921.

294

that:

Friendship with America was fundamental.
It is a
dominant principle in all British policy, and it
IS inconceivable that we should embark
upon any
policy that would involve a breach with the United
States
The British Prime Minister then advanced the claim
that "a
refusal to renew would involve a breach with Japan."

After

insisting that "we must not insult Japan," Lloyd George

advocated consultation with America and support for China.
All of these laudable intentions, he suggested, might be

achieved at a conference, the forum in which one might
"reconcile the irreconcilable."

Then he asked for an

opinion of the status of the alliance from Lord Birkenhead,
who replied that "no denunciation has taken place."

Upon

realizing that Birkenhead's legal opinion upset the basis of
the previous discussion by removing the immediacy of a

decision regarding the Angl o- Japanese Alliance, the
delegates adjourned.*^*
The next day, Meighen commenced discussion by restating
the situation: the Treaty ran indefinitely, and Japan and

Great Britain were under obligation to the League to revise
the Alliance.

He claimed his views regarding Japan had been

misstated and recommended that the Treaty be limited to one
year.

The Canadian Prime Minister then urged a

communication to China, Japan, and the United States,

32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 11, June 30,
1921; Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power Vol I, 652-656.
*^*CAB

,
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proclaiming friendship and inviting a conference.

Lloyd

George opposed his effort to limit the
Anglo- Japanese
Alliance but supported calling a conference immediately.
Hughes again attacked Meighen's unwillingness to
understand
the vulnerability of the Australasian Dominions
and demanded

that the Imperial Conference determine the
Empire's policy
at the proposed international conference, which
Australia

and New Zealand would not, in all probability, be able
to

attend.

Curzon sought agreement on five points:

a)

telling

Japan that the Alliance remained in force; b) telling the

League that the Covenant superseded the Alliance;

c)

approaching Japan, America, and China regarding a
conference; d) not denouncing the Alliance, which would

remain in effect if the conference failed; and e) meeting
again.

The group adjourned without reaching consensus

That afternoon, the late session of the Imperial

Conference marked the apex of agreement among the conference
delegates.

Smuts warned the group against publicizing the

understanding that the alliance would remain in effect
unless the proposed conference reached agreement to the

contrary as providing Japan an incentive not to cooperate.
Hughes immediately countered by pointing out that the

opposite position gave the United States a similar
inducement, whereupon Massey concurred.

"^^CAB

1921.

32/2:
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agreed to contact China, Japan, and America
concerning a
conference, that the Alliance stood until denounced,

and to

consider whether or not to announce the default future
of
the Alliance.*"

The Dominion representatives then heard a series of

briefings on imperial defense.

First Lord Arthur Lee

analyzed the British Empire's strategic naval situation.

He

noted that despite the destruction of the German High Seas
Fleet, Britain's command of the seas was "challenged as

never before."

The First Lord stated that Admiralty was

willing to accept a One Power standard but admitted:
There is, however, very grave doubt whether we can
afford to maintain even a one-power standard at
the present time unless the whole Empire
combines ... to assist us in sharing the burden and
responsibi 1 i ty
He provided a spirited defense of the capital ship, together

with the proper ancillaries, as the basis of sea power.

Lee

revealed the details of the American and Japanese naval

construction programs, which forced Britain to lay down four
new capital ships within

a year.

He explained that the

British Cabinet intended to develop strategic oil stockpiles
and a base at Singapore.

The First Lord then made a pointed

comparison, between Britain and the Dominions, of per capita

CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 13, July 1,
1921.
*^'cAB

1921.

32/2:

Imperial Conference Minute 14, July

4,
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spending on naval defense.

He stated that the most helpful

contributions would take the form of "assistance in
the
creation of oil storage in these [Pacific] regions, the

maintenance of oil reserves, and the development and
maintenance of the chief naval bases in these waters."
Beatty joined the discussion to emphasize three points:

Britain needed

a

centrally located fleet; the fleet required

mobility, which rested upon oil supplies; and operations in
the Pacific required a base at Singapore.

Lloyd George

concluded by claiming the Navy was not aimed at any

particular opponent: "We are just building in order to be
equal to anybody, so as not to be in a position to be

dictated to diplomatically by anybody.

"-^^

Lloyd George and Curzon then gave thought to the

mechanics of the proposed conference.

When the Prime

Minister suggested the British capital for the site, Curzon
predicted that a conference held in London would struggle to
overcome the isolationist sentiment in America.

The

Foreign Secretary, after meeting with the Japanese and
Chinese Ambassadors, asked the American Ambassador on July
5th to propose to his government that President Harding

extend invitations to a conference on Pacific affairs which

•''^CAB

32/2:

Imperial Conference Minute 14, July

4,

1921.
-^'Galbraith,

"The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the

Washington Conference."
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might also eliminate naval competition.*^^

Curzon

subsequently asked Ambassador Harvey whether
he might obtain
an answer before July 11th in order that Lloyd
George
might

provide it to Parliament.

The Foreign Secretary added that

the agreement desired from the proposed conference
would

bring an end to the Angl o- Japanese Alliance.
On July 11th, Lloyd George informed the Imperial

Conference that the previous day President Harding had
invited the Allied and Associated Powers to a disarmament
conference, to be preceded by

a

Pacific conference of the

British Empire, China, Japan, and the United States.

While

there was no question of anything but acceptance, Hughes and

Massey strongly desired

a

preliminary consultation in London

before mid-August, in order to attend without extending the
length of their visit.

To the vast irritation of the

delegates, however, the United States refused to accommodate
by date or location the Australasian premiers.*^'

On July

18th, Lloyd George wrote scathingly to Churchill:

agree with you that the venue is immaterial, but
time and the composition of the conference are
essential.
To hold a meeting in Washington in
November with a mob of delegates who have only a
remote interest in this question. .. would be fatal
I

Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes, July
9, 1921, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 336-38.
,

Charles Spinks, "The Termination of the AngloJapanese Alliance", ( Pacific Historical Review VI, 1937).
,

*^^CAB

1921.

32/2:
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to our interests.
Australia and New Zealand could
not be present. .The whol e,,American concept
is
amateurish in the extreme.*-'"
.

In frustration,

the diplomats authorized Curzon to

coordinate with the various governments involved and

establish the conditions of the conf erence(s
On July 19th, the conference delegates entertained

discussion of imperial defense.

Lee reiterated the British

Empire's greatest priorities: "the urgent necessity of

replacing the obsolete units of the Empire battle fleet,"
followed by "the provision and maintenance of adequate bases
of operation for the Empire fleet in the Pacific" and "the

supply and maintenance of the necessary oil fuel
reserves."*

He then asked what contributions the Dominions

were prepared to donate to those projects.

Hughes suggested

that amount borne by the Dominions should be divided "on a

white per capita basis."

Massey quickly agreed to accept

proportional shares in the cost.
dissented.

Meighen, however,

He had left Canada with instructions from the

House of Commons not to accept any defense commitments.

David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
Lloyd George 541-42.
*

,

*^*CAB

32/2:

Imperial Conference Minute 27, July 22,

1921.
*

CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 26, July 19,

1921.

Canada and the Transition to
Congnonwea Ith (New York, 1977), 127; Graham, Meighen
*^^Philip Wigley,

,

63-66.
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He refused on the grounds that Canada was
not threatened and
that the Canadian electorate saw no reason
to support

expenditure on imperial defense.

Meighen's refusal to

contribute caused Hughes and Massey to withdraw their
offers.

The delegates ultimately affirmed the One Power

Standard, but would go no further toward providing

assistance to either the Admiralty or the Exchequer than
to
agree "that the method and expense of such [imperial

defense] cooperation are matters for the final determination
of the several

Parliaments concerned

"-^^
.

The Foreign Secretary proved unable to persuade the

United States to accommodate the concerns of the Empire
representatives.

On 27 July, Auckland Geddes told American

Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that

a

British party

including Lloyd George, Curzon, Meighen, Hughes, and Massey
was prepared to arrive in Bar Harbor on August 18th for

preliminary discussions.

Hughes replied that he was

absolutely opposed to such a meeting.

On August 2d, the

Imperial Conference viewed with displeasure the American

rejection of a preliminary conference.

*

'CAB 32/2:

Lloyd George stated:

Imperial Conference Minute 26, July 19,

1921.
1,

1C

CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 33, August 2,
1921.

Geddes to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, July
29, 1921, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 355.
*^'Sir A.

,
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"I

think it will be a gross waste of time to go [to

Washington].

"-37

Nine days later. President Harding issued

a

formal invitation to Bri tain--none of the Dominions was

invited--to attend a Conference on the Limitation of
Armament and Far Eastern Affairs to convene in Washington
on

November

1,

1921.-3^

Shortly after this invitation reached Britain, the
Imperial Conference ended.
few specific agreements.

Its delegates reached remarkably

The Dominions affirmed the One

Power Standard and the concept of base development without

providing any material assistance.

Britain, without the

Dominions, would attend an upcoming conference on

disarmament and Pacific affairs, pending which the AngloJapanese Alliance would remain in effect.

One historian in

fact states that "the concrete results achieved in the field
of naval policy and defence were very small."*

Nonetheless, the Imperial Conference had important
ramifications, if only in terms of options rendered
untenable.

The positions taken by Meighen and Hughes

precluded Dominion contributions toward

a

naval building

program and any possible implementation of the Jellicoe plan

*

CAB 32/2:

Imperial Conference Minute 34, August

1921.

"^Merze Tate and Fidel e Foy, "More Light on the
Abrogation of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance, ( Political
Science Quarterly LXXIV, 1959).
,

-%oskill. Naval Policy

,
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for a Pacific fleet, thus sustaining both
British strategic

weakness in the Far East and the Empire's resulting

dependence upon Japanese goodwill.

The Dominion leaders

also ensured that a united Imperial Conference could
neither

renew nor abrogate the Anglo- Japanese Alliance.

Britain

prepared for the Washington Conference with imperial unity
apparently depending upon the willingness of Japan and the

United States to enter

a

multi-lateral security pact.

CHAPTER

8

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
The Washington Conference rendered compatible
the
Cabinet's desires to maintain the Royal Navy at
a strength
at least equal to that of any other power
and to prevent the

cost of a naval building program from increasing the
size of

naval estimates.

The British Empire Delegation arrived in

Washington prepared to accept virtually any program of
disarmament that maintained the right of blockade, the
development of Singapore, and approximate parity with the

American fleet.

When the sweeping American proposals to

combine a 5:5:3 ratio of fleet strength for the primary
naval powers with an interlude in naval construction

encountered resistance from France and Japan, Balfour
labored to induce the participants to compromise.

After

laying the groundwork for the successful transformation of
the Angl o- Japanese Alliance, he facilitated a series of

disarmament settlements that preserved the American
framework while providing Britain an advantage in cruiser

strength and a small program of battleship construction.

British preparation for the Washington Conference
lacked the gravity normally associated with British
diplomacy.

Lloyd George himself set the tone at the end of

the Imperial Conference when he refused to attend and

predicted the delegates would spend their time "blowing off
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hot air."'

Churchill, at the same meeting, ridiculed the
American concept of open diplomacy:

Fancy conducting a discussion like that if it is
open to the public, and with stating the facts
that, while the British Empire were straining
every effort to secure universal peace, the
Americans were building sixteen battleships and
they stood out from the League of Nations, and
were starting to arm by land and sea.^

American intransigence toward British proposals for
preliminary conference in London regarding

a

a

settlement of

Pacific and Far Eastern problems aggravated rather than

assuaged the attitudes in Whitehall.^

To Churchill, Lloyd

George described the American proposals as "amateurish in
the extreme" and complained that if the American government

had even "one man with any experience of international

affairs they would not have made this muddle."*

Leading

statesmen, including Bonar Law and Curzon, declined to
attend.

On August 15, 1921, the Cabinet assigned

responsibility for coordinating the British positions to the
C.I.D. and thereafter displayed little interest in the

preparations until the eve of the B.E.D.'s departure for the

*CAB 32/2:

Imperial Conference Minute 34, August

5,

^CAB 32/2:

Imperial Conference Minute 34, August

5,

1921.

1921.

The London location would
^Sprouts, New Order 135-36.
have enabled the Australasian Prime Ministers to attend.
,

*David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
Lloyd George 542.
,
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Conference.^

Even the pace at which the Departments

forwarded the typical memoranda to Hankey's secretariat
lagged in comparison to the staff work produced in

preparation for the Armistice.
A memorandum from the Committee on National Expenditure
(C.N.E.) shattered any feelings of complacency in Admiralty
House.

The C.N.E. comprised a committee of businessmen

^

under Sir Eric Geddes appointed in 1921 to suggest economies
of some £100 millions in the budget.^

The C.N.E., also

known as "the Geddes Axe," sought to force the Board to
accept reduction in the Navy Estimates.

The C.N.E. compared

the Estimates for 1921-22 (£82.48 millions) to 1922-23

(£81.18 millions) and observed that a decrease in general

expenditure of over £11 millions was due primarily to

deflation and that it was offset by an increase of nearly
£10 millions due to capital ship construction, with a net

decrease of only £1.3 millions.

The Geddes committee

further noted that the Navy's personnel strength of 121,000
was only 27,000 less than that of 1914-15.

wanted

a

The C.N.E.

definition of the One Power Standard, together with

'CAB 23:

Cabinet Conclusion 67 (3b), August 15, 1921.

^ADM 1/8614/187: Oswyn Murray note indicated the
importance of a response, October 13, 1921; /8615/200:
Director of Statistics minute described C.N.E. proposals as
"unthinkable," October 28, 1921.

^Pollard, British Economy
History 184.
,

,

210; Taylor, English
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any plans for the placing of ships into reserve.

The

deficit commission inquired as to whether the
seventeen
capital ships already in reserve could be relegated
to care
and maintenance parties.

The C.N.E. suggested postponing

new construction until after the conference and requested
an

evaluation of the risk of laying down only two vessels and
the docking requirement involved.^
In response. Admiralty House prepared a memorandum

designed to set forth clearly the premises under which the
Board was operating.

The Admiralty noted that the

Government's expressed naval policy was still the One Power
Standard, which, according to the Admiralty, meant that "the

Navy should be maintained at sufficient strength to ensure
the safety of the British Empire and its sea communications
as against any other Naval Power.

The Board stated that

"more than absolute equality" would be desirable, but

recognized "this is not attainable in the present difficult
times, and we shall be put hard to it to obtain absolute

equality."
of naval

The Admiralty made no objections to the concept

limitation provided Britain retained, if not her

present relative advantage, at least

a

position of equality.

From the Board's perspective, two issues complicated the

ADM 1/8614/187: Observations by Committee on National
Expenditure, October 1921.
^ADM 1/8615/200: Admiralty Memorandum,

Standard", October 1921.

"One Power
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problem of finding an acceptable level of reduction.

The

first involved the protection of sea-borne commerce,
the

defense of which required a substantial number of cruisers.
At the hub of a maritime trading network, Britain's

livelihood depended on sea communications.

The Admiralty

considered the Navy's responsibilities in this area to be
"infinitely greater than those of any other Power" and that
Britain required
nations.

a

larger number of cruisers than other

The second issue concerned "modern capital ships,

which are the gauge of

a

country's Sea Power.

"*°

The Board

worried that equality in numbers of ships would leave
Britain at a marked disadvantage, as all of the Royal Navy's
battleships were of pre-Jutland design.*^
The Admiralty plan for retaining at least equality in

capital ship strength involved the construction of eight new

vessels.

The Board hoped to lay down four battle cruisers

in 1921-22,

followed by four battleships in 1922-23.

The

battle cruisers, carrying 16-inch main guns, would displace
48,000 tons apiece, while the battleships, armed with

enormous 18-inch weaponry, would displace 48,400 tons each.
A new pattern of inclined armor, concentrated only over the

1/8615/200: Admiralty Memorandum, "One Power
Standard", October 1921.
^"adM

"Chalmers, Life and Letters of David Beatty 366.
Britain's sole post-Jutland capital ship was the battle
cruiser Hood as her sister ships Anson Howe and Rodney
had been cancelled shortly after the Armistice.
.

,

,

,
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vitals of the ships, would be raised higher to provide

better protection against aerial bombing and
plunging fire,

while a novel system of "water protection" sandwiched

between the side of the ship and her anti-torpedo
bulkheads
afforded increased safety from submarines.

The designs of

the new ships, developed in 1920-21 and incorporating

lessons from the Battle of Jutland and the newest German

battleship Baden

represented

,

a

quantum leap past the ships

of the American 1916 Program, which were designed before

Jutland.*

These eight vessels would cost some £75 millions,

at roughly £15 millions per year over

5

years.

*^

The Cabinet at least partly assuaged the fears of

Admiralty House on the issue of capital ship quality during
the closing days of the Imperial Conference.

On July 19th,

the conference delegates reached unanimous agreement to

uphold the One Power Standard.
be more difficult to resolve.

Funding, however, proved to

When Hughes of Australia

proposed that the Dominions accept shares in the imperial
naval budget on a per capita basis of white population.

D'Eyncourt MSS 22: A.C.N. S. Memorandum, "Main
Requirements of Design", June 11, 1920; D'Eyncourt MSS 27:
Goodall Memorandum, "Battleship Design", July 1, 1920;
Preston, The Ship 24-26.
,

116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
The projected annual
New Construction", November 22, 1920.
costs (in millions of pounds) broke down as follows:
'21-22 '22-23 '23-24 '24-25 '25-26 Total
Ship\Year
37.5
0.0
13.0
0.0
15.5
Battle Cruisers, 4 9.0
37.5
13.0
14.5
2.5
7.5
0.0
Battleships, 4
-^ADM
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Meighen of Canada and Smuts of South Africa demurred.**
following day, the delegates agreed to a division of

The

a

portion of German reparations payments amounting to over £16
mi 1 1 ions

Country

Britain
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
India
Minor Colonies
South Africa
New Foundland

Share

Amount

86. 85%

£14,200,000

4.35%
4.35%
1.75%
1. 20%
0.80%
0.60%

£740 ,000
£740,000
£295 ,000
£204,000
£136,000
£102,000
£17 ,000

0

.10%

Beatty then briefed the delegates on the Adm.iralty's

proposed capital ship building program.

Despite further

opposition from Meighen, the group adopted Smuts' suggestion
to use German reparation payments towards the cost of the

proposed capital ships."

That afternoon, the Cabinet

considered the Admiralty request for approval to start

building the four capital ships for which the preliminary
funding had been approved on March 17th by the House of

Commons during the presentation of the Navy Estim.ate.*^

The

Cabinet agreed that four new capital ships were necessary to
meet American and Japanese ships under construction.

CAB 32/4: Imperial Conference (Prime Ministers) Minute
26-A, July 19, 1921.

"CAB 32/4: Imperial Conference (Prime Ministers) Minute
26-B, July 20, 1921.
*^House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates
Volume 126, Columns 2296-2347, 2442-2550.

,

5th Series,

310

Despite warnings from the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to
the heavy expenditure involved, the Cabinet granted

Admiralty House the authority to build the four ships in the
1921-22 naval program.*^

The First Sea Lord delegated the primary responsibility
for crafting the Admiralty's proposals for naval lim.itations
to Adm.iral Ernie Chatfield,

Staff.

the Assistant Chief of the Naval

As Chatfield felt that no proposals for arm.s

limitation were proof against deliberate subterfuge, he
sought to determ.ine the "least objectionable.""

He ruled

out the use of either budgetary or manpower cei 1 ings as too

easily evaded.

Limitation based on the displacement of

ships seem.ed to the admiral sim.ilarly susceptible to

cheating

,

so he sett 1 ed on num.be r of capital ships as the

most easily enforced measure for naval

Chatfield saw aircraft carriers as

arm.s

limitation.

a m.ixed

blessing.

He was keenly aware of the potential value of naval air

support

.

At the sam.e tim.e

,

the admiral perceived aircraft

carriers as a potential focus for future naval building

^^CAB 23:

*^ADM

Cabinet Conclusion 60 (6), July 20, 1921.

1/8615/200: Chatfield Memorandum, October 14,

1921.

Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff reversed the
position taken in 1919 by the Director of Plans, who
suggested that the limitation of ship size was the m.ost
See ADM 116/1863: Director of Plans
prom.ising m.ethod.
Memorandum, "League of Nations: Reduction in Naval
Arm.am.ents" (attached minutes dated July 1919).
^^The
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corr.peti

tion

The nur?JDer of Aircraft Carriers present in a Fleet
Action will decide who is to coirar.and the Air, and
as Command of the Air is likely to be vital in
the
next Naval Battle, competition in Aircraft
Carriers may, unless regulated, supplant
competition in Capital Ships.

Certain that capital ships would be regulated, Chatfield
therefore suggested limiting carriers to

a

percentage of

capital ship strength.^''

The Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff hoped to
elim.inate submarines as a lawful weapon of naval warfare.

He realized, however, that the smaller powers, particularly
France, viewed the submarine as an inexpensive method of
coastal defense.

As a result, he feared "the whole problem,

of subm.arine abolition was so involved as to be

im.practicabl e

.

"

His concern on the issue had abated after

British experiments indicated that

a

new underwater

detection system., known to the British as ASDIC and the
Am.ericans as SONAR, proved increasingly able to locate

submerged submarines.
By the end of SeptemJDer, while Chatfield labored to put

the finishing touches on his argum.ents, Adm.iralty House

reached a consensus on the two principal naval issues at

*^ADM

1/8615/200: Chatfield

Mem.orandiim.,

October 28,

1921.
^-Ernle Chatfield,

It

Might Happen Again (London, 1947),

6.

^^ADM 1/8609;

Chatfield Minute, July 27, 1921.
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Washington: arms limitation and the Far Eastern question.
The Board wanted to prevent Japan from advancing
any further

south than Formosa and advocated "an international guarantee
of the territorial status quo" while preserving
Britain's

right to develop Singapore.

The Adm.iralty dealt at greater

length with the question of naval lim.itation.

The Board

recognized that "Capital ships and their accessories run
away with the money and necessitate undesirable reductions
in other im.portant naval services" and concluded that "a

substantial reduction should suit our policy."
Adm.iralty developed a plan for naval
prem.ises:

The

limitation based on two

that naval strength rem.ained prim.arily a function

of post-Jutland capital

ships and that rules for limitation,

in order to be effective, m.ust be sim.ple and designed to

prevent duplicity.

The Board presented a five point plan.

First, naval limitation should be based on a limited number
of capital

ships.

Second, the British Em.pire and the United

States should have a m.argin over Japan of 3:2 (this point

implied naval equality between Britain and Am.erica).
only post-Jutland capital ships should be counted.

Third,

Fourth,

ships should be replaced after twenty years of service.
Fifth, the abolition of subm.arines should be favorably

considered.

The First Lord sent a memorandum containing the

23
views of the Admiralty to the C.I.D. in early October.

21/218: Admiralty Mem.orandum, "Washington
Conference", October 5, 1921.
^^CAB
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On October 14th, the Standir.g Defence Sub-Conmi ttee
(S.S.) of the C.I.D. considered those recoranendations

.

The

subcorrroittee completely agreed with the Board's analysis.

The S.S. endorsed the Admiralty position that the

development of Singapore and the right of blockade were nonnegotiable, and further agreed that Britain should not
accept close technical inspections of her warships.

The

subcomjp.ittee also concurred with the Board's judgm.ent that

naval reduction should be based on numbers of capital

ships
Later that week, the Cabinet also provided the C.I.D.
some guidance.

The Cabinet m.emJDers had strongly desired the

presence of the Prim.e Minister at the beginning of the
Conference, even though they recognized that at best he
could stay only

a

few weeks.

By the m.iddle of the m.onth,

however, the press of Par 1 iam.entary business, m.uch of which

dealt with Ireland, led Lloyd George to decide that he would

have to m.iss at least the initial phase of negotiations.

On

October i7th, the Cabinet agreed that in his absence, Arthur
James Balfour, Lord President of the Council, would head the

British Empire Delegation (B.E.D.).

Lee, the First Lord,

and Geddes, the Ambassador to the United States, would

constitute the remainder of the political team, while the
naval section com.prised Beatty, the First Sea Lord, and

•CAB 21/218:

S.S. Minute, October 14, 1921
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Chatfield, the Assistar.t Chief of the Navai Staff.

ubiquitous Hankey would manage both secretariats.

The
The Prime

Minister would join as soon as the Par 1 iam.entary and general
situations all owed.
Four days later, Winston Churchill broached an idea to
the Standing Defence Sub-Committee.

He suggested the

adoption of a paper program, of naval construction as

bargaining chip.

The Adm.iralty's request for

a

a

second

installm.ent of four new capital ships (i.e., the 1922-23

battleship com.ponent of the proposal that Beatty briefed at
the Im.perial Conference), as yet unauthorized by the

Cabinet, constituted the obvious basis for such a program..
The former First Lord explained that the tactic had proved

successful in his dealings with Germ.any before the Great
War.

Lord Lee quickly supported Churchill's proposal, which

the S.S. then approved.

Jutland battleships, for

The authorization of four posta

total of eight new capital ships,

would provide a significant counter to the American 1916
Program, of sixteen capital ships,

for which the Harding

Administration still possessed only partial funding.
The following day, the Foreign Office provided the
3.S.D. a memorandum that contained its latest appraisal of
the Anglo- Japanese Alliance.

The F.O. cited communications

Cabinet Conclusion 80 (7), October 17, 1921;
Cabinet Conclusion 77 (5), October 7, 1921.
^'CAB

23:

^-CAB

21/218: S.S. Minute, October 21, 1921.
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from Geddes

ir.

Washington and Eliot in Tokyo to the effect

that both the United States and Japan were favorably

inclined towards the transformation of the existing treaty
into a tripartite agreement.

The memorandum reminded the

B.E.D. of the need to remove from any draft treaty all
m.ilitary commitments,

"for otherwise the United States can

never be induced to become

a

party."

The Foreign Office

suggested that "the advisability of admitting other parties
(especially China) having interests in the Pacific may well
be considered" but cautioned that "a multilateral agreement,

which does not include the United States, would be of no
value to us at all."

The m.emorandum advised the B.E.D. of

the desirability of having the Am.ericans "first suggest a

formula" for replacing the Alliance but enclosed two

separate draft treaties, one by Sir Auckland Geddes and the
other by Sir John Jordan of the Foreign Off ice.
On October 24th, the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of
the C.I.D. sent a m.emorandum. to the Cabinet that defined its

aim in preparing for the Washington Conference as achieving
"the largest possible reduction in expenditure on armaments,

subject to two fundamental considerations."

First, any

Foreign Office Memorandum respecting a Tripartite
Agreement, October 22, 1921, as recorded in Butler and Bury,
Docum.ents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV,
,

448-50.
C.I.D. Memorandum. 280-3, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armam.ents", October 24, 1921.
^^CAB 21/218:
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agreement must safeguard "the vital interests of the British

Empire."

Second, any treaty must possess "a stable

character" in order to avoid being:

dislocated by any miscalculations of national or
political elements concerned, such as occurred
after the Paris Peace Conference, owing to the
refusal of the Government of the United States to
ratify the instruments drawn up.
The C.I.D. accepted the Treasury's position that failure to

achieve an immediate reduction of expenditure on the armed
services would eliminate any real possibility of balancing
the budget without raising taxes, "which would be

politically most undesirable and econom.ical
prejudicial to the nation's interests."

1

y m.ost

The

C.I.D. 's concern for budgetary consideration, however, did

not translate into a defeat for the Navy.

The Standing Defence Sub-Committee accepted completely
the Admiralty's viewpoint as presented by Admiral Osm.ond

Brock, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.

The S.S. agreed

that the development of Singapore "should not be interfered

with by any agreement reached at the Conference

"^'^
.

The

subcommittee further accepted the Navy's view on the
importance of retaining unrestricted use of blockade, so
that any "question of the regulation or limitation of

"CAB 21/218: C.I.D. Memorandum 280-B, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", October 24, 1921.
21/218: C.I.D. Memorandum 280-B, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", October 24, 1921.
^'CAB
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methods of warfare should be resisted," and shared the

Admiralty's view that

a

total ban on submarines was "a

policy of perfection not very likely to be realized."
S,S.

The

labelled the limitation of naval armaments as "by far

the most important task of the Conference at Washington" and

agreed with the Board's position "that the only method which
is sufficiently simple as to be really practicable is an

international agreement as to the limitation of the number
of

capital ships."

The subcomjv.i ttee decided the best way to

achieve their goals was "to allow the other delegations to
put forward their proposals,

The S.S. also

forward

a

and submit them to criticism."

endorsed Churchill's idea "as to putting

paper program of capital ship construction

likely to be undertaken by the British Governm.ent

.

as

,

The

"

Standing Defence Sub-Comm.i t tee concl uded by recommending to
the Cabinet "that
to the B E D
.

.

.

a

wide measure of discretion

m.us t

be left

on the understanding that m.ajor policy

"

questions would be referred to the Empire government

concerned
On November 1st, the Cabinet gave its first collective

consideration to major policy decisions for the Washington
Conference.

The Lloyd George Ministry decided that if

21/218: C.I.D. Memorandum. 280-B, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", October 24, 1921;
Nish, Al liance 364, suggests that the Cabinet acted in
deference to Lloyd George, tentatively scheduled to visit
the conference
•"CAB

,
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France sought

a

renewal of the British guarantee of French

territory, the B.E.D. would seek to promote American

ratification and would further seek to use French support
for the guarantee to move toward a limitation of aerial

armaments.
a

The Cabinet then endorsed Churchill's scheme for

program of naval construction designed as

chip.

a

bargaining

The Cabinet agreed that, while adhering to the One

Power standard
full discretion should be given to the principal
British Delegate, according to the circumstance of
the Conference, to adopt [Churchill's suggestion]
in regard to having a paper programme of capital
ship construction, to be used for bargaining with
a view to inducing the other Powers to reduce

their building programmes
In consonance with the C.I.D.'s determ.ination to react to

the proposals of other nations, these decisions represented
the extent of the guidance provided to the B.E.D prior to
the Conference.

The B.E.D. sailed to Washington in the first week of

November, under the direction of Arthur James Balfour, Lord

President of the Council.

Balfour at the time was seventy-

three years of age and tired from his labors with the League
of Nations.

Dining with the Prime Minister, Churchill had

laughingly remarked that "if you wanted nothing done, A.J.B.
was undoubtedly the best man for the task."^^

^CAB 23:

^Riddell,
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initial notification from Hankey that he would be asked to
lead the B.E.D., Balfour himself replied that he "hoped
very

much hoped the Prime Minister will think better of it."
After suggesting that Bonar Law was better fitted to the
task,

the Lord President responded to the call of duty: "If

there is an important reason for my going,
r,^
go

I

am ready to

"34

Born to immense wealth and political influence as the

nephew of Robert, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, Balfour had
held political office, including the premiership, almost

continuously since 1874, when he had first won election to
Parliament in the family borough of Hertford.

Yet Balfour

disguised his capacity and willingness for work behind an
artful facade of intellectual dilettantism.

Underneath his

studied detachment, he remained convinced that the

aristocracy should play
government. 35

a

leading role in British

The Lord President also held firm views about

the value of sea power.

Throughout his career, Balfour advocated

defense policy.

a

strong

As Prime Minister, he had established the

C.I.D. to improve the coordination among the armed services.

He had also sponsored the eighteen-pounder gun, which gave

^^Arthur Balfour,

as recorded Roskill, Hankey

,

Vol

236.

17-19; Piers Brendon, Eminent
1980), 68-86.

^-Dugdale, Balfour
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,
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Balfour's greatest legacy to*Britain's defense involved the
support for Fisher's revolutionary battleship that had

earned him the sobriquet "Godfather of the Dreadnought."

During the naval crisis of 1909, he had described "the

maintenance of

a powerful

Government."'^

When the Asquith Ministry considered in 1912

a

Fleet" as "the first duty of a

proposal for universal service, designed to produce

a

mass

army, Balfour had objected to the cost and had asked:

Would not this money be much better spent, from
the point of view of national security, upon
increasing the Navy? ... Remember that a sufficient
Navy not only =^ecures your shores, but secures
your commerce."
As Foreign Secretary, during the preparations for the

Armistice, Balfour had sharply attacked President Wilson's
call for freedom of the seas.

He had contended that until

such time as the League became "firmly established," that
"every attempt to limit the use of Sea Power" merely added
"to the relative strength of Land Power: and that in the end

militarism would be the only gainer."'
Despite this opposition to Wilson's policy, Balfour

possessed

a

profound sympathy for the United States and

hoped to see close cooperation between America and Britain.
In 1913,

he had written:

^'Arthur Balfour,

as recorded in Dugdale, Balfour

^Arthur Balfour, as recorded in Dugdale, Balfour

,

31.

,

53.

116/1651: Balfour Memorandum, "Freedom of the
Seas", October 23, 1918.
'^ADM

321
In 1913, he had written:

am moved by a feeling especially patriotic in
Its character, for the group of nations who are
the authors and guardians of western civilization,
[and] for the sub-group who speak the English
language
I

With friends in the Republican party of the United States,
Balfour had served as vice-president of the Anglo-American
Society and as British empire president of the English-

Speaking Union.

One historian of Anglo-American relations

writes: "To Balfour, Anglo-American co-operation was not

merely a temporary or tactical expedient but
policy.

"^^

a

fundamental

With his beliefs that Britain would require both

the friendship of America and the protection of a fleet,

Balfour was thus well-suited for his responsibilities as
head of the B.E.D. to Washington.

Moreover, he had some

previous experience with delegations to Washington.
In April 1917,

shortly after the United States had

entered the war, Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, sailed for

America on the S.S. Olympic with some twenty-two specialists
from the Foreign Office, the fighting services, and the
The Balfour Mission was originally

supply departments.

a

technical delegation designed to increase the efficacy of

mobilization efforts within the United States.

During his

visit to l^merica, the Foreign Secretary met with President

Arthur Balfour, as recorded in Dugdale, Balfour
'Fry,

1 1

lusions

,

15-16.

.

66.
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Wilson to discuss war aims and the various secret treaties
of the Allied powers.*^

Under the pressure of unrestricted submarine warfare,

Britain also sought to influence the course of American
naval expansion so as to obtain the greatest possible

assistance in the struggle to protect Atlantic shipping.
Balfour himself later noted: "Things were dark when
that trip to America

mind.

I

...

I

took

The submarines were constantly on my

could think of nothing but the number of ships which

they were sinking."*^

Balfour consulted Wilson's adviser

Colonel House, while Rear-Admiral Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de

Chair met with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Benson.
The Balfour Mission requested the diversion of American

naval construction from, capital ships to anti-submarine
vessel s

The Wilson Administration then balanced the immediate

gain of additional anti-submarine assets against the

reduction in the post-war capital ship strength of the

United States Navy.

House believed that the United States

should help the Allies, in exchange for British guarantees
of capital ship support in case of American difficulties.

43

Benson, however, worried about the possibility that America

''Dugdale, Balfour
^^Arthur Balfour,
Benson 68

,

141-45.

as recorded in Klachko, Admiral

,

*^Seymour,

Intimate Papers

,

Vol III,
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might have to carry on the struggle against Germany alone

should the Allies collapse.^*

His reluctance to accept a

loss of capital ship production prevented any immediate

decision
After Balfour's return to Britain in May 1917, the
Cabinet requested that he pursue the issue.

The following

month, the Foreign Secretary submitted a memorandum to the

Cabinet for consideration.

Balfour noted that the United

States Navy was worried about post-war ramifications if they
did not build capital ships and Germany and Japan still

possessed significant fleets.

He suggested that for four

years after the war, ample time in which to build new
capital ships: "Am.erica should have a right to call upon

other Fleets to her assistance, in case of maritime
attack.

"^^

Balfour raised and rejected the possibility of

a

mutual defense treaty between Britain and the United States.
He described a bilateral agreement as both simple yet

adequate and added:
confess, for reasons of high policy, there is
nothing I should like more than a defensive
alliance with America, even for four years, as
would be capable of extension and development,
should circ\imstances prove auspicious.
I

Balfour then identified the major flaw with his proposal:
"The objection to it arises out of our existing Treaty with

"Klachko, Admiral Benson

,

69.

^^Balfour MSS 49699: Balfour Memorandum, "Future Naval
Construction in the United States", June 22, 1917.
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Japan."**

The Japanese government, unfortunately, was not

likely to cooperate.

Balfour wrote that there was no logical incompatibility

between the Anglo- Japanese Alliance and the suggested
arrangement, but predicted that an Anglo-American "treaty

would produce a very unpleasant feeling in Tokio" (sic).

He

lauded the Angl o- Japanese Alliance as contributing "to

stability in international relations in the Far East."

He

reasoned that the best way to avoid offending Britain's
longtime ally was "to try to associate Japan from the

beginning with the new arrangem.ent
conjectured that

a mul ti

- 1

.

"

Balfour then

ateral agreement "would have the

triple effect of allaying Japanese fears, of engaging

Japanese support, and of advertising the treaty as a
prot.ection against Germany."*^

difficulties of lim.iting any

Balfour admitted the
m.ul

ti-1 ateral treaty.

He

pointed out that if Japan was brought in against Germany,

Britain could hardly avoid asking France, and if France was
asked to join the arrangement, Italy.

advocating a very broad arrangement.

He concluded by
He recommended, in

return for the diversion of American shipbuilding resources

from the construction of capital ships to the building of

*°Balfour MSS 49699: Balfour Memorandum,
Construction in the United States", June 22,

"Future Naval

^^Balfour MSS 49699: Balfour Memorandum,
Construction in the United States", June 22,

"Future Naval
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destroyers, that:
the Governments of the United States of America,
Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan
engage singly and severally to assist each other
against any maritime attack for a period of four
years after the present war.

The Foreign Secretary relayed his proposals, with Cabinet

approval, to House, only to have Wilson categorically reject
any formal alliance with the Allied powers/'

proposal for
fruitless.

a

Balfour's

general maritime alliance thus proved

Nonetheless, it indicated both his desire to

develop closer relations with the United States and his

willingness to see Britain retain her naval superiority.

Circumstance provided Balfour the opportunity to play
major role in Washington.

a

The civilian members of the

delegation. Ambassador Geddes and First Lord Lee, were

clearly figures of the second rank, while Lloyd George was
never able to leave the press of responsibilities in London.

Additionally, Admiral Beatty returned to London shortly
after the conference opened, leaving Chatfield in charge of
the British Naval Section, Washington (BNSW).

More

importantly, the Cabinet had decided against "a precise and

detailed mandate" for the del egation

.

Thus, Balfour

possessed an unusual m.easure of autonomy at the conference.

^^Balfour MSS 49699: Balfour Memorandum,
Construction in the United States", June 22,
^•'Trask,

^^CAB 23:

Captains and Cabinets

.

"Future Naval
1917.

119-20.

Cabinet Conclusion 83 (2), November

1,

1921.

326

On November 11th,

the day after he arrived in

Washington and the day before the Conference opened,
Balfour
sent his appreciation of the situation to Lloyd George.

The

Lord President defined the ultimate aim of the B.E.D.
as
"the largest possible limitation of armaments consistent

with the safety of the British Empire," with the

understanding that "satisfactory and durable results"
regarding naval disarmament rested upon the resolution of

diplomatic issues.

Balfour identified the Ang 1 o- Japanese

Alliance as "first and foremost" among the obstacles to
successful arms limitation, along with "a number of problems

regarding China."

Balfour explained his intention "to deal

with the political side of the Pacific question" before
taking on "the subject of naval diminution of armaments."""^
The head of the B.E.D. addressed the future of the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance and China in two separate treaties- -which
he had drafted during the Atlantic crossing- -whi ch he

attached.

"The Foreign Office was concerned not so much that the
discussion of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance precede naval
limitation talks as that the discussion take place "only
among the parties concerned." See F.O. Memorandum, "General
Survey of Political Situation in Pacific And Far East with
reference to the forthcoming Washington Conference", October
20, 1921, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 434-448.
,

"cab 21/218: Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George,
November 11, 1921; the cable is also recorded in Butler and
Bury, Documents on British Foreign P olicy, 1st Series, Vol
XIV, 466-70, although without the draft treaties.
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Balfour sought to replace the Anglo- Japanese Alliance

with a tripartite agreement between Britain, Japan, and
the

United States.

His draft comprised three brief clauses: the

first called for the three signatories to respect territory
in the Pacific and to preserve peace through consultation in

case of threat; the second allowed any two of the powers to

establish a defensive alliance, provided they notified the
third; and the last stated the proposed treaty would replace
all existing arrangements.

Balfour explained the draft

treaty would serve numerous purposes:
(a)

To enable the Americans to be party to a

tripartite arrangement without committing
themselves to military operations.
(b)
To bring the existing Angl o- Japanese Alliance
to an end without hurting the feelings of an Ally.
(c)
To leave it open to us to renew a defensive
alliance with Japan if she should be threatened by
Germany or Russia
(d) To frame a treaty which will reassure our
Australasian Dominions.
(e)
To make it impossible for American critics to
suggest our Treaty with Japan would require us to
stand aside in the case of a quarrel between them
and Japan, whatever the cause of the quarrel.
Balfour sought to square the circle of diverging opinion

expressed at the Imperial Conference, bringing America into
an arrangement without any military commitments, but

retaining with Japan a relationship which held the

possibility of military assistance.

The junior members of

21/218: Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George,
November 11, 1921; the cable is also recorded in Butler and
Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol
XIV, 466-70, although without the draft tripartite treaty.
^-CAB

,

328

the E.E.D.

raised no objections to Balfour's proposals when

he presented them informally over dinner.^-

On the eve of the Conference, the Lord President
met

with American Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes,

primarily to discuss the future of the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance.

Balfour presented Hughes

a

copy of the draft

treaty, explaining that it had not been approved by the

Cabinet and hence was unofficial.

He agreed to Hughes'

request to show it to the American contingent, provided it
was described as unofficial yet held in secrecy.

Balfour

then asked Hughes whether he (Balfour) might share the draft

with the principal Japanese delegate on the same conditions.
Hughes demurred, on the grounds that the term "treaty" would
inflame American public opinion should word of the

discussions leak out.

Balfour then substituted the word

"arrangement" every place the word "treaty" appeared in the
text.

Hughes refused to discuss his remarks at the opening

of the Conference,

but in all other respects the

conversation remained cordial.''

Balfour accordingly left

the meeting still under the impression that a resolution of
the political questions of the Pacific remained

prerequisite to

a naval

a

arms limitation agreement.

"Vry, Illusion, 163-64.
'^Hankey Memorandum, November 11, 1921, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Doc^oments on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 470-71.
,
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Contrary to the Lord President's expectations,
Secretary Hughes presented the first plenary session
of the

Conference on Limitation of Armaments on November 12th with
a

comprehensive and detailed set of proposals for the

reduction of naval strength.

He listed four principles for

arms reduction:

The elimination of all capital ship building
rograms, either actual or projected;
Further reduction through the scrapping of
2)
certain of the older ships;
That regard should be had to the existing
(3)
naval strength of the conferring powers;
The use of capital ship tonnage as the
(4)
measure of strength for navies and a proportionate
allowance of auxiliary combatant craft
prescribed.
(1)

Hughes proposed

a

curtailment to current construction

combined with an aggressive program of scrapping existing
vessels, amounting to 30 capital ships of almost 850,000
tons for America, along with smaller cuts for the other

powers.

The Secretary then proposed specific future

strengths by numbers and tonnage for the American, British,
and Japanese fleets according to a 5:5:3 ratio, with capital

ship totals of 500,000 and 300,000 tons respectively.

He

continued by proposing a replacement schedule for capital
ships which included both a ten year "naval holiday" from

new building and a life cycle of twenty years per vessel.

33/ lb: B.E.D. Memorandum 76, "The Proposal of the
United States for a Limitation of Naval Armaments"; also
published in United States, Department of State, Conference
on the Limitation of Armament: Washington November 12 1921
- February 6. 1922 (Washington, D.C., 1922), 78-93.
'•CAB
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New ships would be limited to
35,000 tons.

a

maximum displacement of

Hughes then announced similar provisions for

the reduction of auxiliary combatant craft, including escort

vessels, aircraft carriers, and submarines.

Hughes

concluded by forming the chief delegates of the five major
powers (America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) into

a

Committee on Limitation of Armaments and, together with the
primary representatives of the four smaller nations

attending (Belgium, China, Netherlands, and Portugal), into
another for Pacific and Far Eastern Questions.

The

delegates agreed to hold the next plenary session on

November 15th.
Hughes stunned his audience with the boldness and

specificity of his proposals.

The American plan, known to

only eleven men before its public disclosure, reflected the

work of a small bipartisan committee, appointed by President
Harding, which included Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and

Theodore Roosevelt."

Harding had excluded Anglophobic

Admiral William Benson from the planning process after the
former Chief of Naval Operations wrote Secretary Hughes

a

B.E.D. Memorandum 76, "The Proposal of the
United States for a Limitation of Naval Armaments"; also
published in United States, Department of State, Conference
on the Limitation of Armament: Washington Nov ember 12, 1921
- February 6. 1922 (Washington, B.C., 1922), 78-93.
-'CAB 33/lb:

-^Thomas Buckley and Edwin Strong, American Foreign and
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memorandum accusing the Lloyd George Government of using
"propaganda for disarmament and other features tending
to
keep the United States in a position subordinate to the

British Empire."^'

Benson fought long and hard to prevent

any reduction in the American 1916 building program, but

kept his struggle strictly within official channels.

As a

result, no word reached British naval circles of the Hughes
plan.

Two naval historians record

a

contemporary account of

the impact of the Secretary's proposals on Admiral Beatty,

who reputedly leaned forward in his chair like

a:

bulldog, sleeping on a sunny doorstep, who has
been poked in the stomach by the impudent foot of
an itinerant soap-canvasser seriously lackijj^g in
any sense of the most ordinary proprieties
The admiral noted that Hughes' proposals "certainly caused

considerable surprise in many quarters, not excluding the

American naval clique."^*

Arthur Willert, in charge of the

Publicity Section of the B.E.D., later wrote that "the

suggestion knocked everybody backward by its brutal
simpl icity

"**
.

Bal f our was also surprised

,

but took careful

"William Benson, as recorded in Klachko, Admiral
Benson argued in vain against the 5:5:3 ratio,
Benson, 189.
suggesting that France should be allowed the same strength
as Japan in order to prevent an Anglo- Japanese combination
against America.
""Sprouts, New Order
^'David Beatty,

,

155.

as recorded in Roskill,

Last Naval Hero

.

308.

"Arthur Willert, Washington and Other Memories (Boston,
1972), 157.
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notes on the back of a number of envelopes supplied by

Hankey ."^
Balfour and Hankey immediately departed for lunch.
They discussed Hughes' speech, and Balfour laid out the

basic outline of his reply based on the notes taken that
morning.

He would approve the spirit and principle of the

speech but suggest certain reservations as to specific
detail.

These reservations would focus on the abolition of

the submarine, the strength of the auxiliary vessels, and
the replacement schedule for capital ships."'

Admiral Beatty gave Hughes' proposals

a

mixed review.

He accepted the multi-lateral cuts in existing naval

strength.

Beatty strongly opposed the ten year hiatus in

capital ship construction, however, on the grounds the war

had forced Britain to forego heavy ships in order to produce
the necessary anti-submarine vessels, and in consequence,
the suppliers of capital ships were in desperate economic
straits.^'

He wrote: "The difficulty will be in carrying out

the proposed 10 years Naval Holiday" as "we have
al ready ... had a

holiday of

"'Dugdale, Balfour

,

5

years the result of which has

236; Riddell,

Intimate Diary

,

335-

36.

'•Roskill, Hankey

,

Vol

II,

241-42.

^'Beatty was following a line of argument he had
presented to the Cabinet in December 1920. See CAB 16/37/3:
N2 + N4, Admiralty Memoranda, "Naval Construction", December
14 and 20, 1920.
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almost broke the armament firms of the Country."

The

admiral extrapolated that "another 10 years would require
a
large subsidy from the government which would defeat the

Economical objective."

In addition,

the inevitable result

at the end of the proposed holiday would be "a hectic period
of feverish building" by all parties concerned,

prove "greatly more expensive than

building programme.""

a

which would

steady but very small

Beatty made no issue of the 35,000

ton size limit for capital ships, despite its

incompatibility with the Admiralty's battle cruiser design
He may have worried about the adverse

(48,000 tons).

publicity that opposing the constraint could have created,
or, more likely,

he may have believed that D.N.C. Tennyson

D'Eyncourt would successfully modify his designs to meet the
reduced limit.
of the B.E.D.

Beatty 's criticisms would color the thinking
during the early part of the Conference.

The Admiralty team rapidly prepared for the B.E.D. a

paper along similar lines.

The memorandum stated that the

British delegation was in complete agreement with the
proposals of the United States Government with regard to the
capital ships to be retained, arrested in construction, and

"^David Beatty,

as recorded in Roskill,

Last Naval Hero

.

308-09.

similarity between Balfour's initial reactions and
Beatty's detailed analysis is remarkable. Willert,
Washington 157, notes that Beatty passed Balfour "an
obviously anxious note," which probably contained Beatty's
thoughts, during Hughes' speech.
'"^The

,
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scrapped respectively by the British Empire, the United
States and Japan.
The paper then described the proposed
naval holiday as neither "in the best interest of the

economical conditions of the countries concerned" nor

"likely to lead to a stable and durable condition of
armament reduction."

The BNSW surmised that at the end of a

ten year building holiday, governments would desire to

replace their aging vessels only to find their construction

capacity atrophied:
There would follow, therefore, a period of
feverish activity in the shipbuilding world.
Armour plate and gun manufactories would be
revived at great cost and all other specialized
concerns whose products are required to bring to
life a modern capital ship would once more be
brought to life, the process of revivification
being attended by considerable outlay.
Such a period might last six or seven years, with as many as
six ships under construction at the same time.

Thus,

"spasmodic" cycles would cost more than the same

construction stretched across the entire life cycle of the
fleet.

The Admiralty section instead recommended "the

substitution of

a

low and steady rate of ship construction,"

which would reduce the expenditure necessary for
size fleet.

a given

Furthermore, in the eyes of the BNSW, such a

policy would have the added benefit of "diminishing the

warship-building potentialities" of the nations involved

"cab 30/la: B.E.D. 1st Conference, Appendix I, November
13, 1921; ADM 116/2149: Views of the Admiralty Section
regarding the American Proposals, November 13, 1921.
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(e.g.,

two docks continuously occupied, rather than six

docks used seven years of twenty), thus being more likely
to

produce feelings "of mutual confidence" than "intermittent
outbursts of naval rivalry."^'
The BNSW also introduced some additional reservations.

They agreed to the 5:5:3 ratio, with the proviso that it

remained "subject to revision" in case Germany or Russia
showed "any tendency to recreate their naval power."

The

memorandum then argued that the safety of the British Empire
depended on the ability of the Royal Navy to secure
Britain's sea lines of communication, particularly as

pertained to foodstuffs,

a task that

required numerous

cruisers beyond those allocated to the battle fleet.

Such

cruisers, the BNSW argued, constituted "a purely defensive

requirement" and hence should be excluded from any
limitation imposed on fleet strength. 71

The memorandum

closed by advocating "the total abolition" of the submarine,
72
although recognizing the difficulty of such a course.

CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 1st Conference, Appendix I, November
13, 1921; ADM 116/2149: Views of the Admiralty Section
regarding the American Proposals, November 13, 1921.

BNSW here reflected arguments produced earlier in
the Admiralty memorandxim, "One Power Standard", October,
^^The

1921.

that time, the Royal Navy possessed 322,000 tons of
fleet auxiliary tonnage and 180,000 tons dedicated to the
See ADM 116/2149: Notes
protection of sea communications.
on Auxiliary Combat Craft, November 13, 1921.
^*At

^^CAB

30/la: B.E.D. 1st Conference, November 13, 1921.
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Beatty and Lee met with the B.E.D. on the afternoon of

November 13th, when the First Sea Lord presented the views
of the naval staff.

In the process of discussion,

the

B.E.D. agreed that the naval force of France and Italy

"could not be regarded as negligible," as Hughes had
implied.

The British commission then considered and

rejected any possibility of limiting the operating range of
submarines.

The British delegation generally accepted the

views expressed by Admiral Beatty.

Hankey prepared

a

Foreign Secretary.

After the meeting,

summary of Beatty 's analysis for the
At the conclusion of the telegram, which

would reach London the next morning, Balfour indicated his
intention of accepting Hughes' proposal "as regards numbers
of capital ships" while emphasizing the "widespread and

special responsibilities of British Navy" and pointing out
that "certain aspects of the scheme require further study"
73
and therefore "should be referred to a commission."

Alexander Flint, secretary to the BNSW, separately sent

a

precis of the American proposals directly to the Admiralty
Board.

On November 15th, Balfour presented the views of the
He began by reminding those

B.E.D. to the Conference.

30/la: B.E.D. 1st Conference, November 13, 1921.
The telegram alone is recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents
on British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 472-73.
'^CAB

,

^^ADM 1/8 615/207:

1921.

BNSW Memorandum S-1, November 13,
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present that "the British Empire and Great Bri
tain ... are
more profoundly concerned with. .matters
naval than it is
.

possible for any other nation to be" because of
Britain's

dependence on sea-borne transport of foodstuffs.

He then

expressed "admiration and approval" for the general nature
of the proposal,

but noted that it skipped over any

discussion of the navies of the smaller European powers and
avoided the question of land armaments to focus on the
battle fleets of the major powers.

He described the

American proposition as "reasonable" and, playing to the
audience, pronounced: "We think it should be accepted; we

firmly believe it will be accepted."^The elderly British statesman then made clear that the
B.E.D. was not rendering unqualified approval.

During his

summation of Hughes' plan, the Lord President noted that it:
omits all consideration for the time being of
those European nations who have diminished their
fleets, and who at present have no desire, and I
hope never will have any desire, to own fleets
beyond the necessities that national honor and
national defense require.

He was obviously referring to the absence of naval quotas
for France and Italy.

After stating that the occasion was

ill-suited for going into detail, Balfour added: "There are

'XAB 30/3: 2nd Plenary Session, November 15, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament 96-104.
,

2nd Plenary Session, November 15, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, 96-104.
^^CAB 30/3:
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details which can only be adequately dealt with in
committee." He discussed at length Britain's desire

to

limit more severely the tonnage allocation for the
submarine

class and perhaps the size of individual submarines.

Before

closing, the Lord President briefly noted the B.E.D.'s other
two major concerns: "questions concerning replacement"
and

"questions concerning cruisers which are not connected with
or required for fleet actions."

Balfour's mention of the

need for technical experts foreshadowed the difficult

negotiations ahead.
The remainder of the Conference featured the process of

negotiation whereby Britain, Japan, France, and Italy became
reconciled to the American proposals and, to

a

lesser

degree, those proposals evolved to conform to specific

national interests.
Balfour, involved

a

The British position, as stated by

willingness to accept the Hughes plan

conditional upon resolution of five issues: integration of

France and Italy into the allocation of capital ship
strength; acceptance by those nations and Japan of their

allotted strengths; the replacement scheme; recognition of
the British requirement for cruisers dedicated to the

protection of sea lines of communication, apart from those
serving with the battle fleet; and limitation of submarines.

30/3: 2nd Plenary Session, November 15, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, 96-104.
''CAB
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France desired

a

return to her pre-war position as third

naval power, and her unwillingness to accept
Hughes'

decision to base future allocations on current strength
levels would nearly wreck the Conference.

In the words of

the British naval attache in Paris, France "quite
agrees to

everyone else reducing their navy but do not think it
should
apply to them." 78
I

Moreover, she saw submarines as an

inexpensive, efficient means of coastal defense,
that greatly bothered Britain.

equality with France.

a

position

Italy simply desired naval

Japan strongly desired multi-lateral

naval limitation, but believed her national interests

required, and her present strength justified, a ratio of 70%
of the Anglo-American fleets,

Hughes proposed.

rather than the 60% that

As neither the French nor the Japanese

showed any immediate desire to accept the proposals of the

United States, the B.E.D. initially spent much of its time
analyzing the issues of submarines, capital ship
replacement, and cruiser allocation.
The B.E.D. held its second formal session on the

afternoon of November 15th.

After settling details of

procedure regarding meetings and the press, the delegates
discussed the proposals by Secretary Hughes.
a comment from

Responding to

Australian delegate Senator George Pearce on

the importance of cruisers "over and above the ships

^^ADM

21,

1921.

116/2150: Alexander Ramsay to Admiralty, December
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required as complementary to the battle
fleet," Beatty
explained that "the Naval Staff had
carefully considered the
essential need of stationing cruisers
and auxiliary vessels
abroad for the protection of Imperial
communications." it
was essential, from the Navy's viewpoint,
that the B.E.D.

"insist on a ^ration' of auxiliary vessels
over and above
those required for the main fleets. "^^
gg^tty's comments

received general concurrence.

The Canadian representative.

Sir Robert Borden, then inquired as to the feasibility
of

modifying the proposed ten year holiday into
holiday.

a five

year

Beatty fended him off by stating that he was

waiting for information from London, but that he thought "in
the course of detailed expert examination the disadvantages
of the American proposal would become obvious."^''

The B.E.D.

finished their meeting with a discussion of how to limit the
submarine.

Beatty made the point that limiting

a

certain

class of vessel by size, according to national advantage,

might lead to a competition in terms of alternative
proposals for reduction and that total abolition might be
easier to defend.

'CAB 30/la:

*

B.E.D. 2nd Conference, November 15, 1921.

The BNSW separately recommended criticism of the
spasmodic building that would result at the end of a naval
holiday, together with an invitation to the Americans to
draft new proposals.
See ADM 116/2149: Note to First Sea
Lord for Technical Committee, November 15, 1921.
^*CAB 30/la:

B.E.D. 2nd Conference, November 15, 1921.
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Later that evening, the B.E.D. received
guidance from
the Prime Minister.
Lloyd George stated that the C.I.D had

considered the Hughes proposals the day before (November
14th), and that the Cabinet had reviewed the
C.I.D.

conclusions, which were being relayed separately, that

morning (November 15th).

He firmly rejected Beatty's call

for a slow and steady approach to naval construction: "The

sovereign virtue of the naval holiday consists in the fact
that there will for ten years be a complete cessation of

capital shipbuilding."^^

Jutland had given rise to

Using the Admiralty's claim that
a

new standard of capital ship

against them, the Prime Minister noted that

a

construction

freeze would prevent the "existing fleets" from being

"rendered obsolete by the appearance of superior capital
vessels."

Furthermore, he claimed, such an advantage "far

outweighs the convenience of keeping armament plants in

moderate activity by spreading replacements slowly over the
ten years' holiday period."

Lloyd George valued the naval

holiday so highly as to assert that it "also outweighs the

inconvenience of having to make a sudden expansion of

shipbuilding plants at the end of the period."

He then

opined that he would rather "keep the necessary plant in

existence by subsidies than mar the effect to world peace of

Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
,
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the ten years' holiday by building new battleships."^^

The

Prime Minister concluded the first portion of
his telegram

with a blunt warning to his First Sea Lord: "We
should
regret our country taking the lead in such a
proposal [the
slow, steady construction alternative]."^*

Lloyd George then addressed the consequences in light
of "possible building of submarines and aircraft."

He

noted

Britain and the United States will be committed to
powerful, costly, but obsolescent fleets of
battleships almost all of pre-Jutland design.
These battleships will run much greater risks even
from existing submarines than would the new ships
which were projected.
The Prime Minister then observed that the Hughes plan would

restrict the development of capital ships, while "submarine

development in numbers may still be considerable and in

design unlimited."

Nor did he think that the implementation

of the Beatty plan would improve the situation, since "the

bulk of the ships constituting the British and American

Both the BNSW and the Board of Trade desired to
maintain a large ship-building capacity in the private
See
sector in order to retain the element of competition.
ADM 116/2149: Naval Holiday and Arms Subsidies, November 14,
1921; Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 484-85.
,

^^Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
,

'^Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
,
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lines of battle would still remain at
a disadvantage
compared to the constantly improving
submarines." Lloyd

George therefore recommended that "acceptance
of the
American proposal ... carry with it the most
rigorous

restriction of submarine construction, if not
indeed their
complete abolition." The Prime Minister conceded
the

impossibility of regulating developments in air power
because of the close relationship between civil and
military
aviation.
In this cable from London, Lloyd George displayed
once

again his lack of faith in the battleship.
of capital

His description

ships as both "powerful" and "costly" hearkened

to the Fisher era, when such vessels were regarded almost as
a

strategic panacea.

His use of the word "obsolete" to

describe the proud squadrons that had accepted the surrender
of the High Seas Fleet,

however, revealed the shift in naval

defense paradigm that marked the thinking of the British
Cabinet.

In 1919,

Lloyd George had convinced Bonar Law that

spending money on the construction of battleships would be
"a big mistake."

After launching an investigation into the

Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
,

97

Clark Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and
Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York, 1974), 402-35.

David Lloyd George, as recorded in Riddell, Intimate
Diary

,

255.
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future role of the capital ship, the Prime Minister
had
insisted that "it was very necessary to obtain
the views of
men who favoured the Uittle ship'."^^
November 1921, he
had highlighted the vulnerability of capital ships
to

submarines.

Lloyd George believed that the development of

capital ships would inevitably fall further behind advances
in submarine and aerial technologies.

He curtly dismissed

the future of existing battleships, which ran "much greater

risks" from submarines.''^
The Prime Minister's assessment, while probably

exaggerating the vulnerability of the capital ship to the
submarine, nonetheless reflected the inability of capital
ships to protect shipping from submarine attack.

After all,

at the height of the German submarine campaign in 1917,

the

First Sea Lord had informed him:

We are absolute masters of the situation as far as
surface ships are concerned, but it must be
realized. .. that this is all quite useless if the
enemy's submarines paralyse, as they do now, our
lines of communications.
Lloyd George recognized quite rightly that while new

construction techniques might reduce the vulnerability of
capital ships, command of the sea's surface was not

"'CAB

2/3: C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23,

1920.

'^Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
,

"Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Patterson, Jel licoe
Papers Vol II, 160-62.
,
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sufficient to enable Britain to conduct the
sea-borne trade
necessary for her survival. This concern for
the security
of Britain's international commerce also
appeared in the

considerations of the C.I.D., which followed within

a day.

The C.I.D. provided the B.E.D. four primary

conclusions.

First, the committee supported "the limitation

of the number of capital ships."

The C.I.D. skirted the

issue of "the ten years' holiday" versus "a slow and

continuous replacement policy" as "a matter for the Cabinet
to decide."

Second, the defense advisory panel exhorted the

B.E.D. "to minimize the activities of submarines, if not

secure their total abolition."

Third, the C.I.D. recognized

that the Washington powers had to be concerned with the

naval developments of "non-signatory Powers" (i.e., Germany

and Russia)

.

Fourth, the committee voiced concern over any

limitation of Britain's cruiser strength.

The C.I.D. wrote:

The number of British cruisers must be based not
upon the number of cruisers maintained by other
Powers but upon the length and variety of sea
communications over which food and other vital
supplies for the United Kingdom must be
transported.
This final reservation concerning the Britain's need for

additional cruisers reinforced earlier analysis by the naval
staff of the B.E.D.'^

^^Marquess Curzon to Sir Auckland Geddes, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 476-77.
,

"See p. 335 above.
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The early communications between the B.E.D.
and the
Cabinet established a pattern that later events
seldom

disturbed.

Both sides agreed to accept capital ship

limitation, to limit submarines insofar as possible,
and to

seek an extra allowance of cruisers beyond those needed
for
duty with the fleet.

The major dispute within the British

government concerned the wisdom of the naval holiday.

The

Cabinet, lacking naval representation, opposed any

expenditure of funds on a technology distrusted by many,
including the Prime Minister.

The B.E.D. and the Admiralty

opposed the holiday for several reasons.

First, they

worried about its effect on the ship-building industry and
unemployment.

After polling the major naval arms

manufacturers, the Admiralty endorsed

a

continuous program

of two ships every three years as the most effective means
of reducing subsidies and unemployment.'^

Second, both the

B.E.D. and the Admiralty were concerned with the

difficulties of meeting the replacement schedule, which
called for Britain to lay down fourteen ships between 1932
and 1934.

The First Sea Lord explained to the rest of the

delegation that "it was impossible even at present to build
AC

fourteen ships simultaneously."
'^ADM

Third, capital ship

1/8615/206: Admiralty telegram, November 15, 1921.

30/la: B.E.D. 3rd Conference, November 16, 1921.
At the naval subcommittee meeting that day, the United
States recognized that other nations might have difficulty
maintaining armament plants. See ADM 116/2149: Note to
^'CAB
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supporters feared that

a

naval holiday would preclude

improvements in the capital ship and soon "the position
of
the capital ship will have depreciated enormously
in

comparison with new submarines and aircraft."'^
On November 17th, Balfour cabled the views of the
B.E.D. on the naval holiday to the Foreign Secretary.

The

Lord President acknowledged the popular support evoked by
the holiday, but emphasized the need "to examine the dangers

involved in it and not to imperil the security of the

British Empire.

"^^

He indicated that the American Navy was

having second thoughts about the implications of their own
proposals, and that Japan, France, and Italy would raise

separate objections.

Balfour made two observations on the

Prime Minister's reference to government subsidy of armament
firms:

first, that costs would be high and future ministries

might not be able to sustain such

a course;

and second, that

other countries might nationalize their naval construction

plant and thus maintain a superior ability to produce
warships.

He noted the holiday would probably produce

"periodic and violent spells of armament activity at immense

First Sea Lord for Balfour's Committee, November 16, 1921.
116/1776: Admiralty Memorandum, "United States
Proposals for the Reduction of Armaments", November 21,
1921.
^^ADM

^^Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
,

Series, Vol XIV, 480-81.
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cost."

The Lord President then suggested that if the

holiday were to eventuate, it should be extended
to "all
other combat craft as well as to capital ships"

in order to

prevent the Americans and Japanese from improving
their

positions with regard to auxiliary craft.

Balfour also

rebutted the notion that a slow and steady building
program

would not improve the survivability of capital ships against
air and submarine attacks.

He assured the Cabinet that his

naval experts had been instructed to avoid making premature

commitments with regard to the proposed naval holiday.''
This telegram from Balfour clearly indicated that opposition
to the ten years'

holiday was not limited to crusty admirals

whose visions extended only as far as the view from the
bridges of their battleships.
In a separate telegram that night, Balfour gave the

Cabinet

a

general review of the progress of the Conference.

He explained the division of the Conference into two main

branches: one dealing with China and the Pacific, and the
other with naval limitation.

He also described the

establishment of a technical subcommittee of naval experts.

See
The BNSW originated the idea on November 16th.
ADM 116/2149: Note to First Sea Lord for Balfour's
Committee, November 16, 1921. When Beatty proposed it to
See CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 4th
the B.E.D., they concurred.
Conference, November 17th, 1921.
as recorded in
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st

^^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon,

Butler and Bury,
Series, Vol XIV, 480-81.

,
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Balfour concluded by explaining that the involved
nature of
committee work on the American proposals "renders
difficult
any forecast at the present time."-°^

He correctly assessed

the obstacles in the way of any naval agreement.

The following afternoon, Balfour and Beatty met
with

Hughes in an attempt to resolve the capital ship question.
The immediate issue concerned the advisability of permitting
the technical subcommittee to discuss capital ship ratios
for France and Italy.

The British delegates explained their

position that the size of the Royal Navy "cannot be
considered without relation to possible French and Italian
navies."

Hughes agreed, but pointed out that Japan's

consent to the 5:5:3 ratio was the sine qua non of

lasting

a

agreement and should be secured before "embarking on any

subsidiary problems."*^*

The three agreed that Hughes and

Balfour would discuss the relative strength of the three

major powers with Baron Kato.

Britain had agreed to

a

Hughes recognized that while

naval strength relative to that of

America and Japan, the absolute strength of the Royal Navy
was "subject to satisfactory arrangements being reached in

regard to numbers of French and Italian capital ships."

Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 482-83.
,

Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 486.
•'^'Arthur

,
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Finally, the Anglo-American delegates decided
to move very
cautiously with regard to the proceedings of
the technical

subcommittee—in effect, reserving the crucial decisions
the diplomatic level.

at

Balfour subsequently reported the

contents of the meeting to the Foreign Secretary

. -"^^

On November 18th, Balfour met with Hughes and Baron

Tomosaburo Kato.

The chief delegate from Japan, who also

attended the naval subcommittee, stated his dissatisfaction
with Hughes' proposal that Japan accept 60% of the capital
ship strength of the Atlantic powers and demanded an
'03

increase.'

Hughes explained that his plan reflected

existing strengths rather than national requirements, which
could be subject to "endless and inconclusive discussion."*''*

He then stated that according to his experts, Japan was

entitled to only 50% of the Anglo-American strength.
Balfour declared his support for the American approach,

despite his opinion that "the British Empire stood more in
need of battleships than the United States."

Kato, tacitly

Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 486.
,

The B.E.D. had known for three days Japan desired a
capital ship ratio of 10-10-7, together with a strength in
aircraft carriers equal to the United States and Britain,
and that Japan was not prepared to scrap either the Mutsu or
See CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 3rd Conference, November 16,
the Aki
.

1921.

Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 489.
''^^Arthur

,
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accepting Hughes' methodology, then expressed
his desire to
check the accuracy of the American calculations.
The

meeting ended on a cordial

note.*^^

That same day, Kankey met with Sadao Saburi

,

the

Secretary-General of the Japanese delegation, to discuss the

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Balfour had wanted to cover the

Alliance with his counterpart. Baron Kijuro Shidehara, but
the latter's illness had prevented a meeting.

The Lord

President thus authorized Hankey to discuss the issue with
Saburi, who indicated Japan's willingness to transform the

Alliance into

a

tripartite arrangement.

Hankey explained

the American concern to avoid security commitments and

delivered numerous documents outlining the British
position.*

The timing of these meetings reinforced the

relationship between any future naval limitation agreement
and the ultimate disposition of the Alliance.

Diplomatic talks thus proceeded in parallel with naval
discussions.

On November 23rd, the Lord President provided

Baron Kato--Shidehara had not yet recovered--copies of the

Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 489.
,

to Balfour, in Enclosure 1, Arthur Balfour to
Marquess Curzon, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents
1st Series, Vol XIV, 505-09.
on British Foreign Policy
''''Hankey

,
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draft tripartite agreement given to

then modified the proposal into

After receiving Shidehara'

s

a

Hughes.*'^'

Shidehara

purely consultive pact.

scheme on the morning of

November 26th, Balfour discussed it with Root and
Lodge that
afternoon.
The Americans were inclined to accept but

suggested that the arrangement be modified to include
France.

C3
^

By this time,

each of the three major naval

powers had proposed slightly different versions of

multi-

a

lateral agreement designed to replace the Angl o- Japanese

Alliance, the latest (American) version requiring the

participation of France, as yet unaware of the negotiations.
The Japanese naval section, meanwhile, continued to

oppose the capital strength ratio of 5:5:3.

They pressed

for a definition of existing strength, explained by their

American counterparts as post-dreadnought ships with keels
laid, by percentage complete.

The Japanese were not

satisfied with the American decision to include ships under

construction (i.e., not yet prepared to fight).

Vice-

Admiral Hiroharu Kato's naval section disputed the figures

provided by the United States Navy, with regard to
compl eteness and to the exclusion of pre-dreadnought ships

Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 505-08.
,

as recorded in
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st

*^^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon,

Butler and Bury,
Series, Vol XIV, 512-13.

,
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The American delegation gave some ground and
raised their
calculation of Japan's existing strength from
49% to about
58% of the U.S. Navy, but refused to agree to Japan's

desired 70% ratio.
The B.E.D. considered the discussions between Japan
and
the United States on the afternoon of November 28th.

Chatfield briefed the delegates on the latest developments
in naval arms limitation.
a careful

American naval authorities, after

refutation of Japanese objections, thought that

Japan might accept the Hughes proposals.

The admiral

anticipated being asked at the next subcommittee meeting to
evaluate the 5:5:3 ratio.

He intended to answer that the

proposal seemed reasonable from "a world-wide point of view'*
and that Japan "could accept the 5:5:3 ratio safely and

remain as strong as any of the Western Powers would be in
the Pacific Ocean.

""'^

Chatfield then turned to the latest

sticking point between the United States and Japan, the fate
of the Mutsu

.

The Japanese, who claimed the battleship was

fully complete and practically in commission, certainly

wanted to retain their newest capital ship.

The Americans,

Chatfield estimated, would want to keep as compensation two

-^'ADM

1/8615/207: BNSW Memorandum S-2, November 24,

1921.

8th Conference, November 28, 1921.
This presentation reflected views expressed in a paper that
See ADM 116/2149:
Chatfield wrote the previous day.
B.N.S.W. Memorandum, "The 5-5-3 Ratio", November 27, 1921.
"'CAB 30/la: B.E.D.
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more battleships of the Maryland class, each almost
90%
finished, thus retaining a 3:2 advantage in
post- Jutland
capital ships completed.
Britain would probably receive
authority "to design and build two new capital ships
of
35,000 tons."^"

The three major naval powers were thus on

the verge of a naval limitation agreement.

Curzon

a

Balfour sent

telegram which apprised the Cabinet of the

situation on November 30th.
Balfour called on Baron Tomosaburo Kato, the chief

delegate from Japan, early the afternoon of December 1st to
discuss naval limitation.

Kato explained that he was

personally convinced of the need for naval limitation, but
that he needed some assistance in order to portray

concession of the 60% ratio of capital ships to Japanese
public opinion as something other than capitulation.*'^

The

Japanese delegate explained to Balfour that his naval

advisors still believed Japan was entitled to

based on the American

f ormul a

of

a

ratio of 70%

existing strength

Bal

.

f

our

8th Conference, November 28, 1921.
This presentation reflected views expressed in a paper that
Chatfield wrote the previous day.
See ADM 116/2149:
5-5-3
Ratio", November 27, 1921.
B.N.S.W. Memorandum, "The
***CAB

30/la: B.E.D.

Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
,

Series, Vol XIV, 524.

"Japanese naval historian Hiroyuki Agawa, in The
Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Japanese Navy
notes that Kato felt obliged to accept naval limitation due
to the rising cost of the Japanese battlefleet, which in
1921 absorbed one-third of the national budget.
,
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noted that if Japanese recalcitrance caused the
Conference
to fail, the United States would surely
embark on a large

program of capital ship construction that would worsen
Japan's strategic position.

Kato then discussed the

strategic position in the Pacific and suggested that
"Japan's objections would be removed if America would

undertake to observe the status quo as regards
fortifications in the Pacific," mentioning Manila, Guam, and
Hawaii by name.

Balfour immediately pointed out that "there

was a distinct difference between Manila and Guam, which are

respectively within 1,318 and 1,360 miles of Japan, and
Hawaii, which is 3,374 miles distant."

Kato conceded the

point and then emphasized the political difficulty of

scrapping the battleship Mutsu

,

paid for by the savings of

Japanese schoolchildren and already serving with the fleet.
Balf our then obtained Kato's permission to share his views

with Hughes

-'"^

At no point in the conversation had either

delegate referred to the development of Singapore.
Balfour facilitated the unraveling of the tangled skein
of security issues.

Armed with Kato's concessions to

Hughes' proposal, the Lord President called upon the

Secretary of State.

After Balfour recounted his

conversation with Kato, Hughes noted that allowing Japan to
retain the Mutsu "would make

**^CAB 30/la:
December 2, 1921.

a

bad hole in the American

B.E.D. 10th Conference, Appendix

I,
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proposal" and that America also had several ships
close to
completion, to which Balfour agreed. Hughes
then suggested
a new arrangement whereby:

America and Japan should reciprocally agree that
if either one or the other were to desire to
erect
fortifications in the Pacific, the opposite party
should be notified, and should then have the right
to terminate the whole of the naval agreement.
Balfour gently dismissed the Secretary's counter-proposal as

introducing "a certain element of instability" and induced
him to carry the Japanese proposal to President Harding."'
The Lord President then sent a report of his discussions to
the Foreign Secretary."^

Balfour then received London's comments on his report
dealing with the deadlock between America and Japan.
Prime Minister related the C.I.D.'s conclusions.

The

First,

Britain should accept Japanese retention of the Mutsu

,

with

the United States and Britain each being allowed two new

vessels in compensation, as the British fleet would gain the

greatest relative strength and the new construction would
reduce unemployment on the Clyde and Tyne.

Second, despite

Admiralty objections, Britain should accept the naval
holiday with regard to capital ships.

Lloyd George here

again demonstrated his loss of faith in the capital ship:

CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 10th Conference, Appendix II,
December 2, 1921.
"'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 529-30.
,
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We cannot exclude from our minds the
possibility
that in ten years time the march of science
in
aviation,
submarines, torpedoes, shells and
explosives may render it impossible to construct
an inexpugnable capital ship especially within
the
tonnage limit governing replacements.

m

Third, Britain would not necessarily replace capital
ships
as fast as the Hughes plan allowed, when minor
delays would

allow far more economical construction by obviating the need
for retaining excessive construction capacity.

The C.I.D.

also agreed that Britain should press for the abolition of

submarines and, if frustrated, retain "entire freedom in

building anti-submarine craft.""'

With these instructions, Balfour met with Kato and
Hughes on December 2nd.

Kato repeated at greater length his

presentation of the previous afternoon, with the distinction
that Japan desired the status quo with regard to bases as
well as fortifications.

Hughes replied in great detail.

He

linked American acceptance of the status quo in the Pacific
to Japanese acceptance of both the capital ship agreement of

15:15:9 (end state) and a four power treaty in the Pacific
to replace the Angl o- Japanese Alliance.

Hughes further made

clear that America could not accept any limitation of the

development of Hawaii, which he described as too far from
Japan to serve as an offensive base.

Balfour reiterated his

advocacy of the capital ship agreement "on the grounds of

"Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy
Series, Vol XIV, 526-28.

,

1st
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general policy."

He supported Japan's proposal to maintain

the status quo in the Pacific as reasonable
and opined the

effect of those two proposals together with the
quadruple

Pacific arrangement would be to ensure the safety of Japan.
The meeting ended cordially, Kato reserving acceptance

pending word from Tokyo.
The following day, Balfour dispatched a pair of

telegrams to Curzon.

The first one reported the State

Department meeting with Hughes and Kato.

The second one

related a brief conversation at the end of the meeting

between Hughes and Kato concerning the proposed four power
treaty intended to replace the Angl o- Japanese Alliance.

Kato had explained that he was waiting on instructions from
his government, but that the Japanese delegation to the

Conference accepted the quadruple arrangement and that he
saw no reason to believe he would receive instructions to
the contrary.

They had discussed approaching French

delegate Rene Viviani, whom Hughes described as quite

sensitive at the relatively minor role thus far allowed to
France.

Balfour also sought confirmation of his authority

to accept the proposed four power treaty.

Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 533-34.
,

"'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
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On the afternoon of December 7th, the
B.E.D. met for
the eleventh time.
Balfour informed the delegation that he

had received from Hughes
Pacific.

a

draft agreement regarding the

He described the quadruple treaty, involving
the

United States, Britain, Japan, and France, as closely
resembling the British proposals.

He had

a

meeting

scheduled with Hughes and Kato, and, if the latter agreed,
Hughes would ask France to associate.

After minor revision,

the B.E.D. accepted the draft four power treaty.*^-

That night, the Foreign Secretary sent guidance to the
B.E.D.

regarding the four power arrangement for the Pacific.

Curzon welcomed the enlargement of the Angl o- Japanese

Alliance to include IVmerica.
"always contemplated

United States."**

a

He noted that Britain had

tripartite arrangement with the

He took a less positive view, however,

toward other participants.

The Foreign Secretary predicted

"the admission of France, although tolerable if required to

secure the adhesion of America, will probably seriously

diminish the value of the proposed substitute for alliance
in Japanese eyes."

Curzon flatly opposed including Italy,

who had "no substantial interests in the Far East and whose
inclusion, in the Foreign Secretary's opinion, "would in all

CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 11th Conference, Appendix, December
1921.
*

7,

'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 539-40.
,
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probability lead to similar and embarrassing requests" by
other small powers."^
The following day, December 8th, Admiral Chatfield

received a visit from a Japanese naval officer, Katsunoshin
Yamanashi."-

Yamanashi

,

at the behest of Japan's senior

naval representative. Vice Admiral Hiroharu Kato, wanted to

discuss matters concerned with Pacific security.

He

suggested that Japan would accept the status quo with regard
to bases and fortifications if the United States did so at

Manila, Guam, and Hawaii, whereupon Chatfield told him, as

Hughes had told Kato, that the United States might agree to

Manila and Guam, but not to Hawaii, which was at least 3,000
miles from Japan.

Yamanashi then asked about Singapore and

Hong Kong, probably the real reason for the visit.

Chatfield told him Britain would probably agree to leave
Hong Kong as it was, but not Singapore.

Yamanashi seemed

satisfied with this, and suggested that the delegates could
move quickl y if the admi ral s agreed
Two days

1

ater

,

Secretary Hughes convened the 4th

Plenary Session of the Conference on the Limitation of
Armament.

He then yielded the floor to Senator Henry Cabot

Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 539-40.
,

'^"Chatfield refers to him as a captain, while the
conference record lists him as a rear admiral.
^^'ADM
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Lodge, who read to the assembled delegates the text of the

Four Power Treaty between the United States, Britain,
France, and Japan.

The first clause called for the

signatories, in the case of controversy among themselves,
to
"invite the other High Contracting Parties to

conference."

a

joint

The second clause required the participants to

"communicate with each other fully and frankly" in the case
of outside aggression.

The third clause defined the life of

the treaty as ten years and thereafter until one year beyond

denunciation by one of the contracting parties.

The final

clause established that ratification of the treaty by all

parties would terminate the Angl o- Japanese Alliance.

Balfour rose to deliver
Alliance.

a

eulogy to the Angl o- Japanese

He noted that the Alliance, which he had

concluded originally in 1902, had "been the cause of much
searching of heart, of some suspicions, of

a

good deal of

animadversion in important sections of opinion in the United
States."

Balfour acknowledged that 2^merican opinion could

rightly point out that the original conditions that had

given rise to the agreement no longer endured, but then
asked that same opinion to recognize that the ties forged

CAB 30/3: 4th Plenary Session, December 10, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament 146-180.
,

30/3: 4th Plenary Session, December 10, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conferen ce on the
Limitation of Armament, 146-180.
-^^CAB

between Britain and Japan had "stood the strain
of common
sacrifices, common anxieties, common efforts, common
triumphs" through two wars.

He explained that Britain,

faced with the choice of offending America by
retaining the

Alliance and offending Japan by denouncing it, had long
desired to replace the existing treaty with one "which
should embrace all the Powers concerned in the vast area of
the Pacific."

Balfour concluded by manifesting his hope

that the Four Power Treaty would facilitate a naval arms

agreement
That same day, Balfour received a pointed cable from

Curzon asking for information concerning the status of the
ten years' holiday.

The Foreign Secretary claimed that the

Cabinet was concerned about American press reports "to the
effect Hhat the British naval experts have pointed out to
the American naval experts that the scheme as announced by
Mr, Hughes, however well meant, will not work in

practice.'"*"

He further declared that the Cabinet had

received little information about developments at the

30/3: 4th Plenary Session, December 10, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament 146-180.
-^'CAB

,
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Conference beyond a letter from Hankey.*^^

Curzon flatly

stated
The ten years' absolute naval holiday in capital
ship construction originally proposed by the
United States ought to be accepted definitely as
the policy to which Great Britain will subscribe.
He then criticized the notion of British naval experts

helping out their American counterparts, an action that he

described as "a gratuitous and even

a

wanton task."

Curzon

went so far as to suggest that "admirals on both sides" were

pursuing a joint game to frustrate the desires of their
"governments and peoples."*^'
The Foreign Secretary was careful to explain, however,
that the naval holiday did not extend to "cruisers and small
craft."---

He stated that "the purely naval interests of

Great Britain" would be satisfied by "a ten years' absolute
naval holiday in capital ship construction" and either

-'That statement appears very curious in light of
Balfour's frequent cables to Curzon. The Lord President
first raised the subject on November 17th and on the 28th
had provided a significant analysis of both the Mutsu
arrangements and the "exceptional difficulties" of
implementing the ten years' holiday. Balfour had at that
time written to the Cabinet that the "Americans admit
mistake of launching the idea before realizing
impracticability." Roskill, Hankey Vol II, 253, notes that
Churchill originally drafted the telegram and probably
supplied the bombastic tone.
,

as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 544-45.
-^'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour,

,
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"perfect freedom in the construction of smaller
craft" or
"the abolition of submarines plus a limited
construction of

smaller craft."

Curzon concluded by suggesting the House

would not be pleased if the B.E.D failed to
secure
holiday.* 32

naval

a

'

These instructions from London once again

indicated a greater concern for anti-submarine capability
than for battleships.
The Cabinet cable elicited a double response.

Beatty submitted

a

insubordination.

First,

note denying the charge of
He wrote:

have read Telegram No. 101 to Mr. Balfour with
the utmost amazement, and I desire to place on
record that there is no foundation in fact for the
statements therein made, that the British Naval
experts are working in collusion with the United
States Naval experts to frustra|:e the views of the
Governments of both countries.
I

Two days later, Balfour sent Curzon

explanatory value.

a

telegram with greater

He stated that on the evening following

Hughes' proposals, Lord Lee had dined with the Secretary of
the Navy, who "had already realised holes in 10 years'

holiday and was much disturbed by discovery," while the

Cabinet's views had not reached the B.E.D.

In that

Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
,

Series, Vol XIV, 544-45.
-"adM 116/1176: Beatty Note, December 10, 1921.
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circumstance, Balfour judged, discussions were
inevitable,
and he had in fact approved of them. He
refrained from

pointing out the obvious falsehood of the charge of
failing
to keep London informed.
On November 17th and 28th, he
had

submitted detailed analyses of the naval holiday to the
Foreign Secretary.

In the latter telegram, Balfour pointed

out the ludicrous situation that would come to pass under

the Hughes plan, whereby the three major powers would have
to begin constructing 27 capital ships within a two year

period.-"

holiday.

Mutsu.

.

The Lord President refused to endorse the naval
He claimed that "refusal of Japanese to surrender

.destroys 10 year holiday at least in its original

form.""'

From that point forward, however, Balfour no

longer attempted to sway the Cabinet to oppose the naval

building holiday.
On the afternoon of December 12th, the Committee on

Limitation of Armament met briefly.

The delegates modified

the naval subcommittee to include the heads of delegations

"'CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 8th Conference, November 28, 1921.
Also recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on British
In a separate
Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 519-21.
paper to the Cabinet, the Admiralty argued the difficulties
of expanding Britain's naval building capacity after a long
dormant period. Capital outlay for armor plate plant would
cost some £30 millions, with annual subsidies for slips,
plate, and gun mountings running to £5-6 millions per year.
,

See ADM 116/1776: Admiralty Memorandum, "American proposals
for the Limitation of Naval Armaments", November 30, 1921.
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as well as both a civilian and a naval

expert.

In practice,

that meant the head of delegation plus his naval
minister

and senior admiral.

The new

group was called the

Subcommittee of Fifteen on Naval Limitation.*'^
The new arrangement served to allow the naval experts to

modify Hughes' proposals for capital ship retention and
scrapping in order to accommodate Japan's desire to retain
the Mutsu while preserving the 5:5:3 ratio.

Theodore Roosevelt, the American naval expert,

developed

a

naval limitation proposal that would enable

Japan to retain the Mutsu.

The three major naval powers

would agree to the 5:5:3 ratio for capital ships while

maintaining the status quo in the Pacific with regard to
fortifications and bases.

In order to retain the Mutsu

Japan would agree to scrap the Settsu

,

,

thus retaining 10 (2

post- Jutland) capital ships of 313,300 tons.

The exchange

would increase the total displacement of Japan's fleet by
13,600 tons.

In compensation,

the United States would

receive permission to complete two ships of the 1916
Program, Col orado and Washington

Dakota and Del aware

.

,

and scrap the older North

America would thus retain 18

(3

post-

Jutland) ships of 525,850 tons, increasing her total capital

ship tonnage by 25,200 tons.

Britain in turn would be

3rd Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
Also recorded in U.S. State
of Armament, December 12, 1921.
Department, Conference on the Limitation o f Armament, 442444.
"'CAB 30/9:
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allowed to construct two new vessels of 35,000 tons
and then
to scrap 4 ships of King Georas V type: Ajax
Centurion
.

and King Georas V.

.

Britain would then possess 20

post-Jutland) ships of 578,050 tons,
fleet displacement of 26,400 tons.

a

(3

reduction in her

This proposal would

increase the end state tonnages authorized to 525,000 tons
for the British and American fleets and 315,000 for Japan
and, with Mutsu arrangements excepted, maintain the ten

years' naval holiday.

The entire proposal was contingent

upon successful incorporation of France and Italy.
The B.E.D. did not immediately agree to Roosevelt's

proposal, as British naval experts sought a displacement
larger than the 35,000 ton standard for their two

compensatory ships.

Capital ship design, for any given

size, involves trade-offs between hitting power, armor

protection, speed, and range.

Increased displacement allows

improved performance in any of the above qualities (larger
vessels, surprisingly, move through the water more

efficiently).

British designers traditionally chose

relatively large ships in order to obtain the offensive
The

power and the range necessary for their naval doctrine.

Hood

,

for example, exceeded 41,000 tons, while the newest

American battleships displaced only 32,600 tons each.

Given

the need to protect capital ships against the airplane and

"'ADM 1/8615/207: BNSW Memorandum S-9, December 21,

1921.
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the submarine in the relatively enclosed waters of the

Mediterranean and the North Sea, the Admiralty chose

a

displacement of 45,000 tons for Britain's newest capital
ships.

On November 21st, in response to a query by Beatty,

the Controller had opposed the 35,000 ton limit on capital

ships and stated that 45,000 tons "is considered minimum to

meet satisfactorily attacks from existing guns, torpedoes
and aircraft, and to embody adequate speed and radius of

action for British Empire needs."

On December 7th, the

Admiralty informed the BNSW that ships of 35,000 tons, with
adequate protection against torpedoes mounting 750-lb
warheads, could carry only nine 15-inch guns, rather than
the 16-inch guns specified in the 45,000 ton designs.*^'

On

December 13th, Balfour therefore argued to Hughes and Kato
that Britain should receive permission to build two

battleships of 45,000 tons, on which much money, time, and
labor had been expended, while scrapping four ships of the

King George V class.

Kato agree, but Hughes demurred.

They

adjourned to consult their naval advisors.
The following day, Balfour, Hughes, and Kato met again
to discuss compensation for the Mutsu.

Balfour reiterated

his arguments of the day before, emphasizing that within the

'•^'ADM

1/8615/207: Admiralty telegram, December

7,

1921.
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classes being scrapped, British ships were both
heavier and
newer.
In the newer classes, however, advantage
rested with
the American vessels.
The three leaders agreed that if

Britain were to build two ships comparable to the Hood
would have to scrap
King George Vs.

,

she

battle cruiser in addition to the four

a

Britain would retain an advantage of 50,000

tons (575,000 versus 525,000) to compensate for the age of

her pre-Jutland ships.

Discussion then focused on the

impact of the super- Hoods on the replacement schedule.

The

extra displacement of those vessels would force Britain to

choose between new capital ships of less than 35,000 tons

displacement or maintaining only fourteen full size vessels.
Hughes then repeated Roosevelt's original proposal, whereby

Britain would retain

a

(578,000 to 525,000).

similar advantage of 53,000 tons
The three men then took a brief

recess to consider the two alternatives in conjunction with
Lee and Chatfield suggested that the

their naval experts.

matter should be referred to London.*'*
Balfour raised
discussion.

a

new issue upon resumption of the

On Chatfield's urging, he brought to the

attention of the American and Japanese delegates the

difference between British and American methods of
determining displacement.

American displacement figures

Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 558-59.
-'•'Arthur

,
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included fuel oil and water, while British legend tonnage
did not.--^ Thus the British figures represented
a slightly
larger vessel (35,000 legend tons equals 37,000 tons
by the

American standard).

Balfour explained the additional weight

would enable designers to provide additional protection
against air and sea menaces and that British experts

considered the difference essential to the construction of
the properly balanced ship.*-"

This line of argument

impressed neither Hughes nor Kato.

The meeting thus ended

without resul t
On the morning of December 15, Balfour amplified his

argument about the importance of the difference in tonnage
calculations.

Hughes accepted the British position, and

then appealed to Balfour to forego the super- Hood s as

violating the spirit of the limitation agreement.

Balfour

accepted the standard size limit of 35,000 tons (now 37,000
tons

for Britain 's compensatory ships

)

.

Chatf ield,

however, remained dissatisfied and continued to press his

•

1947),

Ernie Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (London,
5.
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view that tonnage limitation remained susceptible to

subterfuge and that numbers of capital ships were much more
easily verified.

--^

The three major naval powers thus agreed

to Roosevelt's scheme, as modified by the change in tonnage

standard (5:5:3 ratio, capital ship limitation of 35,000
tons,

the ten year naval holiday, Mutsu arrangements

excepted, and status quo in the Pacific), conditional upon
the inclusion of France and Italy.

The Conference had its first major indication of the

attitude of France toward arms limitation on November 21st.

Aristide Briand, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
spoke eloquently of the desire in France for peace, a

prospect impaired by "the moral aspect of the problem in

Germany."

He quoted extensively from a recent publication

by General Erich Ludendorff, who described war as "a natural

phenomenon" and "the last and only decisive factor in the
settlement of political questions,"

Briand addressed the

German capacity for rearmament, including factories, war
materials, and seven million trained soldiers.

He concluded

by explaining that France requested the Conference to

declare its understanding of French intentions to maintain

sizeable army.**^

a

France thus asked the delegates to exclude

land armaments from limitation.

••^ADM

116/2149: Chatfield Memorandum, December 16,

-^^CAB

30/3: 3rd Plenary Session, November 21, 1921.

1921.

That same day, the British Cabinet received two
divergent communications regarding the intentions

of France

From Washington, Balfour sent record of an interview
in
which Briand expressed the view that the American

participation in the naval conference was motivated
primarily by the Harding Administration's desire for
political gain that would result from tax reductions

following naval disarmament.

Briand further declared that

Hughes was ignorant of conditions in Europe and the Far
East.

Balfour therefore concluded that Briand had realized

that "France had nothing to hope for from the United States

and that "co-operation with Britain was essential for
France.

"'"^

From Paris, however, the British Ambassador had
different outlook.

a

very

Lord Hardinge explained that French

public opinion had viewed the Washington Conference "with
certain amount of apprehension" as France appeared to lack

prominent position in disarmament discussions.**'
France could hope for was

a

The best

divergence of American and

British interests requiring the services of a mediator.
Balfour's response to the Hughes plan, however, had

Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 489-90.
,

Hardinge to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 490-93.
^^^Lord

,
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virtually eliminated that possibility.

The Hughes plan

itself had caused the greatest unrest.

French defense

needs, dictated by

necessitated
all,

a

a

large coastline and overseas colonies,

large force of "light cruisers and, above

submarines."

British attempts to abolish these craft

had been aimed at France, with a view to dominating the

Mediterranean.

The Senate Naval Committee had thus

increased the number of submarines authorized over the next
three years from 36 to 60.

In Hardinge's opinion,

France

would demand authorization to build to the position of third
naval power.*"

The second meeting of the Committee on Limitation of

Armament took place on the morning of November 23rd.

In

accordance with guidance from Lloyd George, Balfour raised
the question of the limitation of land armaments."*

replied that France constituted

a

Briand

special case--since the

Conference was unwilling to guarantee assistance, France
would decide her own requirements.

He countered by

suggesting subcommittees on aircraft, gases, and the laws of
war.

Briand refused to accept any limitation on French

military strength without international guarantees, however.

Hardinge to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 490-93.
''"Lord

,

-•-Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British For eign Policy, 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 494.
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and stated that on that subject he "had received

explicit mandate" from the French Pari iament

.

a

very

That

afternoon, the Committee on Program and Procedure
with

respect to Limitation of Armament established the

subcommittees suggested by Briand.*^^
On November 24th, the B.E.D. received two related

cables from London.

After the C.I.D. considered the French

intentions of resisting any limitation of military and
aerial strength, combined with possible expansion of their

submarine forces, Curzon sent his personal appreciation of
the position to Balfour.

The Foreign Secretary predicted:

The situation of this country vis-a-vis France
will become impossible if British Navy is to be
restricted in accordance with the American
proposals while the French army continues on the
scale of at least a hundred divisions together
with overwhelming aviation and the inten|:ion to
build a very large fleet of submarines."'

After describing the French Army as "a serious menace to the
peace and freedom of Europe", he pointed out the degree to

which the Royal Air Force was outnumbered by its French

CAB 30/9: 2nd Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
Also recorded in U.S. State
of Armament, November 23, 1921.
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament 422,

444.

2nd Meeting of the Committee on Program and
Procedure with Respect to Limitation of Armament, November
Also recorded in U.S. State Department,
23, 1921.
Conference on the Limitation of Armament 410-416.
"^CAB 30/8:

,

"Sdarquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 495-97.
,
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counterpart.

Curzon then noted the decision by the French

Senate to construct 24 additional submarines beyond the
12

already funded.

He wrote: "We cannot contemplate

a

situation where Great Britain would be in a few years at the
mercy of France if present happy relations were to

deteriorate."

The Foreign Secretary urged Balfour to enlist

American assistance to achieve "a general disarmament rather
than disarmament by Britain alone."

He concluded by

rejecting a naval arms limitation agreem.ent by the three

major powers without French participation.""'
The Foreign Secretary then sent another cable which

contained the views of the Prime Minister.

Lloyd George

took a similar line to that followed by Curzon: he disputed
the French need for a massive army, he worried about the

potential of

a

French air attack on Britain, and he regarded

growth in the French submarine fleet as "the most serious
matter of all."

The Prime Minister stated:

France dominates the sea approaches to the United
Kingdom from the south and could make the English
Channel and the Mediterranean Sea impossible for
British sea-borne trade by the use of her
submarines
He noted that in a war with France, Britain would require "a

"'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 495-97.
,

as recorded in
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st

-•'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour,

Butler and Bury,
Series, Vol XIV, 497-500.

,
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very large force of destroyers and small craft"--in fact,

a

much larger force than the American proposals would permit.
Lloyd George then reiterated his bias in favor of smaller
vessels: "The capital ships of Great Britain are becoming

obsolete as regards resisting attack by submarines and air
attack."

He urged the abolition of the submarine, and

suggested Balfour adopt "an uncompromising attitude
regarding M. Briand's military and possible air proposals"
as a bargaining chip.*"^

Later that same day, Balfour sent a reply to London
that registered his unhappiness over his recent

instructions.

He emphasized

-che

importance of countering

the "post- Jut 1 and naval programme of the United States.

"*^^

While that goal remained possible, according to Balfour,
France was in

a

position to frustrate its achievement.

The

Lord President explained that France was being asked to
accept an extraordinarily subordinate naval position in the
world, and that antagonizing France by opposing the size of

her military forces was an act of folly.

risking

a

He characterized

probable naval arms agreement in an attempt to

secure an improbable military limitation treaty as "not the

"Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy
Series, Vol XIV, 497-500.

,

1st

as recorded in
Documents on British For eign Policy, 1st

-^'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon,

Butler and Bury,
Series, Vol XIV, 503-05.
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highest wisdom."

Balfour indicated his intention of

attempting the abolition of submarines but admitted
little
hope of success."^
On November 25th, the Admiralty provided the Cabinet

with the latest information from France.

Captain Alexander

Ramsay, the naval attache in Paris, had reported on November

18th that France intended to claim pride of place as "the

third naval power.

""^

The French would likely request

agreement to build to such

probably not do so.

a

position, although they would

French naval officials thought America

desired submarines as

"

le moyen de defense de cotes a bon

marche " (inexpensive coastal defense), and did not

understand Britain's lack of desire to have submarines for
colonial defense.

Lastly, France wanted compensation for

not having built during the war.

reported again.

Five days later, Ramsay

This time, he conveyed the French intention

to refuse to accept any limitation of submarine strength

below that of the strongest power.

He explained the French

willingness to limit capital ship strength as a means of
reducing the gap between British and French sea power.

Ramsay then cited

a

work by French Captain Raoul Castex

that, in his opinion, clearly supported the German methods

"'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 503-05.
,

"•ADM 116/1776: Admiralty Memorandum, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", November 25, 1921.
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of unrestricted submarine warfare.

The French interpreted

British opposition to the submarine as an attack on
themselves.

The Admiralty also forwarded Ramsay's

information to the B.E.D., with emphasis on the French
intention to demand
the strongest powers

a

submarine strength equal to that of

.

Early on the morning of November 27th, Lloyd George

answered Balfour's request of the 25th for Cabinet

reconsideration of policy guidance.
C

.

I

.

D

.

He explained that the

saw "the enormous French armies" as

European peace."

a

"menace to

Lloyd George dismissed "the claim of

France and consequently of Italy to build up to the standard
of the 3rd naval power.

"'"'

He was far more concerned with

the growth of hostile submarine fleets in European waters.

He suggested allowing the Latin powers to expand their

capital ship strength in exchange for "the virtual abol ition
of the submarines or at least the prevention of new building

of submarines of any kind."

limit their batt lef leets

,

If

France and Italy refused to

Lloyd George advised Balfour to

accept a capital ship treaty with America and Japan.

If

116/1776: Admiralty Memorandum, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", November 25, 1921.
*^*ADM

^^^ADM

1/8615/207: Admiralty telegrams, November 26,

1921.
as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on Bri tish Foreign Policy, 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 513-16.
^^^Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour,
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they persisted in building submarines, however,
then

Britain:

could agree to no limitation upon the smaller
vessels, light cruisers, destroyers, etc. which
would be vital with a deadly submarine menace so
near her doors and... to protect our food supplies
from the submarine menace.
Here, the Prime Minister indicated a willingness to spend

money to prepare against the one naval threat he genuinely
feared

'^^
.

On the morning of December 9th, Balfour talked with

Hughes about the ratio of capital ships to be allocated to

France under the naval limitation proposal.

After

meeting

a

with Viviani and Shidehara to place the finishing touches on
the four power arrangement for Pacific security, the Anglo-

American delegates stayed behind.

Balfour informed Hughes

that Viviani had approached the Lord President with

instructions from Paris "to the effect that France was
likely to ask for the same proportion as

Japan."*""'

Hughes

said he regretted not formally raising the issue with

France

,

but he bel ieved agreement on the Japanese ratio took

priority.

The Secretary of State noted that France

possessed seven modern capital ships displacing about

'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Doc^oments on British Foreign Policy
Series, Vol XIV, 513-16.

,

1st

as recorded in Butler and Bury,
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV,
548.
-^^Hankey Note,

,
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170,000 tons, together with some older vessels.

He stated

that in his discussions with Viviani and
French Ambassador

Jules Jusserand, the French delegates had implied
that their

nation would be content with an allocation of about
175,000
tons although she would prefer authorization to build to
the
level of the third power.

thought 175,000 tons was

Hughes had suggested that he
a

fair allocation.

Balfour, at

that time, refrained from speculating on the effect of the

French demand on the British position, although Hughes had
already acknowledged the linkage.*'"
The agreement of Britain, Japan, and the United States
to accept the 5:5:3 ratio, as modified to include the Mutsu

arrangements, collided with French intransigence.

On

December 15th, the Subcommittee of Fifteen met to discuss

American addenda to the original proposals whereby France
and Italy would receive a quota of 175,000 tons of capital
ships.

French Admiral F.J. de Bon made the first public

profession of France's position toward capital ship
limitation.

He declared that the situation in which France

found herself was "entirely different from that of the three

powers whose ratio had already been settled."*"

France, who

as recorded in Butler and Bury,
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV,
548
*^Siankey Note,

,

.

Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 561-62.
'•^Arthur Balfour to

,

381

had possessed 28 capital ships in 1914. had lost over

210,000,000 working days which would have been spent on the
fleet. Her current strength of

7

modern ships and

3

older

vessels was "quite insufficient for her great mission in
the

world."

France could not build now, but could not agree

never to do so.
if

The French required at least ten ships, and

35,000 tons were to be the standard, France must be

authorized

capital ship limit of 350,000 tons.

a

As her

holiday began in 1915, she required permission to build in
1925.

Italian Senator Carlo Schanzer then briefly

summarized his country's willingness to accept the naval
holiday and

a

minimal capital ship ratio, subject to

equality with France."^
Hughes had little patience with de Bon.

When the

admiral refused to change his position the foil owing day

Hughes cabled Briand, then in London en route for France.
The Secretary of State reported the provisional naval

limitation agreement between the United Stares, Britain, and
Japan, based upon the original 5:5:3 proposals as modified
to include the Mutsu arrangements.

He explained that the

sett 1 ement was "dependent upon an appropriate agreement with

France and Italy with respect to their capital ships."*"'

"^Arthur Bal f our to Marquess Cur z on as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 561-62.
,

,

4th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
December 22 1921

*"cAB 30/9:
of Armament

,

,
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Hughes noted that the three major naval powers had accepted
the situation as it existed, rather than as
they desired it
to be.

They had scrapped 40% of their capital ship

strength, which, if applied to France, would reduce
her navy
to 102,000 tons.

He proposed instead to allow an increase

of the present strength of 164,000 tons of capital
ships to

an authorization of 175,000 tons.

Hughes then declared that

if "France desires a greater relative strength,

the obvious

answer is that this would be impossible of attainment."

If

there were no cuts, the Secretary noted, the American and

British Navies would outnumber the French by "more than 61."

He characterized the suggestion that France build 10

ships of more than 300,000 tons as raising "the greatest

difficulties," in fact precluding any capital ship
agreement.

Hughes obliquely referred to American financial

contributions to the French economy before requesting Briand
••70

to reconsider the French position.

The following day, at French request, the naval experts
met in the morning.

Admiral de Bon argued against the

American proposal to limit France to 175,000 tons with
respect to capital ships.

He complained about the

4th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
Also recorded in U.S. State
of Armament, December 22, 1921.
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament 446Balfour, in his report to the Cabinet, indicated
472.
Hughes was prepared to use "the financial screw." See
Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in Butler and
Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol
XIV, 562.
*^"CAB

30/9:

,

,
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artificiality of talking about tonnage limitation,
when
every nation would build the largest allowable
ships.

The

admiral then explained that the current French fleet
was

skewed by the experience of the war and repeated his
claim
that France needed more than five battleships.

Roosevelt

replied that the basis of calculation involved existing
capital ship strength rather than past policy, such as

Britain's Two Power Standard, or building plans, such as
Japan's progress toward

a

eight battle cruisers.

fleet of eight battleships and
Lee interjected that Britain could

not accept a weaker fleet with respect to France.

At 3:1

before the war, the current position in capital ships was
20:7,

reducing eventually to 15:5 under the Hughes'

proposals.

He sympathized, however, with the French desire

to calculate in numbers of ships rather than tonnage.

meeting ended with no satisfaction for the

The

French.*''^

The same day, Beatty fired his last salvo at the naval
hoi i day

•

The First Lord had returned to London in late

November to protect the Navy against the predatory advances
of the Geddes Committee.^

He wrote a memorandum to the

***Roosevelt ignored the fact that the British intended
to maintain a two power standard against Japan and France.

116/2149: Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon,
December 17, 1921.
^^^ADM

Last Naval Hero 311-12, notes that Beatty
wrote his mistress that he would be "'more use soothing
Lloyd George and keeping him straight' over the current Navy
Estimates than by remaining in Washington."
-'^Roskill,

,

384

Cabinet comparing the cost of

a ten

year holiday followed by

mass replacement with a gradual replacement program.

In

Beatty's estimation, the ten years' holiday would cost some
£20 millions more than a replacement program.

He estimated

that the naval holiday would increase the cost of the

unemployment dole by a further £20 millions.

The admiral

argued that the continuous building program would improve
the efficiency of the fleet with regard to personnel and

design.

He also declared that capital ships would thus keep

pace with aircraft and submarines.

stressing the economic value of

Beatty concluded by
steady building program.*^'

a

The Cabinet took no apparent notice of his arguments.

"'The following tables of capital ship strength reflect

Beatty
Original
1922-25:
1932-35
1933-36:
1934-37
1935-38:
1936-39

comparison
Britain

Modified

Britain

1922-251924-27
1925-28
1927-30
1928-31
1929-32
1930-33
1932-35

22 + 2 - 4 = 20

'

16
15

+
+
+
+
+
+

2

4
3

-

•

•

•
•
•

•
>
•

•

-

4
7

4

United States
=
=
=

3

-

3

=

2

-

=

1

-

3
1

20 + 2

*

1933-36
1934-37
1935-38
1936-39

22
20
17
16

-

-

2

+

20
17

18 +

16
16
15
15

16
16
16 + 2
15 + 1

17 + 2

16 +
16 +
15 +
15 +

2

-

2
2

-

1

-

+
+
+

4
3
3

--

--

--.

3
5

=

=

3
3

=

3

=

1

=

=

17

16
16
16
15
15

United States
=

20

20 + 1 - 1 = 20
20 + 1 - 4 = 17
-

17

2

-

3 =
2 =
3 =
2 =
1 =

16
16
15
15
15

18 +

2

17 + 2
17 + 1
17 + 1

15
15
15
15
15

+
+
+
+
+

2

--

--

--

-

-

•

2
2
2

1

-

-

•

-

-

•

3
2

=
=

1

=

3

=

2

2
2
2
1

=

=
=
=
=

Japan
10
10 + 2
10 + 2
10 + 2
10 + 1

-

2

=

-

2
2

=

-

=

10
10
10
10

-

2

=

9

1

-

1

=

9

1

=

10

]_

=

10

=
=

9

=
=

9
9
9

=

9

9

+

=

Japan

17

10 + 1

-

10 + 1

-

10 + 1

-

17
17
15
15

15
15
15
15

9 + 1
9 + 1
9 + 1
9 + 1
9 + 1

-

-

2

1
1
1
1

=

9

116/2149: Admiralty Memorandum, "Proposals for a
Modified Building Holiday", December 17, 1921.
*^^ADM
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On December 18th, the BNSW reviewed the situation
optimistically.
They expected the United States to approach

Britain with a request to allow an increase in the French
capital ship authorization to 210,000 tons (six ships).

They believed the Cabinet would accept the adjustment in
order to save the agreement and therefore decided to seek

recompense.

In their view,

the tonnage method of

calculating capital ship strength was severely flawed and
should be replaced by numbers of ships,

a

position

apparently shared by the American naval experts.*''

substitution of

a

The

numbers basis of limitation instead of

aggregate tonnage for capital ships would have the effect of
allowing Britain to build the 48,000 ton ships desired by
the Royal Navy.

The meeting ended with the rosy view that

the claim of the naval staff was logical and that "Mr.

Balfour can see it through and enable us to retrieve our
'77

lost position."*

The B.E.D. met for the fourteenth time on Monday

morning, December 19th.

Lee raised the issue of submarines,

suggesting that Britain request the opportunity to present

Sprouts, New Order 188, quotes the American naval
experts as agreeing "that it would be a good thing for
England to make a 'beau-geste' and allow France six
battleships" but deciding to "stand by our original
percentage basis and let suggested modifications come from
some other Power."
,

116/2149: BNSW Memorandum, "French Ration of
Capital Ships", December 18, 1921.
-^^ADM

386

the case for abolition in open session, if possible within

the week.

drafted

a

Geddes seconded Lee's proposal, whereupon Balfour
note to Hughes to that effect.

During the

meeting, the B.E.D. learned that the Associated Press was

reporting from Paris that Briand had instructed Albert
Sarrault, his Colonial Minister, to accept the American
naval program."'

This information completely undercut the

intention of the BNSW to trade an increase in capital ship

strength for France in return for the substitution of
numbers basis for naval

1

a

imitation

That afternoon, Balfour met with Hughes to discuss the

submarine question.

The Secretary of State informed the

Lord President that he personally supported the abolition of

submarines, but that his naval advisors opposed the idea.
An Advisory Body of the American delegation, according to
Hughes,' regarded the submarine as "the only defensive

instrument which
could employ."

"79

a

weak Power with an extensive seaboard

He further expected that Japan, France,

and Italy would oppose abol i tion
the Conference.

,

as we 1

1

as nations outside

Hughes suggested that rather than extending

the ratio system to submarines he desired to institute a

178

CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 14th Conference, December 19, 1921.

30/la: B.E.D. 15th Conference, Appendix II,
December 20, 1921. Also see Arthur Balfour to Marquess
Curzon, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on British
Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 567-68.
-^'CAB

,
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universal ceiling of about 40,000 tons per nation, but

worried that premature efforts by Britain would appear
selfinterested and prevent any limitation, such as
against misuse.

Balfour withheld

a

a

resolution

general reply, but

observed that the British naval experts "did not regard
submarines as the powerful defensive weapon which popular
fancy painted them."*^The B.E.D. met again the next day, December 20th.

Balfour opened the meeting by reporting the results of

morning session of the Subcommittee of Fifteen.

a

Hughes had

read his December 16th appeal to the French Government to

accept a ratio of 1.75 with respect to the 5:5:3 capital
ship authorizations for America, Britain, and Japan, and the

response from Briand.

After claiming that "the

preoccupation of France is not the offensive point of view,
but uniquely defensive," Briand had agreed to instruct his

delegation to cooperate with respect to capital ships but
that such cooperation did not extend to auxiliary craft
(light cruisers, torpedo-boats, and submarines), which

defended the vital interests of France.

Hughes had

30/la: B.E.D. 15th Conference, Appendix II,
December 20, 1921.
*^'CAB

"*CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 15th Conference, Appendix I,
December 20, 1921. Also recorded in CAB 30/9: 4th Meeting
of the Committee on Limitation of Armament, December 22,
1921; U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limi tation of

Armament

446-472.
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privately indicated to Balfour that the French delegation
was "probably in the embarrassing position
of receiving

conflicting instruction from M. Briand in London and
from
the

French Admiralty in Paris."

Balfour had then arranged

with Hughes to move the issue to the full Committee on the

Limitation of Armament.

Chatfield urged the group not to

allow the French an increase in capital ship tonnage.

The

B.E.D. then debated the proper forum for the pursuit of the

submarine question.

After much discussion, Balfour

convinced his colleagues to make the case at committee
level, accept a compromise (with prior agreement from

Hughes), and then make a public statement at
session.-^'

a

plenary

He then relayed this intention to the Cabinet.

On the morning of December 22nd, the fourth session of
the Committee on Limitation of Armament began with a summary
of the naval

limitation discussions.

Hughes announced the

tentative naval limitation agreement: 5:5:3 capital ship
ratio, including the Mutsu and four compensatory ships;

35,000 ton maximum displacement for replacement capital
ships; and status quo in the Pacific with regard to

fortifications and bases; all arrangements remaining
"dependent upon

182

a

suitable arrangement with France and

CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 15th Conference, December 20, 1921.

Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 569.
•'^Arthur Balfour to

,
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Italy."

Hughes then summarized the discussion of the

Subcommittee of Fifteen on December 15th, in which
Admiral
de Bon had demanded for France an allocation of
350,000 tons
of capital

ships.

The chairman next presented his letter of

December 16th to Briand, which had been sent with the

knowledge of the French delegation.

Hughes subsequently

read Briand's reply, which accepted the proposed ratio of
1.75 for capital ships, but not for auxiliary craft, and

then mentioned Admiral de Bon's continued desire to increase
the French allocation to six capital ships or to arrange

a

settlement with respect to auxiliary vessels prior to
agreeing to a capital ship understanding.

He concluded by

asking the French delegation to explain their position to
the

f ul

1

commit tee.''^'^

De Bon again pled special consideration: other nations

had increased their naval strength in war, while France had

France willingly accepted, according to the admiral,

not.

limit of

ships, her present strength, and desired

7

a

a

program of gradual replacement, in accordance with the
schedule proposed by Hughes.

The French delegation, in

keeping with instructions from their government, had agreed
to the enormous concession of a limit of five capital ships.

Such

a

strength left her, from

a

naval perspective.
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"practically disarmed/' while with six ships she "could
still create a living organization."

This reduction

mandated retention of greater numbers of light craft and
submarines.

The British Empire question in regard to

abolition of the submarine took precedence, in de Bon's
view, as it would inform general progress.

In response to a

comment by Hughes that U.S. proposals had not limited
numbers, only maximum size of vessels and maximum aggregate
tonnage, the French admiral stated that smaller capital

ships were foolish.

If

France should build, her battleships

would displace the full 35,000 tons, and the only question
concerned her total tonnage: 175,000 or 210,000 tons.

He

suggested that the Conference should address the future of
submarines.

The chairman held that question for the

afternoon session."'
Later that day, in the Columbus Room of the Pan

American Building, the Committee on Limitation of Armament
resumed discussion with regard to restrictions on the use of
submarines.

Lord Lee summarized the existing position:

agreement on capital ships without any commitments on

smaller vessels.

He then presented a comparison, by nation,

of the existing aggregate submarine tonnages with the

American proposals and described as "very strange" the idea
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that a Conference on limitation would allow
increases

Furthermore, he noted, maritime nations would be
forced to
increase their anti-submarine capacities. On behalf of

the

B.E.D., Lee proposed "total and final abolition."

Submarines, the First Sea Lord claimed, had little value
against legitimate naval targets, as proved by recent
experience.

They worked only against merchant ships,

against which they were dreadfully effective.

Lee noted

that Britain had been reduced to a mere seven weeks' supply
of

food and pointed out that other nations would have been

affected by British capitulation.

He indicated that Britain

would be willing to abolish her large and efficient

submarine fleet.

If,

as he suspected,

other powers would

reject abolition, then Britain would not overthrow the
capital ship agreement, but would welcome suggestions for
•

07

submarine reduction.
The other delegates quickly confirmed Lee's suspicion
that they would not support abolition.

Albert Sarrault answered for France.

Colonial Minister
He claimed submarines

were both legitimate and necessary, and further argued

Lee presented the following figures:
Britain Japan
America
32,200
80,500
Existing Tonnage 83,500
54,000
Hughes' Proposal
90,000
90,000
21,800
6,500
Permitted Growth
9,500

France
28,360

Italy
18,250
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against any tonnage limitations.

Sarrault reiterated the

French opposition to linking submarine allowances
to

proportion of capital ship strength.

a

Schanzer emphasized

the difficulty of settling the future of submarines
due to
the absence of other powers.

abolition.

Hanihara also opposed

Hughes sought to emphasize the one point of

agreement within the Committee, opposition to illegal use of
submarines.
of

He then shared with the delegates the findings

the technical commission appointed by President Harding.

The Advisory Committee found submarines to have legitimate

naval functions

despi te the reputation of the weapon being

,

tarnished by flagrant misuse in the recent conflict.
Hughes

'

advisors therefore recommended that "unl imi ted

warfare by submarines on commerce shoul d be out 1 awed
opposing any limitation in size.

,

"

whi

1

After his presentation,

the committee adjourned until the next day.

On December 23rd, the Committee on Limitation of

Armament met for the sixth time

,

De Bon took issue with

Lee's position that submarines had little value against

warships

He ment i oned their effect on fleet operations

.

their ability to def end enc 1 osed areas
as scouts

Then

.

,

,

and their functions

almost as if deliberately attempting to

bait the British representatives, de Bon stated that the
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submarine "has shown itself especially efficient against
the
merchant marine." The admiral urged the need to
restrict
illegal submarine activities, while emphasizing the scope

remaining for legitimate commerce destruction.

He opposed

any limitation on the size of individual submarines, while

claiming that "90,000 tons is the absolute minimum for all
the navies who may want to have

a

submarine force."

Balfour, in reply, returned to Lee's point that the primary

purpose of submarines was the eradication of maritime trade.
He asserted that "f rom Admi ral de Bon

*

s

own speech it is

clear that the main object they serve is the destruction of

commerce."
De Bon,

Balfour then urged the committee to ban the sub.

in a rather strange volte-face, claimed he had not

supported submarine activity against merchant marine, but
merely cited German usage.
adjourned.

On that note, the meeting

'39

The foil owing day

Armament met again

.

,

the Committee on Limitation of

Sarraul t ampl if ied Schanzer

'

s

point

that other nations would not be limited by a decision to

abolish submarines taken by the Conference.

He suggested a

general conference of all nations at which more effective

decisions might be reached.

Balfour replied.

France had

stopped all work on the limitation of land armaments by her
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declaration of danger.
vast submarine fleet.
the threat.

Now she proposed a sea policy of

a

The Lord President sought to identify

He pointed to a resurgent Germany, with land

forces and submarines.

He then suggested that submarines

would be useless as a means to protect merchant trade and
could serve little purpose beyond attacking Britain.

While

conceding that those nations present at the Conference could
not legislate for the rest of the world, Balfour predicted
that the moral example of five major powers abolishing subs

would influence others.

He placed into record a statement

from the B.E.D. that "the use of submarines, whilst of small

value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which
are inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of

humanity."

Hughes suggested abolition should be abandoned

as hopeless, due to technical disagreement as to the value
of submarines,

and limits (such as numbers, tonnage, and

usage) considered.

The Secretary of State concluded by

suggesting 60,000 tons for the United States and Britain,
with others nations retaining the status quo (according to
his figures: Japan, 31,452 tons; France, 31,391 tons; and
Italy, 21,000 tons).-'°

Later on December 24th, the full arms limitation

committee resumed its discussions.

Balfour promptly
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accepted Hughes' latest proposals.
remained adamantly opposed.

De Bon, however,

He stated that

a

force of 90

boats (each about 1000 tons) allowed 15 to 20 units for
action, which he called "a minimum limit."

Further

limitation he described as "equivalent to abolishing the
whole French program."

De Bon indicated that the French

delegation could not accept Hughes* figures and would have
to refer them to their government.

Schanzer stated Italy's

willingness to accept virtually allotment of submarine
tonnage that met her requirement for naval parity with
France.

Hanihara rejected the newest proposal, which would

limit Japan to 31,000 tons.

He stated Japan needed 54,000

tons, which he claimed represented a minimum figure for

actual defensive requirements.*'*

Hughes then scheduled

a

delay of three days to allow the French delegation to await

instructions from Paris.
The BNSW view of submarine warfare during the

Conference remained generally consistent with earlier

Admiralty analysis.

Commander J.G. Bower, of the Admiralty

*'*Hanihara may well have been attempting to apply to
submarine strengths the 5:5:3 ratio, under which the figure
of 54,000 tons reflected Japan's proportion of the original
If this
proposal of 90,000 tons for the United States.
reading is correct, he would have settled for 36,000 tons
against 60,000 for Britain and America.
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Plans Division, argued that the laws of war were useless as
a

check to submarines.

Failing abolition, Britain could not

agree to any limitation on auxiliary craft.

He also

admitted arguments against abolition: Britain was five years
in advance of other nations, such as Italy and France, whose

submarine forces were both small and inefficient.
forces,

Submarine

furthermore, lost much of their effectiveness

without fleet support, an arena in which only the United
States could compete with Britain.''"

Beatty advised

Chatfield that if abolition failed, he should attempt to
limit aggregate submarine tonnage rather than the size of

individual ships.

possibility of

a

The First Sea Lord sought to reduce the
large fleet of small submarines based near

the English Channel, where restrictions on si2e--and hence

range--would have only minor impact.*'"

By the end of the

month, with the delegates suggesting that usage might be the
only aspect of submarine warfare subject to

BNSW prepared

a

1

imitation

,

the

position paper on the rules of submarine

engagements against merchant shipping.

The memorandum

advocated "support for existing rul es of visit and search
against submarines," along with the requirement to place
crews and passengers in a place of safety prior to sinking

-%DM 116/2149: BNSW Memorandum, "Submarines", December
4,

1921.
^'"ADM

1921.

1/8615/207: Admiralty telegram, December 23,
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vessels carrying contraband.

These strictures, if followed

in wartime, would have greatly reduced the effectiveness
of

submarines.

The BNSW believed, however, that

"the adoption

of any such rules would not constitute adequate safeguard"

and that the B.E.D. should reserve the right, as long as

submarines existed, to retain a free hand against

them.-'^

The Committee on Limitation of Armament convened its

ninth session on the morning of December 28th.

Sarrault

explained that his government could not accept the latest
proposals from America.

He stated they had concluded that:

it is impossible to accept a limitation below that
of 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and 90,000
tons for submarines, without imperiling the vital
interests of the country and of .^^ ts col onies and
the safety of their naval life.*'"

Sarrault claimed that France needed these types of ships
"for the protection of her territory," perhaps in one

1

ast

effort to extract the military guarantee to which Briand had
'

made reference in late November.

*

Q7

Balfour attacked the

116/2149: BNSW Memorandum, "Rules for Submarine
Warfare against Merchant Shipping", December 27, 1921.
^''ADM
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French increase in submarine strength.

He asked how "a

fleet of capital ships limited to 175,000 tons required

90,000 tons of submarines to scout for it and protect it?"

He declared that such

a

submarine force was "intended to

destroy commerce" and promised to place the issue publicly
before the full Conference.

Balfour concluded by stating

that a fleet of 90,000 tons of submarines would cause

Britain to reserve "the full right to build any auxiliary
craft which she considered necessary to deal with the
situation."-'

This exchange, which reflected the animus

between France and England following Versailles, marked the
final breakdown of negotiations to extend the 5:5:3 ratio to

auxiliary vessels.
The Committee on Limitation of Armament then turned its

attention to establishing
and cruisers.

a

division between capital ships

At the end of the morning session on December

28th, Hughes offered the following resolution:

No ship of war other than a capital ship or
aircraft carrier hereafter built shall exceed a
total tonnage displacement of 10,000 tons and no
guns shall be carried by any si^ph ship with a
caliber in excess of 8 inches.*"
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Lee agreed with the need for an upper limit to cruisers
lest
"it would be possible to build so-called light
cruisers

which would be capital ships in disguise," but he worried
that Hughes'

formula would permit

a

carrier to mount heavy

guns, becoming, in his words, "a capital ship with the

addition of flying appliances."
of Hughes'

He suggested

a

modification

resolution to preclude aircraft carriers from

carrying guns greater than eight inches."^

That afternoon,

De Bon questioned size limitation of cruisers, as he felt

limitation of armament defined the class.

After some

further discussion, the Committee accepted, for all

practical purposes, the limits of 10,000 tons and 8-inch
guns for cruisers.
That same afternoon, Hughes presented proposals for the
lim.itation of aircraft carriers.

He started with the

aggregate tonnage originally presented (80,000 tons for the

United States and Britain, with 48,000 tons for Japan) and
extended the capital ship ratios to France and Italy (28,000
tons each)

.

The Secretary avoided the presentation of a

detailed replacement program.

He recommended a size limit
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of

27,000 tons per vessel, which would carry guns not to

exceed eight inches.

Lee's suggestion limiting capital ship

armament to 16-inch guns was unanimously approved.^"
This discussion resumed during the 14th session of the
full disarmament committee on December 30th.

Acton

complained that the allowance of 28,000 tons would allow
Italy only a single aircraft carrier, which would inevitably

require refit and repair.

He requested that the Italian

allowance be increased to 54,000 tons to allow for
carrier.

second

a

Lee expressed sympathy for this position, and then

explained his view of the aircraft carrier as
weapon."

a

"fleet

He asserted that "the number of airplane carriers

should be adequate and proportionate to the size of the

Britain had five carriers, four of which, in

fleet."''

Lee's view, required replacement.

Since submarines had not

been limited, the First Lord stated that "it would be

impossible to reduce the number of airplane carriers for
fleet service."

He further indicated that "the tonnage laid

down in the original American proposals was inadequate."

De

Bon estimated that France required 60,000 tons, which would

10th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
Also recorded in U.S. State
of Armament, December 28, 1921.
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament 590^•^CAB

30/9:

,

602.

30/10: 14th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, December 30, 1921. Also recorded in
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limi tation of
Armament 670-682.
^'-CAB

,

401

provide three small aircraft carriers.

Kato similarly

rejected the proposed Japanese allowance of 48,000
tons as

providing a carrier and a half.

He expressed Japan's desire

for three full-sized carriers, or a total of 81,000
tons.

Hughes then submitted

a

new proposal, allowing the United

States and Great Britain 135,000 tons

carriers at 27,000

(5

tons), Japan 81,000 tons, and France and Italy 60,000 tons,
to which all present assented.

The Secretary of State then

suggested that due to the experimental nature of the
aircraft carriers, as Lee had noted, they might be replaced
at whatever interval each government found appropriate.^'^

The other delegates promptly agreed.

The full committee

then turned over the responsibility of drafting the final
naval limitation agreement to the technical subcommittee.^^'
The aircraft carrier agreement underwent further

modifications at the hands of the naval experts.

The

American delegation desired to convert two partially built
battle cruisers into aire raft carriers, but could not reduce
their designed displacement
33,000 tons.

(

43 , 500 tons

)

to

1

ess than

During the first week of January, they

The free repl acement cl ause extended onl y to those
aircraft carriers designated as experimental, defined as
those existing or under construction before November 12,
See ADM 1/8615/207: BNSW Memorandum, December 30,
1921.
1921.
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requested permission to produce two carriers of this size,
while not increasing their aggregate carrier tonnage/^^

The

Japanese supported this request, as they desired to

transform two of their battleships into carriers.

The

B.E.D. extracted two concessions in return for their

agreement.

First, the size exemption was extended to

include any of the signatories and, more importantly, ships
built purposefully as aircraft carriers, to enable the

Admiralty to use materials collected for two of the superHoods toward new ships.

Second, the B.E.D. wanted

permission to add anti-torpedo bulges up to 3,000 tons
displ acement to the battle cruiser Renown

,

whose sister ship

Repul se had already been thus altered, and such bulging

became

a

general provision

The cumulative effect of the various exceptions and

exemptions to Hughes

'

original proposals went far to

ameliorate the B.E.D.'s concerns with the ten years' naval

building holiday.

The Mutsu arrangements entitled Britain

to construct two new capital ships of 35,000 tons

displacement.

The aircraft carrier agreement, which allowed

the participants to replace existing warships at their own

this time, work on the draft naval agreement was
See CAB 30/la:
"in an advanced state," according to Lee.
B.E.D. 17th Conference, January 2nd, 1922.
^°*By

30/la: B.E.D. 21st Conference, January 9th,^^1921;
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^•'CAB

403

discretion, authorized Britain to construct five additional

major vessels, two of 33,000 tons displacement each, for
total of 135,000 tons.

a

The addition of anti-torpedo bulges

offered the opport^onity for further construction, which
could involve capital ships, while no limits were placed on
the production of auxiliary vessels.

The Admiralty

therefore had vast scope to employ Britain's major

shipbuilding firms during the so-called holiday.

When H.W. Malkin of the Foreign Office Section asked on
January 6th "whether, in the draft Naval Treaty, any mention

should be made of the ten years' holiday," the B.E.D.

decided that the issue was no

1

onger very important and

should be left to the Americans.
The American delegation made a final effort to secure

limitation of the submarine.
former Secretary of State

,

On December 28th, Elihu Root,

gave practical effect to the

recommendation of the Advisory Committee of the United
States when he delivered to the Committee on Limitation of

Armament a series of resolutions restricting submarine
attacks on merchant shipping.

Root hoped to mobilize world

opinion and in that manner influence belligerent
governments.

His first resolution stated that the signatory

powers recognized certain of the existing laws of war:

submarines were required to stop and search merchant vessels

^•^CAB

30/la: B.E.D.
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before capture or even attack; they were likewise required
to place crews and passengers in a place of safety before

destruction; and when these conditions could not be met,

submarines were required to desist from attack.

His second

resolution stated the signatory powers recognized "the
practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce

destroyers" without violating the laws of war and hoped for
future universal prohibitions against unauthorized use.
Root

'

s

thi rd resolution stated that the signatory powers

would try violators as pirates.
The foil owing morning

,

*^^'

when the Committee resumed its

discussions, the delegates took

a

remarkably similar line.

Bal f our praised the spirit of the Root Resolutions but

suggested
text

,

a

team of lawyers might profitably review the

eliciting concurrence

f

rom around the tabl e

.

Root

opposed this suggestion vigorously, albeit with humor:
It would be far from his thought to say anything
derogatory about the members of the profession of

which he had been a humble member for more years
They were the salt of
that he cared to remember.
the earth; they were the noblest work of God; they
were superior in intellect and authority to all
But both this Conferencp
other people whatsoever.
and his life were approaching their termination.^*
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Root implored the Committee to deal directly with his

proposal s
The reaction of the British delegation, although

containing certain reservations, was generally favorable.
The full B.E.D. first considered the resolutions on December
31st, 1921.

Geddes explained that the technical

subcommittee had already modified Root's first resolution
slightly where it described the requirement of

a

blockading

vessel to search a merchant ship, by removing any possible

restriction of the search to the immediate vicinity of the
confrontation, in order to accommodate British blockade
practices.

He then explained that "there was no agreed part

of international

law which covered the question of torpedoes

fired from a submarine at a ship with passengers on board

which would not stop."^**

By codifying the absolute

requirement for submarines to comply with the same

restrictions as surface ships (which Germany had found an
impossibility), the Conference would drastically reduce the
operational effectiveness of submarines against merchant
shipping, at least for governments that chose to adhere to

international law.

Chatfield then voiced his opposition to

the third resolution.

He worried about the possibility of

a

naval officer being ordered to conduct unl imited submarine

warfare and then facing the choice of "being shot by his own

^"CAB 30/la:

16th B.E.D. Conference, December 31, 1921.
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country for disobedience or shot by another for breaking

international law."

He suggested that "it was rather heads

of state than their tools who should be tried and
2*

punished."^* 2

It was probably this concern for the fate of

naval officers that caused the BNSW, two days earlier, to

describe the Root Resolutions in

a

draft letter for the

Foreign Secretary as "generally sound," but "too vague.
Balfour's consistent support
him, at Root's behest,
4th,

""^

for the Root Resolutions led

to call upon Baron Kato on January

1922, in order to derail any attempts to link the anti-

submarine clauses with limitations on the arming of merchant
Hankey subsequently noted that Balfour "shared Mr.

ships.

Root's desire for passage of the submarine resolutions
The Committee on Limitation of Armament began

discussion of the Root Resolutions on January 5th.
raised

a

a

key

Schanzer

series of questions with regard to the right of

merchantman to carry defensive armament

,

a

which Hughes skated

over by declaring that:
all the representatives present accepted the
proposition that merchant vessels--a category well
known--stood where they were under the law, and
that this Resolution defined the duties of

^*^CAB

30/la: 16th B.E.D. Conference, December 31, 1921.

^^^ADM

116/2149: Draft letter to Curzon, December 29,

1921.
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submarines with respect to them.^"

After that fine piece of obfuscation, the Committee
assented
to Root's first resolution.

This consensus relieved the

B.E.D.'s concern over maintaining Britain's right to the use
of defensively armed merchant ships

(DAMS).^*^

Schanzer then

raised the question as to the legality of a submarine

operating against
legal

(i.e.,

a

merchant vessel attempting to run

effective) blockade.

a

Balfour ridiculed the

notion that submarines could not themselves make

a

blockade

effective but could legally attack merchant vessels

attempting to run a blockade made legal by the presence of
surface warships.

The Committee then accepted Root's

resolution against "the use of submarines as commerce

destroyers" both as binding among themselves and as an

invitation to other nations, and adjourned.
On January 6th, the Committee on Limitation of

Armament finished its consideration of the Root Resolutions.
Schanzer again voiced

a

concern, this time as to whether

submarine officers were not being subjected to greater

^"CAB 30/10: 15th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, January 5, 1922. Also recorded in
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limitation of
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,
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hazards than the officers of surface ships in the commission
of like acts.

Hughes then modified Root's original proposal

to subject any violator of the laws of war to trial for

piracy, whereupon the Committee gave its assent/*'

Balfour

later admitted the clause "caused me some anxiety," but

concurred in the belief that "we may confidently expect that
[as far as violators go] neither the Government nor sailors

will be British.""*^

The spirit of Root's original

res o 1 ut ions thus emerged from the Committee onl y

s

1

ight

1

altered, and presented to any nation desirous of adhering to
the

1

aws of war a

f

ormidabl e obstacl e to the use of

submarines against sea-borne commerce
On February

1

,

1922

,

Char 1 es Evans Hughes convened the

fifth plenary session of the Washington Conference.

discussion concerning China

,

After

a

the Secretary of State

announced that the Committee on Limitation of Armament had
reached agreement on

a

naval treaty.

Hughes dwelt

extensivel y on the simi 1 arities between the final treaty and
the original proposals.

He informed the Conference of the

limitations placed upon new capital ships: displacements not
to exceed 35,000 tons and main guns not to exceed sixteen

^'TAB 30/10: 16th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, January 6, 1922. Also recorded in
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limitation of

Armament

,

714-740.

"^Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George, January 13,
British
1922, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV, 598-601.
,
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inches.

He explained that the Treaty identified which

vessels each country would initially retain: for the United
States, 18 ships with an aggregate displacement of 500,650
tons;

for Britain,

22 ships of

658,450 tons; for Japan, 10

ships of 301,320 tons; for France, 10 ships of 221,170 tons;
and for Italy, 10 ships of 182,800 tons.

The final

agreement differed from the original American scheme with
respect to capital ship provisions in two minor regards:
first,

the inclusion of France and Italy; and second,

Japan's retention of the new battleship Mutsu

.

America

would be allowed to complete two new ships of the West

Virginia class and then scrap two older vessels presently
retained, while Britain would be allowed to build two new
ships not to exceed 35,000 tons each and then scrap four

older vessels.

Hughes also provided details of scrapping

and replacement procedures.

Hughes then addressed the subject of aircraft carriers
The Treaty embodied the spirit of the

and their limitation.

proposals with regard to this class of vessel, limited to

a

maximum size of 27,000 tons displacement--each power could
build two carriers of not more than 33,000 tons--and main
guns not to exceed eight inches.

Britain and the United

States received an allotment of 135,000 tons; Japan, 81,000

30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament 182-276; for the treaty, see ibid.
^^7-^-1 fill; Ruell
Washington Conference 371-91.
^^'CAB

,

,

,
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tons;

and France and Italy, 60,000 tons each.

All existing

vessels were categorized as experimental and could be

replaced at any time.^^Hughes glossed over the far greater difference between
the treaty and his proposals with respect to limitations

upon auxiliary combatant craft.

He briefly acknowledged

that "the provisions relating to auxiliary craft contained
in the proposal made on behalf of the American government

were not carried into the final agreement."

He hurried on

to note that these ships were limited to a maximum size of

10,000 tons and main guns of eight inches.

Hughes failed to

explain why the Conference powers placed no limit on their

holdings of cruisers

,

destroyers

,

or submarines

222

The Secretary of State then rel ayed the final two major

provisions of the new treaty.

First, the United States,

Britain, and Japan agreed to maintain the status quo as of

February 1922, with certain limited exceptions, with regard
to the fortification of their Pacific possessions.

Second,

the Treaty would remain in force through December 31, 1936,

and thereafter until two years beyond notice of denunciation
by one of the contracting parties.

Hughes concluded his

30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament 182-276.
^^-CAB

,

30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922.
the
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on
^^^CAB

Limitation of Armament, 182-276
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presentation by remarking that the agreement would diminish
"the burdens of naval armaments," end "the race in

competition of naval armaments," and leave "the relative
security of the great naval Powers unimpai red
Root then introduced

a

"^^^
.

companion treaty based upon

resolutions by the Committee on Limitation of Armament from
January 5th, 6th, and 7th condemning certain practices in
the late war.

warfare.

This treaty focused primarily upon submarine

Article

I

required submarines to stop and search

merchant vessels before seizure.

further requi red

It

submarines, as an absolute prerequisite to sinking captured
vessels, to place crew members and passengers in

safety-- life boats not constituting

a

a

place of

sufficient haven.

The

subsequent articles invited other nations to accept these
conditions as

1

aws of maritime warfare and to treat

transgressors as violators of the laws of war (i.e., as
pirates

.'^^^^

)

The results of the Washington Naval Conference

completely satisfied neither the British Cabinet nor the
Admiralty.

The limitations on capital strength and future

construction provided considerable relief to the beleaguered

^"CAB 30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament 182-276.
,

30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, 182-276.
^^*CAB
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Exchequer, but Beatty and his colleagues would have far

preferred the slow and steady approach to the ten years'
naval holiday.

The British entitlement to construct two new

battleships, which increased the relative strength of the
fleet and provided British naval construction firms with

much-needed employment, would draw grudging assent from the
Cabinet.

These differences of opinion reflected the

divergent evaluations of the capital ship as seen from

Westminster and Whitehall.

Both statesmen and sailors,

meanwhile, regretted the B.E.D.'s failure to secure the

abolition of the submarine.
The results of the Washington Conference, nonetheless,

protected British national security aims with remarkable
Balfour, in his final appreciation of the

effectiveness.

Conference, wrote to the Prime Minister that:
in all essentials the safeguards of our Naval
position. .have been fully secured. Nor has this
result been achieved at the cost of any other
The financial burdens of the great Naval
nation.
Powers have been alleviated with no in jurjj. to
national honor or diminution of security.
.

The Anglo- Japanese Alliance became

a

four power treaty

involving the United States and France, and the

transformation took place in such a manner so as not to

as recorded in
Documents on British Foreign Poli cy, 1st

'^^Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George,

Butler and Bury,
Series, Vol XIV, 643-45.
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offend Japan.

Britain retained both the right of blockade

and the right to fortify Singapore, while neither the United

States nor Japan would establish new bases in the Pacific.
The treaty based on the Root Resolutions offered protection

against unlimited submarine warfare from any signatory

willing to honor its commitments.

Furthermore, French

intransigence over the submarine issue influenced the

American delegation to accept the British arguments against
the limitation of cruisers and destroyers without engaging
in a competition for superiority in auxiliary combatant

On the importance of anti-submarine capabilities, at

craft.
least,

the British naval community shared a common

viewpoint.

From the perspective of the supporters of the

capital ship, there were two positive aspects of the 5:5:3
First, the new rules created a relatively level

ratio.

playing field on which Britain would not have to fear

overwhelming competition based on unmatchable finances.

In

the words of Britain's Director of Naval Construction:

Naval Architects should welcome the new rules, as
they are really comparable to the rule for racing
Certain limitations are laid down and it
yachts.
^^'British Ambassador to Japan Sir Charles Eliot wrote
to the Foreign Office on January 7, 1922: "Minister for

Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that Japanese
government were on the whole satisfied with results of
Washington conference so far. They regretted termination of
the Anglo- Japanese alliance but recognized that a good
understanding with America was essential and would not have
been possible had bilateral agreement continued." See Sir
C. Eliot to Sir E Crowe, as recorded in Butler and Bury,
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series, Vol XIV,
588-589
,

.
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is the Naval Architect's work to produce the best

results subject to those limitations, and the best
designer will produce the best ship. ^'
And,

for the morale of the senior service and its partisans,

the Royal Navy, with its existing margin of superiority in

capital ship numbers and aggregate tonnage, avoided manifest

surrender of its maritime supremacy for the remainder of the
decade

^^'D'Eyncourt MSS 40: D'Eyncourt Note,

July

4,

1922.

CONCLUSION

British participation in the Washington Naval

Conference of 1921-1922 reflected

a

sometimes contradictory influences.

number of competing and
The most venerable of

these, undoubtedly, was the British tradition of maritime

supremacy.

The Great War, however, exposed cracks in the

edifice of Churchill, Fisher, and Mahan.

More importantly,

the experiences of the war discernibly weakened the union of

frocks and pea coats.

Both groups perceived the challenge

of emerging technologies to the dominance of the capital

ship, but while the politicians, particularly Cabinet

members familiar with the full details of the 1917 U-boat
campaign, focused on the potential threat of the submarine
and,

to a lesser degree,

the airplane, the admirals looked

with complete confidence to countermeasures such as antitorpedo bulges, ASDIC, and depth charges.

Nonetheless, the British tradition of command of the
sea, despite its battering in the Mediterranean and North
Sea, was not so dilapidated as to have completely lost its

support in either Whitehall or Westminster.

All respectable

legislators understood the need to protect Britain's

maritime commerce.

Furthermore, both the voting public and

the Conservative backbenchers, swept to Parliament in the

Coupon election of 1918 and ably represented by Walter Long,

generally accepted the opinion of Jellicoe and Beatty that
force
the capital ship still constituted the dominant

416

afloat.

Thus,

the prime minister proved unwilling to risk

the political consequences of disowning the One Power

standard even as he established the Bonar Law Enquiry.
This loss of faith by leading members of the

Ll

oyd

George ministry would not have mattered except for two
independent circumstances.

First,

to compete for command of the seas.

the United States aimed

Before and during the

Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson and his

representatives repeatedly threatened to build the "world's
greatest navy."

The Cecil-House compromise of 1919 left

intact the 1916 building program of the United States Navy.
The First Lord warned the Cabinet in October 1919 that

Britain needed either to induce the Uni ted States to abate
the 1916 program or to commence capital ship construction in

order to avoid the sacrifice of sea supremacy,

a

warning

repeated throughout 19 20
The other factor that bore heavily on the British

willingness to come to Washington was the condition of His

Majesty's Exchequer.

Britain saw her income from both

shipping and overseas markets decline significantly during
the conflict.

The war increased the national debt to an

alarming degree, and many British loans, particularly those
to Russia,

appeared irrecoverable.

The United States,

however, showed no inclination to forgive its loans to
Britain.

The Committee on National Expenditure, or "the

which
Geddes axe," espoused classical economic theory,
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called for reduced government spending, and Chancellor

Austen Chamberlain found the service estimates the most
fertile field for reductions.

The Imperial Conference of

1921 revealed the Dominions' unwillingness to assume

a

significant share of the burden of imperial defense.

From 1919 to 1921, the Cabinet and the Admiralty shared
a

willingness to negotiate

with the United States.

a

naval arms limitation agreement

Both groups shared the opinion that

the possibility of war with the United States ranged from

remote to non-existent.

The Cabinet hoped to avoid spending

money on the construction of capital ships

,

the value of

which appeared uncertain, while the Admiralty understood the
Cabinet's uncertainty and feared the loss of parity, let
alone supremacy.

To be certain, both groups desired through

the negotiating process to retain supremacy.

simply valued that goal more highly.
of the Paris Peace Conference,

The Admiralty

After the conclusion

however, the paralysis of the

Wilson administration precluded any serious discussion of
naval disarmament.

Only the inauguration of President

Harding offered the Lloyd George government the chance to
make a deal
The decision of the Cabinet to send Balfour to

Washington reflected concern for the national treasury, fear
of the loss of naval supremacy,

and apprehension that

of
capital ships did not represent the wisest allocation

scarce resources.

The Cabinet revealed its greater concern

418

for Britain's anti-submarine defenses during the Conference

by confirming Balfour's acceptance of Hughes' capital ship

reduction proposals; directing Balfour to accept the ten
years' holiday for capital ships, over strenuous objections

from the B.E.D. and the Admiralty; repeatedly instructing

Balfour to seek the abolition of submarines; and refusing to
permit any limitation of Britain's auxiliary craft.

The

Lloyd George ministry did not believe that capital ships

provided an adequate safeguard against the menace

submarine warfare against merchant shipping.

of
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